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Summary
Austria was the scene of some of the more ferocious posturing between East 
and West during the Cold War. This thesis summarises British interests 
regarding Austria and recovers the chronology of important events, beginning 
with the 1943 Moscow Declaration. This identified Austria as a victim of Nazi 
Germany and provided for her to be treated as liberated rather than 
conquered. The narrative pauses to examine significant events and issues as 
they arose. While not concentrating exclusively on negotiations toward an 
Austrian State Treaty, the narrative keeps track of this important diplomatic 
exercise. The behaviour of the Western Allies and the USSR in Austria is 
examined against the background of a dynamic situation and severely 
differing opinions on disposition of German assets and the rearming of 
Austria. Finally, the thesis examines the abrupt change in Soviet policy in 
May 1955, which resulted in bilateral Austro-Soviet talks during which 
Moscow indicated a willingness to end the occupation. The thesis leans 
heavily on archival documents and on information from individuals who were 
involved in policy formulation in the 1940s and 1950s. The thesis highlights 
the importance of the Anglo-American relationship, and concludes that 
Britain’s leaders were not always sensitive to the forces behind their principal 
ally’s policies toward Austria, a shortcoming that caused at least Ernest Bevin 
to misjudge the situation in Washington, and to launch an ill-timed lobbying 
campaign designed to persuade the Americans to pay whatever bribe 
Moscow demanded in return for a Russian signature on an Austrian State 
T reaty.
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In t r o d u c tio n
Austria’s drive for independence following World War II is often overlooked 
by students of the Cold War, whose attention perhaps understandably drifts 
toward more important issues in more important places. Yet this small alpine 
land was a bellwether battlefield -  a testing ground for Four Power strategies 
designed to affect events elsewhere, primarily in Germany. Austria was host 
to some of the most dangerous East-West confrontations for almost a full 
decade after the war, during which the Austrian people were subjected to the 
humiliation of military occupation and the plundering of the country’s natural 
and industrial resources by the Soviet Union. A question mark is still attached 
to the Kremlin’s motives behind the sudden and unexpected decision in May 
of 1955 to sign the Austrian State treaty, after a decade of cantankerous 
opposition. To many at the time, this was the first step backwards taken by 
the Soviet Union during the entire Cold War.1
S t a t e m e n t  o f  P u r p o s e  a n d  M e t h o d o l o g y
The first objective of this thesis is to bring into the public domain a 
chronological and focused narrative describing British interests and policy 
toward Austria during the period of Four Power occupation, 1945-1955. The 
second objective is to pose and answer certain key questions, which arise 
logically from that narrative. The thesis describes British interests in Austria, 
the process by which Britain formulated its foreign policies regarding Austria,
1 The Austrian State Treaty was signed on 15 May 1955. The 18 May 1955 New York Times quoted 
American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as saying: ‘approximately 16,000 square miles and 
1.7 million people have been freed from Soviet control and economic exploitation. ... It marks the 
first time that the Red Armies will have turned their face in the other direction and gone back since 
1945’. See William L Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f Austria (Bonn, Vienna, 
Aurich: Siegler &  Co, 1962), p. 169.
and British Government policies as these evolved, usually in reaction to what 
the United States and the Soviet Union were doing, as well as what was 
happening in the rest of the world. The presentation of information and 
analyses is a combination of the chronological and thematic. The 
chronological narrative begins with the initial phases of occupation planning 
and evolution of British foreign policy, and it proceeds in a linear fashion 
through the occupation period to Austria’s independence in May of 1955, 
pausing, thematically, at particularly important stations along the way to 
examine specific issues in appropriate depth.
The narrative in each chapter will, by necessity, be comparative because the 
scenario in Austria developed as a result of the interaction between parties 
participating in the occupation, and in negotiations leading to the country’s 
independence. It is seldom possible to limit descriptions, observations or 
evaluations exclusively to any one of the participating parties without 
referring to the others. Britain was incapable of unilateral action in the 
immediate post-war era, and had to depend on its ability to enlist support 
from others, primarily the United States of America, over whom the British 
Foreign Office had no control and only marginal influence. The overall 
environment within which Britain was required to carry out her diplomacy was 
also not under British control, and was significantly influenced by the actions 
of the Soviet Union and her East Bloc allies -  forces that were not always 
friendly toward Britain and her interests. In many respects, Britain was 
forced to scramble, reacting to unexpected events with inadequate resources
and attempting to play the role of a major world power when, in fact, she was 
not.
The relationship between Western foreign policy during the occupation period 
and Austrian independence deserves and indeed receives special attention 
here. Was it a mistake for Britain to conclude that an ’earlier end to the Allied 
occupation of Austria would necessarily have resulted in the country’s earlier 
independence? Scholars who have written about the occupation period 
sometimes point to specific time frames during which they believe the USSR 
was prepared to sign an Austrian State Treaty, had the West been willing to 
pay a hefty bribe and withdraw their military forces, leaving Soviets in place 
or at least with continuing control of the country’s natural and industrial 
resources. Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and his Foreign Office 
were in the front ranks of those who were frustrated by certain US attitudes 
regarding an Austrian Treaty, and Bevin lobbied his American counterpart 
energetically to make whatever concessions the Soviets demanded in order 
to bring about an end to the occupation. Was Britain’s assessment of the 
situation in Austria correct? Was Bevin’s understanding of the atmosphere in 
Washington sound when he lobbied the US Secretary of State to surrender to 
Moscow’s economic demands on Austria? Or were Bevin’s lobbying efforts 
misguided and mistimed? Would Austrians have enjoyed freedom earlier if, 
as Bevin wanted, the West had paid Moscow money and withdrawn Western 
occupation forces?
Because of the critical importance of Anglo-American relations and the 
cohesiveness of the North Atlantic Pact during the occupation of Austria, the 
relationship between Britain and her American friends is examined. How did 
the two countries divided by a common language get along, as they joined 
together to confront what was perceived first by the British and eventually 
also by the Americans as a sinister Communist threat? How did Britain’s 
diplomats and other statesmen rate their US counterparts on policy matters 
having to do with Austria? How and why did the Anglo-American relationship 
work in programmes designed to solve the post-war Austria problem, despite 
different interests and culturally different ways of going about the resolution 
of complex issues? Did Britain’s process orientation and America’s results 
orientation serve the interests of both nations and of the Austrian people, or 
did these different perspectives cause unnecessary problems?
The Cold War was fought in part through covert intelligence operations, and 
there was no one place in the world more heavily involved than Vienna in 
hosting these activities. Vienna really was the city of Graham Greene’s Third 
Man, reeking of intrigue, deception, double-cross and triple-think. Vienna 
provided a welcome, secure and almost risk-free environment in which 
intelligence agents of many nationalities plied their trade. It is arguable 
whether Berlin ran a close second in the Cold War spy game, but there is no 
question that Vienna was a major battleground in the world of international 
espionage. Vienna was also the scene of one of Britain’s Secret Intelligence 
Service’s (SIS or MI6) most successful Cold War operations. For this reason, 
the following narrative will pause briefly on the subject of intelligence
operations during the occupation of Austria, providing unique information and 
insight from professional intelligence operations officers who were there. 
Were these operations for operations’ sake, or did the product from covert 
intelligence benefit Britain’s policy makers?
The European Recovery Programme (ERP), it is frequently said, rescued 
Austria’s economy and provided an opportunity for Austria to lift itself from 
the rubble of war and develop prosperity and security. The Marshall Plan was 
an American programme and Britain’s main involvement was to benefit from 
it. Given the subject of this thesis, it is not necessary to describe the ERP in 
depth. Still, controversies often accompany academic comment on the 
Marshall Plan, so this narrative will pause and consider certain of these 
issues. How, for example, did the Marshall Plan affect Austria? Was this 
effect beneficial? Did, as it has been sometimes suggested, the Marshall 
Plan represent an unwarranted and unwelcome intrusion on Austrian 
society?
One sensitive issue in the Cold War was the rearming of Austria. It remained 
a cause of severe friction between the Soviet Union and the West. A major 
American foreign policy objective vis-a-vis Austria throughout the entire 
period of occupation was to make certain that Austria possessed the 
wherewithal to provide for her own internal security before Western 
occupation forces were withdrawn. This necessitated the creation of armed 
Austrian forces -  an action the Soviet Union opposed. Britain eventually 
agreed to participate in a rearmament programme, and to assume
responsibility for creating an Austrian air force. The narrative pauses to 
consider the ramifications of Anglo-American activities designed to 
strengthen Austria’s internal security capabilities. It does so by addressing 
the question of how America and Britain approached this delicate task and 
were they successful.
The thesis is the result of over six years of research and intellectual 
endeavour, during which secondary and primary sources in Britain, the 
United States and Austria were explored, as well as a wide variety of 
international writings on the Cold War, Britain and Austria. The works of 
Austrian academics and other authors were studied extensively, with the 
recognition that Austrians did not have access to the British policy 
formulation process. During the occupation, the only thing Austrians knew 
about British policy is what they were told by British representatives or could 
discern from the behaviour of British representatives. British policies were 
formulated in Great Britain, by elected and appointed British officials, 
frequently but not always in consultation with the United States.
H is t o r io g r a p h y
Conclusions herein rely heavily on unpublished material, personal interviews 
with people who were directly involved with policy matters during the 
occupation, and with primary source material that may have been cited in 
previous works but which has never been thoroughly exploited.
The material offered here contributes new information and insights to the 
historiography of occupied Austria, to the understanding of Cold War 
developments concerning Austria, and to British foreign policy regarding 
Austria. Some information is new because it has not been reported in 
previous works. The analyses and conclusions are new and based, in part, 
on unique experience and perspective. No American who participated directly 
in the Cold War and who enjoyed such close association with Austrian issues 
has concentrated exclusively on British policies regarding Austria in similar 
detail or depth.
I have sought to avoid the trap that apparently awaits historians who, when 
trying to learn about foreign policy and foreign policy formulation processes, 
place excessive faith in archival documents and fail to distinguish between 
policy recommendations, statements of official policy and strategies designed 
to accomplish policy objectives. Wherever possible, I have confirmed the 
nature and relevance of source material against the memories of eye 
witnesses - people who actually participated in administration of the 
occupation or in other activities covered by this thesis. The resulting letters, 
e-mails and other communications from individuals who served on the Allied 
Council and as intelligence operations officers in Vienna also contribute new 
and unique information to Cold War historiography.
The books, articles, papers, archives and other material used for this thesis 
can be placed into four broad categories: reporting on the Cold War in 
general, on Austria in general, on British and other Four Power policies
regarding Austria, and on this author’s personal experience and intimate 
contact with the issues of the day.
T h e  C o l d  W a r  in  G e n e r a l
First, there is the huge volume of Cold War historiography, consisting of a 
wealth of secondary material and declassified archival documents. The 
bibliography here identifies the primary and secondary source material that 
contributed most to this thesis and had most influence on its conclusions. 
The bibliography on the Cold War is by no means exhaustive. There is a 
mountain of books, articles, papers and other forms of reporting on the Cold 
War and the many debates that continue to rage regarding that period of 
contemporary history.
The wider events of the Cold War affected virtually everything that happened 
in Austria during the occupation -  indeed more than developments inside the 
country itself. Germany, for example, was more important to the Four Powers 
than was Austria, and so available literature on Germany and its role in the 
Cold War was studied during preparation of this thesis, including recently 
uncovered Soviet and Warsaw Pact source documents made available 
through, among other sources, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars’ Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and Harvard 
University’s Project on Cold War Studies, Davis Center for Russian Studies. 
The latter’s publication, Journal of Cold War Studies, was an invaluable 
source of information and analysis in the preparation of this thesis.
In the West, the Cold War continues to generate active debate in the halls of 
academia. Western archives are open and, despite complaints of relatively 
slow declassification of material by some governmental bodies, the 
publication of official documents continues and the body of evidence 
expands. Learning what the Western Allies did and reading interpretations of 
why they did it is an ongoing activity in universities and research institutions. 
This debate has already been through at least three major schools of 
historical analyses: the traditionalist, the revisionist and the post-revisionist. 
Some suggest that current contributions fall more accurately into a post­
modernist school, which essentially rejects the methodology and conclusions 
of previous schools. Yet others caution that such theoretical discourses on 
schools of thought and their alleged philosophical and methodological 
leanings distract historians from their real raison d ’etre, namely, as this 
author believes, the illumination of historical truths and explanation of 
important events.
The Soviet Union, a major adversary in the Cold War, played an important 
role in determining Austria’s post-war fate. Soviet behaviour in and about 
Austria has' been studied by a variety of researchers interested in the 
occupation period. Most have been Austrian, although William L. Stearman’s 
1962 offering, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, remains a 
remarkably durable account of Soviet policy and behaviour. The motives, 
deliberations and policy objectives of the Soviet Union during the period of 
Austria’s occupation, however, remain still today matters of speculation.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the new government took initial 
steps to relax access to some Soviet archives, but researchers continue to 
experience difficulty and frustration. Access to Soviet archives is still difficult, 
sporadic and unpredictable. Also, there is little doubt that archival documents 
have been handed out selectively by those in charge, often in return for 
bribes or, at best, excessively high service charges.2 In 1997, the editor of 
the journal, Diplomatic History, in introducing a series of articles on the 
Russian archives, was inspired to observe: ‘...the new documentation has 
done little to clarify matters. On the contrary, it has fuelled the flames of 
controversy and made it more likely that debate and disagreement over the 
history of the Cold War will continue.’3
The most important Soviet archives (the Presidential Archive, the Foreign 
Intelligence Archive, the State Security Archive and the Central Ministry of 
Defence Archive) remain closed. Access to others, for example the Foreign 
Ministry Archive, is extremely difficult and the prices for photocopies are 
prohibitive. Trailblazers like Harvard’s Mark Kramer and James Hershberg 
have performed miraculously in unearthing valuable Soviet archival 
documents, many found not in Moscow but elsewhere, some in former 
satellite states. Here, Mark Kramer’s extraordinary linguistic abilities have 
enabled him to tap the archives of virtually every former Soviet Bloc state.
2
M ATRIX: Center for the Humane Arts, Letters, and Social Sciences On-line, Michigan State 
University, H-RUSSIA, H-HABSBURG, H-DIPLOMACY, H-W AR and H-HISTORY, <www.H- 
NET.org> , [accessed periodically throughout research for this thesis],
3 Diplomatic History, vol. 21, issue 2, Spring 1997.
11
Zubok and Pechatnov have found and made available valuable Soviet 
primary source material, as have Vladimir V. Sokolov and Sven Holtsmark.
During research for this thesis, over 1,000 pages of Soviet archival 
documents were identified and photocopied from microfilm records (Fond 5, 
Opis 28) purchased by Harvard University from the Russian State Archive of 
Contemporary History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii 
[RGANfl). These records are now available in the Harvard University library, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Most of the Soviet archival documents that have reached Western 
researchers are on non-European issues, such as the Korean War, USSR- 
China relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Europe-related material 
has tended to focus on Germany and on the NATO-Warsaw Pact face-off. 
There are very few references to Austria, but some far away developments 
did affect Allied interaction in Austria. A good example is the Korean War, 
which we now know was. started by North Korea only after receiving Josef 
Stalin’s personal approval and assurances that the Soviet Union would 
support a North Korean invasion of the South.4 The suspicion in the West 
that Moscow was behind the Korean War certainly did affect East-West
4 In June 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin handed over to South Korean President Kim Young 
Sam a collection of high-level, declassified Soviet documents on the Korean War. These proved 
conclusively that Stalin, and later Mao Tse Tung, both granted their personal approval for the North’s 
invasion of the South. Since then, the Presidential Archives in Moscow have declassified and released 
some 1,200 pages of official documents from the Kremlin’s file on the Korean War. Photocopies of 
this file with all of its released documents are available in the US National Archives, the National 
Security Archives, the Gelman Library, George Washington University Library and the Columbia 
University Library. Approximately 100 of the most important and revealing documents from this file 
are available in translation in The Cold War in Asia (Washington: The Cold War International 
History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7, Winter 1995/1996).
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diplomatic activity in Europe. During the Korean War, Austria was one of the 
few places on earth where Western and Soviet officials continued to sit with 
each other around conference tables, discussing important issues, albeit with 
infrequent occasion to celebrate progress.
Garthoff, Wohlforth, Westad, Tucker, Larres and Mastny are responsible for 
valuable assistance in understanding the ways various governments 
formulated foreign policies during the Cold War. Hogan, Taubman, Bowie 
and Zubok are others. Again, CWIHP remains a rich source of both 
secondary and primary information on Soviet and Soviet Bloc policies, as 
well as the way these were developed and sponsored. The personal memoirs 
of chiefs of state, foreign ministers and other senior government officials 
have been studied for this thesis, but hopefully with a sense of scepticism 
appropriate to the works of those who write in part to justify their own actions 
and decisions.
While much Cold War research has been devoted to the United States, 
Britain’s participation in the Cold War generated a considerable collection of 
books, articles and papers. Those that influenced this thesis most are 
identified in the accompanying bibliography.
In the Winter 1999 edition of Harvard University’s Journal of Cold War 
Studies, Adam Ulam wrote a short but thought-provoking article entitled, ‘A 
Few Unresolved Mysteries about Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: A 
Modest Agenda for Research’. In this, Ulam observed that, now the Cold War
is over, ‘most people in the West have largely forgotten about the concern 
that preoccupied us during the first four and a half decades after World War 
Two: the danger of a fatal clash between East and West. ... Still, for the 
minority of those who follow international affairs, that recent past has left a 
number of unanswered questions and problems’.5 Ulam concluded that, 
despite an increase in the supply of Soviet archival material becoming 
available, definitive answers to some of the most basic questions pertaining 
to the Cold War are still unavailable and will remain so until all Soviet archival 
documents are made available to the international community. Perhaps Ulam 
is right, but there remains a question as to whether or not Moscow’s closed 
and protected files will actually prove to contain the information and insight 
needed to understand why Kremlin leaders did what they did. Leaving a 
written trail of opinion and actions was a dangerous practice in Moscow and, 
as we know from the unique Stalin-Molotov correspondence during the 
immediate post-war months, political figures in the Soviet Union were very 
careful what they wrote.6 We do, however, have Khrushchev’s personal 
explanation of why he instructed Molotov to stop obstructing progress 
towards an Austrian State Treaty and agree to the withdrawal of the Soviet 
Army from Austria.7
5 Adam Ulam, Journal o f  Cold War Studies, Winter 1999, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 110.
6 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, ‘Foreign Policy Correspondence Between Stalin and Molotov and Other 
Politburo Members, September 1945 - December 1946; The Allies Are Pressing You To Break Your 
W ill’, CWIHP Working Paper 26, September 1999.
7 ‘Concluding comments by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev before the Central Committee Plenum of the 
CPSU Ninth Session on 12 July 1955,’ Translations by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, Leo Gluchowski 
and Vladislav Zubok CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 10, March 1998, pp. 42-43.
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Among those who have contributed to and stimulated the ongoing debate on 
how the Four Powers made policy decisions are Gaddis, Waltz, Zubok, 
Richter, Simmons, Parish, Naimark, Weathersby, Pechatnov and Kramer. Of 
these, Kramer’s many contributions, Gaddis’ 1997 We Now Know, and the 
1996 Zubok/Pleshakov expose on Kremlin politics are probably the most 
invigorating and closer to what we will eventually learn is the truth.8
A u s t r ia  in  G e n e r a l
Second, there is a smaller but equally important body of material on post-war 
Austria in general. Much of it is of marginal value for the purposes of this 
thesis. The literature is particularly rich on Jewish issues, the fate of Austria’s 
National Socialists during and after the war and the ways the Allied Powers 
did or did not pursue so-called denazification programmes. Some Austrian 
academics, apparently with a penchant for self-flagellation, have asserted 
that their country and countrymen did not deserve the favoured treatment 
afforded Austria and Austrians by the victorious Allies under terms of the 
1943 Moscow Declaration.9 Others have interested themselves in religious 
and Austrian identity issues, Austrian labour union issues, the post-World 
War Two (WWII) fate of the First Republic’s ‘Red Vienna’, the Socialist (SPO) 
and (less consequential) Communist (KPO) parties of Austria and their 
interaction with other political movements, and with the unique Austrian
8 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). For an example of Kramer’s 
contributions, see ‘The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: 
Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making’, Part 1, Journal o f  Cold War Studies, vol. 1, no.
1, Winter 1999, pp. 3-55; Part 2, Journal o f  Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 3-38. See also 
Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to 
Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996).
9 See, for example, Gunter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage o f the 
Weak (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999).
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capacity to form successful coalition governments bringing together political 
opponents.
Austria has attracted the attention of researchers because it remains as one 
of post-war Europe’s real success stories. The so-called Waldheim Affair has 
lured some scholars. More recently, others have been attracted by the 
election gains of Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO) and the ensuing tantrum 
thrown by disapproving European Union (EU) member states. Indeed, 
Austria’s decision to join the EU has been the subject of considerable 
comment, given the terms of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the first 
independent Austrian Government’s decision to adopt a policy of perpetual 
neutrality. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union and every one of its 
European satellite governments, the continuing validity and relevance of the 
State Treaty itself is now sometimes called into question.10
Some academics who, for whatever reason, still resent the presence in 
Austria of a sizeable American community during the occupation, have also 
voiced concern over what they term ‘cultural imperialism’ by the United 
States. America, it is sometimes suggested, exploited its influential presence 
as an occupying power in Austria to force crude Yankee values down the 
throats of protesting but usually jeans-wearing Austrians who were too weak 
to resist such unwelcome intrusions as jazz music, Hollywood movies and ice
10 D. J. Morrow, Neutrality and foreign policy in Austria since 1955, 1987).
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cream sodas. Reinhold Wagnleitner’s Coca-Colonization and the Cold War is 
a demonstration of this particular protest.11
In a 1996, 25-page chapter entitled ‘Narratives in Post-war Austrian 
Historiography’, British historian Robert Knight suggests that post-war 
presentations on Austria, in general, can be placed into four broad 
classifications, or ‘narratives’: ‘three of them broadly benign, one of them 
highly critical.’12 The benign, ‘educative’ contributions are the educational 
narratives describing in different ways and from different ideological 
perspectives what happened as Austria crawled out of the rubble of war, 
eventually to become a sovereign, independent nation whose government 
adopted as one of its very first acts a policy of perpetual neutrality. Knight 
describes the one critical category of works as also a narrative, but one that 
‘is of a journey which in failing to confront National Socialism took a wrong 
turning.’13 Knight’s chapter is a broad-brush history of post-war Austria -  a 
commendably competent reference to the complex interplay of societal 
forces that drove Austria during its first successful encounter with democracy. 
It is sprinkled with occasional reference to writers who typify one or more of 
the ‘narratives’.
11 Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War; The Cultural Mission o f  the United 
States in Austria After the Second World War (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994).
12 Robert Knight, ‘Narratives in Post-war Austrian Historiography’, in Austria 1945-1955, Studies in 
Political and Cultural Re-emergence, ed. Anthony Bushell (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996), 
pp. 11-36.
13 Ibid., p. 11.
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Knight highlights one of Austria’s most embarrassing problems, namely the 
absence of any tradition of national identity, and suggests that the first 
‘Austrian national identity appears to have solidified in the twenty years after 
the State Treaty’.14 This is a particularly interesting observation, given that 
post-war Austrian historians may have felt compelled to exaggerate the 
influence of individual Austrian political figures in winning the country’s 
independence precisely because there was no tradition of national identity 
and no foundation of democracy to be found elsewhere in Austria’s 
background. Knight’s abstract of the first post-war decade is noteworthy and 
a valuable contribution to post-war Austrian historiography.
Knight also figures in the most recent contributions to Austrian post-war 
historiography with his March 2001 article for Contemporary European 
History, which critiques Gerald Stourzh, the doyen of modern Austrian 
historians, Gunter Bischof, the country’s most prolific historian writing in the 
English language, Lothar Hobelt, whose 1999 focus was on the Verband der 
Unabhangigen, forerunner to the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), and political 
scientist Anton Pelinka, whose name is often among the small group of 
Austrian researchers who interest themselves in the occupation period.15
F o u r  P o w e r  P o l ic ie s  in  A u s t r ia
There exists a third, even smaller collection of scholars who have addressed 
the narrower matter of Four Power policy and policy formulation
14 Ibid., p. 15.
15 Robert G. Knight, 'The Austrian Treaty and Beyond', Contemporary European History, 10 (2001), 
123-142
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concentrating specifically on occupied Austria. Such material, especially that 
pertaining to British policy, is of course critically important to this thesis and 
its conclusions. It has been explored in detail. Virtually all of the available 
secondary sources on this subject have been read and studied, but the thesis 
relies heavily on unpublished archival documents as well as source material 
that may have been cited briefly in other works with regard to British policy, 
but which have, heretofore, not been adequately assessed. Foreign Office 
correspondence during the lifetime of the Austrian State Treaty Commission 
is an example. Other examples include the Confidential Print collection of 
selected documents declassified for the first time in January 2003.16
The works of Whitnah and Erickson (1985), Stearman (1962) and Cronin 
(1986) have held up admirably as rational explanations of American and 
other Allied planning, organisation, behaviour and policies. Bischof, Rathkolb 
and Leidenfrost have offered respectable efforts to assign different slants to 
Western motivation and policy, and all three have used recently declassified 
archival material -  selectively, in some important cases -  to update or justify 
positions they have taken in the past. It must be said of the Austrians that 
one cannot ignore the presence of some element of near-masochism, in that 
it appears obligatory for Austrians to flail themselves in public because of 
perceived sins of their ancestors. There are repeated, one could say 
obsessive, arguments to the effect that Austria’s post-war success was not 
deserved because Austrians misbehaved during World War Two and 
because they did not do enough to purge National Socialists after the war. A
16 FO 465/6, PRO.
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spring 2000 review of Gunter Bischofs book for Harvard University’s Journal 
on Cold War Studies observed:
Admirers of Austria will find their illusions shattered by Bischofs first 
paragraphs. He reports that the Founding Fathers of Austria’s 
Second Republic were intent on covering up the country’s pro-active 
role as part of Nazi Germany, and ‘invented a version of history that 
would liberate them from the burdens of the past’ (p. x). It became 
official policy that the Austrian State had lain dormant during World 
War II and, because Austria had never declared war on anyone, it 
could not reasonably be held responsible for what the Germans had 
done. Thus was born the so-called ‘occupation doctrine’ and the 
‘Austrian Rip Van Winkle legend’ -  a ‘country sleeping blissfully 
through seven years of War while the Germans committed horrific 
War crimes.17
In 1999, Gerald Stourzh produced a monumental 862-page update of his 
earlier treatises on Austrian State Treaty negotiations. This makes use of 
new archival material, including some Soviet documents. It represents by far 
the most authoritative, comprehensive work on the twists and turns of the 
complex bargaining and posturing by the occupying powers. In his narrative, 
Stourzh also describes how successive Austrian Governments used 
differences between the Allies as leverage to influence the outcome of Treaty 
negotiations. Bischofs much thinner book of the same year pales in 
comparison, although Bischof exerts stronger effort to create an impression 
that Austrians played the major role in moulding their own future. Indeed, 
Bischof offers, in his description of ‘the legendary Moscow diplomacy of the 
Raab delegation’, the delightfully creative image of a Western ‘crisis 
management (that) found itself relegated to the sidelines of merely observing
17 Warren W. Williams, ‘The Road to the Austrian State Treaty,’ Journal o f Cold War Studies, vol. 2, 
no. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 97-107.
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this vigorous bilateral diplomacy, reduced to the unsavoury task of trying to 
strictly proscribe the Vienna Ballhausplatz’ diplomatic manoeuvring space’.18
Other Austrian historians, including Rauchensteiner and Wagnleitner, 
concentrate more on how the American occupation affected Austrian culture, 
and Beer has contributed significantly to an understanding of cultural and 
legal issues in the British occupation Zone. Beer’s unique, extensive work on 
allied intelligence activities in Austria during and after the war is valuable, 
particularly because covert intelligence operations played an important role in 
the prosecution of the Cold War by all sides. Indeed Beer’s fascinating 
evidence linking participants in The Third Man with British intelligence and his 
detailed investigations into the making of this epic film are, to say the least, 
thought-provoking.19
Reinhold Wagnleitner wrote his doctoral thesis, Grossbritannien und die 
Wiedererrichtung der Republik Osterreich, at the University of Salzburg in 
1975. He was the first historian to study the Public Record Office’s FO 371 
files and, at the time, his research was original. The thesis concentrated on 
British planning for the occupation and then implementation of these plans in 
the year 1945, but no further.20
18 Gunter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage o f  the Weak (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), p. 144.
19 Siegfried Beer, 'The Third Man', History Today, 51 (5) (2001), 45-51 .
20 E-mail message to author from Professor Siegfried Beer, 14 November 2003, hard copy in author’s 
personal files.
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Ralph W. Brown III and former US Army Lieutenant Colonel James Jay 
Carafano are two of the few foreign scholars to concentrate on the American 
military in occupied Austria. The US Army Military History Institute Internet 
web site contains valuable bibliographic and source material.21
Brown wrote a thesis in 1995 at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, 
entitled A Cold War Army of Occupation: The US Military Government in 
Vienna, 1945-1950. Brown concentrated on the American military presence 
and its organization, but contributed some useful material for students of 
British policy as well, highlighting the difficulties that existed between 
American and British military commanders on the ground. He challenged 
Whitnah and Erickson’s previous assurances that all was well between the 
two allies, and pointed to significant animosity between generals McCreery 
and Clark.22 Brown also offered one of the more comprehensive accounts of 
Soviet kidnappings, as well as useful information on American military 
intelligence activities during the period covered, providing persuasive 
reporting that speaks against some of Carafano’s later assertions to the 
effect that American military intelligence was providing the information and 
threat assessments upon which overall US foreign policy was based. Brown 
quotes official histories of the US Forces in Austria (USFA) and USFA’s G-2 
Staff to confirm that American military intelligence in Austria was sharply
21 United States Army Military Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/> [accessed periodically throughout 
research for this thesis].
22 Clark was one of the few American general grade officers who frequently clashed with his British 
counterparts. See for example Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: the War in North Africa, (New 
York: Henry Holt &  Co., 2002).
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focused on denazification activities.23 It was only in November 1946, shortly 
before the establishment of CIA’s first station in Vienna, that the 7769 Military 
Intelligence Service began to devote attention to the Soviet presence -  an 
activity that was, in any case, frowned upon by Army Command.24 According 
to Brown, the American counterintelligence effort was concentrated ninety 
percent on denazification. While Brown’s research focuses on American 
issues in Austria, it is useful to students of general occupation issues as well.
Carafano’s December 2000, groundbreaking doctoral thesis (Georgetown 
University) bears the clever title, Waltzing Into the Cold War: US military 
operations in occupied Austria, 1945-1955.25 While this is of marginal value 
to students of British foreign policy, it nevertheless contributes helpfully to the 
background against which any examination of Britain in Austria must be 
considered.
Carafano’s conclusions receive some attention in this thesis because of his 
creative explanations of how American military operations and military 
commanders in Austria influenced overall US foreign policy. British policy 
enjoys less attention from Carafano, but American influence at the time was 
profound, and, in some of the issues covered by Carafano, British interests
23 History of G-2 USFA: From Beginning to June 1947, Folder 43, Box 5, RG 260, US National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA II), College Park, Maryland , pp. 10 , 20. See also, 
‘History of the Office of Director of Intelligence, USFA’, January -  March 1948, RG 260, Folder 46, 
Box 6, NARA II, p. 10.
24 Ralph W. I l l  Brown, A Cold War Army o f  Occupation. The U.S. Military Government in Vienna, 
1945-1950, (PhD, University of Tennessee, 1995)., p. 93.
25 James Jay Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War: U.S. military operations in occupied Austria, 
1945-1955, (PhD, Georgetown University, 2000).
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must be studied within the context of Anglo-American relations. The 
information and explanations in this work are important for students of the US 
role in Cold War history, especially those interested in the military aspects of 
East-West confrontation. Students of British policy should at least be aware 
of it.
Alice Hills, currently a Senior Lecturer at the British Joint Services Command 
and Staff College, obtained a Ph.D. in 1975 while in the Department of War 
Studies, King’s College London. Her thesis, published under the name Joan 
E. Hills, was on British Policy and Strategy Towards Austria in the Years 
1943-1945. In the year 2000, Hills published a book on the same subject but 
with a slightly different title, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945, 
with virtually no changes from the 1975 thesis and with no acknowledgement 
of scholarly contributions on Austria during the 25-year interlude. In separate, 
published reviews of the Hills book, both this author and Austrian Professor 
Siegfried Beer pointed out that the title is misleading.26 The occupation of 
Austria began in 1945, not 1943. Beer is troubled further by Hills’ book:
It must be said from the outset: this is an extremely disturbing book 
despite being published by a reputable editor in a respected military 
series, for it is a unilateral work, in which the documents accessible 
and the literature published since 1975, particularly by Austrian 
scholars, appear to have been methodically ignored, the latter 
without even the slightest hint of a bad conscience, like a reference 
to an unfortunate lack of linguistic acumen. There is an explanation 
for the fact that the scholarship exhibited in this study more or less 
dates back to the mid-1970s both in the documentation consulted 
and in the secondary literature cited: Alice Hills submitted at least the
26 Warren W. Williams, review of Alice Hills, Britain and the Occupation o f  Austria: 1943-1945, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), in Journal o f  Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 2003, 
pp. 131-132.
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essence of her findings already in 1975 for a thesis approved at the 
University of London under the name of Joan E. Hills and under the 
title British Policy and Strategy Toward Austria in the Years 1943- 
1945. Unforgivably, she has not attempted to bring the study up-to- 
date. This is unfortunate, for despite several flaws in scope and 
detail, this book has its indisputable merits.27
Hills’ book is helpful to students who are interested in the way the wartime 
British Government went about structuring strategic planning for post-conflict 
operations, specifically for the occupation of Austria, and also to those who 
are more interested in process than results. Hills’ personal interests include 
the military’s role in post-conflict operations, and so she provides minute 
detail on the day-to-day complex procedure that was employed by the British 
Government to prepare for and manage the occupation of Austria. Hills would 
have benefited by acknowledging the work of other scholars and by 
considering the sizeable volume of material that has become available since 
her 1975 thesis.
Robert Knight’s 1986 doctoral thesis, British Policy Towards Occupied 
Austria, 1945-1950, remains the only comprehensive work devoted, at least 
in title, solely to British policy regarding Austria, and this treatise ends with 
the year 1949.28 After reading Knight, however, the reader is left wondering 
what British policy was during this period of time. A title more descriptive of 
the content may have been appropriate. Elizabeth Barker’s 1983 book on
27 Siegfried Beer, 'Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-45', American Historical Review, 107 
(2002), 279-280 , pp. 279-280.
28 Robert Graham Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, (PhD, London 
University, 1986).
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Britain’s role among the Superpowers touches on overall British policy, but 
does not cover the subject in depth.29 Barber’s 1976 book on how Britain 
formulates policy is helpful in understanding the mechanics of foreign policy 
formulation in the United Kingdom, but does not contribute to a better 
understanding of the results -  namely, the effects of British policy. Dorey’s 
1995 treatise on British politics since 1945 is devoted almost solely to 
domestic issues, but is nonetheless useful to those lacking depth on the 
topic.30 Graz University Professor Siegfried Beer’s very useful research and 
several publications on the behaviour of Britain as an occupying power tend 
to focus on British administration of the two Austrian provinces constituting 
the British Zone of occupation. Bullock’s 1983 biography of Ernest Bevin 
mentions Austria, as do Anthony Eden’s memoirs, but neither describes 
British policy toward Austria.31
P e r s o n a l  E x p e r ie n c e
The fourth category of material that has been invaluable in completing this 
thesis is unique and will not be found in any scholarly or other work. It stems 
exclusively from this author’s personal experience. Observations and 
conclusions herein are influenced by over forty years of close personal 
contact with geopolitical, diplomatic and strategic issues, many of them 
having to do in earlier years with occupied Austria, and, later, with various
29 Elizabeth Barker, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (London - Basingstoke: The 
Macmillan Press Limited, 1983).
30 Peter Dorey, British Politics Since 1945 (Oxford UK &  Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1995).
31 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: William Heinemann Ltd,
1983). Anthony Eden, The Memoirs o f Sir Anthony Eden; The Full Circle (London: Cassell &  
Company Limited, 1960).
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governmental processes for the formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy in different governmental systems.
The experience of residing in Vienna during the post-war era contributed to 
an intense interest in Austrian issues and a perspective that could not 
otherwise be developed. Because my father was a senior member of the 
United States Element on the Allied Commission for Austria, I moved to 
Vienna soon after the war, and attended an Austrian secondary school. 
When my father’s tour as Chief of the United States Forces Austria (USFA) 
Education Division ended, he was appointed Guest Professor at the Second 
Zoological Institute, University of Vienna. My home was in Vienna until 1963. 
Although I was not physically present consistently for that entire period of 
time, Vienna remained home where I took vacations and where I visited as 
often as possible. As a young man, I met and grew to know most senior 
American military and civilian personalities in Vienna, including generals 
Keyes, Hickey and Balmer, and on one occasion I held a memorable 
conversation with Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Kurasov, to whom I 
gave my necktie after he admired it.32
I witnessed at least one certain Soviet kidnapping on the streets of Vienna, 
was present during the immediate aftermath of a shooting by Soviet sentries 
on the Ringstrasse, was evacuated with other dependents during times of 
Soviet threat and was detained and harassed on different occasions by
32 This conversation was reported as a footnote in this author’s Review Essay, ‘The Road to the 
Austrian State Treaty’, in Harvard University’s Journal o f  Cold War Studies, Spring 2000, Vol. 2, No. 
l,p . 98.
Soviet military personnel. I have maintained personal ties with Austrian 
friends over the many years, one of whom is a now-retired police officer who 
served in the front ranks confronting Communist demonstrators during the 
1950 riots.
In presenting these credentials to comment on Austria, on foreign policy and 
on military issues, I offer no apologies for whatever personal opinions may 
appear in the narrative and conclusions. Rather, there is an honest effort to 
seek balance and fairness, which should be the maximum that can 
reasonably be expected of a historian. Vojtech Mastny agrees that:
By its nature, contemporary history imposes upon a scholar a more 
personal commitment than do other periods of the past. Rather than 
determining the topic of his inquiry solely because of its intrinsic 
merit, he can hardly pretend that he was not influenced in his choice 
by direct exposure to his subject matter.33
Direct participants in the Cold War -  or perhaps any war -  will inevitably be 
influenced by what they saw, heard and felt.
33 Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: diplomacy, warfare, and politics o f  Communism, 
1941-1945 (New York and Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1979) p. ix.
C h a p te r  O n e : B r it is h  In t e r e s t s , P o lic ie s  a n d  P l a n n in g  
A c t iv it ie s  t o  M a y  1945
In a 2001 review of a book written by Alice Hills of the British Joint Services 
Command and Staff College, Austrian Professor Siegfried Beer offered an 
interesting observation -  one that contributed significantly to the inspiration 
for much of the thinking behind this particular chapter. Beer wrote in the 
American Historical Review:
It remains a remarkable fact about the Austrian problem of the 1940s 
that most initiatives undertaken in Austria's reconstruction originated 
in London. This was true, for example, for the first official formulation 
of allied policy culminating in the Moscow Declaration of November 
1, 1943; for the military and political planning on Austria throughout 
the war and even for the question of an accelerated transfer of 
responsibilities to Austrian authorities connected with the so-called 
Second Control Agreement signed by the Allies in June 1946. ... In 
short, British military planners and policy makers were most 
consistent in their efforts to prepare for the inevitable occupation 
tasks ahead, political and military.1
Without detracting from the astuteness of Professor Beer’s observation, and 
without for the moment mentioning the Marshall Plan, one can suggest that 
historians should not be surprised that Britain played such an important role 
in Austria’s reconstruction. Britain did, after all, have most interest not only in 
defeating Germany, but also in arranging for an orderly post-war Europe, a 
Europe that would accommodate a financially bankrupt Britain and still allow 
her to play the role of a major world power, which in fact she was not.
1Siegfried Beer, 'Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-45', American Historical 
Review, 107 (2002), 279-280
The United States was, at best, an unwilling entrant into World War II, and 
her leaders had no plans for American forces to remain on the continent after 
the armistice was achieved. In fact, the American President had told Josef 
Stalin that the last US soldier would be out of Europe within two years of a 
cease-fire.2 The United States flatly refused a role in the post-war occupation 
of Austria, and made clear that its only occupation desires were for a small 
zone in Northern Germany where the ports were, so that evacuation of all 
Americans could be facilitated. It was Winston Churchill and, ironically, Josef 
Stalin, who, by January 1945, had talked Roosevelt into accepting an 
occupation zone in Austria and a share in the administration of Vienna, the 
capital.3
This chapter presents the background information necessary to understand 
the evolution of British policy and behaviour towards Austria after Germany’s 
surrender. It summarises British policy interests regarding Austria, beginning 
with the 1938 Anschlufl, and describes how Britain went about planning for 
the post-war situation, while highlighting the difficulties military planners 
encountered as the war against Germany progressed. The chapter describes 
the instruments of diplomacy employed by Britain, as the victorious Powers 
attempted to reach agreement on important post-war matters.
2 This conversation between Roosevelt and Stalin is reported by a number of historians. See 
William L Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria (Bonn, Vienna, Zurich: 
Siegler & Co, 1962), pp. 15-17.
3 F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government, North-West Europe, 1944-1946 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), p. 284.
Some difficulties arose from the clash of cultures, as British and Americans 
developed joint planning procedures and modus operandi. But the two 
worked well together, probably because of the effective way the joint staffs 
were organised and managed. Those problems that existed were 
exacerbated by a variety of uncertainties and an almost total lack of 
information on Austria and on what was happening within the country. Also, 
Austria was of secondary importance to Allied leaders, and the War Cabinet’s 
attentions were focused on Germany, which was always the more important. 
Once planners recognised that Austria would have to be occupied and that 
front line combat troops would have to begin the process of occupation 
before military government staffs could be put into place, responsibility for 
occupation planning became increasingly important. Unfortunately, this 
responsibility kept shifting between Allied commands, in part because it was 
impossible to know what specific units would be involved in the occupation 
and from which direction or command they would have to come.
Before occupation planning could begin, several complex political questions 
had to be answered. What was Austria? Since 1938, she had been a part of 
Germany. None of the Allied nations had declared war against Austria. So, 
political leaders had to decide whether it was going to be necessary to have 
some form of treaty or other agreement acknowledging the cessation of 
hostilities with Austria. How were Allied forces supposed to treat Austrians, 
as liberated people or conquered enemy? How was the country to be 
governed? If Austria was to be accepted as a separate, sovereign state that 
had been unjustly occupied by Germany, then what governing role, if any,
should the Allied armies play on Austrian soil? There was no government in 
exile and virtually no internal resistance movement. Somebody was going to 
have to govern the country to avert social chaos in the immediate aftermath 
of a cease fire, but who would govern and with what authority?
Answers to these and a myriad of other difficult questions were necessary 
before any realistic occupation planning could take place. To complicate 
matters, occupation planning had to begin without any insight into what the 
Soviet Union’s plans were for Austria. British planners did not know what the 
Kremlin planned for Germany, much less this small alpine land. A lot of 
Austrian soldiers had fought on the German side at, among other places, 
Stalingrad, and one could legitimately assume that Stalin would take interest 
in their post-war fate.
It was not until the end of 1943 that Allied agreement was reached to regard 
Austria as a sovereign nation that had been taken over forcefully by Nazi 
Germany. The decision was then made to treat Austria and its people as 
liberated, rather than defeated, and the planning for a reasonable approach 
to post-war administration of the country could begin.
This chapter includes discussion of the October 1943 Moscow Declaration, 
which reflected this Allied decision and which provided the first foundation for 
a coherent British post-war policy. There is also acknowledgement of the 
failed attempt by the Allies to manage post-war issues through the vehicle of 
a new European Advisory Commission (EAC) and the Council of Foreign
Ministers (CFM). The chapter concludes with a brief reminder of the 
challenge to British forces in Italy and Southern Austria posed by 
Yugoslavia’s Marshall Tito, whose territorial claims in Austria were to remain 
a serious and at times dangerous irritant in the subsequent, lengthy 
negotiations on an Austrian treaty.
B r it ish  P o l ic y  a n d  P la n n in g  R eg a r d in g  A u s t r ia  B efo r e  th e  M o s c o w  
D e c la r a tio n
During the last days of the First Republic, the Austrian Chancellor was under 
strong pressure from domestic Nazi forces to unite with Germany. The crisis 
escalated dramatically following Chancellor Schuschnigg’s announcement of 
9 March 1938 that he planned to hold a plebiscite to determine whether 
Austrians wanted to remain independent from Germany. The country’s Nazis, 
predicting that Austrians would vote to remain free and independent, 
demanded the removal of Schuschnigg and cancellation of the plebiscite. A 
furious Hitler sent Schuschnigg an ultimatum: he had one hour to resign or it 
would be the end of Austrian independence. In a desperate last minute 
attempt to preserve Austria’s independence, Schuschnigg turned for help to 
London. Lord Halifax consulted the Prime Minister who replied, ‘His 
Majesty’s Government could not take any responsibility of advising the 
Chancellor to take any course of action which might expose his country to 
dangers against which His Majesty’s Government are unable to guarantee 
protection’.4 The British Prime Minister was Neville Chamberlain.
4 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria p. 27, citing Conclusions of a 
Cabinet Meeting, 12 March 1938, Cab.23, vol. 92, pp. 346-9.
British interest in Austria during WW II was straightforward. Austria had been 
absorbed into the German Reich as a result of the 1938 Anschlufl, and was 
an integral part of an enemy nation with which Britain was at war. But the 
War Cabinet, which had ultimate authority for the conduct of the war, did not 
pay much attention to Austria except to acknowledge that it was part of 
Germany.5 The nation’s top leadership concentrated its resources on broader 
issues affecting Britain’s war-fighting capabilities, and the subject of Austria 
was not seen as a problem of particular importance:
With Austria, we were not directly concerned, although the news 
came to us of the difficulties of arranging an agreement on the zones 
of occupation. Strangely enough, this was the one country -  in 
addition to Germany -  in which Russia agreed to a division of 
authority, although they were not ill placed to impose their will. At the 
time, I watched what was happening in the last days of April with 
detached interest. More than ten years later I was to sign a treaty by 
which Austria was finally freed from Allied occupation -  Russian, 
French, British and American.6
On the planning levels in London, however, it remained an assumption that 
the Allies would win the war, and plans had to be made for the management 
of a post-war situation. Here, Austria was seen as a separate problem, 
because it was also assumed that Austria would have to be occupied for a 
period of time and that British forces would have to participate in that 
occupation. Dedicated plans for Austria would be required, and resources 
would have to be found to enable implementation of these plans. In a Foreign
5 Alice Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), p. 13.
6 Harold Macmillan, The Blast o f War 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 690.
Office brief of 10 March 1943, the German Department’s Sir Geoffrey 
Harrison wrote ‘It should be emphasised that it is in the interests of the 
United Nations and of Austria itself that the abolition of the Nazi regime not 
be followed by chaos. ... Occupation will be necessary.’7 The Foreign Office, 
the War Office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began formulating strategies to 
cope with the kind of problems that might await Britain in a post-war Austria. 
All three Allied Powers were agreed that Austria would have to be 
established as an independent state following the war, and that all vestiges of 
German control over the country would have to be dismantled.8
Donnison, who wrote the definitive work on civil affairs and military 
government in Northwest Europe, explains that ‘martial law’ is used to 
explain a situation in which responsibility for governing a given area is 
transferred from civil to military authorities, ‘whether under provisions of the 
constitution or by means of special legislation, or has been assumed by the 
military authorities of their own motion on grounds of military necessity.’9 In 
occupied enemy territory, international law provides the right of invading 
forces to assume sovereign power and to establish military government. 
When invading forces find themselves on friendly territory, however, the 
situation is far from clear. A 23 July 1942 paper distributed by the 
Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee addressed this problem,
7 Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945 , p. 4, citing 10 March 1943 Foreign 
Office Brief, FO 371/38839, The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), 
hereafter, PRO. This is an incorrect citation. This file contains documents which relate 
entirely to the year 1944.
8 Eden briefing paper to the Foreign Secretary, 25 May 1943, PREM 4/33/7, WP (43) 218, 
PRO.
9 Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government, Northwest Europe, p. 37.
recognising that it consisted, basically, of three different situations. There 
was the case of those countries whose governments had been able to flee 
before being captured by invading German forces. Here, there were firmly 
established governments-in-exile with whom Britain could agree on post-war 
governmental matters. Then there were other countries in which organised 
resistance movements were in full operation, and these would eventually be 
available for consultation on post-war government issues. Finally, there were 
those conquered or liberated nations which had no government-in-exile and 
no organised resistance movements. Here, it was clear that there would be a 
period of time between liberation and the establishment of a new permanent 
government, during which the invading Allied forces would have to administer 
and do whatever was necessary to avoid social chaos, feed the people, deal 
with displaced persons and refugees and begin the process of 
reconstruction. It was not easy to plan for these very different
• 1 ncontingencies.
Initial consideration of issues that would be involved in the establishment of
an Allied military government in Austria began in 1942, and British planners
had their hands full. It was impossible to predict whether occupation of
Austria would have to start before or after Germany’s capitulation. It was
assumed that, in either case, occupation would initially have to take the form
of a military government, hopefully for as short a time as was absolutely
necessary. Occupation objectives were formulated by the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, North-West Europe (SHAEF). But
10 F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government Central Organization and 
Planning (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), pp. 37-56.
these were of little practical use because of all the uncertainties 
characterising the Austria problem and because of the low priority assigned 
to Austria. The initial stages of the occupation would almost certainly have to 
be managed by combat troops, whose involvement in military government 
matters would exclude them from other assignments. These war fighters 
would need advice and assistance from specialists in civil affairs and military 
government. The initial occupation authority might have to be a military 
government, but it was always envisioned that the Foreign Office would play 
an influential role in the occupation, as indeed it did.
Planners recognised the potential problems inherent in a military holding 
operation that lasted for any length of time after the shooting stopped. First of 
all, there would be British domestic problems generated by a lengthy military 
occupation. It was unrealistic to expect Parliament to provide the financial 
and other resources necessary for an efficient military occupation for very 
long. At the same time, it would be difficult if not impossible for the initial 
military governors to solve all of the serious problems that would inevitably 
confront them in a war-torn society. It was therefore of paramount importance 
that all occupation plans provide for the rapid replacement of military 
occupation forces with civilians. Hills observed that ‘insistence on a civilian 
outlook in military government was an important theme in British planning, 
and it moulded the attitude to be adopted towards Austria from the 
beginning’.11
11 Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945 , p. 5.
London knew very little about the situation inside Austria during the war, and 
there were virtually no intelligence operations specifically targeting the 
country. While the SIS, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare’s Psychological Warfare Branch were active in 
other combat zones, none of these organisations was prepared to dispatch 
teams into Austria until late in the war.12 There was no Austrian government 
in exile to provide guidance or assistance, nor was there any confirmed, 
organised resistance movement inside the country.13 Any team inserted into 
Austria would have to deploy into a totally unknown situation and, in any 
case, could probably not be supported from existing British military 
resources, which were already severely stretched. British understanding of 
Austria was based primarily on calculated guesses. This meant that planners 
had to develop plans covering every conceivable contingency. This type of 
extended staff exercise required vast resources, far in excess of the 
importance that was being attached to Austria as a problem separate from 
Germany.
As a result of these difficulties and Austria’s relatively low ranking on Britain’s 
priority list, British policy towards Austria throughout most of the war was
12 It was not until 1944 when a small SOE mission, led by Peter Wilkinson, who was in 
charge of SOE/Austria, with Charles Villiers and Edward Renton, infiltrated into southern 
Austria from Yugoslavia. See Douglas Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze (Windlesham: 
Springwood Books Limited, 1983), pp. 186-187.
13 Records of the OSS, 1942-1945, Washington Director’s Office, Administrative Files, 
Wash-Dir-Off Op 266: 990 SSU Operations and Wash-Dir-Off Op 266: 969 Balkans Basic 
File, (National Archives Microfilm Publication 1642, Roll 83), US National Archives II, College 
Park, MD (hereafter NARA II). See also David David Stafford, Britain and European 
Resistance, 1940-1945: a Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with documents 
(London: Macmillan in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1980) See also Dodds- 
Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze, pp. 186-187.
always somewhat nebulous. There was little continuity in government 
thinking, and resources available to those few people working on Austria 
were scarce. Responsibility for Austria kept changing between military 
commands, and planning assumptions on when the occupation would have 
to begin and which military units would have to participate kept changing with 
the strategic situation. In 1942, for example, responsibility for Austria passed 
from a relatively junior civil affairs officer to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied 
Commander (COSSAC). The function was then elevated directly to SHAEF 
in Hammersmith, England. By 1944, when detailed planning for the 
occupation began in earnest, responsibility rested with the Supreme 
Commander, European Theatre (SAC). When it became clear that the 
occupation would have to be initiated by forces advancing through Italy, 
planning responsibility was transferred to the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Mediterranean (SACMED). When it appeared that the occupation would have 
to begin before Germany surrendered, planning authority for Austria was 
taken from both SAC and SACMED, but it was not assigned clearly to 
anybody else. Eventually, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) decided that 
planning responsibility should rest with the new tripartite control machinery, 
not yet in existence, but under consideration in the EAC, a body created by 
the Allied foreign ministers at the Moscow Conference in the fall of 1943. At 
this point, Britain did not have a plan for a military government in Austria, and 
it was not even clear who had ultimate responsibility for finalising one.14
14 Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945 p. 2.
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A British Element for Austria was formed in August 1944, when the civilian 
and military deputy commissioners for Germany were instructed to organise 
it. At this stage, both the British Elements for Germany and Austria were 
directly under the Foreign Office. In November 1944, W. H. B. Mack took 
over as civilian British Deputy Commissioner of the Allied Commission for 
Austria, headquartered in St. Paul’s School in Hammersmith. Shortly 
thereafter, Brigadier T. J. W. Winterton was appointed the military Deputy 
Commissioner. A small contingent from the British Element moved to 
.Caserta, Italy, to work alongside Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). During 
the following March and April, the full British Element for Austria moved to 
Rome in preparation to go to Vienna as soon as possible.15
Meanwhile, British legal officials were wrestling with the legal ramifications of 
the 1938 AnschlufZ. Until the government could make up its mind as to how it 
was going to regard the Anschlud, the Foreign Office recommended against 
any public statements regarding Britain’s attitude toward Austria, and public 
debate on Austria was actively discouraged. Thinking on post-war policies 
only began to gel toward the end of 1943, but it was not until much later that 
Britain could say with any confidence what its post-war policy on Austria 
really was.
The proposals eventually presented in Moscow emerged from 
several years of confused debate. The records show how, partly 
empirically and partly by what can only be described as intuition, the 
British Government made up its mind on critical issues, such as the 
influence of Nazism in Austria, which were then debated repeatedly
15 Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government, Northwest Europe p. 284.
and indecisively. ...[Hjesitancy remained characteristic of most of the 
recorded public and private discussions...[T]he treatment to which a 
post-war Austria should be subject and the means by which she 
could be freed from German domination remained uncertain.16
T he M o s c o w  D e c l a r a t io n  -  a  F o u n d a tio n  fo r  S u b s e q u e n t  B r it is h  P o lic y
The ambiguities of British policy regarding Austria began to clear toward the 
end of 1943. The foreign ministers of Great Britain, the United States and the 
USSR met in Moscow from 18-30 October 1943 to discuss war plans and 
objectives. Among other things, they reached two agreements that had 
profound effects on Austria and on Allied policies toward post-war Austria. 
They agreed to form the EAC, which was to function as the principle advisory 
body on post-war European issues, including Austria. They also issued what 
became known as the Moscow Declaration.
In Moscow, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden introduced a draft 
declaration on Austria’s future status. This was sent to the Drafting 
Commission consisting of Sir William Strang, Andrei Vyshinsky and James C. 
Dunn, where a finished draft was eventually produced and subsequently 
approved by Foreign Ministers Molotov, Eden and Hull. On 1 November 
1943, two days after the Moscow Conference ended, the ‘Declaration on 
Austria’ was announced to the international public. This was the very first 
agreed, joint allied policy on Austria:
The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the 
United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first country to
16 Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945 pp. 27-28.
fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German 
domination. They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by 
Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void.17 They consider 
themselves as in no way bound by any changes affected in Austria 
since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a 
free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the 
Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighbouring states 
that will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and 
economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is 
reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot 
evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, 
and that in the final settlement, account will inevitably be taken of her 
own contribution to her liberation.18
The first two clauses in this declaration are consistent with earlier Allied 
statements on Austria and its post-war status. The last point is not, and tends 
to water down the effect of the whole declaration. This so-called guilt clause 
was the result of a heated debate after Vyshinsky insisted on the inclusion of 
a statement holding Austria responsible for her participation on Germany’s 
side during the war. The Soviets initially proposed the sentence ‘Austria 
bears full political and material responsibility for the war’. Britain and America 
argued that Austria had, in 1938, ceased to exist as a state and therefore 
could not be held politically responsible for anything that occurred after the 
Anschlufl. Also, Britain made the point that inclusion of the term ‘materially 
responsible’ opened the door to the extraction of war reparations, and it 
would not be appropriate for the Allies to expect war reparations from a 
liberated country.19 Unfortunately, the matter of war reparations, or the 
disposition of German Assets as the issue became known in Austria, 
escalated to the top of a long list of contentious issues between the Western
17 The Anschlufl took place on 17 March 1938.
18 United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. IX. (1943), No. 228, p. 310, NARA II.
19 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria p. 13.
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Allies and the Soviet Union, and was the subject of heated debate during the 
decade-long occupation.
Here was an example of the ambiguities inherent in Britain’s policy 
formulation process at this point in time. Winston Churchill, in a November 
1939 radio broadcast, had promised Austrians an eventual return of their 
independence.20 Again in 1940, Churchill told his Foreign Secretary, Anthony 
Eden, that he was personally extremely interested in Austria, and thought 
that the separation of Austrians and South Germans from the Prussians was 
essential to the post-war harmonious reconstruction of Europe.21 (This could 
not have impressed Mr Eden because the conversation is not mentioned in 
his memoirs, although a number of Austria-related issues do receive broad 
comment).22 In a 9 November 1940 Mansion House speech, Churchill 
specifically said that Austria was one of the countries Britain had gone to war 
for.23 This statement differed somewhat from that of Lloyd George who, in 
1936, told the House of Commons ‘here is one thing that the people of this 
country have made up their minds definitely about. Whatever government is 
in power they will never go to war again for an Austrian quarrel’.24 On 18 
February 1942, Churchill said ‘with the victory of the allies liberated Austria 
will again take up her place of honour. ...The British people will never leave
20 Ibid., p. 5
21 Churchill to Eden, 10 June 1940, PREM 4/33/7, PRO.
22 Anthony Eden, The Memoirs o f Sir Anthony Eden: The Full Circle (London: Cassell & 
Company Limited, 1960).
23 Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945 p. 28.
24 Ibid., p. 17, citing House of Commons Debate, 5th Ser., 313, 1228.
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the cause of liberty in Austria in the lurch. ...We will fight for her liberation’.25 
On 2 June 1942, Churchill wrote a Minute to Eden in which he stipulated ‘I 
certainly look forward to the liberation and thereafter its liberation as a 
separate state or as the centre of a mid European Confederation’.26 In 
September 1942, Eden informed the House of Commons that Britain did not 
recognise the AnschIuQ> and continued to respect Austria as an independent 
state taken over by force. Since 1939, various other British politicians and 
diplomats had highlighted the fact that Britain did not recognise the Anschlufc 
and continued to regard Austria as an independent state -  indeed the ‘first 
free country to fall victim to Nazi aggression’.27 Austria was a state to be 
liberated, not defeated. Yet, in 1943, Britain found herself in Moscow arguing 
with the Russians that Austria had ceased to exist in 1938 and could 
therefore not be held responsible for fighting on Germany’s side. The final 
wording of the ‘guilt clause’ was an uncomfortable compromise for all three 
Allies, and it opened the door to later Soviet demands for reparation 
payments, despite the intent of the rest of the Moscow Declaration. The guilt 
clause was also used by Moscow in an attempt to justify what became a 
program of mass confiscation of Austria’s industrial and natural resources.
The first draft of the Moscow Declaration was prepared in the British Foreign 
Office German Department by Sir Geoffrey Harrison.28 There is evidence that
25 Ibid., p. 28.
26 Churchill to Eden, 10 June 1942, PREM 4, 33/7, PRO.
27 Guenter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955; The Leverage of the Weak 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), p. 24.
28 Ibid.
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the original idea for it was born in the Psychological Warfare Branch, the 
rationale being that such a proclamation in 1943 would have encouraged 
more Austrians to turn against the Germans and to develop at least some 
form of resistance movement against Nazi Germany.29 If this was the British 
strategy, it didn’t work. The Moscow Declaration did not inspire formation of 
an Austrian resistance movement. It did, however, provide the Psychological 
Warfare Branch with a more solid foundation for increasingly focused 
propaganda messages transmitted into Austria.
Policy guidelines for British propaganda broadcasts to Austria were also 
inconsistent and at times confusing during this phase of the war, reflecting 
the shifting responsibility for strategic planning and therefore policies 
anticipating the British military occupation.30 Just as Britain’s psychological 
warriors were concentrating increasingly on Austria with messages designed 
to encourage Austrians to earn their independence, Eden himself cautioned 
that, while he expected Austrians to contribute towards their own liberation, 
‘acts of overt resistance were discouraged’.31 Austrians were somehow 
expected to damage Nazi Germany, but only through passive strategies. 
‘Appeals to the Austrian people to revolt were to be avoided until the final 
moments of the war.’32 At the end of 1943, the Psychological Warfare Branch
29 Ibid., p. 149. See also Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit; Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat 
und das Ende der Ost-West Besetzung Osterreichs 1945-1955 (Vienna - Cologne - Graz: 
Bohlau Verlag, 1998).
30 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom (London, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1961).
31 Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945 p. 26, citing Eden in an 11 March 
1944 Minute, FO 371/38839, PRO.
32 Ibid., p. 26, citing Wilson to Harrison, 13 June 1944, FO 371/38839, PRO.
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was apparently hoping that the Moscow Declaration would inspire the kind of 
resistance movement in Austria that, overall, the British Government did not 
necessarily want.
It has also been suggested that Britain and the United States approved the 
‘guilt clause’ precisely because it created the possibility for war reparations 
payments. Harrison vociferously denied this in a correspondence exchange 
with Gunter Bischof. Harrison wrote ‘it was at no point envisaged by us ... as 
a basis for exacting reparations from Austria. ... It was however a warning to 
the Austrians that they must earn the restoration of their independence’.33
Whatever motivation lay behind the Moscow Declaration, this 1943 joint 
commitment did provide a relatively clear foundation for Britain’s post-war 
policy toward Austria. It established that Britain, the United States and the 
Soviet Union would view Austria as a victim rather than an enemy, a liberated 
rather than conquered nation. For the first time, signs of a reasonably 
consistent, comprehensible British policy towards post-war Austria were 
evident, and these signs were reinforced by public statements, however 
cautious, by the country’s political leadership, both in the run up to the 
Moscow Conference and during the Conference itself.34
33 Giinter Bischof E-Mail to author, 1 May 2000, hard copy in author’s files.
34 See Eden’s summary of Britain’s political options in his 25 May 1943 memorandum, PREM 
4/ 33/7, WP(43)218, PRO, approved by the War Cabinet in June 1943 as a broad reflection 
of British policy towards Austria.
Because the Moscow Declaration provided that Austria would be treated as a 
special case after the war, this, in turn, implied that the Allies intended to 
ignore the legitimacy of the 1938 Anschlufc. Because Austria was part of 
Germany when the Allies declared war on that country, and because there 
was no separate declaration of war against Austria, the termination of a state 
of war between the Allies and Germany was, de facto, seen to include 
Austria. For legal and diplomatic purposes, the Anschlufc became a non- 
event, and, while the so-called guilt clause acknowledged that Austria had, in 
fact, fought on Germany’s side, Austria was to be treated by the Allies as an 
independent country taken over by force. In fact, more than 1.2 million 
Austrians had fought in German military forces during the Second World War 
and the Russians never forgot that many of them were at Stalingrad. The 
44th Infantry Division, for example, under XI Army Corps command, was 
destroyed at Stalingrad. It was originally an entirely Austrian division, as was 
the replacement division formed under the same unit designation in 1943, 
although this no doubt included other Germans.35 It was the desire and 
intent of at least Britain and the United States that Austria would be given 
back its independence, once Nazi Germany had been defeated.
There were disagreements between Britain and the United States on how the 
cessation of hostilities with Austria should be handled, but these were 
accommodated during the war and resolved in 1946:
35 W. Mitcham Samuel, Hitler's Legions: the German Army Order of Battle, World War II 
(New York: Stein and Day, 1985).
Whilst the United Kingdom Government in virtue of their recognition 
de jure and de facto of the Anschlufc of 1938 regard Austria as 
having necessarily inherited enemy status of Germany, so that 
technical state of war existing between United Kingdom and Austria 
must continue until it is specifically terminated, we have no desire to 
accord undue emphasis or significance to this fact at present time. 
And, although the United Kingdom’s formal position is thus 
somewhat different from that of the United States, we believe that 
there is no discrepancy between policies of the two Governments 
toward Austria. (US) State Department is also being informed that, 
should Austrian treaty be unduly delayed, we might be prepared to 
consider issuing unilateral declaration, similar to that just made by 
the United States Government, designed to abrogate the technical 
enemy status of Austria, in advance of conclusion of general treaty.36
T he E u r o p e a n  A d v is o r y  C o m m is s io n
Allied diplomatic interaction during this mid-war period highlighted the 
difficulties involved in coordinating policies for a post-war Europe, yet 
effective coordination was essential if chaos was to be avoided. In Moscow, 
the foreign ministers recognised the need for some form of effective 
machinery to arrange for this coordination, and they agreed to establish the 
EAC.
The EAC, headquartered in Lancaster House, London, was to function as the 
main advisory body on post-war European issues. It was supposed to remain 
aware of the developing situation, to make recommendations on how Allied 
policy might best be coordinated, to seek mutually acceptable resolution at 
the staff level of the myriad of complex issues victory would bring, including 
those related to the peace treaties with Germany and its wartime allies. In
36 Robert H. Keyserlingk, Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), pp. 273-274.
short, the EAC was to deal with all possible questions relating to the 
termination of hostilities in Europe.37
Each of the Allied governments announced their appointees to the EAC at 
the Teheran Conference in December 1943. Britain appointed Sir William 
Strang, who was later to become Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Office 
(1949-1953) and still later Lord Strang. John Winant, US Ambassador in 
London, represented the United States. The Kremlin also designated its 
ambassador in London, Fedor Gusev, as EAC representative. British 
diplomat Michael Cullis recalls Gusev ‘once refusing, in over twenty minutes’ 
sullen silence, to say anything at all’.38 Each delegate formed his own staff 
consisting of officials with the appropriate civilian and military expertise. In 
November 1944, the French Provisional Government was invited to 
participate, and it assigned M. Massigli, the French ambassador in London.
The EAC met for the first time to draw up and recommend to the three 
governments (the United States, Great Britain and Russia) the terms of 
conditions to be imposed on Germany and the enemy countries in Europe at 
the time of their surrender and to recommend the form of control machinery 
which should be put into effect for the purpose of executing such terms and 
conditions.39
37 For the constitution and charter of the European Advisory Commission see FO 371/40580 
and FO 371/40581, PRO.
38 Michael Cullis, 'Austria 1945-1955: The Desk-level View of a British Diplomat,' in 
Geschichte Zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung: Gerald Stourzh, zum 60. Geburtstag,
Leidenfrost, (Graz: Verlag Styria, p. 214.
39 Donald R Whitnah and Edgar L Erickson, The American Occupation o f Austria; Planning 
and Early Years Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 14, citing a 7 January 1944 memorandum from
The EAC did not prove to be an effective body. It had only advisory powers 
and therefore all decisions had to be referred to the respective capitals. The 
Commission was headquartered in London and so it was possible for the 
British delegation to clear strategies and positions quickly and efficiently with 
the Foreign Office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, when necessary, the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. The other three delegations had to await instructions 
from their home capitals on all matters, including the complex and 
controversial delineations of occupation zones, sources of supplies for 
civilians, the nationality of occupation forces, and a variety of other issues 
which became increasingly difficult, as Allied cooperation during World War II 
drifted toward the dangerous confrontations of the Cold War.
Strang was the only EAC delegate to enjoy the luxury of spending full time on 
EAC matters. According to Gunter Bischof, the Foreign Office sought to use 
this advantage to ‘buttress (Britain’s) position in an alliance in which they 
were becoming a junior partner’, and in the process give ‘matters of political 
peacekeeping equal status to American-Soviet predominance in war-making’. 
The Soviets wanted to prevent ‘the fruits of battlefield victory (to be) snatched 
away by shrewd Western diplomacy,’ while the United States’ objective was 
to protect its image as the winner of World War II.40 While this is certainly an 
interesting analysis of the respective priorities of wartime Allies, it is more 
likely that the EAC was created at this particular time in an honest and
Brig. Gen. J.E. Hull, Chief Theater Group, US War Office’s Office of Planning Development, 
to Gen. John H. Hildring, Director of Civil Affairs in Washington.
40 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage of the Weak , p. 28.
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practical attempt to solve a lot of complicated problems. In 1943, nobody 
predicted -  or wanted - the Cold War.
From the beginning, EAC sessions descended into continual argument. The 
Soviet delegate refused to discuss any aspect of Allied control machinery 
before agreement on occupation zones was reached. He ‘methodically 
procrastinated on EAC decisions that might threaten (the Soviet) future 
security sphere in Eastern Europe and prejudice occupation matters in 
Central Europe’.41 The United States had already announced that it did not 
desire to participate in the occupation of Austria. But both Britain and the 
USSR wanted a US presence in the occupation. It was only toward the end 
of 1944 that Roosevelt recanted and agreed to occupy an area in Austria 
adjacent to the American Zone in southern Germany, much to the Foreign 
Office’s relief. Gunter Bischof has suggested that Roosevelt changed his 
mind because he learned that Stalin was using this stalemate at the EAC to 
set up puppet governments in Eastern Europe, primarily at the time in 
Rumania and Bulgaria, and was thereby demonstrating that only a physical 
presence on the ground would allow any of the Four Powers to have an 
influential say on important issues. Bischof demonstrates an appealing sense 
of imagination, but he might be right. Roosevelt almost certainly changed his 
mind because Churchill persuaded him that an American presence was 
critical in a post-war effort to contain Soviet imperialism on the continent. 
Bischof is probably correct in asserting that ‘it was only in cases where the 
British tabled proposals at the EAC which offered unexpected bonuses (for
41 Ibid.
Moscow) did the Soviet representative move quickly’.42 Even before the end 
of the war, Britain was already drifting toward a mediating position in East- 
West negotiations, while at the same time Churchill was hard at work trying 
to change Roosevelt’s rosy opinion of the Soviet Union and the benevolence 
of ‘Uncle Joe’ Stalin. The atmosphere surrounding discussions on zones, 
districts and control machinery was not helped by Roosevelt’s death on 12 
April 1945.
The EAC was unable to agree on any important issue until the ‘Agreement on 
Zones of Occupation in Austria and Administration of the City of Vienna was 
signed on 9 July 1945 43 Even this triggered a furious exchange when the 
Soviets refused to agree on the Covering Report, providing for Allied 
privileges and facilities in Vienna and Western rights of movement between 
the British, French and American Zones and Vienna, which was situated 
deep in the Soviet occupation zone. It was only when British delegate Lord 
Hood, on instruction from the Foreign Office, threatened to break off all 
further negotiations that the Soviets acquiesced. This Agreement then was 
superseded by the Second Control Agreement of 28 June 1946, the drafting 
of which was begun by the British element in November 194544 In all, it took 
four separate proposals before the Allies agreed on the delineation of 
occupation zones.
42 Ibid.
43 Minutes of the European Advisory Commission meeting of 9 July 1945, E.A.C. (45) 5th 
Meeting, FO 1060/729, PRO.
44 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria p. 40.
Like Germany, Austria was eventually divided into four occupation zones: 
American, British, French and Soviet. Agreement on the geographic and 
political boundaries of the four zones was not easy to reach. The first plan for 
the partitioning of Austria was submitted by the British on 21 August 1944, 
and provided for the country to be divided into a Soviet Zone comprising a 
little less than half of the northern part of the country (Upper and Lower 
Austria), and a British Zone in the south (Vorarlberg, Tyrol including what 
was then East Tyrol, Salzburg, Carinthia, and Styria). There were no 
provisions here for the Americans or French. The United States had made it 
clear it was not interested in joining the occupation, and the French had yet 
to be afforded serious consideration as an occupying power.
The Soviets countered on 13 November of the same year with a 
recommendation that would have the United States occupying the five 
western-most provinces (Vorarlberg, Tyrol including East Tyrol, Salzburg and 
Upper Austria). The British were to have a strip right down the middle of the 
country, comprising part of Upper Austria, part of Styria and Carinthia. The 
Soviet Union would occupy the rest of Lower Austria, the rest of Styria and 
Burgenland.
On 30 January 1945, London offered yet a third plan which did include 
France as an occupying power. This allocated Lower Austria and half of 
Burgenland to the Soviet Union, Upper Austria and Salzburg to America, 
East Tyrol, Carinthia and Styria to the United Kingdom, and the western
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provinces of Vorarlberg and Tyrol to France. Moscow tinkered with this for 
three months and submitted what turned out to be the final proposal, agreed 
by all Four Powers. This provided for essentially the same zone borders 
included in the 30 January British proposition, except that it extended the 
Soviet Zone to include part of Upper Austria, up to the Enns River, a few 
kilometres east of Linz.45
Four Power agreement was finally reached on a Soviet recommendation on 4 
April 1945. This included a minor adjustment that gave all of Burgenland 
Province to the Soviet Union. The occupation zones had been established.
It took no less than six separate plans before the Four Powers could agree 
on a partitioning of the capital, Vienna, into four occupation sectors, one each 
for the occupying powers, and one so-called International Sector in the First 
District, in the middle of the city. A Vienna Inter-Allied Command (VIAC) was 
formed to govern the city.46 Formal interaction between the Four Powers took 
place in the International Sector. Law and order here was supposed to be 
maintained by the ‘Four Men in a Jeep’ made famous by a film of the same 
name and, of course, The Third Man.
In the meantime, the failure of the EAC to resolve urgent issues forced the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff to begin issuing provisional directives as guidelines
45 Hugo Portisch, Die Wiedergeburt Unseres Staates (Vienna: Verlag Kremayr & Scheriau, 
1985), p. 510.
46 Halvor O. Ekern, The Allied Commission for Austria,' in The Austria Solution: International 
Conflict and Cooperation, Bauer, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1982), p. 57.
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for post-war planning, knowing that these same directives would probably be 
inappropriate once the four governments had an opportunity to reach political 
agreement on the issues affected by them -  hardly a prescription for efficient 
command and control.47
T he  L ib e r a tio n  o f  A u s t r ia
On 29 March 1945, the first Allied soldier set foot on Austrian territory. He 
was a Russian soldier from Marshall Fedor Ivanovich Tolbukhin’s Third 
Ukrainian Front. He was the first Russian soldier to set foot on Austrian soil 
for 262 years.48 That piece of Austrian ground in the Province of Burgenland, 
just a few hundred meters from the small village of Klostermarienberg, was 
intended by London to become part of the British Occupation Zone, but fate -  
accompanied by successful Soviet bargaining in the EAC and ACA -  ceded it 
to Moscow. In 1986, an Austrian television crew visited this place to 
photograph the location and, if possible, to identify the Russian soldier. 
According to Hugo Portisch and Sepp Riff, leaders of the expedition, older 
residents of Klostermarienberg remembered the day well, and were able to 
point out the precise location where Soviet tanks crossed the border. The 
track marks were still there.49
47 Whitnah and Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria: Planning and Early Years , 
p. 14.
48 Renewed fighting between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires had brought the last 
invaders from the East to Austria, and along essentially the same route through Hungary as 
taken by Marshall Tolbukhin in 1945. The Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 brought Russia to 
ally with Poland, Venice, and the Habsburg Empire in defending Vienna. This time it was 
Russia’s turn to invade.
49 Portisch, Die Wiedergeburt Unseres Staates p. 25.
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According to a 29 March 1945 entry in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht’s 
Army Group South, ‘the Soviet troops are pressing an advance with three 
armies toward the West, which on 29 March brought them into control of the 
area Steinamanger and Guns and, at about 11:05 o’clock, across the Reich’s 
border at Klostermarienberg’.50
On 29 March 1945, the Orders of the Day for the Third Ukrainian Front, 
which had rolled across Hungary and up to the Austrian border, included the 
observation that ‘the closer Vienna, the closer Berlin and the end of the war 
and victory’.51
Throughout the winter of 1945, the final Soviet offensive was rampaging 
across the Eastern Front, from the Baltic to the Carpathians, along a 750- 
mile German line of defence that was overwhelmed by the sheer weight of 
five full Soviet Fronts. The primary objectives were Berlin in the north and 
Vienna in the south. Marshal Zhukov’s First Belorussian Front reached the 
Oder on 31 January, and on 2 May 1945 accepted the surrender of General 
Weidling, Commandant of Berlin.
In the south, Budapest fell in February, after a difficult siege and massive 
assault by the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts, commanded by Marshals 
Malinovsky and Tolbukhin respectively. Navigating along both the northern 
and southern shores of the Danube, with the southern element of a pincer
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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movement just south of Eisenstadt, the Red Army moved on to Vienna, which 
fell to Malinovsky on 13 April. Farther to the West, Alexander’s 15th Army 
Group and Tito’s Yugoslav People’s Liberation Army had approached Trieste 
and the so-called -  and, as it turned out, mythical -  Alpine Redoubt, roughly 
defined by the area between Trieste, Salzburg, Switzerland and Graz. 
American units under General Alexander Patch roared into Austria from 
Bavaria to place pressure on the Alpine Redoubt from the north.
German soldiers along the Eastern Front had received orders to hold at all 
cost -  no step backward was to be taken. If the Red Army were allowed entry 
into the Reich, Berlin said, only sorrow and misery would follow, especially 
for German women and children. Propaganda films, photographs and 
eyewitness accounts of Soviet atrocities were beamed at Wehrmacht units 
facing the Russians, in an effort to stiffen their resolve. By this time, it was 
too late.
The Nazi leadership in Berlin, divorced from the realities of the fast-moving 
combat situation in the field, expressed disappointment with the performance 
of even their elite units on the Austro-Hungarian border. Josef Goebbels, for 
example, complained that even the SS units committed along the Eastern 
Front did not acquit themselves well.52 And the desperate measure of 
committing the Volkssturm was a disaster.53 The very last German offensive
52 Ibid., p. 30, quoting Goebbels personal diary, 28 March 1945.
53 Ibid., p. 26. As a last resort, Germany called upon its Volkssturm, consisting of civilians 
aged from 1 6 - 6 0 ,  to hold the front against the advancing Soviets. According to first-hand 
accounts given the Austrian television crew in 1984, the Volkssturm did not fight, but either
action of the war, Operation Spring Awakening, was launched from Western 
Hungary in an unsuccessful attempt to save Budapest and relieve pressure 
on the Austrian border. 54 It is noteworthy that the German high command 
made the decision to commit its last available reserves, not in the defence of 
Berlin, but in defence of Vienna. These included the 6th Waffen SS 
Panzerarmee under command of the famous Oberstgruppenfuhrer Sepp 
Dietrich, who fought to the last with his own troops on the front line, after 
sarcastically telling Baldurvon Schirach, Gauleiter of Vienna, that his Panzer 
Army was probably named the 6th Panzerarmee because he only had six 
tanks left.55
As the Red Army rolled ... Vienna was becoming one of the great prizes of 
prestige and bones of contention for the future control of Central Europe.’56 
Soviet interest in Western Hungary and Eastern Austria at the time is 
understandable. The last oil fields under German control were located here, 
and Austria still hosted some of Germany’s remaining, intact industrial 
facilities. Without this oil and without these manufacturing plants, what was 
left of Germany’s war machine would collapse. On 28 March, one day before 
the Red Army crossed into southern Austria, Josef Goebbels observed ‘also 
in Hungary the situation has become critical, we are facing the danger of
abandoned their defensive positions before the Soviets arrived, or hid until it was relatively 
safe for them to go home.
54 Deckname FrCihlingserwachen.
55 Portisch, Die Wiedergeburt Unseres Staates p. 30.
56 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage of the Weak p. 29.
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losing our important oil fields (Olgebiet)’.57 As the Western Allies were to 
find out, however, Stalin had longer-term interests in Austria’s natural and 
industrial resources. In agreeing to the Soviet wording of the 1943 Moscow 
Declaration’s guilt clause blaming Austria for participating in the war on 
Germany’s side, Britain and the United States had opened a Pandora’s Box. 
They did not foretell the severe difficulties that would affect Four Power 
relations as a result of Stalin’s war reparation demands on this ‘liberated’ 
country -  demands the Soviets saw as justifiable because all of the Allies 
had agreed on Austria’s wartime guilt.
It was not until 2 May 1945 that elements of the British 8th Army’s 78th 
Division moved northward from the Po River Valley, through Udine and past 
Tarvisio, toward the Austrian border. Vienna had already fallen. The Soviets 
had, unilaterally and without informing the United States or Britain, 
announced the formation of a provisional Austrian government under the 
leadership of an old Socialist, Dr Karl Renner, the last president of Austria’s 
First Republic. During Austria’s First Republic, Renner had described himself 
as a revolutionary socialist, and this no doubt remained in Soviet memory. 
(He was described by an admirer as ‘an extreme moderate’ -  an interesting 
oxymoron which must have appealed to the Viennese sense of humour).58 
The new Renner government had issued, on 27 April 1945, a declaration of 
Austrian independence for the country and formal establishment of this
57 Portisch, Die Wiedergeburt Unseres Staates p. 30.
58 Ilona Duczynska, Workers in Arms ( New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.), p.21.
provisional government. American troops had crossed into the Tyrol at 
SchonbichlA/ils on 28 April. The French had entered Hohenweiler near 
Bregenz in the Vorarlberg on 29 April.
On 6 May, all German forces in Austria surrendered. On 7 May, the British 
78th division’s 56th Reconnaissance Regiment became the first unit of the 
British 8th Army to cross the Austrian frontier, at the pass of Monte Croce, or 
Plockenpass:
The Regiment then moved without opposition through Mauthen to 
Tamsweg and Oberwolz. After rounding up several concentrations of 
enemy troops, and after accepting the surrender and supervising the 
disarmament of a German SS Brigade, 56 Recce (sic) returned to 
Oberdrauburg, Lienz and Nikolsdorf. There it was involved in 
repatriating to the Soviets, two divisions of White Russian soldiers 
who had been fighting for the Germans in Northern Italy. After 
successfully completing this mission the regiment moved to 
Wolfsberg for a well deserved rest.59
British reconnaissance troops made contact for the first time with Soviet 
forces at Voitsberg in Styria on 9 May, while others of the 8th Army sped 
swiftly into north eastern Italy to counter Yugoslav troop movements into 
Carinthia, Styria and Venezia Gulia. The confrontation between Yugoslav 
and British military units very nearly erupted into a major fire fight, which 
would almost certainly have drawn Soviet and Western forces into a shooting
59 Ronald Arthur Tee, ‘A British Soldier Remembers,’
<http://www.britishsoldier.com/ronindex.htm>, [13 August 2003]. A personal account by 
Ronald Arthur Tee, who served in the 56th Reconnaissance Regiment, 78th ‘Battleaxe’ 
Division, the British 1st, (later the 8th), Army from 1941 to 1946. Mr Tee’s personal 
recollections of his participation in these events are also available in personal e-mail 
correspondence from Mr Tee to this author, hard copy in author’s personal files.
war. As it turned out, close cooperation between Alexander and Eisenhower 
allowed the Western Powers to bluff Tito into withdrawing his forces before a 
more serious situation occurred.
T he Y u g o s la v  C h a ll e n g e
Although Austria, at this time, played a minor role in Britain’s interests, this 
tiny alpine land provided the stage upon which dangerous events transpired 
in the closing days of the war -  events that very nearly triggered a significant 
military engagement between Britain and Yugoslavia. It is reasonable to 
assume that, in the event of such engagement, Yugoslavia’s Marshall Tito 
would have enjoyed Soviet support -  Tolbukhin’s Third Ukrainian Front was 
on Tito’s right flank at the time -  and also that the United States would have 
reinforced Alexander with elements of the US Third Army. Hence, any such 
engagement would almost certainly have broadened swiftly into a wider 
shooting war between East and West. This confrontation was pre-empted by 
a clever Anglo-American bluff.
The liberation of Trieste was quite dramatic. On 16 May 1945, Time reported:
Trieste was liberated last week. But the heady thrill of liberation was 
quickly followed by an international headache - conflicting Yugoslav 
and Italian claims to the city, which is predominantly Italian but 
situated in a Slav area.
Into Trieste, as the Germans retreated, crowded Marshal Tito's 
Yugoslav partisans, Italian Communist partisans, Italian non- 
Communist partisans and (to the surprise of most people who had all 
but forgotten them) General Draja Mihailovitch's Chetniks. Yugoslavs 
and Italians at once asserted squatter's rights.
Before the partisans could come to blows, the British Eighth Army's 
crack [2nd] New Zealand division dashed in and occupied Trieste's
strategic waterfront. So long as they remained there, Italians felt, 
Trieste was not lost to Italy - though the Yugoslavs held almost all the 
rest of Venezia Giulia, including Fiume. Later, US troops [91st 
Infantry Division] also moved into Trieste.
Never since the Allied occupation had the British been so popular 
with Italians. The Cabinet of aging Premier Ivanoe Bonomi issued a 
declaration of ‘deep satisfaction’ that the New Zealanders were in 
Trieste, adding a ‘special salute to the incontestably Italian city’.60
When British, American and Yugoslav forces moved into the Venezia-Gulia 
area (Yugoslavs were carrying US weapons and wearing United States Army 
uniforms made at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot in Pennsylvania), 
Field Marshall Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean 
Theatre of Operations, immediately ordered the American 91st Infantry 
Division to be placed under the operational control of the British Eighth Army. 
The 91st was to send one battalion to occupy Trieste, and the remainder of 
the division was to deploy northward, up to the Austrian border. The 
Yugoslav commander sent a sharp message to the 91st Division 
Commander, Major General William G. Livesay, demanding that he withdraw 
in order to avoid a major incident. Livesay responded ‘you withdraw your 
troops, for if there is (an incident), it will be because of your forces. My troops 
are disciplined’.61 The situation was tense. The US 10th Mountain Division 
and II Corps Headquarters were moved to the area and placed under the 
control of the British Eighth Army. The 85th Infantry Division was also placed 
on alert, while Lieutenant General Sir William Duthin Morgan, Deputy 
Supreme Commander Mediterranean Theatre (and a direct descendent of
60 Time Magazine, May 16 1945, Foreign News - Italy -  Trouble Spot,’ pp. 46-47.
61 Thomas St. John Arnold, United States Forces Austria (Charlottesville: Sunflower 
University Press, 2001), pp. 30-31.
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the pirate, Sir Henry Morgan) established a so-called Morgan Line to 
separate Allied forces in Italy from those of Yugoslavia in Venezia-Gulia. This 
extended from Trieste all the way to the Austrian border.62
By this time, the Yugoslav advance had caught up with the half -million 
refugees who were fleeing northward from Soviet and Bulgarian forces. Also, 
the British found a large population of so-called Chetniks (who were accused 
by some of having fought on Germany’s side), 35,000 and growing quickly, 
as well as some 35,000 German Croat troops.63 Widespread atrocities were 
occurring, as indeed was also the case in that part of Austria that Tito had 
occupied and set up a provisional Yugoslav government. Abuses of the local 
population were widespread.
Alexander and General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied 
Forces in Europe, were appalled by these incidents, but there was little they 
could do about it in pragmatic terms, being significantly outnumbered. 
Alexander appealed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and also to the Foreign 
Office for advice and assistance on this problem, suggesting that to send the 
Chetniks back to Yugolavia ‘might be fatal to their health’.64
Alexander had met with Tito on 8 May, in Belgrade, in an attempt to negotiate 
a resolution of these issues. Tito’s reaction was to expel both the British and
62 Ibid., p. 31.
63 Alexander to Combined Chiefs of Staff, Telegram NAF 975 , 17 May 1945, 371/48018, 
PRO.
64 Ibid.
American Liaison Missions from Belgrade on 14 May, thereby triggering a 
very clear and present threat of military engagement between Yugoslav and 
British forces in Southern Austria.
The issue of the Chetniks in Austria (and the presence of Cossacks, who 
were handed over to the Soviets) was referred to the Cabinet. A 26 May 
Minute by the Cabinet’s Chiefs of Staff Committee rendered the opinion that 
the ‘Austrian’ Chetniks should be dealt with in the same way fleeing Chetniks 
in Venezia Gulia were, and that they not be handed over or returned to 
Yugoslavia. Instead, the Committee felt it best for them to be disarmed and 
interned ‘pending final agreement on their disposal by the British and United 
States Governments’.65 The Cossacks did not fare as well. Macmillan, who at 
the time was touring Italy and Austria, noted in his 13 May 1945 diary entry:
Moreover, among the surrendered Germans are about 40,000 
Cossacks and ‘White’ Russians, with their wives and children. To 
hand them over to the Russians is condemning them to slavery, 
torture and probably death. To refuse, is deeply to offend the 
Russians, and incidentally break the Yalta agreement. We have 
decided to hand them over.66
Alexander was already distracted by another potentially serious situation, 
when the French refused a direct order to withdraw from Northern Italy. His 
military position was untenable, and he asked Eisenhower to intervene with 
the French and also to dispatch three additional divisions, which, he
65 Chiefs of Staff Committee Minute, 26 May 1945, 371/48018, C.O.S.(45)358 (0), PRO.
66 Harold Macmillan, War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean, January 1943-May 
1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 757.
calculated, would give him enough capability to expel the Yugoslavs from 
Austria and Trieste. In addition, he asked for urgent assistance in managing 
220,000 prisoners of war and 200,000 so-called Displaced Persons (DPs), 
whose care was occupying a large number of his troops in Austria, whom he 
otherwise needed for urgent duties. Eisenhower defused the French situation 
by threatening to withhold all military assistance until they were out of Italy. 
De Gaulle backed down. Eisenhower told Alexander that he would be unable 
to assist with the DP and POW situation, but he acknowledged the 
seriousness of the Yugoslav challenge and pledged American support.
London and Washington agreed with Alexander and Eisenhower that war 
with Yugoslavia in Austria had to be avoided if at all possible, and so a 
strategy was developed to bluff Tito into withdrawing his claims. Eisenhower 
believed that Tito’s confidence in dictating terms to Alexander was based on 
the support he had been promised by the Red Army, which was present in 
the area in superior numbers. The new American President, Harry S. 
Truman, and his Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, suggested that 
Eisenhower dispatch the Third Army’s General George C. Patton with several 
armoured divisions to reinforce Alexander, but Eisenhower was reluctant to 
do so. Among other reasons, Eisenhower knew these troops were badly 
needed in Asia, and he did not want to start an unnecessary war with 
Yugoslavia. He suspected that Tito could be sufficiently intimidated by the 
mere threat of such reinforcement, especially if Patton were personally 
involved. The objective, then, was to cause Tito to withdraw without firing a 
shot -  a risky gamble.
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While this discussion was in progress, Tito moved five divisions into 
Southeast Carinthia and he re-configured his forces in preparation for 
possible war with the British. Alexander responded by evacuating all allied 
personnel from the threatened areas of Austria. A shooting war between the 
British and Yugoslavs was imminent when Eisenhower announced that he 
was dispatching General Patton and several US armoured divisions 
southward to bolster Alexander’s Sixth Army Group. Eisenhower, of course, 
had no intention of actually doing this. The bluff worked. Tito backed down. 
According to Portisch and Riff, Tolbukhin himself ordered Tito to withdraw all 
Yugoslav forces out of Carinthia, which, if so, would have contributed to 
Tito’s motivation in going home.67 In any case, he did go home.
The second Belgrade Agreement (9 June 1945) and the Trieste Agreement 
(20 June 1945) decompressed this confrontation. But it had rocketed Austria 
to the top of Britain’s list of priorities before the country’s political leadership 
even had time to catch their breath at war’s end.
C o n c l u s io n s
On 13 April 1945, one day after Roosevelt’s death and succession to the 
American Presidency by Vice President Harry S. Truman, Stalin informed 
American Ambassador Harriman that the Red Army had entered and taken 
Vienna. World War Two ended in Europe a little over three weeks later, on 8 
May. It was time for the occupation of Austria to begin. British and American 
planners had, despite a myriad of continuing difficulties, done their job. Both
67 Portisch, Die Wiedergeburt Unseres Staates, p. 337.
nations were more or less prepared to meet occupation responsibilities, 
which were initially assumed by young, front line officers seconded for this 
civil government duty from front line units.68 The first Control Agreement and 
agreement providing for occupation zones and administration of the City of 
Vienna, however, were to be finalised only in July. It was not until August that 
the first meeting of Allied commanders took place on Austrian soil. The 
bickering between East and West that was to lead to the next war had 
already started, even before the dust of the World War had settled.
The 1943 Moscow Declaration was supposed to have confirmed that Austria 
was to be treated by the victorious Powers as a liberated, independent 
country that had been taken over forcefully by Germany. This implied, at 
least to Britain and the United States, that Austria was still a sovereign nation 
and deserved to be given back its full independence as soon as possible. 
The post-war sovereign power in Austria was, however, to be the Allied 
Commission, even though a provisional Austrian Government was put into 
place by the Soviets in Vienna and a new Austrian Government subsequently 
came into being via genuine national elections. The Soviet Union saw the 
guilt clause in the Moscow Declaration as justification for a massive 
campaign of confiscations, and this generated the single most difficult and 
contentious obstacle to the Austrian State treaty. Austria was not to be free 
until May of 1955.
68 Ekern, The Allied Commission for Austria,' p. 56.
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An effective Anglo-American relationship had been formed during the war at 
leadership levels and in the joint military staffs. The foundation for a 
continuing US -  UK cooperation was, however, shaken with the sudden 
disappearance of both national leaders. Roosevelt died in April and Churchill 
lost the 5 July elections. Stalin was the only one of the Big Three left. The 
new British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was confronted with the 
awesome task of crafting new relationships and alliances that would provide 
for Britain’s continuing national security, and at the same time accommodate 
her new status as a bankrupt nation, yet one accustomed to the role of a 
great world power.
Austria was to play a supporting role in the drama that unfolded during the 
next ten years. Austria provided a stage upon which the competing Cold War 
participants engaged and manoeuvred, always with an eye cocked toward 
the much larger and more important problem, Germany. In 1945, the new 
Labour Government adopted Churchill’s objective of creating a free and 
independent Austria as soon as possible. As the Four Powers engaged on 
Austrian soil and elsewhere, however, British resolve weakened and it was 
not long before London’s ultimate policy objective became ending the British 
occupation and concluding an Austrian State Treaty, even if this meant 
paying bribes the Kremlin was asking for in return for agreement on the 
T reaty.
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C h a p t e r  T w o : B r it is h  In te r e s ts  a n d  P o l ic ie s  D u r in g  t h e  P er io d  
1945-1948
This chapter addresses the transitional period between war’s end and 
consolidation of the two Cold War camps. It reveals the thinking behind 
British policy formulation regarding Austria, relying heavily on archival 
diplomatic correspondence between Vienna, Paris, Moscow, Washington and 
the Foreign Office, drafted by experienced British officials who were in the 
front lines of diplomacy and directly involved with occupation issues, as well 
as with the evolving relationships between the Allied Powers. Austria was to 
become a Cold War battlefield on which the Four Powers would test 
negotiating proposals and tactics, at least partially with intent to identify those 
policies that might work toward the achievement of vested interest in and 
about Germany. While some of this archival material has been mentioned in 
other works, few, if any of the documents used in this chapter have been 
exploited in such depth. Yet each one exposes much of the rationale for 
Britain’s foreign policies toward Austria as they evolved during the post war 
transition years. Here, the reader can see the origins of Britain’s commitment 
to an Austrian State Treaty -  to the resolution of all outstanding issues and 
disagreements between the Allies on Austria through the vehicle of one 
document. This rigid posture was to cause difficulties, and it locked Britain’s 
diplomacy into an inflexible position that did not always work to her 
advantage and that frequently annoyed her most important ally, the United 
States.
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Many Americans could never quite understand why British policy makers 
assumed that an end to the occupation would automatically result in 
independence for Austria, especially since the Russians were demanding 
huge payments and other expensive concessions in return for the treaty, and 
Moscow was insisting on maintaining control of Austrian industrial and 
mineral resources after Western troops left the country. Nor could Americans 
understand why an early execution of a treaty was the most important task at 
hand. The US wanted to keep Western forces in Austria until Austria had the 
capability to provide for her own internal security. That, in the American view, 
was the only way to prevent the country from falling into Communist hands 
and guarantee true independence, particularly given the fate of Austria’s 
immediate neighbours in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Americans were 
more interested in actual results than words on a piece of paper, no matter 
how well those words were intended.
The degree of commitment to the Austrian State Treaty by Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin provided Moscow with powerful negotiating leverage. Did this 
policy stance by Britain prolong the occupation of Austria unnecessarily? The 
answer to that lies in a second question: would the Austrians have enjoyed 
true sovereignty and independence if the United States and Britain had 
signed a treaty and withdrawn their military forces while the Soviet Army 
remained in place and in control of the country’s most important infrastructure 
assets?
70
This chapter also summarises a decision taken at the Potsdam Conference 
(17 July - 2 August 1945), which in effect opened the door for the Russians to 
extract reparations from Austria, something Britain and the United States did 
not want to happen. Some historians have attributed this decision to 'Soviet 
cunning in its plan to take over Austria,’ while others describe it as a Western 
blunder of some magnitude.1
B e g in n in g  o f  T he  O c c u p a tio n
It was Britain that persuaded the United States to participate in the 
occupation of Austria, and the US did so only with great reluctance. The war 
against Japan was still raging at the time of Germany’s surrender. Men and 
material were badly needed in the Far East, and isolationist tendencies were 
still strong throughout the country. The President was under pressure to bring 
the boys home. Roosevelt let it be known that he wanted no more than an 
American zone in northern Germany because the ports were situated there 
and it would make it easier to transport Americans out of Europe. He had 
bowed on 9 December 1944 to British and, ironically, Soviet pressure to 
accept a zone of occupation in Austria as well. American reluctance to 
remain in Europe began to dissipate when it became obvious that the United 
States, Britain and the Soviet Union were drifting into what later became 
known as the Cold War.
1 Robert Graham Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, (PhD, London 
University, 1986), p. 42. See also William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 38.
Vienna fell on 13 April 1945, but it took until June of that year before Stalin 
agreed to allow a British/American delegation travel to the capital. It was not 
until 23 August that the first meeting of the allied commanders took place on 
Austrian soil. The first session of the Allied Council was delayed until 11 
September.2 In the meantime, the Soviets had moved swiftly to appoint a 
provisional government under the leadership of Dr. Karl Renner, a canny old 
Socialist (whom Lenin was said to have described as ‘one of the most 
despicable lackeys of German imperialism’), who had served as president of 
the last elected Austrian parliament, during the First Republic.3 Stalin ordered 
the Soviet High Command to find Renner and place him in charge of 
government as soon as possible, acting presumably under the impression 
that Renner’s long commitment to Socialism and his vast political experience 
would be helpful in establishing a Soviet style people’s democracy in Austria. 
Stalin was prepared to overlook Renner’s enthusiastic support for Hitler’s 
1938 Anschlufi 4 According to Mastny, when Stalin learned that Renner was 
in touch with the Red Army in Austria, he said ‘the old traitor is still alive? He 
is just the man we need’.5 Elements of the Third Ukrainian Front did locate 
Renner but found him disgusted by the undisciplined conduct of Russian 
troops. When assured that these incidents were the result of individual
2 Mark Clark, Calculated Risk: The Story o f  the War in the Mediterranean (New York: Harper &  
Bros, 1950), p. 452: ‘They (Soviets) were busy looting Austria at the time and didn’t want to be 
bothered’.
3 Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and Politics o f  Communism, 
1941-1945 (New York and Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 268.
4 Gunter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage o f  the Weak (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1999), p. 35.
5 Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War p. 268.
72
misconduct and not official policy, and that they would be stopped, Renner 
agreed to lead the provisional government.
On 27 April 1945, Renner declared Austria’s independence and reinstated 
the Constitution of 1920. This action was taken without any consultation with 
or advanced notice to the United States and Britain. The Western Allies, 
expecting joint decision-making in the governing of occupied Austria, were 
shocked. Britain refused to recognise the Renner government and accused 
Stalin of violating the Yalta Agreements. In Central Europe, postwar relations 
between the victorious allies began on a far less than friendly note.
But if the Russians were hoping that Renner would help them put a 
Communist or at least pro-Soviet government in place before the Western 
Allies could compose themselves, Moscow was in for a big surprise. The 
Kremlin was banking heavily on a strong Communist representation in 
Austria’s post war government. It was therefore important that the 
Communist Party (KPO) perform strongly in the first national elections, held 
on 25 November 1945 under supervision of the Soviet-appointed provisional 
government, before the Western Allies were settled in Vienna. It came as a 
very cold shower when the KPO won just over five percent of the vote and 
lost nine of their ten provisional cabinet seats. The conservative Austrian 
Peoples Party (OVP) emerged with almost an absolute majority, and
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proceeded to form a national government with the Socialists (SPO) and only 
an insignificant KPO representation.6
Immediately following the elections, a leading Communist member of the 
Provisional government, Ernst Fischer, conceded openly that the excesses of 
Soviet front line troops had delivered an irreparable blow to the prestige of 
Austria’s Communist Party.7 This uncivilised behaviour had caused many 
Austrians to turn away from Communism and toward the West for protection. 
One parish priest observed ‘these people will never forget what the Red 
Army did to our women’.8 With the exception of a few attempts to generate 
social unrest, the KPO was not to play an important role in Austrian politics. 
Indeed, most Austrians never did forget.
While occupied Germany was initially governed by an Allied Control Council 
until 1949, the Austrian government was subordinate to an Allied Council, 
which met regularly to discuss and agree on important issues and to approve 
or disapprove government actions. Chairmanship of the Allied Council 
rotated on a monthly basis, marked by an elaborate military changing-of-the- 
guard ceremony in Vienna. This ceremony was always followed by a social
6 Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat und das Ende der Ost-West 
Besetzung Osterreichs 1945-1955 (Vienna - Cologne - Graz: Bohlau Verlag, 1998), p. 781. See also 
Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War , p. 69.
7 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, p. 34.
8 Ibid., p. 33.
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reception hosted by the incoming controlling power.9 A Vienna Inter-Allied 
Command was set up to govern Vienna.
The whole Four Power occupation superstructure was known as the Allied 
Commission for Austria (ACA).10 The ACA was organised into directorates, 
each with representation from all Four Powers. Internal Affairs, Political, 
Legal, Finance, Education, Social Administration, Economics and 
Transportation & Communications directorates corresponded to the 
equivalent ministries in the Austrian government. There were five directorates 
without an Austrian counterpart: Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution, 
Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons, Military, Naval and Air.
Heading the ACA was the Allied Council (AC), composed of the four 
Commanders-in-Chief, or High Commissioners. The deputies to these High 
Commissioners formed the Executive Committee (EC). The AC and EC met 
on alternative Fridays. Agenda items could be introduced by any one of the 
Four Powers at any level. Usually, issues introduced were initially sent to the 
responsible directorate. If there was unanimous agreement on an issue, it 
was normally referred to the Executive Committee for ratification. Items on 
which there was disagreement were referred up the chain of command, step 
by step. Directorates could also simply drop items where severe
9 As a boy, the author accompanied his father, a high ranking American official, to some of these 
functions. At one, Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Kurasov made a point of initiating a 
conversation. He particularly admired the colourful necktie I was wearing, and said he would never be 
able to buy such a thing in the Soviet Union. I asked him if  he would like to have the tie. He said he 
would. I took the necktie off and presented him with it -  not the first or last gift handed the Soviets by 
representatives of the Western Powers in Austria.
10 Note the absence of the word control in this title, a result of the Moscow Declaration, as discussed 
in Chapter 1.
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disagreement existed, or they could hold them over until future sessions. If 
the Allied Council, the supreme authority, could not agree on any issue, this 
issue could be dropped from the agenda or referred back to the appropriate 
directorate for continuing discussion and negotiation.11
Each of the occupying powers was responsible for its designated occupation 
zone in the country, and also for its respective sector of the city. Control of 
the International Sector rotated monthly and became the responsibility of 
whichever power was chairing the Allied Council.
The importance of International Sector control was more than symbolic. The 
Soviet practice of kidnapping in Austria was widespread, and was the source 
of much friction between the USSR, the Austrian government and the 
Western allies. Dramatic incidents in which individuals were snatched directly 
off of streets in the International Sector, in broad daylight, were not 
uncommon, especially during those months the Sector was under Soviet 
control.12 The Western allies usually were a bit more cautious during the 
same periods of time, and some Westerners studiously avoided entering the 
International Sector during those months when the Soviets were in the chair.
" Halvor O. Ekem, 'The Allied Commission for Austria', in The Austria Solution: International 
Conflict and Cooperation, Bauer, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1982), pp. 57-58
12 William L Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f Austria (Bonn, Vienna, Zurich: 
Siegler & Co, 1962), p. 66.
76
While the Moscow Declaration may have provided a foundation for British 
policy, there is a difference between having a policy and observing it. During 
the early days of the occupation, none of the Allies treated Austria as a 
liberated nation.13 Indeed, all took a punitive approach, as they addressed 
the myriad of practical problems involved in putting occupation machinery 
into place. The overall atmosphere was not conducive to an amiable 
relationship between the Allies’ battle-hardened combat troops and the local 
Austrians. The fact that German Army personnel, including Waffen SS 
troops, continued to surrender to the Allies sporadically throughout 1945 was 
among the reminders that war was still in progress.
The four Allied commanders met on Austrian territory for the first time on 23 
August 1945. The meeting took place in Vienna, after the Soviets lifted their 
ban on Western travel to the capital. The quadripartite administration of 
Austria began officially on 11 September when the new Allied Council met for 
the very first time, in the Imperial Hotel. Soviet Marshall Koniev chaired the 
session. Between Potsdam and this first Allied Council session, the Western 
Allies had become increasingly annoyed by what was turning out to be a 
concerted program of plant and equipment confiscations by the Russians. 
General Clark observed:
The Soviet approach to this problem was to claim everything and 
then challenge the Austrians and the other Allied Powers to prove 
that it had not been legal German property. ... In this way they
13 Ralph W. I l l  Brown, A Cold War Army o f Occupation. The US Military Government in Vienna, 
1945-1950, (PhD, University of Tennessee, 1995), p. 89. See also US Joint Chiefs of Staff to General 
Mark Clark, FRUS vol.l, Potsdam, 27 June 1945, pp. 338-339. See also Department of State Bulletin, 
vol. X III, no. 331, 28 October 1945, pp. 661-673.
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removed vast amounts of coal, oil and machinery from Austria 
immediately after the war in a period of looting that all but wrecked 
the national economy beyond hope of reconstruction: and they used 
their rights as an occupational power to seize 120 factories in their 
zone.
At Potsdam, the West had suggested that Austria be exempt from paying 
reparations, even if some agreement would eventually be reached involving a 
one-time delivery of capital goods built up solely for German war fighting 
requirements.15 Moscow, in turn, argued that Austria should pay reparations, 
specifically 250 million dollars (in kind) over a period of six years, because 
Austrian troops had participated in the invasion of the USSR and had done 
much damage. On 28 July, Stalin surprised everybody by renouncing 
reparations from Austria on the grounds that no Austrian Army had 
participated in the war. He argued that Austrians had been in the war, of 
course, but they were mostly scattered throughout German Army units.16 
While this discussion was in progress, Soviets in Austria continued to remove 
Austrian plant and other equipment for transhipment to the USSR. British 
Treasury officials warned that, unless this practice stopped, ‘our successful 
contest to get Austria off paying reparations will have been an empty 
victory’.17
14 Clark, Calculated Risk: The Story o f the War in the Mediterranean , p. 467.
15 Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, p. 42, citing a 21 July 1945 British 
draft, FRUS, Potsdam II, Doc. 765.
16 Ibid., p. 43.
17 29 July 1945 Memorandum by Treasury Under Secretary David Waley, FO 371/45906, UE 3373, 
PRO.
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Even at this early stage in post war developments, British officials recognised 
the potential importance of what became the most contentious issue 
throughout negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty: disposition of German 
assets in Austria. This, however, did not prevent the Western Powers from 
striking an agreement with Stalin that a demarcation line would be drawn, 
North to South, through Europe, running directly through Austria, and all 
German external assets on one side of the line would belong to the West and 
German external assets on the other side would belong to the Soviet Union. 
On the last day of the conference, Stalin suggested that this agreement 
include German assets located in Austria. According to Bischof, the 
Americans were not paying too much attention because they were tired and 
wanted to go home, and the British agreed ‘only reluctantly’.18 The assets 
covered by Stalin’s suggestion were in addition to what the Soviets were 
carting off from Austria as these discussions were taking place. It did not 
occur to anybody in the West to insist that the Three Powers agree on a 
definition of ‘German asset’, and both Truman and Attlee signed the 
agreement. It was to come back and haunt them.
The British Treasury was the first to lament this concession, regarding it as a 
‘great pity’, that the Western Powers had renounced claim to German 
external assets in Eastern Europe, a move they felt would totally negate all 
British efforts over the past two years to exempt Austria from paying 
reparations at all.19 Bischof points out that the West’s concessions were
18 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, p. 40.
19 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
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costly. Both Austria and Germany ended up paying something like five times 
what Stalin asked for at Potsdam.20
By signing the German assets agreement, Truman and Attlee triggered 
almost a decade-long argument between the Western Powers and the Soviet 
Union, and they also created raw material for an active debate in the world of 
academia. Knight points to the continuing arguments in recent Austrian 
historiography on this issue. Some historians describe the Potsdam decision 
on German assets to be less of a Western blunder and more a ‘logical 
reflection of deliberate policy’.21 Others describe the decision as representing 
the West’s dividing up war booty. The more traditional interpretation carries 
most weight. This has it that the West, quite simply, blundered. Truman and 
Attlee should not have signed away German assets in Austria without at least 
demanding unanimous agreement on what the term meant. As we shall see, 
however, this mistake was to be matched by one of equal magnitude by the 
Soviets when they casually agreed to a new nationalisation law which, in 
effect, negated Moscow’s veto on most issues in the Allied Council.
Between the end of the war and the first Allied Council meeting, the West 
learned that the Soviets were trying to entice Austria into a bilateral 
agreement providing for the transfer of certain Austrian facilities to Russian 
control. Moscow was holding out the prospect of a bilateral Austro-Soviet 
trade Agreement in return for certain Austrian agreements on these transfers.
20 Ibid.
21 Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950,, p. 42.
Moscow obviously wanted to craft an economic agreement with Austria along 
the same lines as she had with her Eastern European client states. Austrian 
representatives seemed prepared to go along with the deal, but asked 
Russians for three things. First, Austria wanted bilateral agreement on a 
specific list of firms that would be eligible for Soviet take-over. Second, they 
wanted the opportunity to buy Soviet equity back with government bonds. 
Third, Austria wanted concrete assurances that any firms taken over would 
still remain under Austrian jurisdiction. The Soviets were not prepared to 
grant any of these requests, so it is unlikely that the bilateral trade agreement 
would have become a reality, even if Western Intelligence had not found out 
about the discussions, which the Soviets tried hard to keep secret, and 
vetoed the idea.22
The immediate post war months were far from anti-climatic. On 26 July 1945, 
Churchill was voted out of office and a new Labour Government took charge 
in the United Kingdom, with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and Ernest 
Bevin as Foreign Secretary. In Asia, the world’s first atomic weapons were 
deployed in Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (8 August). In Austria, East 
and West were beginning to size each other up and begin a dialogue that 
was, at least ostensibly, intended to lead to Austria’s independence. It was to 
be a much longer and more complex path than anybody in the West 
anticipated at the time.
22 Office of Strategic Service (Charles Thayer) to Gruenther, 7 September 1945, Records Group 59, D 
331, NARA II.
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The EAC had been formally dissolved during the Potsdam Conference in 
July. Following unpleasant exchanges with Soviet command, the British Army 
was finally permitted to move into the British Zone of occupation, replacing 
Red Army units on the move to their newly prescribed zone. The British 
entered Graz on 23 July 1945. On 23 August, each Allied Power was fully 
positioned in its respective headquarters in Vienna, with the British 
headquarters located in Schonbrunn Palace. The transition from Eighth Army 
to civilian control took place smoothly and without serious incident. By 15 
August 1945, Allied Council staff had completely replaced Eighth Army 
personnel in all senior positions.23 The control machinery that was to power 
the Allied Council had also been agreed. Austria’s elected government would 
administer the country, but supreme authority, in effect sovereignty, would 
rest in the Allied Council.
A u s t r ia  in Ea s t -W es t  R e la tio n s
As organisational affairs in Austria were progressing, serious diplomatic 
events were beginning to unfold in the broader international arena. During 
the second half of 1945, there were two meetings of the new Council of 
Foreign Ministers (CFM). The first took place in London from 11 September 
to 2 October. The second was in Moscow from 15-27 December. During both 
of these sessions, Four Power interaction on the wide spectrum of post war 
issues was affected by the demise of the suspicious but comfortable 
relationship that had developed during the war years between Churchill, 
Stalin and Roosevelt. Both Roosevelt and Churchill had suddenly
23 Alice Hills, Britain and the Occupation o f Austria, 1943-1945 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, London: 
Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 167.
disappeared from the scene, and Stalin departed almost immediately after 
Germany’s surrender for a prolonged vacation near Sochi on the Black Sea. 
It was left to the foreign ministers to get to know each other at the CFM 
meetings, and to develop a constructive way of working with each other.
Stalin did historians a favour by taking this vacation, his first in nine years. 
The absence from Moscow of both Molotov, who was attending overseas 
conferences, and Stalin, on vacation, necessitated the exchange of written 
correspondence. Copies of this correspondence are now available to some 
scholars, including Professor Vladimir O. Pechatnov of the Moscow Institute 
of International Relations, who, with translation assistance from Vladislav 
Zubok, has produced a study of the correspondence.24
There is little evidence that the Soviet Union assigned any great strategic 
importance to Austria, which cropped up only once in the 1945 
correspondence exchange between Stalin and Molotov -  at least in that part 
of the correspondence that has been translated and published. Stalin asked 
Molotov to explain a proposal of the Western Allies to replace old 
Reichsmark notes with a new currency, the Alliance Schilling. Stalin said this 
proposal looked to him to be ‘suspicious.’ Molotov responded ‘I consider 
undesirable the exchange of Reichsmark for the Alliance Schilling. This, of 
course, could make us dependent on the Allies. It would be better for us to 
accelerate the adoption of an Austrian currency and to help them [the
24 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, Foreign Policy Correspondence Between Stalin and Molotov and Other 
Politburo Members, September 1945 - December 1946; 'The Allies Are Pressing You To Break Your 
Will', (Washington DC: CWIHP, 1999), p. 25.
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Austrians] in this business. This would be also more advantageous for us 
politically’.25
It is also clear in the Stalin-Molotov correspondence how both viewed Britain 
and the United States. Stalin observed ‘the Anglo-Saxons are hostile, 
duplicitous, and anti-Soviet at heart, they understand only the language of 
firmness and strength. At worst, they are hidden enemies, at best - rivals, 
and if they are allies then it is in name only.’26
The F ir s t  CFM M eetin g s
At the first two CFM meetings, Foreign Minister Molotov represented the 
USSR. The American Secretary of State was still the enigmatic John Byrnes. 
John Foster Dulles, a bright and experienced Wall Street lawyer with strong 
links to Conservative Republicans in congress, arrived in London as a new 
addition to the American team and was soon to become one of America’s 
most influential secretaries of state, with profound influence on East-West 
relations. Ernest Bevin made his first appearance as Britain’s Foreign 
Secretary, following Labour’s victory in Britain’s polls, and he experienced the 
first of his many clashes with his Soviet counterpart. Toward the end of 
September, when Bevin must still have been reeling from this encounter, it 
occurred to him to tell Molotov that his methods were very akin to those of 
Hitler. This did not go down very well. Molotov reported to Stalin ‘I declared 
that if Bevin did not take these inappropriate words back, then I would not be
25 Ibid., p.7.
26 Ibid., p. 8.
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able to participate in this conference’. Molotov stormed to the exit, but Bevin 
defused the incident by apologising.27
The first twelve meetings of the CFM concentrated on Italian and Balkan 
issues. Sparks began flying especially on the topic of Rumania, and the 
Western delegates were able to witness first-hand Stalin’s new get tough 
negotiating style. It quickly became obvious that Stalin had no inclination to 
compromise on what for him was a vital issue—the consolidation of a Soviet 
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
In briefing Molotov on how he should behave at the London CFM, Stalin 
wrote:
What might happen under such conditions? It might happen that the 
Allies could sign a peace treaty with Italy without us. So what? Then 
we have a precedent. We would get a possibility in our turn to reach 
a peace treaty with our satellites without the Allies.28
The London CFM session in September 1945 was the first diplomatic 
encounter between the Allies after the Potsdam Conference. The agenda 
included the preparation of draft peace treaties with Germany’s wartime 
allies, a process that more or less automatically came to include Austria. The 
unifying factor of war no longer existed and everyone suspected that 
negotiations between East and West would be more difficult. Moscow could 
no longer depend on the relationships Stalin had formed with Roosevelt and
27 Ibid., p. 7.
28 Ibid., p.2.
Churchill to negotiate mutually acceptable spheres of influence in Europe. 
Both were gone -  and the United States had the atomic bomb. Stalin 
adopted stronger, more aggressive negotiating tactics and instructed Molotov 
to get tough with the West.29
1946 a n d  th e  T he  M a c k /J er r a m  R e p o r ts
By 1946, the developing standoff between East and West had to be 
acknowledged. On 9 February 1946, in Moscow’s Bolshoi Theatre, in his first 
post war public speech, Stalin highlighted the importance of securing the 
USSR unilaterally, through ‘renewed mobilisation of domestic resources’ and 
rearmament. While suggesting that it might be possible to avoid military 
confrontation with the West if the Allies would agree on a periodic and fair 
reapportioning of raw materials and markets, he conceded that this could not 
take place under the ‘contemporary capitalist conditions of world economic 
development’.30 This speech and George Kennan’s famous Long Telegram 
offered persuasive confirmation that the Cold War had begun.31
Britain’s agreement was signalled by Winston Churchill on 5 March, when he 
delivered a speech entitled The Sinews of Peace’ at Fulton, Missouri, 
population 7,000, to a crowd of over 40,000 people, with the President of the
29 Ibid.
30 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to 
Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 35.
31 Kennan’s communications from Moscow had strong influence on the thinking of Western policy 
makers. For detailed analysis of Kennan’s cables, see William Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy, 
(New York: Norton, 1982), Robert J. McMahon, The Origins o f  the Cold War, third edition, 
(Lexington, Mass: D. H. Heath & Co, 1991).
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United States seated directly behind him. Churchill made it clear that he was 
speaking for himself and that his views did not necessarily reflect the official 
policies of the United Kingdom: ‘from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the 
Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent’. Russia, 
through the agency of the Communist parties and fifth columnists, was set on 
destroying the foundations of Christian civilisation. The Soviet Union must be 
resisted by a permanent alliance of the staunch English-speaking peoples - 
the United States, Great Britain and the Commonwealth.32
Klaus Larres maintains that Churchill’s Fulton speech was misunderstood. 
Churchill’s intention, according to Larres, was to recommend a twin track 
approach to the Soviet Union. While recognising that ‘there is nothing they 
(the USSR) admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they 
have less respect than for weakness, especially for military weakness’, 
Churchill was only calling for negotiations from strength. He remained 
convinced that it would be possible for the West to maintain ‘good 
understanding on all points with Russia’ after the War, but this element of his 
Fulton speech was disregarded and the public focused on his more dramatic 
‘iron curtain’ reference.33 Larres points out that, even in Opposition, Churchill 
continued to press for summit diplomacy -  direct negotiations on the most 
important international issues between chiefs-of-state. This was a prospect, 
however, that was neither acceptable to the American State Department nor
32 Jennifer Rosenberg, ‘Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech,’ 20th Century History in Partnership 
with the History Net, <http://historvl900s.about.com/librarv/weekly/aa082400a.htm?once=:true&>, [7 
October 2003],
33 Klaus Larres, Churchill's Cold War : the Politics o f Personal Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), pp. 124-125.
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the British Foreign Office where there was a growing sentiment in favour of 
conference diplomacy, and where there was by no means common 
agreement that it was going to be possible for the West to maintain amicable 
relations with Stalin. By this time, Austria had already become a Cold War 
battlefield, although of secondary importance to any of the Great Powers, 
except of course to the people who were fighting it on the ground. The real' 
issue was Germany, and Austria was seen as part of that problem.
Diplomats were at work in Austria itself. In a 4 February 1946 despatch, 
Bevin authorised overseas Chiefs of Mission to submit an annual political 
report in lieu of the standard annual report on key developments in their 
respective areas of responsibility, as required by the Foreign Office. In his 
report on 1946, William Henry Bradshaw Mack, Britain’s Diplomatic and 
Political Representative in Vienna, opted for this alternative and submitted a 
paper entitled ‘Austria: Political Report for 1946.’34 This six-page document 
provides valuable insight into the issues Britain’s foreign policy team on the 
ground in Vienna considered most important during the first full calendar year 
of peace.35
Mack was ideal for this assignment. Born and educated in Dublin, he entered 
government in May 1921 as Third Secretary in the Diplomatic Service. 
Following tours of duty in Constantinople and Berlin, he was promoted to
34 Mack to Bevin, Vienna, 'Austria: Political Report for 1946,' 8 May 1947, FO 465/1, Document 21,
C 7006/708/3,
35 Harold Macmillan, War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean, January 1943-May 1945 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 744 -  745: ‘I delight in Hal (Mack) -  always fresh and 
interesting, and with a wonderful sense of humour.’
Second Secretary in 1925 and then First Secretary in 1933. He was sent to 
Prague in 1934, where he became Charge D’affaires, before being 
transferred to Vienna in December of the same year. In Vienna, he acted as 
Charge D’affaires in 1935, 1936 and 1937, and again in mid-1938. He was 
attached to the Representative of Austria at the coronation of H.M. King 
George VI in May 1937. Mack left Austria for Rome in April 1938, and served 
in Paris until his transfer to the Foreign Office in London in June 1940. He 
was made a C.M.G. in June 1942 and appointed as Acting Assistant Under 
Secretary of State while still holding his. post as Political Liaison Officer with 
the forces of the United States of America in Great Britain and North Africa. 
On 13 September 1944, he was appointed as Deputy Commissioner (Civil) 
on the Control Commission for Austria, with the rank of Minister. His 
appointment as Political Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of British Forces 
of Occupation in Austria came on 1 May 1945. His extensive, previous 
experience in Austria during the First Republic, and his experience in dealing 
with Americans, would serve both him and the Allied Commission well.36
Given Europe’s post war economic and financial difficulties, it is not 
surprising that Mack devoted a major part of his 1946 report to ‘Economic 
Difficulties’. Austrians were anticipating what was predicted -  and what 
turned out to be -  a severe winter, with critical shortages of both food and 
fuel. The country’s industries were just beginning to recover, and increasing 
demand for fuel made it critically important that coal deliveries arrive on 
schedule. Unfortunately, Austria’s primary sources of coal (The Ruhr,
36 The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1947, 120th Publication, 
(London: Harrison and Sons, 1948), p. 249, REF: 351 010 ZS FO, PRO.
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Czechoslovakia and Poland) were not able to meet outstanding orders. 
Domestic coal production was lagging, hampered by a shortage of food, 
clothing and equipment and, as it became increasingly evident, Soviet 
confiscations, although Mack did not refer to these in his report.
At the end of the year, the country was in crisis. Mack reported that industry 
had come to a virtual standstill, public utilities and services were drastically 
curtailed, and the public’s morale had fallen to new levels in the face of an 
unexpectedly harsh winter. The food shortages were, in Mack’s words, 
catastrophic. The United States intervened by reducing its bill to the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), for food stocks 
handed over in April, by some $5 million, and this allowed the Austrian 
Government to announce an increase in the daily ration of bread and flour. 
This unilateral action by the Austrian government, Mack reported, infuriated 
the Soviets, who blatantly refused to allow food supplies to move out of or 
even through the Soviet Zone. It was possible to implement the increased 
ration levels only after the three Western Powers persuaded the Soviets that 
they would provide whatever financial assistance was required to ensure 
equal distribution of food and fuel throughout the country.
But UNRRA was scheduled to go out of existence in early 1947, and 
everybody knew that, left to its own resources, Austria could not afford to pay 
for needed food and fuel. The government continued to battle inflation, 
partially caused by the high spending levels of occupation forces. On 13 
December 1946, the Allied Council, after months of debate, finally decided on
90
a significant reduction in occupation costs. During the fourth quarter of the 
year, the Soviet element would receive 1121/ 2 million Schillings, while the 
other three elements would agree to receive only 25 million, each. Also, it 
was agreed that the total occupation costs during 1947 would not exceed 
fifteen percent of the Austrian budget, as compared with thirty five percent 
during 1946.37
Britain’s decision in December 1946 to give Austria grants amounting to £81A 
million and credits for relief and reconstruction, as well as a commercial 
credit of £1 !4 million for purchase of raw wool, created an excellent 
impression. According to Mack, this British offer was the first example of 
concrete economic assistance on the part of any occupying Power.38
Despite the importance of economic issues, the Second Control Agreement 
of 28 June occupied, justifiably, top priority in Mack’s report.
Althouglf the signature of the New Control Agreement, with its 
renewed- assurance of the identity of Allied aims, marked an 
important mile-stone on the road towards the re-establishment of 
Austria as an independent State, political developments in Austria 
from July to December were dominated by continued disagreement 
in the Allied Council over the means by which the agreement should 
be put into practical effect. Much disagreement was almost invariably 
due to obstruction by the Soviet element.39
37 Mack to Bevin, 'Austria: Political Report for 1946,' p. 38.
38 Ibid. This is not entirely correct. The United States had already intervened financially during 1946 
to reduce the War Department Bill to UNRRA, thereby permitting the implementation of increased 
bread and flour rations.
39 Ibid., p. 1.
This is hardly surprising. During negotiations leading up to final agreement 
on this Second Control Agreement, Soviet delegates were either not paying 
attention or had not been adequately instructed by Moscow. They agreed to 
what, in hindsight, was by far the most important provision in this new Control 
Agreement and one of the most significant agreements reached during the 
entire occupation. Article 6 of this new Agreement established that all 
Austrian legislation would become automatically effective after thirty one 
days unless the Allied Council took positive action to disapprove -  except for 
constitutional laws. For constitutional laws, advanced Allied Council approval 
was still required. By agreeing to Article 6, the Soviet Union relinquished its 
veto power in the Allied Council on legislation passed by Austria’s parliament, 
with the singular exception of constitutional matters. A debate on what was 
or was not a constitutional law began only after the Control Agreement was 
signed and after the Soviets began to understand the full ramifications of 
what they had given away. Stearman observed:
Next to November 25, 1945 (the date of the complete Communist 
electoral defeat), June 28, 1946, marked the most important day in 
Austria’s ten year occupation. It was on this day that the four Allies 
signed the New Control Agreement and by four strokes of the pen 
eliminated Soviet veto power over the Austrian parliament. 40
The electric atmosphere surrounding the Allied Council following the Second 
Control Agreement was exacerbated by the publication, via a 6 July 1946 
TASS press release, of the so-called Kurasov Order Number 17. It was 
alleged by the Russians to have been issued on 27 June -  one day before
40 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria , p. 40.
the Second Control Agreement was signed.41 Order Number 17 specified 
that, ‘in accordance with the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference’, all German 
property located in eastern Austria had passed into Soviet hands as war 
reparations payments.42 One day before, in a highly publicised event, 
General Mark Clark had returned the Steyr Works, an enterprise in the US 
Zone that had clearly been created by German capital, to Austria as a 
gesture of American good will -  and probably an intelligent public relations 
gimmick. On 10 July, the United States announced that it was withdrawing all 
claims to a share of German assets in Austria. By mid-1946, Britain was also 
well on her way toward the total renunciation of German assets in Austria. 
But the Soviet Union was moving in just the opposite direction. In fact, 
confiscations were not confined to the Russian Zone; the Soviets also seized 
all assets of the Danube Shipping Company, including the firm’s offices in the 
British occupational sector of Vienna.43
Austrian historian Rauchensteiner has argued that the Soviets knew very well 
what they were doing when they voted in favour of Article 6 of the new 
Control Agreement, but this seems hardly credible, given Moscow’s attempts 
to have it reversed.44 The Foreign Office’s view was that the Soviets were
41 There are suggestions that the Soviets deliberately backdated Order No. 17 in order to be able to 
claim that it was in effect before the Second Control Agreement was signed. Therefore facilities 
seized by the Soviets under the provisions of Order No. 17 could not be nationalised by the Austrian 
Government. See Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, p. 74. See also 
Manffied Rauchensteiner, Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Oesterreichl945 bis 1955 (Graz: 
Verlag Styria, 1979), p. 179.
42 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f Austria , p.47, citing Department of State 
Bulletin XV, 1946, p. 123.
43 Ibid., p. 49.
44 Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950,, p.70, citing Rauchensteiner, Der 
Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Oesterreichl945 bis 1955, pp. 166-167.
simply not paying sufficient attention during this particular part of the 
discussions. It is also possible that communications between Vienna and 
Moscow broke down. The Soviet element in the Allied Council apparently did 
not enjoy the same degree of discretion as did their Western counterparts. 
Decisions on all issues were made in Moscow and passed along to Vienna.
The fact that the Russians were induced to accept it has always been 
seen as remarkable. The general explanation of our people on the 
spot, that the Soviet authorities simply did not understand what they 
were agreeing to, tended to be borne out by the way they frequently 
disallowed Austrian laws in their own zone, even arresting (and 
deporting) numbers of Austrian officials for trying to implement them. 
But in any case it was a crucial development for Austria. The original 
initiative for it was an Anglo-American one, conceived and carried 
through by Jack Nicholls of our Political Division and his US 
counterpart Ware Adams. (The claim made many years later by the 
French High Commissioner General Bethourt that the idea was his 
cannot, I fear, be taken very seriously).45
Whatever Soviet motives might have been, 28 June 1946 was an important 
date in post war Austrian history, and Article 6 provided the Austrians with at 
least some relief from what had become the massive rape of their national 
assets by the Soviet Union. Stearman concludes that ‘Soviet agreement to 
Article 6 represents the most significant Soviet miscalculation vis-a-vis 
Austria since the establishment of the Renner Government’ 46 The German 
assets issue became a source of continuing friction between the allies and 
with the Austrian government throughout the occupation period, and it
45 Michael Cullis, 'Austria 1945-1955: The Desk-Level View of a British Diplomat', in Geschichte 
Zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung: Gerald Stourzh, zum 60. Geburtstag, Brix, Froeschl and Leidenffost, 
(Graz: Verlag Styria, 1989), p. 216.
46 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria , p.45.
remained the ‘single most important issue in the long- winded negotiations for 
the Austrian Treaty’. Whereas the Soviets may not have assigned much 
political or strategic value to Austria, there can be no doubt that they saw it 
as an attractive source of treasure.
On 24 July 1946, the Austrian Government submitted a Nationalisation Bill 
that was passed by the Parliament on 28 July. This legislation ordered the 
nationalisation of over 70 enterprises throughout the country, half of which 
already been taken over by the Soviets -  including the Danube Shipping 
Company.47 The objective was obvious: firms nationalised by Austria were 
no longer German assets, and therefore the Soviets had no right to 
confiscate them.
Despite frenetic opposition and attempts by Soviet authorities to intimidate 
the Austrian government into withdrawing the Bill, it became law of the land. 
The Soviets refused to allow this legislation to be implemented in their 
occupation zone, despite strong protests by America and Britain. Property 
confiscated by the Soviets was transferred to the Administration for Soviet 
Property in Eastern Austria (USIA), and the Soviet Mineral Oil Administration 
(SMV) took over management of Austria’s oil industry, which had also been 
nationalised under the new law. USIA facilities refused to pay taxes, social 
security or import duties. In total, USIA eventually consisted of some 300 
firms employing over 50,000 Austrians. Precise information on the USIA 
complex was difficult and somewhat dangerous to obtain at the time. The
47 Ibid., p. 50, citing Osterreichische Grundindustrie Verstaatlicht Bundesministerium fur Verkehr 
und Verstaatlichte Betriebe, Vienna 1951, p.8.
Russians regarded any attempt to investigate USIA as espionage, and the 
penalty for such espionage was, at the very least, a trip to the Gulag.48
While ignoring Austrian law, Soviet representatives in the Allied Council 
attempted to legitimise their conduct by pressing for repeal of the 
Nationalisation Law or, as an alternative, to have the Four Powers agree that 
it was a constitutional law requiring advanced approval by the Allied Council. 
But, as Mack told the Foreign Office, the ‘horse had already bolted and the 
Western Powers made it clear that it was now too late to close the door’. 49
Britain’s representatives who sat opposite their Russian counterparts in 
Vienna commented on several occasions on what appeared to be a 
consistent Soviet behavioural trait of placing value on the letter of the law. Sir 
George Rendel reported, in September 1947, for example:
Whatever the explanation, there seems to me no doubt that the 
Russians are genuinely anxious to see their positions in Austria 
legalised. ...They have shown a strange eagerness to be ‘made an 
honest woman of, and for the offspring of their irregularities in 
Austria to be legitimised.50
This did not mean, however, that the letter of the law would preclude Soviet 
violations of it. The issue of the Nationalisation Law remained on the Council 
agenda, with the Soviets becoming increasingly confrontational on the issue.
48 Bischof Austria in the First Cold War, P. 86.
49 Mack to Bevin, 'Austria: Political Report for 1946,' p. 36.
50 Rendel to Bevin, London, 'Austrian State Treaty: (1) Concrete Facts Relating to German Assets; (2) 
Soviet Attitude Towards an Austrian Treaty in General, 29 September 1947, FO 465/1, Document 
No. 34, C 12796/6922/3, paragraph 18,
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On 2 August, they alleged that the Law was in violation of both the Potsdam 
and new Control agreements, and they announced once again that the 
Soviet Union would take whatever unilateral action it wished, regardless of 
this new Austrian law:
The evident reluctance on the part of the Soviet element to carry out 
in practice what it had agreed on paper was amply confirmed during 
the remainder of the year (1946) by the Soviet attitude towards a 
number of other measures which were similarly designed to increase 
the authority of the Austrian Government throughout the whole 
country, and to break down the zonal barriers in the interests of 
economic unity...The Soviet action resulted therefore in a failure fully 
to restore to the Austrian Government the degree of sovereignty for 
which the Control Agreement provided.51
British representatives in Vienna began for the first time speaking in 
complimentary terms of Austria’s return to the world of international 
diplomacy. Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber had enjoyed success at the 
Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers in solving the difficult South Tyrol 
problem -  ‘with the help of the United Kingdom delegation’ and despite 
subsequent attempts by the Soviets to invalidate the settlement.52 The 
individual adventures of the Foreign Minister were accompanied by the 
gradual resumption of Austria’s bilateral relations with other governments. 
Article 7 of the Second Control Agreement established that Austria was free 
to initiate diplomatic and consular relations with United Nations (UN) member 
states and also with other governments, subject to the prior approval of the 
Allied Council. By the end of 1946, Austria had established or was in the
51 Ibid., paragraph 5, p. 60.
52 Ibid.
process of establishing sixteen missions in foreign lands, six of which had 
already attained the status of legation. In reverse, diplomatic or political 
missions accredited to the Austrian Government replaced the military 
missions that had been accredited to the Allied Council. The Yugoslav 
military mission alone made an abortive attempt, with Soviet support, to 
prolong its existence, but even after a Yugoslav political mission had been 
accepted in Vienna, the Yugoslav Government refused to receive an Austrian 
political representation in Belgrade’.53 Also by the end of 1946, Austria had 
submitted applications for membership in several important international 
organizations, ‘despite Soviet opposition’.
Mack’s overall assessment of Austria during 1946 began and ended on the 
same note. Austria’s situation was hardly encouraging:
In particular the obstructionism of the Soviet element had the effect 
both of prolonging uncertainty about Austria's political future, and of 
perpetuating the fundamental difficulty of zonal administration. The 
Soviet element continued to regard its own zone as one in which it 
had virtually extra-territorial rights, to interpret the Control Agreement 
to suit its own convenience, and to attempt to secure a long-term 
grasp over Austrian economy which was not consistent with its 
declared aim of the re-establishment of Austria as an independent 
State.54
At the same time, however, the beleaguered Austrian Government had not 
only survived a difficult year, but had proven its ability to hold together and to 
begin the process of resuming pre-war relations with a number of other
53 'Austria: Political Report for 1946,' paragraph 9, p. 37.
54 Ibid. paragraph 22, p. 39.
important nations. It was Mack’s assessment that the Austrian people -  one 
must assume they were referring predominantly to the Viennese -  despite 
severe privations, retained a remarkable cheerfulness of heart, and this in 
itself was seen to justify an optimistic expectation of ultimate recovery.
At the end of 1946, the CFM decided to proceed with negotiations on a treaty 
for Austria. Although Britain’s representatives to the Council could not have 
known this at the time, they made two mistakes. According to Michael Cullis:
First was the way in which, mistakenly believing it would facilitate 
agreement, we based some of our draft on the model of the peace 
treaties with ex-enemy countries that had just been concluded, 
despite the fact that the Austrian Treaty was meant to be of a 
different kind.’ Secondly, there was the equally sincere but 
unwarranted confidence with which we approached these 
negotiations in the New Year, little imagining that it would be over 8 
years before they came to fruition.55
1947 and the Cheetham/ Rendel Reports
The annual report on political developments in Austria during the year 1947 
was signed by Nicholas John Alexander Cheetham of the British Element’s 
Political Division, ACA, from 1946-1948. Cheetham, too, was an experienced 
diplomat. He was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford, and entered 
the diplomatic service as a Third Secretary in October of 1934. He served 
tours of duty in Athens, Buenos Aires and Mexico City, before returning to the 
Foreign Office in January 1944. He was transferred to the Allied Commission 
for Austria on 16 August 1946, as Director of the Political Division (British
55 Cullis, 'Austria 1945-1955,' p. 219.
Element). As of 17 September 1947, he acted as Counsellor of the British 
Legation in Vienna. In 1948, the Foreign Office resumed responsibility for the 
Mission in Vienna, and Cheetham was placed in charge the same year.56
This report described for the Foreign Secretary a more favourable situation in 
Austria. Following a harsh winter, 1947 saw a ‘steady improvement’ in 
Austria’s economic situation.57 Production had increased, thereby relieving 
the fuel and power crisis. Termination of UNRRA supplies was more than 
compensated by a substantial increase in aid from the United States, and the 
daily ration had been increased to 1,700 calories.58 An overall quickening in 
the tempo of economic life allowed Austrians to begin seeing an 
improvement in their living standards. Cheetham noticed an improvement in 
the morale of the Austrian people, and reported that ‘national pride, rising 
above regional, sectional and class jealousies, began to assert itself and give 
Austrians a new strength and resolution to endure the hardships, shortages 
and dangers’ of contemporary life. He also reported that public opinion 
remained strongly behind the Austrian Government in its efforts to preserve 
the country’s sovereignty and independence. (This was an interesting 
selection of wording, given that sovereign power remained with the Allied
56 The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1949, 122nd Publication 
(London: Harrison and Sons, 1949), p. 194, REF: 351 010 ZS FO, PRO.
57 Cheetham to Bevin, Vienna, 'Austria: Annual Report 1947,' 1 April 1948, FO 465/2, Document No. 
16, C 2623/185/3, PRO.
58 This conflicts with U.S, reports that, in March 1947, most Austrians were receiving only 1,300 
calories per day, and Deputy US High Commissioner General J. D. Balmer, was involved in intensive 
discussions with Austrian Food Minister Sagmeister on how to solve the problem of the inability of 
occupying powers to predict food deliveries. See Balmer to Sagmeister, 5 March 1947, Balmer 
Papers, as cited by Donald Whitnah and Edgar Erikson, The American Occupation o f Austria; 
Planning and Early Years Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 241.
Council and it would be another eight years before Austria enjoyed her 
independence).
On the negative side, Cheetham observed that the work of the Allied Council 
grew ‘less and less constructive’ during the course of the year. Efforts by the 
three Western Powers were increasingly devoted to ‘blocking Soviet 
endeavours to undermine the authority of the Austrian Government’ and to 
preventing the Russians from creating conditions under which ‘social unrest 
could flourish’. Meanwhile, the Soviet Element was ‘systematically’ involved 
in strategies designed to obstruct Western attempts to rehabilitate the 
country and to grant free rein to the Austrian Government. At the end of 1946 
‘the shivering and undernourished population looked forward ... with some 
confidence to the conclusion of a treaty. At the end of the year, the position 
was reversed’.59
After Britain recognised the Soviet-appointed Renner Government, and after 
1945 elections delivered a devastating blow to Communism in Austria, the 
Austrian Government began to move toward the West, a phenomenon that 
did not pass Soviet notice, nor did it pass mention in Cheetham’s report.60 
According to Cheetham ‘wiser spirits saw in the Western forces of occupation
59 Cheetham to Bevin, 'Austria: Annual Report 1947,', p. 52.
60 One of the features of this election campaign was the appearance in Vienna of posters and banners 
proclaiming ‘whoever loves the Red Army votes Communist.’ After the elections, members of the 
OVP and SPO told British representatives that they had been responsible for this campaign of black 
propaganda. Michael Cullis, head of the Austria Section of the German Department in the Foreign 
Office, reports that:’ . . .there is little doubt that the Communists themselves, with or without Soviet 
approval, were responsible for what must be reckoned as one of the most counter-productive of 
modem electoral slogans.’ See Cullis, 'Austria 1945-1955,' p. 216.
the surest safeguard of future Austrian independence in the face of Soviet 
expansion’.61
The significance of the year 1947 for Britain’s diplomacy vis-a-vis Austria 
could best be examined within the framework of meetings of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, the Deputy Foreign Ministers’ drafting committee, and the 
Austrian Treaty Commission (ATC). In New York, the foreign ministers 
decided (December 1946) that their Deputies should join together as a 
drafting committee for the Austrian State Treaty, and that the drafting 
exercise should begin in January 1947. The Deputies were instructed to 
compile a report for their principals by March 1947, listing the articles of the 
treaty and describing the level of agreement or disagreement that had been 
achieved on each of them. The Deputies discharged their duty and submitted 
a report to the Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow, 10 
March -  24 April 1947. Discussions on the Austrian State Treaty did not 
progress beyond the German assets issue, on which there were severely 
conflicting views between East and West.
While treaty talks continued throughout 1947, Britain took interest in other 
Austrian issues. Relations between Austria and Yugoslavia improved 
somewhat. These had primarily to do with Belgrade’s claims to Slovene 
Carinthia and that part of Styria hosting a small Croatian community. These 
claims were pressed by the Soviets with unusual vigour at the Moscow 
Conference, and opposed with equal force by the Austrian delegation.
61 Cheetham to Bevin, 'Austria: Annual Report 1947,' p. 1.
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However, Tito finally accepted an Austrian official representation in Belgrade, 
and talks between Britain’s Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Gen. Sir James Steele, 
and Marshal Tito, resulted in an agreement involving the return of Yugoslav 
war criminals.
Yugoslavia remained an important factor in Western strategy. The Soviets 
continued to support Tito’s claims in Austria and use them from time to time 
to deflect quadripartite negotiations away from more important and urgent 
issues. Even after Stalin’s break with Tito, the Russians continued to press 
these claims. The head of the Foreign Office’s Austria Section recalls:
Yugoslavia did have a part to play in Western strategy. For not only 
did all these events (The Moscow-Belgrade rift and Yugoslav claims 
and Soviet support for them in quadripartite sessions) prompt the 
West to plan seriously for its coordinated defence, which was to lead 
to the Brussels, and eventually the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisations, but they also raised doubts in our minds about the 
wisdom of continuing to negotiate towards a possible situation where, 
if a Treaty were indeed concluded, the resultant withdrawal of all 
occupying forces, from an Austria that had not yet been enabled to 
create any armed forces of its own, could produce a dangerous 
vacuum. In these circumstances, the decision was taken to halt the 
Treaty talks until the general situation should improve, or at least be 
clarified. This step had naturally to be concerted with the Austrians, 
who in accepting its necessity were at pains to insist that suspension 
should be on an issue that the public could appreciate. German 
assets were not a good one for this purpose. Better, to repay the 
Soviets in their own coin by taking a clear stand over Austria’s 
territorial integrity, in face of the Yugoslav claims which they were still 
supporting.62
In his annual report for 1947, Cheetham commented on Austria’s ‘ill- 
considered’ application for membership in the United Nations. This had
62 Ibid, p. 223.
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apparently been inspired by advice from the United States -  advice with 
which the Foreign Office disagreed, warning that the action would surely be 
opposed by the Soviet Union on the correct grounds that Austria was not yet 
a sovereign state. The Austrians were more than a little upset when Britain 
abstained on this issue in the U.N. Membership Committee, but they were 
mollified when Britain’s delegation supported a further motion by the United 
States, on 10 November, calling for the Security Council to reconsider 
Austria’s application. Austria also joined three additional international 
organisations during the year, despite strong Soviet opposition and demands 
in the Allied Council that advanced quadripartite approval for such 
memberships be required.
Soviet defensiveness in its interaction with the West in Austria was 
exacerbated from the beginning of the occupation by the incompetence and 
failure of the Austrian Communist Party (KPO) to acquire an influential voice 
in Government. Communist-inspired strikes and demonstrations were 
commonplace, as were attacks on the Austrian Government and Western 
Powers in the Communist press.63 But the KPO never recovered from its 
humiliating defeat in the 1945 elections, and in 1947 the last remaining 
Communist was driven out of the coalition government. In the meantime, the 
KPO frequently found itself in embarrassing positions. For example, 
Communist opposition to Austria’s Nationalisation Law was hardly in line with 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. When it came time to vote on this law, the KPO 
found itself voting against a provision it had previously championed. As
63 See 'Austria: Annual Report 1947,' paragraphs 18-23, for accounts o f ‘unimpressive’ Communist 
strikes and demonstrations held in the British Zone during the summer of 1947, which produced ‘no 
results.’
Stearman points out, it became obvious that such a law would interfere with 
Soviet economic plans which apparently took precedence over ideology.
Cheetham described the departure of the last KPO representative in his 
annual report for 1947, noting the removal from the Cabinet of Dr Karl 
Altman, Minister for Electrification, the forced resignation of the editor of 
Neues Osterreich, a spokesman for Austrian Communists, and ‘... removal of 
the sinister Dr Duermeyer on 3 September from his post as Head of the 
Vienna State (Political) Police’. Still, the KPO would continue to be an irritant 
to the government and would, on at least one occasion before independence, 
come very close to triggering a major confrontation between the Western 
Allies and Soviet Union.
S ir  G e o r g e  R e n d e l  a n d  t h e  A u s tr ia n  T r e a t y  C o m m is s io n
In an attempt to inspire progress, the Four Powers decided to abandon what 
had become unsuccessful efforts to agree on a definition for German assets, 
and concentrate on the development of a list of specific facilities that all could 
agree were ‘German’. The Austrian Treaty Commission (ATC) was formed, 
ostensibly consisting of experts, and was charged with the task of meeting 
until something positive emerged. In December 1947, after the Four Powers 
failed to reach agreement on German assets, Bevin told the House of 
Commons:
Austrian property has been taken and, what is more, a claim has 
been made and is being exercised for extra-territoriality in the 
exploitation of these resources; that is to say, that they are not being
subjected to the general Austrian law. ...That is a position which, in 
all these treaties, His Majesty’s Government cannot accept. ...We 
have, therefore, to try and get an agreed definition. When we found 
included in the term ‘German assets’ the whole of what was 
absorbed by Hitler after the Anschluft, it was, in our view, carrying 
the definition too far, and doing what was never intended or 
understood.64
The ATC met no less than eighty five times between 12 May and 11 October 
1947.65 On 29 September 1947, the British Delegate, Sir George William 
Rendel, wrote a detailed report on the Commission’s activities.66 Rendel was 
‘an experienced diplomat who happened, at the time, to be en 
disponabilite’.67 He had been in Britain’s Foreign Service since 1913. He 
served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Sofia in March 
of 1941 when diplomatic ties between the two countries were severed. He 
moved back to London where he was appointed Britain’s top diplomatic 
representative to the Yugoslav Government in July of the same year. He 
retired from the Foreign Service in February 1944 with the rank of 
Ambassador, but was employed on a temporary basis in the Foreign Office.68 
The selection of Rendel to represent Britain on the ATC was perhaps 
indicative of the importance the Foreign Office attached to the exercise. Was 
he picked only because he was a retired diplomat hanging around the
64 Extract from the House of Commons Debate, 18'December 1947, FO 465/1, Document 44, p. 121.
65 Stourzh, Um Einheit undFreiheit; Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat und das Ende der Ost-West Besetzung 
Osterreichs 1945-1955, p. 783.
66 Rendel to Bevin, 29 September 1947, ‘Austrian Peace Treaty: Report on (1) the ‘Concrete Facts’ 
relating to German Assets; (2) Soviet Attitude Toward the Austrian Treaty in General,’ FO 465/1, 
C12796/6922/3, PRO.
67 Cullis, ’Austria 1945-1955’, p. 220.
68 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Office List 1947, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
FCO Services, Information Management Group, King Charles Street, London SW1A 2AH.
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Foreign Office with little to do, or was he selected because of his experience 
and skill as a negotiator? The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign 
Office List shows that Rendel proceeded from this assignment to become 
Ambassador to Belgium, and while that was probably not the most important 
posting, it shows that Rendel’s service was still held in some regard.
Rendel’s report was the most serious and authoritative summary of Britain’s 
evaluation of Austrian State Treaty issues and also of Britain’s top priority 
foreign policy objectives regarding Austria to date. It remained the principle 
policy paper on this issue until 15 December 1949, when Her Majesty’s 
Delegate to the CFM, Deputies for Austria, dispatched a comprehensive 
review of negotiations to the end of the year 1949.69 The Rendel report was 
included in the Foreign Offices ‘Confidential Print’ collection of key 
documents, distributed to a select audience consisting of high-level decision­
makers. It provided a basis for the Secretary of State’s presentation to the 
House of Commons on 18 December 1947, and also a foundation for his 
personal views on British policy and strategy regarding Austria from that point 
onward.70
By this time, Bevin was more than aware of the burden the occupation was 
placing on Britain’s already beleaguered resources and he wanted it to end 
as soon as possible. This enthusiasm for an end to the occupation eventually
69 Mallet to Bevin, New York, 'Proposed Austrian Treaty: Review of Negotiations to End of 1949', 15 
December 1949, FO 371/465/3, C 9981/176/3, December 1949, p.15 , FO 465/3, C 9981/176/3, PRO.
70 Extract from House of Commons Debate, 18 December 1947, FO 465/1, Document 44, pp. 121- 
122.
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led to his conviction that the West should pay whatever price Moscow asked 
in return for a treaty. This was to contribute to Anglo-American tensions 
toward the end of Bevin’s term as Foreign Secretary.
In his report, Rendel advised that the British delegation’s experience in 
Moscow and Vienna during 1947 had shown beyond any doubt that the issue 
of German assets must be resolved before London could expect progress on 
any other issue having to do with Austria. Britain, America and France had all 
placed the German external assets located in their occupation zones under 
Austrian management until the overall issue could be resolved in the Allied 
Council, through the vehicle of Trust Agreements.71 The problem was 
Moscow.
Britain opted for an Austrian treaty as the best way to restore Austria’s 
independence.72 But the draft texts introduced in early 1947 by the Western 
powers were based on the treaties developed for the Soviet satellite states, 
mostly because it was thought that this would make it easier for the Soviets 
to agree. When serious negotiations began, in January and February 1947, 
fourteen treaty articles were agreed. By the time of the Moscow Conference, 
twenty-six articles remained to be agreed and nineteen had not even been 
discussed. By the end of the Moscow Conference, a further seventeen 
articles had been agreed. From that point onward however, until after the
71 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria p. 50.
72 Mallet to Bevin, 'Proposed Austrian Treaty: Review of Negotiations to End of 1949,' paragraph 7, 
p. 74.
Paris Conference in June 1949, no additional agreements were reached. 
German assets had become a logjam.73
With the benefit of hindsight, Rendel felt that the whole predicament of 
German assets in Austria could have been avoided if a simple agreement 
had been reached at Potsdam to define ‘German assets’ as those assets that 
were genuinely German before the Anschlufc. Immediately following the 
Anschlufc, the Germans had set about harnessing the entire Austrian 
economy for the purposes of the German war machine. After the war, it was 
difficult to distinguish between those facilities that became German by fair 
and proper means and those that were taken by force. Rendel observed:
Clearly we cannot agree to the Russians simply succeeding to the 
controlling position in Austria which the Germans acquired by their 
wrongful annexation of Austria in 1938 -  an annexation which was 
condemned by the Moscow Declaration of 1st November, 1943, 
under which it was agreed, moreover, that the consequences of this 
German annexation should be regarded as null and void.74
Two years later, Britain’s delegate to the CFM, Deputies for Austria, W. I. 
Mallet, phrased the problem somewhat differently:
It became increasingly clear during the Treaty Commission’s 
discussions, that any settlement on the basis of the Soviet 
interpretation was likely to leave the Russians in possession of so
73 Ibid., paragraph 8, p. 74.
74 Rendel to Bevin, 'Austrian State Treaty: (1) Concrete Facts Relating to German Assets; (2) Soviet 
Attitude Towards an Austrian Treaty in General,' paragraph 5, p. 60.
much of Austria’s industrial resources as to make it problematical 
whether Austria could survive as an independent country.75
Based on this recognition, the British delegation to the Treaty Commission, 
where it took nineteen meetings just to agree on the agenda, formulated a 
negotiating strategy and assigned it the code name ‘Portia’, after the rich 
heiress in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice.76 In ‘Operation Portia’, Britain 
would concede that the Russians were entitled to their pound of flesh in 
Austria, but the British Government should be resolved to ensure that they 
did not get more than ‘just one pound’. Moscow must not end up in a position 
more favourable than the original German owners. Portia also included the 
position that only ownership rights to property could be transferred, not the 
property itself. This was important because the Soviets were tearing out 
industrial equipment and other property and shipping it to the Soviet Union. 
The British would also argue that, if the Soviets wanted rights that initially 
belonged to Germans, then they should also be subject to the same 
liabilities, obligations and limitations attached to those rights. The Foreign 
Office felt they had a cast iron case with this strategy: ‘no State property 
could be labelled a German asset, and ownership of all such properties 
should revert to the Austrian Government’.77
The Rendel report noted that cooperation between the US and British 
delegations could not have been better. This assessment of Anglo-American
75 'Proposed Austrian Treaty: Review of Negotiations to End of 1949,' paragraph 9, p. 74.
76 Act IV .i.311-2: ‘This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood -  The words expressly are ‘a pound 
of flesh’. For confirmation of the nineteen meetings see Cullis, 'Austria 1945-1955,' p. 220.
77 Rendel Report, 29 September 1947, Annex I, paragraph 5, p. 65.
working relationships on the ground and in quadripartite discussions is 
shared by Halvorn O. Ekern, an American official who personally participated 
in most if not all important quadripartite discussions during the period 1947- 
1955:78
Throughout the ten years, I can’t remember any significant 
differences between the US and the British at the Allied Commission 
level. What dissimilarities were encountered could usually be settled 
over the phone. I usually accompanied the US High Commissioner, 
or his Deputy, to any business meetings with the British, and can’t 
remember any occasion when disagreements had to be reported to 
governments.
The technical elements of both sides were ‘virtually integrated into a single 
unit’, according to the Rendel Report, and much of the substance in the 
British Delegation’s reporting to Whitehall during 1947 arose from joint Anglo- 
American effort.80 There were of course differences in the working style of 
British and American representatives. The Americans, Rendel said, were 
inclined to work on the principle of the internal combustion engine, ‘by a 
series of short, sharp explosions’, which were not always followed up with, by 
inference, the same professionalism demonstrated by Britain’s more 
experienced and competent diplomats.
78 Halvor O Ekem served as a member of the US Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers and 
the Deputy Foreign Ministers. He also served on the US Delegation to the Austrian Treaty 
Commission. He was an advisor to the Allied Commission for Austria from 1947-1950. In October 
1950, he was assigned to the Quadripartite Secretariat, and in March 1954 he was appointed as 
Political Officer. Ekem went on to complete a distinguished career in the American diplomatic 
service. I remain grateful to Hal Ekem for providing many personal observations on his experiences in 
Vienna and for confirming a number of facts included in this thesis. For biographical information, see 
the US Department of State Biographic Registry, July 1970.
79 Halvor O Ekem, in a personal letter to this author, dated 6 March 2002, available in author’s 
personal files.
80 William Stearman and Halvor Ekem were senior US officials who participated in these Four Power 
negotiations. Both agree with Rendel’s account of Anglo-American cooperation. See e-mail messages 
to author from Stearman and Ekem, available in author’s personal files.
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The Cherriere Plan to Resolve the German Assets Problem
On 8 October 1947, the French Deputy High Commissioner, General Paul 
Cherriere, submitted a proposal designed to facilitate agreement on the 
disposition of German assets in Austria. In his 1986 doctoral thesis, Robert 
Knight suggests that this plan probably owed most to one David Ginsberg, an 
economist and deputy chief of the American ATC delegation.81 Bischof also 
reports that it was Ginsberg who ‘engineered’ the proposal.82 Stourzh 
identifies Ginsberg as the ‘eigentliche Autor*, and reports that the so-called 
Cherriere Plan was submitted by the French only as a matter of tactics, on 
the assumption that Moscow would be more receptive to a French rather 
than a British or American initiative.83 Essentially, this Plan provided for 
Austria to allow Moscow to keep part of the Danube shipping complex and 
certain oil production and rights, while regaining ownership of other German 
assets in return for a lump sum payment. The size of this payment and the 
complex formula for calculating who got what under the various versions of 
the Cherriere Plan are described in detail by Stourzh in his 831-page history 
of the Austrian State Treaty negotiations.84 In this work, Stourzh provides a 
chart identifying the specific assets involved in the proposed deal, and the 
suggested distribution thereof.85
81 Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, p. 135.
82 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War , p. 109.
83 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit; Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat und das Ende der Ost-West Besetzung 
Osterreichs 1945-1955 , p. 116.
84 Ibid..
85 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
The events of 1947 had convinced Bevin that only an agreement on the 
disposition of German assets in Austria would open the door to a State 
Treaty, and here was a suggestion that had attracted expressions of interest 
from Moscow.86 Bevin wanted Britain to renounce claims to German assets 
located in the British Zone, and he told the Foreign Office that Britain should 
not ‘insist on too rigid a settlement in satisfaction of any British interests 
which might remain in Austria’.87 Everybody understood that any monies paid 
to the Russians would probably come from American taxpayers and, not 
surprisingly, the US delegation was less than thrilled by the concept of a one­
time, lump sum payoff to Russians. Knight describes how Austria’s Foreign 
Minister believed the American camp was divided on this issue, with half 
prepared to pay the Russians off. Whether Minister Gruber’s observations 
were accurate or not, the final deal struck with the Soviets did include a lump 
sum payment of US$ 2 million, but this was a tit-for-tat payment for the return 
of the Danube Shipping Company.88
The Galloway Report: Britain’s Position in Austria and Concerns Over 
Cost
86 James Marjoribanks, First Secretary of the German Political Section at the time, reported to Bevin: 
‘we can take it that the Soviet are prepared to accept the French proposal as a basis of a settlement... ’ 
Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, p. 139, citing a Minute sent to Bevin by 
Marjoribanks, dated 28 November 1947.
87 Foreign Office Minute, 28 November 1947, C 15614, FO 371/63985. PRO.
88 Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, p. 137.
On 30 January 1948, the Commander-in-Chief of British Troops in Austria 
(BTA), Lieutenant General A. Galloway sent a revealing report to Bevin 
explaining his views on Britain’s mission in Austria, and addressing several 
concerns that Bevin had expressed regarding the cost of the occupation and 
the extent to which Galloway had gone to divest costly administrative 
authority to Austrians.89
Galloway was an experienced officer with both staff and command 
experience. In 1940, he was the Commandant of the British Staff College in 
Haifa, Palestine. After staff duty in Egypt, he served in command of a brigade 
on Crete before being assigned to the War Office from 1942-1943. He 
commanded the 1st Armoured Division in North Africa from 1943-1944 and, in 
1945, became Commanding Officer, 3d Division. Following the war, he 
served in the Netherlands and Germany before taking over as Commanding 
Officer, Malaya Command. He was assigned as British High Commissioner 
and Commander British Troops Austria in 1947. Lieutenant-General 
Galloway retired from the army in 1950.90
Galloway opined that British occupation forces were in Austria to carry out 
the physical occupation and to participate in quadripartite activities. They 
were also politico-economic reasons to have a British participation in the 
Four Power occupation of Austria. The small military forces under his
89 Office of the Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in Austria Vienna, 'British Function in Austria', 
30 January 1948, FO 465/2, Document No. 6, C 855/54/3, PRO.
90 Steen Ammentorp, Librarian, DB, The Generals o f  World War II; British Generals, 
<http://www.generals.dk/Main.htm>. [10 October 2003],
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command were ensuring the inviolability of Austria’s 1947 frontiers in the 
British Zone, and assisting Austrian authorities in maintaining law and order.
Galloway noted that the planned separation of Britain’s diplomatic and Allied 
Commission functions had, in fact, already taken place. The former Political 
Division had relinquished control of the Information Services Branch, and 
Public Relations had become ‘in all but name’ the responsibility of the British 
Legation. Sir Henry Mack’s September 1947 appointment as His Majesty’s 
Minister formalised this change.91 In Austria, the primary task of the British 
Element was to participate in existing quadripartite machinery. The most 
efficient way to organise this activity, according to Galloway, was to have the 
heads of each functional division report directly to the Deputy Commissioner. 
Such a reporting channel would automatically allow for efficient coordination, 
especially if the Deputy Commissioner would look to each Division Director to 
ensure proper coordination of effort in his respective area of responsibility.
Galloway opposed a recommendation that the division heads be somehow 
grouped or amalgamated, on the grounds that this organization would 
necessitate experienced British Element officers functioning as coordinators, 
which would place them outside the existing quadripartite machinery 
provided by the Control Agreements. Also, an additional level of bureaucracy 
would be created between the specialised divisions and the central 
coordinating authority. At the same time, Galloway applauded the ‘fusion’ of 
the Economic and Finance divisions, because the head of this new entity
91 Galloway to Bevin, 'British Function in Austria,' paragraph 13, pp. 16 - 17.
could then coordinate all economic matters. He recommended that this 
division be kept in the British Element rather than having it transferred over to 
the Legation. There is not, and never has been, any obstacle to the full use 
by His Majesty’s Minister of the talent available in the British Element’.92 
Galloway attached a detailed proposal for the merging of certain other 
divisions, and went on to address Bevin’s plans to reduce the British 
Element’s budget for the Fiscal Year 1948-1949 by twenty five percent.
He felt this would be a difficult target to achieve, but said he could do it if the 
British Legation and the Intelligence Organisation were transferred under 
‘some other ceiling’. He submitted other suggestions for cost reduction, but 
cautioned Bevin that there was only so much one could do to reduce the 
costs of occupation, because ‘...the maintenance staff of the British Element 
has to be butcher, baker, green-grocer, fuel merchant, estate agent, &c., as 
none of these services can be obtained in the normal way nor can 
commodities be safely handled without British supervision.’93
In paragraph 5 of his report, Galloway presented a discussion of the pros and 
cons of combining the office of High Commissioner with that of His Majesty’s 
Minister; in other words, appointing a civilian as both. On one hand, the 
appointment of a civilian as High Commissioner would place an experienced 
diplomat in the post and thereby increase the success potential of British 
foreign policy. It might also serve as further evidence to Austrians of Britain’s
92 Ibid, p. 16.
93 Ibid., paragraph 19, p. 18.
desire to ‘soften the impact of the continued occupation’. On the other hand, 
a civilian should not be burdened with the military responsibilities of a 
Commander-in-Chief. In any case, such a change should be carried out only 
if all four occupying Powers did the same thing, and, here, Galloway 
predicted that the Soviets would never agree, ‘...having regard to the size of 
their army, and relying as they do upon the military aspect of their occupation 
to give effect to their policy...’94
Galloway disagreed strongly with Bevin’s suggestion that the Control 
Agreement be revised in order to reduce British obligations and thereby allow 
further reductions in the cost of occupation. In paragraph 20 of his 
memorandum to Bevin, he wrote:
Even if agreement could be reached among the three Western 
Elements, which itself is doubtful, the Soviet reaction would either be 
completely negative -  in other words they would refuse to discuss 
the matter altogether -  or they would seize upon the opportunity to 
try the modification of parts of the Control Agreement, which they 
have found to be an embarrassment. I refer in particular to the 
present article 6 (a) under which, in spite of Soviet opposition, the 
Austrian Government has been able to pass most of its legislation. If 
the Soviet agreed to discuss revision at all, it would be with the 
objective of removing this article and, worse, of restricting the liberty 
of action of the Austrian Government generally.
He also disagreed with Bevin’s suggestion that the administration of the 
British Zone and Sector be coordinated more closely with the other two 
Western Powers, pointing out that he had always been most careful to avoid 
doing anything that might contribute to the impression of a separate political
94 Ibid., paragraph 8, p. 16.
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or economic organization for the three Western zones. ‘I have always 
understood it to be the policy of His Majesty’s Government that nothing be 
done which might tend towards the partition of Austria.’95
Galloway concluded his report to Bevin by saying he had the impression that 
London did not fully appreciate the extent to which British occupation 
authorities had made Austrians independent of the occupying Power. ‘I wish 
to repeat that in the British Zone administrative responsibility has been 
transferred to the Austrian authorities in every field’.
Galloway also raised an issue that was to become a major point of contention 
between the Soviets and Western allies, and one that served to extend the 
occupation of Austria by, arguably, three or four years. Given Soviet conduct 
in areas hosting elements of the Soviet army since the end of World War 
Two, and given the Western Allies’ desire to prevent Austria from being 
absorbed into the Communist Bloc, Austria’s lack of an adequate internal 
security capability was becoming of increasing importance. Aggressive 
Communist behaviour in other parts of the world, notably in Korea, and 
Communist-inspired civil unrest at home, persuaded many in the West to 
suspect that a withdrawal of Western forces would offer Moscow too tempting 
an opportunity to establish yet another permanent base for a Soviet military 
presence.
In my opinion the presence of the troops of the Western Powers in 
Austria has been a dominant factor in preventing Austria from 
following the same road as Hungary and the other Danubian 
countries. No advice which has been given to the Austrian
95 Ibid., paragraph 21, p. 18.
Government, or is likely to be given in future, compares in 
importance to the presence, even if only in token strength, of the 
protective military forces of the Western Powers.96
Galloway expanded this view by opining that, outside the work necessary to 
abide by Control Agreements, the British Element should remain aware that a 
major struggle was taking place in Austria, pitting the Western way of life 
against that of the East. He saw this primarily political battle being fought 
chiefly with economic weapons. Therefore, included in the British mission in 
Austria was the ‘planning of resistance to Soviet encroachments in the 
economic field and work in connexion with the Marshall Plan’.97
According to Galloway, it was only the presence of the British military that 
gave ‘ultimate authority’ to any British executive work carried out by British 
diplomats. Only continued functioning of the overall quadripartite machinery 
was permitting the central Austrian Government to exercise its authority 
throughout the whole country and to prevent the partitioning of Austria. While 
Soviet obstructionism had reduced the effectiveness of this quadripartite 
interaction, ‘much can still be done to provide the Austrian Government with 
support to stiffen their resistance to Soviet pressure, and thus to gain the 
utmost advantage from the Marshall Plan’.98 Because of the importance of 
the continuing workings of the quadripartite machinery, Galloway advised 
Bevin that there were few places where ‘the battle could be lost’ more quickly 
than in Four Power discussions,
96 Ibid., paragraph 2, p.15.
97Ibid., paragraph. 4, p. 15.
98 Ibid., paragraph. 3, p. 15.
Was an Austrian State Treaty Necessary?
A close examination of British policy towards Austria at this point in the 
occupation inspires some interesting questions. Was a Treaty possible or 
even necessary? There was no requirement for a peace treaty, but, on the 
Soviet side, the term ‘peace treaty’ seemed to flow off the tongue with ease, 
and one cannot help but wonder if the loose choice of language in casual 
conversation did not reflect a more deeply held conviction that, in the real 
world, the Moscow Declaration did not mean all that much. Khrushchev, for 
example, routinely referred to the Austrian treaty as a peace treaty, just as he 
referred consistently to the Allied Control Commission in Austria (see chapter 
5).
One must ask why, after discovering how difficult it was going be to achieve 
Four Power agreement on one all-encompassing, comprehensive treaty -  
one that covered so many post war Austrian issues in one document -  did 
Britain press on, apparently with blind conviction that this was the only way to 
put the Austria problem to rest? Were the British so committed to what they 
regarded as the traditional process of diplomacy that the idea of alternatives 
did not occur to them?
American diplomats explored different ways of solving the Austria problem, 
and submitted alternative proposals. In February 1950, for example, 
Washington suggested the Four Powers simply withdraw all forces and leave 
the Austrian Government to strike a deal with Moscow. This idea was floated
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with little hope that it would be accepted, but it nonetheless demonstrated at 
least some positive attempt to strike out in a different direction to breach the 
impasse. On various occasions individual members of the Austrian 
Government suggested the same thing, that the West withdraw and let 
Austrians quibble with Moscow over reparations. Whether the Austrians were 
sincere or not will probably never be known. It is reported elsewhere in this 
thesis that Austrian politicians frequently said different things in public than 
they did in private conversations with Western representatives.
In fact, some British diplomats did raise these questions, beginning with Sir 
George Rendel in his September 1947 report to Bevin. He did believe that it 
would be possible to negotiate successfully with Moscow on an Austrian 
treaty, and he was certainly well placed to assess the situation. But he also 
wondered if there was a better way of achieving British objectives ‘by having 
no treaty at all’.
Rendel believed that it was realistic to think of drafting a treaty to which all 
parties would subscribe. He wrote There is nothing in the facts of the 
situation, as we have ascertained them, which is incompatible with either the 
Moscow Declaration or the Potsdam decision’.99 Perhaps naively, he 
suggested that, if the Soviets would be satisfied with receiving precisely what 
was promised them at Potsdam and not try to get more, then there was no 
reason why Russia should not agree to the end of the occupation without in 
any way interfering with Austria’s future freedom and independence.
99 'Austrian State Treaty: (1) Concrete Facts Relating to German Assets; (2) Soviet Attitude Towards 
an Austrian Treaty in General', paragraphs 12-13, p. 61.
Would the Soviets ever really be satisfied with only what was promised at 
Potsdam? The answer to this, Rendel said, was more complex and would 
depend on factors not connected with Austria. If East-West relations were to 
deteriorate further, and this was certainly the direction in which relations were 
headed at the time, then the Soviets would probably not accept any treaty the 
West thought reasonable. Soviet attitudes would depend on how much they 
were able to gain elsewhere, for example from German production, in 
Greece, the Aegean, Persia, Korea, and the Dardenelles. Rendel believed 
that Moscow viewed Austria only in connection with other problems they 
were having with the West, and that it was highly unlikely that Russia would 
accept a solution for Austria unless that also encompassed resolution of 
issues outside of Austria.
The shape of Austria on the map is not unlike that of a Yale key, with 
Vienna as the focal point of the handle. It is a key which may open 
the door, on the one hand to Southern Germany and ultimately the 
Rhine, and on the other to Venetia, Lombardy, and ultimately the 
Western Mediterranean. ...[I]t may serve equally as a wedge which 
may be driven between the positions of the Western Powers to the 
north and to the south of the Alps respectively.100
In Rendel’s opinion, no treaty would guarantee Austria’s independence if the 
Soviet Union was intent on pursuing a ‘forward policy’ in Europe; however, he 
also thought the Western Powers should be able to support Austria 
economically to the point where an ‘independent spirit’ could be maintained 
and kept alive. In any case, a Western conclusion that no treaty could
100 Ibid., paragraph 14 (iii), pp. 61-62.
provide for a free and independent Austria would, de facto, mean that the 
Moscow Declaration and all subsequent British foreign policy decisions 
regarding Austria had been unsound -  a conclusion which Rendel believed to 
be mistaken.
We see here once again a heavy reliance on the reliability of the process of 
diplomacy -  on the sanctity of international agreements at a time when 
Britain simply did not possess the wherewithal to deliver the kind of economic 
support to which Rendel referred, and when Britain lacked the military 
strength to add muscle to British efforts designed to press the Soviets into 
accepting unwelcome proposals. In the post war years the Labour 
Government was presiding over an empire that was soon to disappear, and a 
weakened position in the global strategic arena. Some historians believe they 
had, somewhat reluctantly, abandoned hopes of an Anglo-Soviet friendship 
and ‘grudgingly accepted Britain’s position as an ally of the United States’.101 
Recognising that Britain could no longer could legitimately claim the status of 
a world power, the Labour Government believed that intelligent management 
of the Anglo-American relationship, combined with an international 
information program designed to keep Britain’s case before the world, was 
the best way forward.
In any case, Rendel had begun this discussion with the rhetorical question as 
to whether British goals could better be achieved by terminating negotiations
101 Philip M . Taylor, 'The Projection of Britain Abroad, 1945-51,' in British Foreign Policy, 1945-51, 
Dockrill and Young, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: The Macmillan Press ,
1989), pp. 10-11.
and accepting that there would be no Austrian treaty at all. In paragraph 22 of 
his September 1947 report, he suggested that this would be a ‘counsel of 
despair’ and would lead to a variety of unacceptable disasters throughout 
Central Europe and possibly elsewhere in the world. There would be 
widespread consternation within Austria’s borders, and this would lead to a 
significant weakening of those elements of Austrian society working for 
moderation, international cooperation and a ‘reasonable measure of national 
independence’. Rendel felt that the failure of the Four Powers to sign a treaty 
would drive Austrian Socialists into the arms of Communism and ‘shatter the 
confidence ... which is generally felt in Austria in the ultimate justification of 
Western civilisation.’ Failure to agree on a treaty would almost certainly lead 
to a ‘geographical disintegration of Austria and the absorption of at least the 
Soviet occupation zone into the Communist Bloc’. On a more pragmatic 
scale:
A policy of ‘no treaty’ would ... leave the Soviet Union in undisputed 
control over Austrian oil (with serious consequences for all Central 
Europe) and over much of Austrian industry, as well as the City of 
Vienna and all that it stands for. ... It would profoundly shake the 
confidence of southern Germany and northern Italy and perhaps 
even of eastern Switzerland ... Even if we could establish some kind 
of protective mission in western Austria, it would ... still give the 
Soviet Government a commanding political position from which to 
extend Soviet influence either towards the Rhine or towards the 
western Mediterranean. It would still leave us with heavy and 
expensive responsibilities which would impose on us increasingly 
difficult burdens and become increasingly difficult to carry out. We 
should, I submit, get the worst of both worlds, and probably be even 
worse off than with a treaty which was not ideal. ... [We owe it to 
Austria and Europe to continue, in close cooperation with the 
Americans, to fight for a sound Austrian Treaty by every fair means in 
our power.102
102 Rendel Report, 29 September 1947, paragraph. 23, p. 64.
Rendel concluded that Britain had but one reasonable option, and that was to 
drive on in pursuit of an Austrian State Treaty, despite formidable and 
possibly insurmountable obstacles, and with the knowledge that it would take 
many years to disabuse the Soviets of their misconceptions of the West. No 
agreement would be forthcoming if Britain could not find some way to 
‘convince the Soviet Union of her bona fides, more specifically by 
meticulously avoiding any attempt to defend bad cases or to use arguments 
which we know are in themselves unsound’.103
This would not be easy because the Soviet Government and their delegates 
were incapable of understanding honesty of purpose:
Then there is the perfectly genuine Russian suspicion of the policy of 
the Western Powers. In all our dealings with modern Russians we 
are faced all the time with the almost insuperable difficulty produced 
by their fundamental incapacity of understanding or believing in the 
honest motives of others. Having themselves abandoned positive 
and objective ethics and adopted purely materialistic criteria, the idea 
of any Power being actuated, on any occasion, by motives of 
honesty, right dealing, or abstract justice -  or, in fact, by any 
principles of universal application -  is genuinely and utterly 
incomprehensible to them. ...[Tjhey simply cannot conceive the 
possibility of our being moved by any but the basest motives of short­
sighted and sordid self-interest. ...Austrian independence is merely a 
trick to keep them out, to get in ourselves, and to use Austria as a 
spearhead against the Soviet Union, in the conflict which they are 
beginning to regard (I suggest mistakenly) as ultimately inevitable.104
103 Rendel Report, 29 September 1947, paragraph 24, p. 64.
104 Rendel Report, para. 15, p. 62.
As Cheetham had speculated, the prospects of resolving such fundamental 
issues of trust and mutual confidence were slim. Margaret Jackson, 
Cheetham’s Personal Assistant who attended and took notes on Allied 
Commission discussions, recalls that meetings with the Soviets were 
reduced to boring sessions during which the Western representatives sat 
politely and listened to lectures by the Soviet delegate on why the USSR 
could not accept their proposals.105 The British, by this time, attributed lack of 
progress toward an Austrian State Treaty solely to Soviet obstructionism.
The Foreign Office’s head of the Austria Section, German Political 
Department, Michael Cullis, commented on the Rendel report by allowing 
that he ‘... would only question his (Rendel’s) apparent belief that it might with 
more time have been possible to reach agreement on this legal basis, 
whereas it soon became clear to me that for the Soviets the whole Treaty 
Commission exercise was no more than a holding operation.106
Conclusions
By the end of 1947, Bevin had decided that Britain could not afford the costs 
of the occupation of Austria. He wanted to conclude an Austrian State Treaty 
as soon as possible, and withdraw British troops. He knew that the matter of 
German assets had emerged as the single most important obstacle to an 
Austrian Treaty, and he understood this issue would have to be resolved 
before a treaty was possible. Despite eighty five sessions of the Austrian 
Treaty Commission, the Four Powers had failed to reach agreement on
105 Telephone conversation between author and Miss Jackson, 11 March 2002.
106 Cullis, ’Austria 1945-1955,' p. 221.
German assets. The Soviets were insisting on terms that even Bevin was not 
prepared to accept, although he was already leaning towards his later 
conviction that the West should pay whatever Moscow was asking in return 
for an Austrian treaty.
By the end of 1947, Britain had identified the key issues involved in the 
occupation. Britain’s policy objectives vis-a-vis Austria were clear. Foreign 
Office strategies designed to accomplish these objectives were formulated 
and in the process of implementation. Bevin had, with the assistance of a 
few able and experienced diplomats, come to certain conclusions that were 
to guide him on matters pertaining to Austria up until the point where his 
illness forced him from the scene. His periodic presentations to the Cabinet 
and to the House of Commons summarised these views and identified what 
Bevin considered the primary obstacles to accomplishment of British 
objectives.
On one hand Britain wanted to continue enjoying the status of a world power 
whose participation in geo-strategic deliberations was important to the re­
establishment of world order and peace. On the other hand, Britain was 
broke and did not have the material resources necessary to meet the 
obligations of a post war global force. But World War Two threats to the 
country’s national security had swiftly been replaced by new, perhaps even 
more ominous threats, this time originating in Moscow. While agreeing on 
the seriousness of the Soviet threat, Commonwealth leaders had declined an 
invitation to band together in some form of ‘central machinery’ or mutual
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defence pact. None of the European nations was capable of providing the 
resources necessary for the construction of an effective defence shield, 
although serious efforts were made through the Brussels Pact toward a 
common European defence alliance. The only -  and certainly Bevin’s 
preferred -  way forward was to forge a strong alliance with the United States. 
His efforts in this direction were well advanced by the end of 1947.
Britain’s objective of establishing an effective military government in her Zone 
of occupation had been accomplished smoothly. The occupation 
administration was in place, and Britain was represented in all of the Allied 
Council directorates. Britain had persuaded the United States to participate in 
the occupation and had succeeded in strengthening Anglo-American ties. 
American economic aid was benefiting both Britain and Austria, and the 
Marshall Plan was just around the corner. Britain’s place, if not her full role in 
the Cold War, was well established. The initial period of transition from war to 
peace had, by end 1947, come to an end. Unfortunately, the next war had 
already begun.
C hapter  T h r e e : Forlo rn  Hopes
This chapter recovers the narrative of developments in and about Austria 
during the period 1948 and 1949 and up to the beginning of 1950, as seen 
through British eyes. It sets the stage for the dramatic events of 1950 when 
the Cold War turned hot. The chapter summarises key issues and events that 
affected Britain and Austria within the context of a rapidly deteriorating 
international situation. Certain key Cold War events that were not directly 
related to Austria, but that affected Four Power interaction in Austria, are 
explained as they were considered in British diplomacy and as they affected 
British policy aspirations. Again, correspondence between the field and the 
Foreign Office is revealed in some detail. Experienced, competent British 
diplomats and military officers authored the most important reporting covered 
here. These reports contributed significantly to a continuing refinement of 
British foreign policy regarding Austria, as the Cold War environment 
changed. None of the policy documents upon which this chapter is based has 
been exploited fully in the past. Indeed, two Public Record Office series used 
for this research were only declassified in 2002 and 2003, respectively.1 The 
detailed examination this chapter provides offers useful insight into the 
thinking that was driving British policy toward Austria at the time.
As in the previous two chapters, our narrative pauses from time to time to 
examine certain critical issues and developments in depth, calling heavily on 
archival material and combining selected analyses and observations offered 
by astute secondary sources.
1 FO 465/5 and FO 465/6.
Economic issues grew in importance for Britain’s leaders, as the country’s 
efforts to recover after the War II faltered. The Marshall Plan had profound 
impact on Austria and on the ability of Western Allies to expedite efforts to 
bring the occupation to an end in such a way as to ensure Austria’s secure 
sovereignty and independence. While this was an American initiative, Britain, 
which benefited significantly from Marshall Aid, exploited the opportunities 
the Plan created for achievement of British policy goals. Constructive efforts 
continued during this period to be undermined by an obstreperous Kremlin 
intent upon maximising its exploitation of Austria’s industrial and natural 
resources, and maintaining an iron grip on the Austrian population resident in 
its zone.
The Soviet kidnapping campaign is covered here because it was a major 
concern of British authorities in Austria, as is reflected in diplomatic and 
military reporting. Both kidnappings and Soviet economic confiscations took 
place in the British sector of Vienna and in the British occupation Zone. The 
narrative pauses also to consider the elections of 1949, which brought new 
political realities to the country’s electoral process. While the effect on policy, 
as such, was minimal, the Foreign Office and Parliament took active interest 
in these elections and it is appropriate to comment here on that interest.
During this period, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin became convinced that 
the Soviet Union was prepared to sign an Austrian State Treaty, and he 
launched an intensive lobbying campaign to persuade his American
counterpart of what he, Bevin, saw as the overall benefits for the Western 
world in paying whatever bribe the USSR was asking in return for that treaty. 
The West would be well served, Bevin came to think, by signing the treaty 
and withdrawing occupation forces -  even if this meant leaving the Soviets in 
control of certain important Austrian natural and industrial assets. The US 
position was quite different, and this chapter pauses again to examine 
Bevin’s goals and motivation at this crucial point in Cold War history. Was he 
correct in his assumption that the Soviets would sign a treaty in return for an 
economic and financial payoff? Senior Soviet diplomats had told him so. Was 
he naive to believe them? Were his lobbying activities in Washington 
appropriate?
Anglo-American differences on how best to conclude the occupation of 
Austria have been the subject of study by other historians. Among these, 
Gerald Stourzh seems to have been the first to suggest that conditions 
existing during 1948 and 1949 created an opportunity for the American 
military to seize control of US foreign policy and ‘militarise’ American foreign 
policy. Gunter Bischof and, later, James Carafano, echoed Stourzh’s charge, 
but expanded it to include the accusation that US High Commissioner, 
Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes, embarked on a successful campaign to 
turn Austria into an American-dominated garrison state. These allegations 
are examined in this chapter within the context of overall Anglo-American 
cooperation on both an Austrian Treaty and the controversial matter of 
rearming the country.
Finally, it would be irresponsible to offer a narrative of British interests in 
Austria during the occupation without at least mentioning the importance of 
clandestine intelligence operations. Austria, especially Vienna, provided 
fertile ground for intelligence operatives of many different nationalities on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain to ply their trade. Vienna was the scene for one 
of the most dramatic and productive British intelligence initiatives of the entire 
period.
A  T u r n in g  P o in t
Developments in and about Austria must be viewed against the background 
of what else was happening in the world, as relations between East and West 
deteriorated. Strang believed that, ‘by 1948, the cleavage between the 
Communist and anti-Communist parts of the world, with polarization of power 
between Moscow and Washington, had become unmistakably clear’.2 1948 
was certainly a pivotal year in Austria’s path toward independence. It was a 
year during which Western cooperation on Austrian issues was complicated 
by what Bevin’s biographer, Alan Bullock, interpreted as a threat to Britain’s 
relationship with the United States at the most senior levels. While this is 
perhaps an overstatement, Bevin and Secretary of State Acheson did 
disagree on matters having to do with the Austrian State Treaty.
Perhaps most importantly, Britain was broke and, because of this, Bevin 
understood that everything at that moment ‘turned on being able to create a
2 William Strang, Britain in World Affairs : a Survey of the Fluctuations in British Power and 
Influence ; Henry VIII to Elizabeth II ([London]: Faber Deutsch, 1961), p. 347.
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more stable and lasting relationship with the United States’.3 But a close 
relationship with and total dependency on America were not entirely popular 
in Labour ranks, and important Members of the US Congress were not 
thrilled by the prospect of Washington’s giving more money to London -  still 
seen by many Americans as having colonialist aspirations but no longer able 
to wield real influence in the world. Bevin was worried that all of his work 
designed to build a framework for continuing cooperation between Western 
Europe and the United States might collapse. The Cabinet had cogitated 
long and hard before entering into a Loan Agreement with the United States, 
but did so because it saw no other options. In the face of severe challenge by 
Labour Party colleagues and by other influential segments of Britain’s 
socialist society, for example the National Union of Miners, Bevin stood firm 
in his assurance to all that ‘the US will see us through’.4 As Bullock observed, 
‘no one had ever found Ernie Bevin lacking in confidence’.5
Indeed the United States did see Britain through, and the unprecedented 
closeness of the Anglo-American relationship, forged during the war, 
persevered, in spite of the occasional hiccup.
There was no doubt about the closeness of the wartime relationship 
between Britain and the United States. With the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff and combined commands on the military side; the Combined 
Boards and Lend Lease on the economic, and the unique
3 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: William Heinemann 
Ltd, 1983), p. 446.
4 Ibid., p. 444.
5 Ibid, p. 4.
correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt, it was the most 
successful alliance in history.6
The US and British governments continued throughout 1948 to rebuild 
Europe as an effective counter-weight to the Soviet Bloc, and to strengthen 
anti-Communist governments, although Bevin was forced to tell his American 
counterpart that London could no longer pull its own weight in Greece and 
Turkey. In 1948, reconstruction efforts in Germany assumed an increased 
sense of urgency. The Western Allies and Soviet Union moved rapidly toward 
what, in 1949, became the final post-war delineation of rival spheres of 
influence: formation of the West German Republic and the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which committed the United States formally to the defence of 
Western Europe for the first time in history.
In Austria, 1948 began with a Soviet counter-offer to the Cherriere Plan. The 
Special Deputies for the Austrian State Treaty conducted their 64th-163d 
sessions between 20 February and 10 May in London -  without reaching 
agreement, despite what Bevin saw in the Soviet response to the Cherriere 
Plan as a basis of negotiation.7 On 25 February, the Communists seized 
power in Czechoslovakia. On 17 March Britain concluded a 50-year mutual 
defence pact with France and the Benelux countries. On 24 June the Soviet 
Union began the Berlin Blockade, which alerted the Western Allies to the 
possibility that the same fate could befall Vienna, where the West was totally
6 Ibid, p. 12.
7 Robert Graham Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, (PhD, London 
University, 1986). p. 143.
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dependent on Soviet occupation authorities for access to their own airports 
and to the railway and highways linking Vienna with the West. Britain and 
the United States reaffirmed the joint contingency plan that, in the event of 
increased Soviet aggression, no attempt would be made to defend Vienna. 
Western forces would withdraw and be prepared to accept a partitioning of 
Austria. Should the Soviets launch a military offensive, the plan was for 
American and British forces to fight a delaying action while withdrawing into 
Italy where a stand would be made.8
William L. Stearman was a foreign correspondent for the Mutual 
Broadcasting Corporation in Vienna at the time of the Berlin Blockade. He 
describes a very interesting but little known incident involving a confrontation 
between British and Soviet military forces and he raises a question as to how 
much influence this incident might have had on Soviet thinking regarding a 
blockade of Vienna along the lines of Berlin.9
At 12:30 p.m., 11 April 1948, suddenly and without prior notification, Russian 
guards on the border between the British and Soviet occupation zones began 
enforcing the same identification requirements that the Soviets had 
introduced after Marshal Sokolovsky ended Four Power control in Germany 
ten days earlier. In addition to the usual Gray Cards, they began demanding
8 See NSC 63/1, 16 February 1950, 'Proposed US Policy in the Event of a Blockade of 
Vienna’, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abileen, Kansas, Austria (2 ), 2/16/50. See also 
Chiefs of Staff Committee - Joint Planning Staff Memorandum, 31 March 1950, ‘Effect of 
Withdrawal From Trieste on the Position of the British Occupation Forces in Austria’,
J.P.(50) 26, DEFE 11/23, PRO.
9 Stearman E-Mail message to author, 19 August 2003, hard copy available in author’s 
personal files. See New York Times, 8 October 1951, for a cursory report on the incident.
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documents carrying identifying photographs. Although this requirement was 
in direct contravention of the Control Agreements, a number of British 
servicemen were turned back and denied passage to Vienna through the 
Soviet Zone. British enlisted men did not have photographs on their 
identification documents. On the following day, Soviet road blocks were set 
up on the roads from Vienna to British and American airports in Tulin and 
Schwechat. Western High Commissioners decided to hold their protests until 
the next Allied Council meeting, scheduled four days later, on 16 April 1948. 
In the meantime, British military command initiated a more abrupt response:
The British, determined not to comply with the new and totally 
unwarranted ID card measures, sent a convoy of trucks carrying 
armed troops up to the UK-Soviet zonal border crossing. When the 
Soviet guard detail refused to let it through the barrier because of the 
new ID requirement, the British officer in charge ordered his troops to 
‘fix bayonets’ (the clattering of which was well designed to get the 
Soviet guards’ attention). Whereupon he walked up to the barrier, 
flipped it up and ordered his trucks to pass on through. End of 
problem! ... This encounter sure made the Brits look good!
T he  S o v ie t  K id n a p p in g  C a m p a ig n
In the deteriorating international situation during the late 1940s, it is not 
surprising that East-West tensions increased in Austria. In addition to wide 
spread Soviet looting and severe clashes of culture, a major reason for the 
worsening of on-the-ground relations between Westerners and Soviets in 
1948 was the Soviet practice of kidnapping or, as it was sometimes called 
more diplomatically in official correspondence, clandestine arrests. This 
outrageous campaign involved Soviet officials snatching individuals off public
10 Ibid.
streets and into black Mariahs, often in broad daylight and in front of the 
general public. It was apparent that Soviets behaved in Austria pretty much 
the same way they behaved at home. Russians knew only one way to govern 
-  the Soviet way in which they had grown up -  and in this system, arbitrary 
arrests and sudden disappearances were commonplace.11 In his 1944 
conversation with Yugoslav Milovan Djilas, Stalin, himself, said ‘whoever 
occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone 
imposes his own system as far as his army has power to do so’.12
Both Stearman and Bischof report on the difficulties Soviet kidnapping 
caused for Austrian citizens and for quadripartite relations, but it was Brown 
who provided perhaps the most comprehensive detail on the issue.13 Soviet 
authorities had launched a massive kidnapping campaign almost immediately 
after entering Vienna in 1945. Some of this activity represented the kind of 
mopping up operation every victorious army conducts as the dust of war 
settles, but Soviet abductions went further than that. The categories of 
people most at risk expanded rapidly to include German and Austrian 
intelligence officers who had specialised in Soviet affairs, Austrian citizens 
who refused to cooperate with Russian intelligence services, and indeed 
anybody who failed to tremble and obey Soviet authority -  including Austrian 
police officers who were simply doing their duty by maintaining peace and
11 US State Department paper dated 19 August 1948, ‘Soviet Kidnapping,’ 863.00/10-1448 
(microfilm), NARA II.
12 Milovan Djilas and Joseph Stalin, Conversations with Stalin (London: Hart-Davies,
1962), p. 105.
13 Ralph W. Ill Brown, A Cold War Army of Occupation. The U.S. Military Government in 
Vienna, 1945-1950, (PhD, University of Tennessee, 1995), chapter beginning on p. 221.
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order or by investigating crimes. In some instances, Russian military 
personnel used Communist Party members in the police to provide plausible 
justification for kidnappings, but, as the number of Communist policemen 
dwindled, Soviets officers did not hesitate to carry out the acts themselves.
Austrian citizens were not the only people vulnerable to Soviet kidnappers. 
One of the lesser celebrated, and perhaps more tragic cases involved a 
native-born British citizen, Mrs. M. A. Miske, who was snatched off a Vienna 
street by Russian officers while she was searching for her husband from 
whom she had become separated during the war. According to her own 
statements, Miske was born and raised in Newcastle upon Tyne. She met a 
Hungarian diplomat while visiting the Hungarian Legation in London with a 
friend, and she subsequently married this man, one Baron Eugen Miske- 
Gerstenberg. The couple served in several overseas diplomatic posts and 
were then caught up in the Nazi occupation of Hungary, at which time Miske 
was arrested by the Gestapo as a British spy. She was held under harsh 
conditions in solitary confinement for nineteen months, and returned to British 
authorities as part of a prisoner exchange in Istanbul. After failing to find her 
husband, she joined the British Army in Cairo (Force 133), and served until 
the summer of 1945, at which time she was returned to the UK on board the 
HMS Britannic. British authorities helped her search for her husband and 
adopted son, and in the process arranged for Miske to be flown to Vienna, 
her husband’s birthplace and last known location. Shortly after learning that 
Baron Miske-Gerstenberg had committed suicide during the war and that her 
son had been killed, Miske was kidnapped by Soviet officials. She was held
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in a Polar Zone labour camp for some nine years before being released to 
British authorities during the Khrushchev-Bulganin state visit to London. 
There is no indication in the files as to why she was kidnapped or whether 
formal charges were ever brought against her. A 25 February 1955 letter to 
Mrs Miske from the British Legation in Budapest assured her that the Minister 
was gratified by her release from the Soviet Union, and that enquiries were in 
motion that would eventually enable Mrs. Miske to leave Hungary. The 
Legation forwarded 250 forints ‘as a contribution to (her) current living 
expenses’. 14
Brown reports that the most numerous and blatant Soviet moves against 
civilians took place in early 1948, when Russian kidnappings became almost 
daily occurrences.15 Nobody knows precisely how many people were 
kidnapped. The US State Department reported that, during the period 1946 - 
1948, Soviet military or civilian officials snatched between 450 and 800 
people in Vienna. From the beginning of 1948 until July 1950, some 946 
people were kidnapped. A later dispatch reported that 1,800 men, women 
and children had been abducted by Soviet authorities. While there was a 
large prisoner return after the State Treaty was signed in 1955, some of 
those abducted were never seen again.16
14 See the M.A. Miske Collection, No. 91/6/1, Department of Documents, Imperial War 
Museum, Lambeth Road, London SE1 6HZ.
15 Brown, A Cold War Army of Occupation. The U.S. Military Government in Vienna, 1945- 
1950, p. 219.
16 Ibid., p. 217.
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Brown suggests that the Western Powers did surprisingly little to discourage 
or obstruct Soviet arrests in the three Western sectors of the capital or even 
in their own occupation zones. A January 1946 British report touched on the 
subject when a Soviet officer took the initiative to thank a British officer (who 
did not know what the Russian was talking about) for helping arrest 
‘deserters’ found in the British sector. Later in the same year, a Col. Gordon- 
Smith told the British Element’s Political section that he could offer ‘no 
guarantee that anyone wanted by the Russians will not be abducted and 
possibly disappear for good without a trace’.17
There were several celebrated and particularly dramatic cases in 1948, 
including that of an Estonian woman named Sinaida Kao who had fled from 
the Red Army to Vienna with her one child. The Soviets decided to repatriate 
Kao, but she was able to elude them in Vienna’s International (First) District 
for enough time to get an emergency plea for help to the US Provost 
Marshal. The US was chairing the Allied Commission at the time and was 
therefore in command of the First District. American military policemen 
rushed to the rescue. A struggle ensued and a Russian soldier was knocked 
unconscious after attempting to draw a concealed weapon. Kao was never 
handed back to the Soviets despite vitriolic demands, and Soviet protests 
were, for all practical purposes, ignored.18
17 Gordon-Smith Minute, 14 March 1946, FO 1020/2916/133, PRO.
18 The Kao case bears a remarkable similarity to the Anna Schmidt character played by Alida 
Valli in the Graham Greene, Carol Reed, Alexander Korda film, The Third Man. Greene was 
contracted to write the story in January 1948 and filming commenced the same year. See 
Charles Drazin, In Search of the Third Man (London: Methuen Publishing Limited, 1999).
Another case during early 1948 involved an American Counter Intelligence 
Corps (CIC) officer who was snatched by the Soviets and held for more than 
twenty four hours before being released without his official identification 
papers, at a remote location some ninety minutes South of Vienna. In yet 
another case, a CIC officer employed force to protect one of his civilian 
employees against a Soviet kidnapping attempt on a street in the First 
District. British military police responded to the commotion and threw all 
parties into a British military jail. Twenty minutes later, an armed Soviet 
military detachment raided the jail and forced the British to release both the 
American CIC agent and the unsuccessful Soviet kidnapper into their 
custody. Soviet authorities refused British and American demands for return 
of the American officer. It was then discovered that the Soviet official involved 
had not only failed to abduct his intended victim, but had inadvertently lost his 
official identification papers in the British jail. The American officer was 
exchanged in return for the documents and reported that he had been 
severely beaten by the Russians while in their custody.19
Only two weeks later, Soviet kidnappers struck again, this time snatching a 
senior Austrian Criminal Investigation Inspector, Oberkriminalinspektor Anton 
Marek, from a public street in front of the Ministry of Justice in broad daylight, 
again in the International District. Marek, a survivor of Dachau, had refused a 
Soviet demand to turn over evidence the police had accumulated on another 
Russian kidnapping case under investigation, and had thereby apparently 
sealed his fate. He spent the next seven years in a Soviet prison.
19 Brown, A Cold War Army of Occupation. The U.S. Military Government in Vienna, 1945- 
1950, pp. 221-222.
It should be noted here that this escalating confrontation between armed 
Western and Soviet military authorities was taking place at the same time the 
Berlin Blockade was becoming nastier and more dangerous. The Berlin Airlift 
was in full operation and both Soviet and Western military forces throughout 
Europe were on a high state of alert. It looked to many at the time that a 
major covert war was breaking out on the streets of Vienna. Brown quotes a 
CIC report to the effect that ‘the Soviets were becoming bolder and more 
aggressive in their activities and were becoming increasingly open in their 
tactics’. 20
Halvor Ekern describes a little-known action taken by American occupation 
authorities in Vienna during the Berlin Blockade. While in command of an 
advance party of American officers, US Major General Al Gruenther had 
informed Soviet authorities that the American High Commissioner, Mark 
Clark, would not move his headquarters from Salzburg to Vienna until the 
Soviets signed a written agreement to provide the Western Allies free and 
open access to Vienna.
The Soviets reluctantly agreed to an air-tight access accord covering air, 
road and rail transit rights. A supplementary local protocol gave the US 
control of that part of the Vienna Woods beyond the eighteenth and 
nineteenth districts ‘for walking purposes’. This, too, was later of near-critical 
importance at the time of the Berlin blockade. When the Soviets initiated their
20 History of the Office of the Director of Intelligence for the Period April-June 1948, RG 260, 
Folder 46, Box 6, NARA II.
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blockade on Berlin, the Soviet High Commissioner in Austria apparently had 
received similar instructions. Soviet troops blocked traffic to and from 
Vienna.21 When this happened, Ekern led a team of engineers into this 
‘walking zone’ to ‘select a location for the rapid construction of an airfield for 
resupply purposes. Remarkably, the American Element lost their copy of this 
agreement! The Soviets apparently had retained theirs because the Russians 
did not interfere with the Ekern party’s movement through this walking area.22
The Soviet kidnapping campaign was also of great interest to Sir C. B. 
Jerram, K.C.M.G., who was Britain’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary in Vienna from 1948-1949. He was a fascinating character 
with extensive diplomatic experience. He had been an interpreter in the 
Levant in 1913, and was arrested and imprisoned by Bolshevik forces in 
Moscow in 1918. He served in Novorossisk, Moscow, Leningrad, and then 
again in Moscow until diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union were suspended in June 1927. Subsequently, he served in 
Tallinn (then Reval) twice, in Bergen, Helsingfors, Warsaw and Madrid in 
1937, when he was also appointed as Britain’s Assistant Agent to General 
Franco’s administration. He was made C.M.G. in January 1938 and sent to 
Buenos Aires as Commercial Counsellor. He was promoted to Envoy
21 Ekern, Halvor O., The Allied Commission for Austria,’ The Austria Solution: International 
Conflict and Cooperation, (ed.) Robert A. Bauer, published for the Johns Hopkins Foreign 
Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University by 
the University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville (1982), pp. 56, 57, 59, 60.
22 This author lived in Vienna’s 18th District and frequently took hiking and camping 
expeditions into this same walking area of the Vienna Woods. On several occasions, 
American Boy Scout Troop Number One (in Europe) was camping along the trail in this 
walking area, as Soviet patrols moved along it. We were within ten meters of each other on 
all such occasions, and at times exchanged friendly greetings, but only after the Russian 
soldiers made sure we were not American military personnel!
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Stockholm in July 1945, was 
made K.C.M.G. in June 1947 when he was also promoted to the rank of 
Ambassador. Jerram was appointed as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary in Vienna in April 1948.23
Jerram assigned Russian kidnappings a prominent place in an official report 
to Clement Attlee on major political developments in Austria during 194824 
This report makes particular mention of the Marek abduction and of the 
audacity behind a Soviet snatch of Austria’s head of the Planning Section of 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and Property Control, Dr Margarethe 
Ottillinger. The seizure of (Dr Ottillinger), which was carried out in the 
presence of her Minister ... coupled with the temporary detention of the 
Minister himself, and the fact that Frau Dr Ottillinger was both a high official 
and a young woman, caused widespread dismay.’25 This case was of 
particular interest to Britain because Dr Ottillinger had just returned from 
studying British economic planning in London, where she had been the 
luncheon guest of Michael Cullis, a member of the British Embassy staff in 
Vienna.26 The Western High Commissioners failed to secure the release of 
these two Austrian officials, or even to obtain a Soviet promise that they 
would get a fair trial and be treated humanely. Jerram attributed the serious
23 The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1949, 122nd 
Publication (London: Harrison and Sons, , 1949), p. 266, REF: 351 010 ZS FO, PRO.
24 Jerram to Attlee, Telegram No. 38, 12 April 1949, ‘Austria: Annual Political Review for 
1948’. C 3216/176/3, FO 465/3, paragraph 6 ,PRO.
25 Jerram to Attlee, 12 April 1948, paragraph 6.
26 Michael Cullis, 'Austria 1945-1955: The Desk-level View of a British Diplomat,' in 
Geschichte Zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung: Gerald Stourzh, zum 60. Geburtstag,
Leidenfrost, (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1989), p. 223.
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deterioration of relations between the Austrian Government and the Soviet 
occupying authorities in 1948 directly to this Soviet kidnapping campaign.
E c o n o m ic  M a t t e r s
Soviet behaviour regarding certain important economic issues represented a 
second and major cause of friction between the Western Allies and Soviets, 
and received prominent mention in Jerram’s 12 April 1949 report, The British 
High Commission was concerned that tensions during 1948 were being 
exacerbated by ‘the unscrupulous economic policy’ pursued by the 
Administration of Soviet Property in Austria (USI.A.) and by Moscow’s 
support for Yugoslav treaty claims. Jerram assumed that, despite Russian 
propaganda to the contrary, the prospect of continuing economic gain 
constituted the main reason for Moscow’s reluctance to sign an Austrian 
treaty. During the year, it was learned that U.S.I.A. was directly involved in 
the smuggling of goods for sale in Austria, and had unilaterally initiated a 
series of barter agreements with the USSR’s East European client states. 
Jerram informed Attlee that ‘If the Austrian character were not easy-going 
and optimistic, morale might well have been more seriously shaken by the 
prospect of the indefinite continuance of a system based on gangsterism and 
exploitation’.27
The Jerram report noted that the currency reform of December 1947 had 
brought a remarkable outburst of production and trade and, for the first time 
since the war, shops were full, the food ration was steadily improving, and
27 Jerram to Attlee, 12 April 1949, paragraph 6.
both the volume and variety of foodstuffs available in the open and black 
markets was significantly' higher than the previous year. However, price 
increases were still ahead of wage hikes, and many low-paid people were 
finding it difficult or impossible to benefit from the overall increase in the 
health of Austria’s economy.
In paragraph 7 of his 1949 dispatch, Jerram raised what was to become an 
issue of critical importance to political stability and the rule of law in Austria: 
the role of the country’s trade union leaders. In this particular case, Jerram 
attributed an important inter-party agreement on wage -  price control to the 
‘energetic intervention’ of certain union leaders who were prepared to commit 
themselves to increasing living standards in the country through aggressive 
price reductions rather than systematic wage increases. Inter-party bickering 
was intense on this issue, but, at least according to Britain’s top diplomat on 
the scene, the agreement ‘effectively put an end to incipient industrial unrest’. 
Unfortunately, this conclusion was premature, and stability in Austria was to 
be threatened on more than one occasion by Communist-inspired violence 
based ostensibly on workers’ dissatisfaction over the relationship between 
wage and price increases. In 1950, these issues caused major civil unrest 
and came very close to triggering an East-West armed confrontation.
During 1948, the Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber, launched a number 
of initiatives, which seemed to be intended to counter Communist 
accusations of an Austrian economic bias toward the West. Trade pacts were 
concluded with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary -  although Switzerland
147
and Italy continued to receive some thirty percent of Austria’s exports.28 Dr 
Gruber made a successful trip to Rome where he signed two conventions on 
rail traffic between North and South Tyrol. He later, in December 1948, 
commented favourably during a budget debate on Austro-ltalian relations and 
the long-range importance of Austria’s ‘powerful neighbour covering 
(Austria’s) southern flank’. Austria was once again emerging into the 
international arena.
T h e  M a r s h a l l  P lan  a n d  A u s t r ia
The Marshall Plan - '... that most successful and beneficent of all the post­
war international enterprises’ - was one of the most important economic 
issues to emerge during the entire occupation.29 While this was an American 
program and Britain’s primary role was to benefit from it, the impact on 
Austria was such that some mention here is more than appropriate. 
According to some, it was the most important turning point in Austria’s 
economic recovery.30 Bischof, for example, writes that, with ‘a total of 1.5 
billion dollars in American post-war aid, Austria was one of those European 
countries profiting most from American generosity.’ According to Bischof’s 
calculations, Austria received US$ 909.1 million, or the equivalent of $131.70 
per capita, in Marshall Plan aid, alone.31
28 Ibid., paragraph 7.
29 Strang, Britain in World Affairs , p. 355.
30 Guenter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955; The Leverage of the Weak 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), p. 98.
31 Ibid, p. 102, citing statistics available in Ingvar Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the 
European Economy, (Geneva: UN Economic Commission for Europe, 1954), p. 236f.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Statistics 
& Reports Division, accounting dated 17 November 1975, is probably a more 
reliable source of this data. If so, ERP funds to Austria totalled some $ 98 per 
capita. This USAID report establishes that Marshall Plan funds were 
allocated as follows:32
M a r sh a ll  P lan Ex p e n d it u r e s E c o n o m ic  A s s is t a n c e . A pril  3 .1 9 4 8  t o  June  
3 0 .1 9 5 2
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
COUNTRY Total Grants Loans
Total for all countries 13,325.8 11,820.7 1,505.1
Austria 677.8 677.8 0
Belgium-Luxembourg 559.3 491.3 68.0
Denmark 273.0 239.7 33.3
France 2,713.6 2,488.0 225.6
Federal Republic of 1,390.6 1,173.7 216.9
Germany
Greece 706.7 706.7
Iceland 29.3 24.0 5.3
Ireland 147.5 19.3 128.2
Italy (including Trieste) 1,508.8 1,413.2 95.6
Netherlands 1,083.5 916.8 166.7
Norway 255.3 216.1 39.2
Portugal 51.2 15.1 36.1
Sweden 107.3 86.9 20.4
Turkey 225.1 140.1 85.0
United Kingdom 3,189.8 2,805.0 384.8
Communists reacted angrily to the Marshall Plan, labelling it just another 
weapon of American imperialism. Moscow took the immediate initiative to 
forbid Communist controlled governments from participating in the Marshall
32 The George C. Marshall Foundation, Exhibit on the European Recovery Plan, 
<http://www.marshallfoundation.org/about qcm/marshall plan.htm/expenditures>. [3 
September 2002],
Plan, and did its best to obstruct ERP funds from flowing into the Soviet 
occupation Zone in Austria. In fact, Soviet High Commissioner, Kurasov, 
even issued orders to block American officials from entering the Russian 
Zone to supervise the distribution of ERP funds, as America’s congress had 
mandated in approving the program. Kurasov described the Marshall Plan 
as a ‘gross violation of the control agreements and a case of blatant 
American imperialism’.33 Through some administrative creativity, however, 
American and Austrian authorities found a way to evade this Soviet 
obstructionism, while still complying technically with congressional 
restrictions designed to ensure close supervision of the way Marshall Plan 
dollars were spent. Bischof explains how this was done.
Vienna was rife with rumours of a Communist coup, and Marshall 
ordered Vienna to find a mutually acceptable arrangement since it 
was ‘most important that relief supplies continue to enter the Eastern 
zone’. Erhardt and Keyes devised a simple solution. The new food 
stocks forwarded by the June relief agreement, and under strict 
Congressional restrictions, were channelled to the three Western 
zones. Older food reserves of the post-UNRAA aid programme from 
the beginning of 1947 had no strings attached and were channelled 
into the Soviet Zone. In this way, all of Austria was supplied with 
American food stocks, and a national unity was preserved. The 
ingeniousness of the solution lay in the can-do pragmatism of mid­
level American policy makers on the spot, and signalled the final 
victory of the principle of Austrian economic unity.34
This tactic, which succeeded in circumnavigating Soviet obstacles, probably 
saved Austria from being partitioned. There was an ever-present danger that
33 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955; The Leverage of the Weak, p. 100, 
quoting a 10 July 1947 Allied Council document.
34 G. Bischof, The Marshall-Plan and Austria', Zeitgeschichte, 17 (1990), 463-474 pp. 101- 
103.
Austria would become, like Germany, divided into two parts, one under 
Soviet control and part of the Soviet Bloc, the other allied with the West. This 
possibility remained of concern to London and Washington throughout the 
decade-long tussle with Moscow. But Austria was never partitioned, and it 
remains an interesting Cold War fact that the Russian occupation Zone of 
Austria was the only territory under Communist control to benefit from the 
Marshall Plan.
For Great Britain, of course, the Marshall Plan came as a godsend. 
According to the above USAID statistics, the United Kingdom received 
$3,189.8 million or $63 for each of Britain’s 50.6 million citizens. Alan Bullock 
describes Bevin’s personal reaction:
‘I assure you, gentlemen,’ he told the National Press Club in 
Washington, ‘it was like a life-line to sinking men. It seemed to bring 
hope where there was none. The generosity of it was beyond our 
belief. It expressed a mutual thing. It was Try and help yourselves 
and we will try to see what we can do. Try and do the thing 
collectively and we will see what we can put into the pool.’ I think you 
understand why, therefore, we responded with such alacrity and why 
we grabbed the lifeline with both hands.35
The United Kingdom was the only OEEC member state able to dispense with 
Marshall aid two years before the formal termination of the program, a 
development which the Economist (25 March 1950) called ‘almost fantastic,’ 
especially since Western Europe, at the brink of economic collapse in 1947, 
had surpassed pre-war levels of industrial production, and almost reached
35 Bullock, Ernest Bevin pp. 405-406.
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these levels in agriculture.36 Investment in capital equipment was higher than 
in 1938, and both excessive unemployment and inflation had been pre­
empted. This was success beyond the expectations of anyone in 1947- 
48’.37 In a 14 December 1950 telegram, Bevin sent the following instructions 
to his ambassador in Washington:
Please convey the following message from me to General Marshall.
I sat in the House of Commons yesterday and heard Chancellor 
announce suspension of Marshall Aid and had you been there I 
should have wanted to go and say to you with full heart Thank 
you’.38
The ERP was intended primarily to help European states defend themselves 
against Communism by rebuilding their own economies. Participation was 
voluntary. The Soviet Union and Europe’s Communist states were invited to 
participate, but they declined. It is understandable that the Kremlin didn’t like 
the program and perceived Marshall Plan aid as a threat to Soviet control in 
satellite states, as well as a black eye to Communism in general. It is 
understandable, if not laudable, that the Soviets forbad their client states 
from participating in the Plan.39 It is understandable that the Congress of the 
United States enacted legislation that was in the best interests of the 
American People, because that is what every Member of Congress is elected
36 Ibid., p. 718.
37 Ibid., p. 761.
38 Bevin to Franks, Telegram No. 5620, 14 December 1950, US/50/58, FO 800/517, PRO.
39 For a current and comprehensive treatise on Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan, see: 
Parish, Scott D. and Narinsky, Mikhail, ‘New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the 
Marshall Plan, 1947,’ in CWIHP Working Paper Number 9, March 1994.
to do. That US foreign policy interests coincided with the needs of recipient 
countries at the time of the Marshall Plan was a positive, constructive and 
very fortunate development.
A u s tr ia n  P o l it ic s
Already in 1948, attention began to turn toward the national elections 
scheduled for the following year. It is the duty of every overseas diplomatic 
mission to monitor and report on political developments in the host country, 
and so it was with the British mission in Vienna. Britain had little interest in 
Austria’s internal political developments, beyond an ongoing desire to see 
stability and progress, primarily because there was virtually no reason to 
worry about the local Communist Party acquiring sufficient representation 
through democratic electoral process to exert deciding influence on key 
issues.
Nonetheless, periodic reporting on domestic political issues was routine, and 
Jerram offered his own analysis of developments in 1948.40 He reported that 
the Austrian political parties had begun manoeuvring to position themselves 
for the 1949 campaign. The smooth co-operation between the People’s Party 
and the Socialists in Austria’s coalition government was thus more strained 
than it was in 1947, and this became increasingly obvious as the year 
progressed, usually in the form of public recriminations and political duelling 
in the press.
40 Jerram to Attlee, British High Commission Vienna, 'Austria: Annual Review for 1948,' 12 
April 1949, FO 371/465/3, Document No. 11, Telegram No. 38, C 3216/176/3,
In Jerram’s opinion, the Socialists were expecting to increase their strength 
at the expense of both the People’s Party and the Communists who had 
been ‘further discomforted’ in May when they lost a good portion of the 
influence they had previously enjoyed in the Trades Union Federation. 
Having yet again seen the democratic process act against them, Austrian 
Communists should have been inclined to exploit the growing anxieties 
associated with steadily increasing prices and the decision by both the 
Socialists and Trades Union Council to seek relief through solutions that did 
not involve significant wage hikes. The Communists did not. There were a 
few Communist-inspired demonstrations and strikes, but these were not 
serious or disruptive. Nor, according to Jerram, did the Communists benefit 
from their attack on a Capital Levy Bill, which was condemned as wholly 
inadequate and indulgent towards capitalist interests.
Both the Capital Levy and Capital Increment Levy Bill became law on 20 
August 1948, completing the government’s financial reform package begun in 
1947 with the currency conversion of December 1947 -  the final step in what 
had been a controversial, acrimonious and at times confrontational 
negotiation between coalition partners. The Communists concentrated their 
attacks on economic aspects of the reform, while the Socialists and Peoples 
Party disagreements were mostly political -  unfortunately leaving a number 
of important economic issues ‘shelved to the detriment of the Austrian 
economy’.
In connection with the forthcoming national elections, the coalition partners 
each concentrated on maintaining and strengthening solidarity and discipline 
within their own ranks, while attempting to recruit new members. It was in this 
competition for new members that one saw the most mutual antagonism. 
Several factors contributed to an increase of about one third in the eligible 
voting population; (for example, the return of prisoners of war, the 
naturalization of Volksdeutsche, the emergence of new age groups and a 5 
March Amnesty Law that allowed ‘less-implicated Nazis’ to vote).The 
opportunity for all political parties to enlist new voters was obvious. It was 
also evident to others who were not participants in the coalition government, 
and this new floating vote was wooed by new ‘mushroom political parties,’ 
which sprang up all over the country. Some applied formally to the Allied 
Council for approval to compete in the 1949 elections, the most noticeable of 
which was the Democratic Union which attempted to recruit disillusioned 
members of the People’s Party whose views tended to lean to the right of the 
political spectrum.
Jerram reported that Britain, supported by the United States, opposed new 
political parties, arguing that a further fragmentation of the Austrian political 
scene would not be in the best interests of the country. Britain’s diplomats on 
the scene believed the Soviets were promoting these new political groupings 
in order to ‘atomise’ Austria’s political body and ‘create the utmost possible 
confusion’ before the 1949 elections.41 Interestingly, Jerram’s successor, Sir 
Harold Caccia, reported on 1 January 1950, that:
41 Ibid., paragraph 15, p. 24.
His Majesty’s Government declared themselves in favour of allowing 
Austrians the full political activity permitted by their constitution. But 
the French and Americans both viewed with hostility the prospect of 
new political forces and concepts emerging before the elections. ... 
The Soviet Element, and behind them the Communists, avoided 
committing themselves to either thesis and sought merely to 
perpetuate the confusion.42
In the meantime, Jerram contradicted himself and, on 18 October 1949, 
reported to Bevin on the ‘lengthy and sometimes painful process of 
conversion’ he and his staff had suffered while attempting to persuade his 
American and French counterparts of the wisdom behind British policy that 
‘Austrians should be free to form new political parties in accordance with their 
Constitution’ 43
This policy issue was discussed at some length in the House of Commons, 
where, on 9 May 1949, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Christopher Paget Mayhew, was asked whether he could ‘give an assurance 
that the Austrian people will be free to decide the number of political parties 
contesting the next election ...’ 44 Mrs Ayrton-Gould followed-on with the 
request that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tell the House whether 
the ‘Control Commission for Austria’ had yet agreed to allow new political 
parties and, if not, what the British Element was doing about the issue. Mr
42 Caccia to McNeil, British High Commission Vienna, 'Austria: Annual Review for 1949,' 1 
January 1950, FO 465/4, Telegram 1, C 214/6/3,
43 Jerram to Bevin, British High Commission Vienna, 'General Elections in Austria,' 18 
October 1949, FO 465/3, Document No. 27, Telegram No. 115, C 8189/47/3,
44 The Hansard ‘PARLIAMENTARYDEBATES,' Session 1948-1949, Fifth Series, vol 464, 
cc 1487-1488.
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J.B. Hynd jumped up to challenge the Under-Secretary, asking if he was 
aware that the ‘Allied Control Council’ in Vienna was preventing the 
recognition of any parties other than the People’s Party, the Socialist Party 
and the Communist Party -  what was the British Element doing to lift the 
embargo so as to ‘enable such democratic parties as wish to prepare for the 
forthcoming elections ...?’ Mr Benn Levy took the implied argument a step 
further by seeking Foreign Office assurance that ‘any attempt to influence the 
course and results of the forthcoming elections in Austria by artificially 
restricting the number of parties who may contest the election will be 
vigorously resisted by His Majesty’s Government’. Mr Mayhew responded:
His Majesty’s Government have for some time been anxious that the 
Austrians should be free to form any new political parties they wish in 
accordance with the Austrian Constitution. The House will, however, 
appreciate that there are various other considerations which have to 
be taken into account, and one of them is the need for securing joint • 
action by all four of the occupying powers in Austria. My right hon. 
Friend regrets that it has not yet been possible to obtain unanimity in 
this matter.
When pressed to identify which other governments were objecting to new 
parties in Austria, Mr Mayhew said ‘We have discussed this question with the 
French and United States Governments and have not been able to reach 
agreement’.
In fact, none of the new political groupings attracted large memberships, but 
the movement towards more parties did generate a surprising amount of 
local and national press coverage, including in some provincial newspapers, 
which voiced pan-German, if not outright neo-Nazi opinions. Jerram reported
that the most objectionable of these publications, Alpenlandischer Heimatruf, 
sprang up in the British Zone in October 1948 and quickly spread throughout 
the country. The Socialists were encouraged by these developments, which 
of course distressed the People’s Party who feared a split in the so-called 
bourgeois vote.45
In turn, the People’s Party took comfort in the 31 October expulsion from the 
SPO of Socialist Deputy and former party secretary, Dr Erwin Scharf, who 
had published a booklet reflecting Communist views, and which leaked 
classified Socialist Party documents. Scharf hoped to attract support from 
left-wing members of the Socialist Party, but he did not ask for Allied Council 
approval as an official political party, so the year ended with virtually no 
realignment of the political party structure.
Jerram concludes his report on 1948 with the assurance that:
The zest and occasional bitterness with which the issues of internal 
politics were pursued should not, I think, be taken as indicating that 
Austrian politicians, in their concentration upon domestic affairs and 
lulled into an unreal sense of security by a vast improvement in 
economic conditions, are becoming blind to the precarious situation 
of their country on the borderline between democratic and 
Communist Europe. The responsible leaders of both coalition parties, 
with the fate of Czechoslovakia and Hungary before their eyes, are 
shrewd and patriotic enough to realise that ideological differences 
and personal rivalries must not be allowed to develop to a point 
where they might endanger the democratic unity of the State and 
facilitate the infiltrating and disintegrating tactics of communism. 
They have constantly assured me that whatever the outcome of the 
1949 elections and treaty discussions the coalition of People’s Party 
and Socialists must continue in face of the menace from the East46
45 Jerram to Attlee, 'Austria: Annual Review for 1948,' paragraph 16, p. 24.
46 Jerram to Attlee , 'General Elections in Austria,' 12 April 1949, paragraph 19, p.25.
On 18 October 1949, Jerram wrote a comprehensive report to Bevin on the 9 
October national elections.47 94.3 percent of the eligible voters did in fact 
vote on a day when, according to Jerram, complete calm reigned and no 
disturbances were reported. Occupation authorities had taken care to make 
sure that their troops had no contact whatsoever with the voting public on 
Election Day. In fact, all occupation troops were confined to barracks, and 
‘...the democratic freedom of the elections was scrupulously respected in all 
four zones’ 48
The OVP won 1,844,850 votes, which gave them seventy seven seats in the 
National Assembly. The SPO won 1,621,275 votes (38.69 percent), which 
gave them sixty seven seats. The ‘Left Bloc,’ a combination of Communists 
and dissident Socialists, won 212, 651 votes (5.07 percent) and five seats. 
There were three new parties, none of which had contested elections before. 
Of these, only the VdU registered significantly, winning 489,132 votes (11.67 
percent) and sixteen seats in the National Assembly.49 Jerram recalled that,
47 Jerram to Bevin, ‘General Elections in Austria,’ 18 October 1949, C 880/47/3, FO 465/3, 
PRO.
48 Ibid., paragraph 1, p. 66.
49 The VdU was an issue of some controversy in the British House of Commons. During a 9 
May 1949 debate, for example, Under-Secretary Mayhew was tackled by Philip Piratin, a 
Labour M.P. from Stepney (Mile End), who asked if the government was aware that the VdU 
was a ‘neo-Fascist organization, whose appeal is directed to former Nazis’. Mayhew 
responded that the VdU ‘has not offended any Allied Council directive’. This discourse was 
brought to an abrupt end when Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan, Conservative M.P. from Perth 
and Kinross, jumped to his feet to ask Mayhew: ‘In view of the fact that the Communists call 
everybody Fascists who are not Communists, will he (the Under-Secretarty) refuse to take 
any notice of this nonsense?’ See The Hansard ‘PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,’ Session 
1948-1949, Fifth Series, vol 464, cc 650-651.
in the 1945 election, the OVP enjoyed an absolute majority of eighty five 
seats, the SPO seventy six and the Communists four.50
Jerram reported that the Socialist leadership was extremely disappointed by 
their party’s performance in the polls, especially because they succeeded in 
attracting so few of the 940,000 newly eligible voters. The People’s Party was 
pleased, the Chancellor being especially proud that his party gained strength 
in his own home province, Lower Austria and ‘Red Vienna’. It was Jerram’s 
assessment that the presence of the Independents (VdU) would make it 
easier for the OVP and SPO to found a new coalition government on a 
relatively secure basis, and he welcomed the signs of the ‘growing sense of 
statesmanship and national responsibility among senior Austrian political 
leaders’ that this trend toward coalition signalled.51 He also welcomed the 
fact that, despite the Left having gained one seat (KPO), there was little for 
the Communists to be pleased about. ‘I am informed that the Russians, who 
placed a very large sum in schillings at the disposal of the Communist 
electoral organisation, are profoundly irritated by the utter failure of their 
satellites to extend their influence’. He did not expect the Soviet authorities to 
attempt to overturn or interfere with the election’s results; however, ‘the 
maintenance of an atmosphere of uncertainty is an elementary part of the 
technique of Soviet policy in Austria’.52
50 Jerram to Bevin, 'General Elections in Austria,' paragraph 3, p. 67.
51 Jerram to Bevin, 18 October 1949, paragraph 10, p. 69..
52 Ibid., paragraph. 11, p.69.
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If for no other reason, Jerram’s 12 April 1949 report is significant because it 
cuts through the complexities surrounding Four Power negotiations and 
unilateral efforts by the Austrians to conclude a treaty, and it identifies a 
fundamental difference of opinion that clearly existed in both Austrian and 
some foreign circles throughout the occupation. There was by no means a 
consensus that the true interests of the country would be served by a speedy 
end of the occupation. This is seldom if ever mentioned in the historiography.
According to official British assessments of the situation, many Austrians 
believed that the withdrawal of Western occupation troops would give ‘free 
play to the sinister undermining tactics the Russians have used with such 
signal success to destroy democracy and independence in the neighbouring 
countries’.53 All of the obvious benefits resulting from a treaty granting 
Austrians their freedom, independence and an end to Russian exploitation of 
the country’s natural and industrial resources were insufficient, according to 
Jerram, to convince a large body of Austrian opinion that the departure of the 
Russians under the terms of any treaty would not be followed by their rapid 
return. This fear was accompanied by the further suspicion that, in such a 
case, the Western Powers would either ‘stand idly by as they did in 1938’ or 
‘in their slowness and indecision’ would not move quickly enough to forestall 
a Soviet takeover. Jerram concluded ‘even members of the Austrian 
Government, who so insistently demand in public the end of the occupation, 
have been known to voice such apprehensions in private’.54
53 Jerram to Attlee, 'Austria: Annual Review for 1948,' paragraph 19, p. 25.
54 Ibid.
The Commander-in-Chief British Troops in Austria (1947-1950), Lieutenant 
General Alexander Galloway, reported essentially the same personal 
impression. In a 30 January 1948 communication to Foreign Secretary Bevin, 
Galloway wrote ‘I think it is fair to say that the large majority of Austrians are 
not averse to the presence of military High Commissioners, or troops, and 
look upon us, together with the United States and French troops, as their 
guarantee of security against Yugoslav and Soviet aggression in Austria’.55
It is interesting that it occurred to both Jerram and Galloway to include this 
observation in their formal reporting to London. It was not at all unusual for 
Austrians, in private settings, to voice concerns over what might happen to 
the country -  or in the case of politicians and certain categories of others, 
what might happen to them, personally - if Western forces pulled out. This 
author had friends and acquaintances that were not at all reluctant to express 
the same concerns, both during the occupation and, in hindsight, afterwards. 
These personal memories were not unique. American international affairs 
expert and author of perhaps the most reliable and durable report on the 
occupation years, William L. Stearman, recalls precisely the same 
experience:
I can assure you the Austrians regarded the Western powers as 
benefactors especially the Americans (less the French). Austria was 
initially in dreadful shape, especially in that dreadful winter of 1947- 
48, one of the coldest in the 20th century, and especially in the 
eastern part which I knew best. (Some were actually dying of
55 Office of the Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in Austria Vienna,, 'British Function in 
Austria,’ 30 January 1948, FO 465/2, Document No. 6, C 855/54/3, paragraph 9, p. PRO.
starvation.) And they badly needed our aid. (Of all the Europeans we 
aided, the Austrians remained the most grateful.) They depended on 
both our aid and on our protection. They were really and truly scared 
of being taken over by the Communists after what happened right 
next door to their close, if sometimes disdained, former relatives. I 
knew no Austrians who, in the 1945-1950 period and even later, 
thought Austria could survive if the West pulled out. All Austrians, 
with a few Communist exceptions, wanted, however, to end the 
Soviet occupation. I am sure any Austrian who was an adult during 
this period would bear me out. (I had especially good insights into 
Austrian thinking, since I was engaged to a Viennese in 1949 whom I 
married in 1950. She is no longer with us.) When we finally pulled out 
in 1955, a station Rot-Weiss-Rot commentator remarked that 
Austrians viewed our departure ‘mit einem lachenden und mit einem 
weinenden Auge.56
The presence of foreign occupation troops in any society is always an 
anomaly, and one that is usually accompanied by resentment on the part of 
the local population. It was popular and perhaps sensible for political figures 
to bemoan the occupation in public and to demand that foreign troops be 
withdrawn, while, in private, worrying that this might actually happen. 
Austrian politicians who were known to lean heavily toward the West 
probably had good cause for concern. After all, the Soviets were still 
kidnapping people they didn’t like while Western forces were still present. 
Few Austrians had reason to expect relief in a situation where only Soviet 
troops were there.
There were periods of time during the occupation when Austrians were more 
outspoken about their fears of a premature treaty. Audrey Cronin, for 
example, reports that senior Austrian political leaders actually told the 
Western Allies that they did not want a treaty, at the time of the London
56 Personal E-Mail message from William L. Stearman to author, 1 April 2002, available in 
author’s personal files.
Conference in November 1947. They wanted the appearance of progress 
toward a treaty, but ‘when it came to the actual signing of a burdensome 
agreement they were far less than enthusiastic’. 57 Indeed, Mack reported to 
Bevin, following a conversation with President Renner, that Austrians wanted 
the occupation to continue indefinitely, in part because the cost of the 
occupation to the Austrian Government would be far less than the assets 
Moscow was claiming.58
One has to acknowledge that the obsequiousness for which at least the 
Viennese have a well-deserved reputation may have coloured their 
conversations with Western officials in social settings. These overtures, 
intended to be polite, could have been misinterpreted as a serious desire for 
occupation forces to stay. Nonetheless, there was official reporting from both 
British civilian and military sources to the effect that not all Austrians were 
anxious to see the occupation end, regardless of what they said in public.
Jerram would have been aware that, in private, bilateral, Anglo-American 
discussions, US officials had been passing along reports to their British 
counterparts to the effect that the French, too, were less than enthusiastic 
about the early conclusion of an Austrian Treaty. London was sceptical about 
these reports, at least until December of 1949, when Sir William Hayterof the 
Foreign Office visited the French Foreign Ministry’s Couve du Murville in 
Paris to talk about Austria and find out how much substance there was in the
57 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria (Ithica, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 59.
58 Mack to Bevin, 16 October 1957, FO 371/63975 (C13901), PRO.
American reports. On 21 December 1949, Hayter wrote to the head of the 
German Political Department in London, Sir Patrick H. Dean, forwarding 
Couve’s confirmation that ‘there was in fact considerable substance in these 
(American) reports’. Couve told Hayter that the view was particularly strong in 
the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Assembly that the ‘Austrians 
were a feeble lot and would find it quite impossible to resist Russian 
pressure, exercised through the controls they would retain after the Treaty’.59 
Even Foreign Minister Schuman held this view personally, believing that 
Austria would eventually be forced into the position of a Soviet satellite if an 
Austrian State Treaty was concluded. Hence, an Austrian Treaty was not 
viewed with great enthusiasm in Paris where, in any case, it might be difficult 
to get it ratified by the French Assembly. The French Government might even 
find itself having to seek Communist support for ratification -  ‘not a prospect 
they viewed with any favour’.
From the British perspective, even if a treaty became a reality in 1949, it 
would be necessary to ‘inject large doses of confidence’ into the Austrian 
Government and Austrian people, in order to convince them that, under the 
watchful eye of the West, Austria would never find itself in a less favourable 
position than the other Western European democracies.60 Absent in Jerram’s 
important report was any mention of the fact that both Britain and the United 
States had already, in secret, begun plans to provide Austria with a military 
capability that would be adequate to protect her internal security, once
59 Hayter to Dean, Letter of 21 December 1949, C 9899 106/9/544/49, FO 371/84927, PRO.
60 Jerram to Attlee, 'Austria: Annual Review for 1948,' 12 April 1949, paragraph 19, p. 25.
Western forces withdrew. Jerram would have known about these highly 
classified activities, however, and must have intended that the phrase ‘doses 
of confidence’ include the assumption of Western assistance in raising an 
Austrian Army.
Fo u r  P o w e r  N e g o t ia t io n s
Historians interested in the occupation of Austria have tended to concentrate 
on the tumultuous negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty, sometimes 
losing sight of the fundamental objective of those negotiations. The twists 
and turns of this lengthy and tedious negotiation were at times dramatic, 
always unpredictable and usually fascinating, so it is not surprising that even 
experienced modern historians have allowed themselves to be lured into 
exclusive focus on the progress -  or lack of progress -  toward finalisation of 
the Austrian State Treaty. The Doyen of Austria’s corps of contemporary 
historians, Professor Gerald Stourzh, the patron and Dissertationsvater to 
many of the country’s younger scholars and a prolific writer, himself has 
produced a detailed history of the Austrian State Treaty -  one of epic 
proportions. In adopting this exclusive focus, some seem to have become so 
intrigued by the negotiating strategies that they forgot what the ultimate policy 
objectives were -  why the negotiations were taking place. Hence, we see 
frequent, at times breathlessly indignant allegations that one or more of the 
Western powers was as guilty as Moscow for sabotaging the negotiations 
and prolonging the occupation, thereby delaying independence. Here, the 
instinctive behaviour is to equate independence with an end to the 
occupation. Although related, the two were quite separate issues.
British historian Knight, for example, asks ‘was an agreement on Austria 
possible six years before 1955’?61 Of course it was. The occupation could 
have ended at any point during the ten years of its lifetime, but this would not 
necessarily have resulted in independence for Austria. Western Powers 
could have withdrawn their military forces from the country at any time -  as 
indeed both the United States and the Austrian Government suggested at 
various times -  but this would almost certainly not have led to Austria’s 
independence. The Soviet Union would have agreed to a deal on the 
Austrian treaty at any point until late 1949, had the West been prepared to 
pay them a lot of money, had the treaty required withdrawal of Western 
forces from the country, and had it permitted the Soviets to maintain military 
forces on the ground in Austria while retaining control over the country’s 
industrial and natural resources. On several occasions during the period 
1945-1950, Soviet representatives actually told Western diplomats that the 
Kremlin would be amenable to such a bribe.
In August of 1949, for example, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgiy 
Zarubin told British Deputy, Sir Ivo Mallet, that the Soviet Union would agree 
to all other articles in the draft treaty if the West would grant all Soviet 
economic demands, mostly having to do with the disposition of so-called 
German assets. 62 Mallet was obviously attracted by this proposal because 
he reported it to the British Legation in Vienna, asking if the Legation staff
61 Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, p. 245.
62 Mallet was Britain’s Deputy for Austria on the UK Delegation to the Council of Foreign 
Ministers.
thought that Austrians would find it acceptable. He also requested an 
assessment of Austria’s actual capability to meet the Soviet conditions, if 
Britain’s diplomats felt these conditions would be acceptable. Mallet also 
wrote to Bevin’s Private Secretary, E. E. Tomkins, alerting him to the 
possibility that the Secretary of State might have to take up the matter 
personally, should the Vienna Legation believe Austria would accept the 
deal. In this communication, thinking realistically, Mallet speculated that 
Bevin might have to ‘put considerable pressure on the Americans before they 
will agree (to the Zarubin proposal). ...,63 This incident and Mallet’s 
interpretation of it, reveal two things. First, Mallet fell for Zarubin’s bait. 
Second, Mallet’s communications on the matter reflect the British 
Government’s recognition that the United States would probably not.
Two months later, in October 1949, Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Vyshinsky 
opened a second door to Zarubin’s deal with Mallet, and told Bevin that Josef 
Stalin wanted an Austrian treaty -  the Soviet Union was prepared to sign. But 
there was a catch: the Western Powers would have to concede to all Soviet 
economic demands in Austria. By this time, Bevin had drifted away from 
Britain’s basic policy objective -  a free and independent Austria -  and was 
concentrating single-mindedly on the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty and an 
end to the occupation. By 1950, Bevin wanted the matter of Austria settled, 
even if it meant paying the Russians off and agreeing to withdraw Western 
occupation forces, leaving a Soviet presence still on the ground. In an April
63 Mallet to E. E. Tomkins, Bevin’s Private Secretary, 6 August 1949, (C6353, FO 
371/76446, PRO. See also telegram from Foreign Office to Vienna, 6 August 1949, C6274, 
FO 371/76446 , PRO.
1950 paper to the Cabinet, he wrote ‘it became clear enough to us that, 
however unreasonable the Russian interpretation of the Paris agreement, we 
must be prepared to swallow it for the sake of getting an early treaty’.64 The 
Americans were no doubt inclined to ask why, when getting an early treaty 
would have meant deserting Austria and leaving her without the means to 
protect her own internal security.
Bevin had become convinced that the Soviets would deliver a treaty if the 
West agreed to Soviet economic demands, and he was pressing this view 
strongly on his American counterpart, Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 
After all, in the higher planes of diplomacy, the Paris Conference of Foreign 
Ministers (23 May -  20 June 1949) had been something of a success, and 
some Western diplomats were suggesting that a significant step had been 
taken in the direction of reduced East-West tensions. If nothing else, the Four 
Powers were speaking with each other again, and the prospect of imminent 
war was not as alarming as it had been.65 It was a matter of great frustration 
to Bevin that, in his view, the Americans continued to drag their feet on an 
Austrian treaty at a time when the Soviets were showing signs that they 
might be prepared to be reasonable. In April of 1950, he told the Cabinet:
...While Soviet policy ultimately underlies all our troubles with the
Austrian Treaty, we have also had difficulties with our Western allies.
Neither the United States nor the French Government seem really to
64 CP (50) 66, 11 April 1950, CAB 129/39, PRO'
65 For a more detailed account of this period of reduced Cold War tensions in mid-1949, see 
Klaus Larres, Churchill's Cold W ar: the politics of personal diplomacy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), p.131. See also Robert Murphy, Diplomat among warriors (London: 
Collins, 1964), pp.391-394.
have faced the full implications of getting an Austrian Treaty until it 
was too late to reverse the policy of trying to get one. For a long time 
the United States Government sheltered behind the supposed 
unwillingness of the Soviet Government to conclude a Treaty, and 
behind the complexity of the German assets question. However 
when the negotiations were resumed at the beginning of 1949, the 
State Department had evidently decided in favour of concluding the 
Treaty, provided tolerable terms could be secured. ... It is possible 
that the Americans went further in Paris than they intended to, and 
that this was one of the reasons for their stubbornness in the 
subsequent negotiations. ...66
More likely, Washington had, in fact, faced up to the full implications of 
getting an Austrian treaty and withdrawing from the country before Austria 
had sufficient armed security forces to protect against a communist coup, 
and that it was Bevin who had not grasped the full ramifications of such a 
potential blunder. One month later, however, Bevin acknowledged formally 
that his drive to negotiate a treaty at any cost had failed, and concluded ‘the 
fact that the Russians have ceased to want a Treaty has altered the whole 
position, and I do not now advocate the making of concessions which are 
unlikely to serve any useful purpose’.67
Mallet took the Vyshinsky/Zarubin offer directly to Bevin in August of 1949, 
after receiving the somewhat astonishing advice from Britain’s Minister in 
Vienna (1948-1949), Sir Bertram Jerram that Austria’s economy would not 
suffer as a result of a treaty acceptable to the Russians.68 Jerram had, 
however, added an important proviso, namely that, should such a treaty be
66 CP (50)66, 11 April, 1950, CAB 129/39, PRO.
67 CO (50) 93, 4 May 1950, CAB 129/39, PRO.
68 Memorandum of Conversation, Mallet and Bevin, 19 August 1949, C6548, FO 371/76447, 
PRO.
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signed, Austria’s need for foreign aid would become more important and 
more prolonged.69 Here, Jerram had given contradictory advice. Either 
Austria could afford to pay the Soviet price without having her economy 
affected, or she could do so only with expanded foreign aid -  a situation 
reminiscent of the failed First Republic, and a development that all of the 
Western Powers wanted to avoid. Bevin’s response, as recorded in a Minute 
summarising this conversation, was that he, personally, was in favour of 
signing a treaty on Russian terms, but he would accept whatever decision the 
Americans made. If the Americans did not want to sign the treaty at that time, 
he regarded it as important that ‘the onus of such a decision be placed 
entirely on them’.70 Here again, one sees the steam going out of Bevin’s 
energetic drive to win independence for the Austrian people. Passing the 
buck was hardly a characteristic of the younger and more physically fit Ernest 
Bevin.
Bevin’s behaviour at this point was more than a simple cop-out. He was 
obviously tiring of the Austria problem and wanted it settled, almost 
regardless of the consequences. He had advice from his senior diplomats in 
Vienna that Austria would not necessarily suffer economically from a treaty 
on Russian terms. He also had advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it 
was in British interests to withdraw all occupation forces from the country if 
the Foreign Office could not conclude a treaty before a ‘stable Austrian
69 Jerram to Foreign Office, 13 August 1949 , C6417, FO 371/76446, PRO.
70 Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria , p. 81.
government was in control’.71 In offering this opinion, the Chiefs of Staff said 
that the conclusion of a treaty and development of strategies designed to pre­
empt Communist subversion into Austria must remain the responsibility of the 
Foreign Office -  a classic demonstration of passing the buck.
Not surprisingly, there was opposition to Bevin’s approach in Washington 
where the British strategy was seen as an unnecessary sell-out to the 
Russians and a distinct departure from the original policy objective of 
guaranteeing a free, independent and sovereign Austria. It was broadly 
recognised -  not without some irritation -  that America, alone, would have to 
bear the costs of any bribe paid to the Soviets in return for an Austrian State 
Treaty. And nobody in Washington really believed that the Austrians would 
be able to sustain the cost of a treaty under these circumstances anyway, 
despite Foreign Minister Gruber’s assurances to Bevin to the contrary. 
Experts in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, Gruber had said, were working out 
how the country could pay what the Soviets were asking in return for the 
German assets they had confiscated. Gruber also argued that an early 
withdrawal of occupation forces would benefit the Western Powers because it 
would remove the Soviet Army from Tito’s northern border, make it easier to 
bring Austria into the European Council and other international organisations, 
and the treaty would be encouraging to the West Germans. Gruber asked
71 Report by the Joint Planning Staff, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 5 December 1947, 
‘Withdrawal of Allied Forces from Austria,’ C199/G, FO 371/70388, PRO.
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Bevin to encourage the Americans to grant Soviet economic demands and 
agree to an early treaty.72
Bevin subsequently met with the American Ambassador in London, and put 
forth these arguments, offering his opinion that all of these benefits would be 
worth paying a ‘small price’ to the Russians.73 Ambassador Douglas 
disagreed, pointing out that the United States Senate would never ratify such 
an agreement and, besides, an agreement along the lines Bevin seemed to 
want would give the Soviets ‘dangerous economic influence over Austria’. He 
once again told Bevin that his government did not believe the Austrians could 
afford to pay the Soviet price, regardless of what Gruber was alleging, and as 
soon as the Austrians found themselves in trouble, they would call for the 
Americans to bail them out -  yet again. Douglas also remarked that it was 
easy for Great Britain to lobby in favour of bribing the Soviets because 
London would not bear any of the costs.74
It was following this 26 August 1949 conversation that Bevin took his 
argument directly to Acheson, but to no avail. Acheson was already under 
harsh pressure from critics of the Truman administration, and he knew full 
well that such an agreement would not be approved in the Senate. The mid­
term US elections had resulted in Republican control of both houses of
72 Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria Cronin, p. 82. Gruber had 
specifically told Bevin that experts in the Austrian Foreign Ministry had worked out detailed 
plans for the payment of what the Soviets were asking for the return of German assets to 
Austria.
73 Foreign Office London, 'Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the American 
Ambassador,' 26 August 1949, FO 465/3, Document 23, Telegram 1242, C 6812/176/3,
74 Ibid.
congress, and Truman was wrestling with formidable political opposition. 
Also, Acheson’s personal position in Washington was far too shaky to permit 
him to incur further political risks. He was accused from several directions, 
accurately as it was later proven, of tolerating. Communists and Soviet agents 
in the State Department. Truman and Acheson’s policies in the Far East 
were seen by many as having abandoned a valuable ally in Nationalist 
China, and losing Mainland China to the Communists. Acheson had come 
squarely into the sights of the House Un-American Activities Committee and, 
later, Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, who was popular with the 
American public and who later, accused Acheson in public of hiding 
Communist spies in the State Department.75 Acheson’s spirited defence of 
Alger Hiss - even after Hiss was exposed, tried as a Soviet spy and convicted 
of perjury - did not contribute to the public’s perception of his judgement on 
matters of national security. At this point in time, Acheson was certainly not 
inclined to do anything else that could be interpreted as yet another gift to 
Communism.
Bevin’s behaviour in this interaction with his American counterpart indicates 
that he may not have understood - or at least was not adequately respectful 
of - the intricacies of America’s political process, and that he was not 
sensitive to the wide spectrum of political forces at play in the United States.
75 On 9th February, 1950, Joseph McCarthy gave a speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, in 
which he attacked Acheson as ‘a pompous diplomat in striped pants’. McCarthy alleged that 
some State Department officials were passing secret information to the Soviet Union. 
Declassification of the Venona Papers in 1995 proved that some of McCarthy’s accusations 
were correct -  the American Government was, in fact, riddled with Soviet spies. Acheson 
had seen this pressure mounting and, during the latter stages of 1949, had become more 
cautious in his own dealings as Secretary of State. See Michael Paul Rogin, The 
intellectuals and McCarthy: the radical specter {Cambridge,: M.I.T. Press, 1967). pp. 232- 
235.
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Perhaps Bevin and his advisors focused solely on opinion inside the 
Washington Beltway and remained oblivious to the mood of the broader 
American public. It is possible that his people on the ground in the United 
States and in the Foreign Office were not reliably informed -  or that they 
were misinterpreting what they saw, perhaps confused by the vast amount of 
information and intensity of emotions circulating in the capitol. On the other 
hand, reporting by experienced British diplomats posted in other American 
cities did highlight the American public’s anger over Communist infiltration of 
the government and the influence Communists appeared to be enjoying over 
US foreign policy.76
In April 1950, in a paper to the Cabinet analysing why no Austrian treaty had 
been concluded to date, Bevin reported that the State Department ‘... were 
concerned also with their own domestic difficulties particularly with the Army 
Department and with Congress, and indeed public opinion generally’.77 
Bevin apparently had forgotten that the United States was a democracy in 
which the views of the American public and their elected representatives in 
congress always have profound effect on national policy -  much more so 
than in Great Britain where a different system for foreign policy formulation 
exists. Of course appointed officials in the Truman administration were 
sensitive to the mood of congress and the American people, and the mood at 
that particular time was definitely not receptive to gratuitous concessions to 
Communism.
76 See, for example, British Consulate General Chicago, 'Anti-British Sentiment,' 27 October 
1949, Telegram No. 80, 27 October 1949, FO 371/74174,,
77 CP (50) 66, 11 April 1950, PRO.
Cronin makes the interesting point in her Great Power Politics and the 
Struggle Over Austria, that, had the United States and Britain taken Bevin’s 
advice and paid the Russians for a treaty, Moscow would have almost 
certainly strengthened her hold on Austria’s economy. Bevin’s advisors had 
apparently not noticed that the first payment against the suggested debt to 
the Soviet Union would have been due only two months after the treaty was 
signed, one month before occupation troops would have been obligated to 
exit the country. Despite what Gruber told the British, the Austrian parliament 
was not at all certain that Austria would have been able to pay even this first 
instalment against the Soviet debt.78 Had Austria reneged on the first 
instalment payment while foreign occupation troops were still in the country, 
the Soviets could have used this payment failure as justification to keep the 
Soviet Army in Austria. Such a decision would have, it is reasonable to 
conclude, caused the Western Powers to also keep Western forces in the 
country, leaving the situation almost as it was before conclusion of the treaty 
with one important difference. The Soviet Union would have acquired legal 
justification for its exorbitant economic demands and would have landed in a 
stronger position in the country.79 Knight dismisses this as a ‘rather flimsy 
(American) economic objection to a treaty.80 ‘Perceptive’ might be a more 
appropriate adjective to employ in this observation.
78 Minute of a meeting between the three Western foreign ministers, 29 September 1949, at 
the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, C7755, FO 371/76451, PRO.
79 Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria p. 91.
80 Knight, British Policy Towards Occupied Austria 1945-1950, p. 243.
1949 was the last year during which responsible Four Power discussions 
took place on the subject of an Austrian State Treaty. The Deputies for 
Austria did meet again on 9 January 1950, but the meeting produced no 
constructive results. For Austria and the Austrian people, the year was full of 
false starts and false hopes, and it ended in an atmosphere of gloom and 
dejection. What must have seemed like the last coffin nail was driven home 
on 22 November when Soviet Treaty Deputy Zarubin, ignoring a total 
capitulation by the Western Powers to Soviet treaty demands only four days 
earlier, announced that the Soviet Union was not prepared even to discuss 
an Austrian Treaty until full agreement was reached on the trivial Article 48, 
which pertained to post-war relief supplies of dried peas taken from German 
Army stores and distributed by the Red Army, an issue that hardly qualified 
as a deal-breaker in any serious discussion. This was a heavy-handed 
deflection from the real issues. Knight calls it an obvious ‘red herring’.81 It 
was broadly known that the supply of peas was worm-ridden, a fact that 
detracted somewhat from Soviet largesse. As one result of this bizarre pea 
issue, the dramatic statue of the victorious Red Army soldier, which still 
stands in Vienna’s IV District, acquired the Viennese nickname of 
‘ Erbsenkonig\ 82
1949 was the year in which the Soviet Union exploded her first atomic bomb 
(29 August), thereby propelling the Cold War into a totally new phase and
81 Ibid. p. 245.
82 This author was resident in Vienna at the time and recalls this example of droll Viennese 
wit. This memory is reinforced by that of Dr TH Bagley, another Old Austria Hand, via a 
personal communication dated 22 April 2002, copy available in author’s personal files.
introducing a modern definition of the term deterrent force. 1949 was the year 
in which Stalin’s personal interest and attention swung from Europe in the 
direction of the Far East, and this could go far in explaining the erratic nature 
of Soviet diplomatic behaviour in Austria’s quadripartite forums from this date 
until the treaty was agreed in early 1955.
Beginning in March, Stalin became preoccupied with his secret meetings in 
Moscow with Kim II Sung, the North Korean dictator, during which the two 
crafted a relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist North Korea, 
and during which they eventually agreed to start the Korean War.83 In 
December 1949, Stalin engaged in the first of five significant meetings with 
Mao Zedong of the newly created People’s Republic of China. The original 
documents emerging from these meetings are in the Archive of the 
President, Russian Federation, and copies are available at CWIHP in 
Washington, DC. With the Vozhd’s attention focused elsewhere, the 
Kremlin’s staff for Austria was apparently not inclined to take initiatives, and 
Austria faded from the Soviet list of foreign policy priorities.
R e -A r m in g  A u s t r ia
Recognising the necessity for Austria to have a capability to provide for its 
own internal security, Britain, France and the United States went about the 
task of rearming the country. The initiative was taken in Washington. On 17 
November 1949, the US National Security Council produced a Top Secret 
document that was declassified only in March of 1999. NSC 38/4, ‘A Report
83 See Introduction.
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to the President on Future Courses of US Action With Respect to Austria,’ is 
a fifteen-page document summarizing various views on the nature and timing 
of possible courses of action with respect to the Austrian State treaty and 
also regarding Austria’s ability to provide for her own internal security, once a 
treaty was concluded. It discussed the current state of Austria’s internal 
security capabilities at the time, and it concluded with an identification of 
American, British and French policy options.84
Western military commanders assumed that political and economic factors 
might dictate the conclusion of an Austrian treaty before the country was 
prepared adequately for self-defence, and that ideal circumstances might not 
prevail. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the NSC:
...the treaty should be concluded in such a manner that Austrian 
armed forces are reasonably adequate to perform all tasks 
envisioned in the treaty... the most urgent problem involved in the 
conclusion of the treaty is the creation of an initial Austrian army 
capable of maintaining internal order during the period immediately 
following withdrawal of the occupation forces and pending the 
expansion of the army to the full strength authorised by the treaty.85
Further, it was the JCS view that, in order to guarantee effective internal 
security, Austria must have not only an army but also a strong local police or 
mobile army capable of ‘...imposing martial law in principal industrial and 
political centers in the event of internal disorder, and to prevent the entry of
84 NSC 38/4 was updated by NSC 38/5. NSC 38/6 and then superseded by NSC 164/1 in 
May 1950. See Folder ‘Austria (3),’ Box 47, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, 
Eisenhower Library.
85 NSC 38/4, p. 2.
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foreign action groups attempting to create internal disorder or attempting to 
arrange a coup d’etat.86
Paragraph 3-d of NSC 38/4 is entitled ‘British and French Views’. Here, it is 
acknowledged that ‘...the exact extent or effectiveness of British and French 
participation in the program for Austrian internal security has not been 
determined’. In response to a 22 July 1949 request by the United States to 
both France and Britain asking for specific information on how they would 
participate in the rearming of Austria, the French Foreign Ministry replied that 
their Ministry of National Defense was studying the matter. France might, it 
was said, be able to provide some light weapons such as automatic rifles, 
pistols, machineguns and ammunition, depending on who paid for this 
equipment. The British Government answered that it ‘...considers the 
equipping of the Austrian army a United States responsibility’.87 Bevin said 
British forces might agree to leave behind some surplus military equipment 
when their troops pulled out of Austria, but he declined to quantify this 
contribution. Britain did, however, agree to train and equip an Austrian Air 
Force consisting of 5,000 men and 90 aircraft.
The following Foreign Office Minute is a reliable reflection of London’s views:
The Americans and, to a lesser degree, the French, attach the 
greatest importance to ensuring that Austria should be in a position 
to defend herself against a communist coup when allied forces are 
withdrawn. It appears that the US military made this a condition for
86 ibid.
87 Ibid.
their consent that the State Department should be authorised to 
make all concessions to the Soviet necessary to get agreement on 
the Treaty. The Americans therefore attach importance to these 
conversations, and we have agreed to participate in them.88
Again, the British got it slightly wrong. The American military command was 
never in a position to set conditions for foreign policy. Every contribution to 
this debate by the JCS was in the form of opinion or recommendation. It was 
the purpose of NSC 38/4 to pull together the opinions of the JCS and all 
other interested parties, to merge them into an NSC recommendation, and to 
present this recommendation to the President of the United States. As 
Truman confirms, only the President decides policy:
The difficulty with many career officials in the government is that they 
regard themselves as the men who really make policy and run the 
government. They look upon the elected officials as just temporary 
occupants. Every President in our history has been faced with this 
problem: how to prevent career men from circumventing presidential 
policy. Too often career men seek to impose their own views instead 
of carrying out the established policy of the administration. 
Sometimes they achieve this by influencing the key men appointed 
by the President to put his policies into operation. It has often 
happened in the War and Navy Departments that the generals and 
the admirals, instead of working for and under the Secretaries, 
succeeded in having the Secretaries act for and under them. And it 
has happened in the Department of State.
Some Presidents have handled this situation by setting up what 
amounted to a little State Department of their own. President 
Roosevelt did this and carried on direct communications with 
Churchill and Stalin. I did not feel that I wanted to follow this method, 
because the State Department is set up for the purpose of handling 
foreign policy operations, and the State Department ought to take 
care of them. But I wanted to make it plain that the President of the 
United States, and not the second or third echelon in the State 
Department, is responsible for making foreign policy, and, 
furthermore, that no one in any department can sabotage the
88 Mallet to Sir I. Kirkpatrick, Foreign Office Minute, 9 February 1950, The Rearmament of
Austrian Forces’, C113, FO 371/84927, p.1, PRO.
President’s policy. The civil servant, the general or admiral, the 
foreign service officer has no authority to make policy. They act only 
as servants of the government, and therefore they must remain in 
line with the government policy that is established by those who have 
been chosen by the people to set that policy....89
NSC, State Department and Defence Department documents show that, 
despite spirited debate, the NSC was unable to reach agreement on Austrian 
Treaty issues. Consequently, the secretaries of state and defence reported 
this impasse to Truman, who thought about it for a moment and then issued 
instructions that an Austrian treaty be concluded as soon as possible. The 
remaining time should be used to beef up Austria’s internal defence 
capability to the extent possible. This, then, was US policy.
The Western Allies already had sound legal grounds for their ensuing 
activities. Article 17 of the draft treaty had already been agreed by the Four 
Powers. This Article limited Austria to a force capable of maintaining internal 
order and protecting the national borders. The force could not exceed 53,000 
men, including border guards, air force, river patrols and a gendarmerie. 
Austria would be limited to an air force of 5,000 men and ninety aircraft of 
which no more than seventy could be combat capable. The air force was not 
permitted to possess any aircraft that had been specifically built as bombers. 
Austria’s military forces would be pledged not to rebuild any of the World War 
Two military facilities that had been destroyed by the four occupying powers. 
A Soviet demand that the Austrian military be armed and equipped solely
90 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952 (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday & Company Inc., 1956), p. 165.
with weapons and equipment manufactured in Austria by Austrians was 
withdrawn by the Russians on 15 April 1948. It is ironic that, after causing so 
much trouble between East and West, Article 17 was one of the treaty 
articles left out of the final treaty draft in 1955. The final Austrian State Treaty 
did not contain restrictions on the size of Austria’s military forces.90
But in the late 1940s, Article 17 still posed major problems. The West had 
determined that the full treaty limit of 53,000 men, including 11,000 
gendarmes, was required to protect the internal security of the country. The 
Austrians had estimated that it would take between one and two years to 
recruit, train, equip and field an army of this size. But Article 33 of the treaty 
draft gave them only ninety days after conclusion of a treaty to build that 
force.
Because the United States was driving this issue and Britain was going along 
with whatever Washington decided - so long as it did not involve any money 
from London - it is worth summarising how the US decided to approach the 
rearming of Austria. Moscow was watching closely and remained sensitive to 
anything the West did to strengthen Austrian military and paramilitary 
capabilities. Western officials assumed that the Kremlin was hoping to 
concoct strategies for later use in Germany on rearmament issues.
90 See Article 17 of the Austrian State Treaty, and the final Treaty text, both carried in full in 
the German language in: Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat 
und das Ende der Ost-West Besetzung Osterreichs 1945-1955 (Vienna - Cologne - Graz: 
Bohlau Verlag, 1998), pp. 681-773.
It was left to US High Commissioner, Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes, to 
submit recommendations for a smaller force, one that could be raised and 
ready within ninety days of the signing of a treaty. Keyes thought it would be 
possible for Austria to recruit and train some 28,000 troops within the 
specified period of time, providing total cooperation from the Austrian 
Government.91 The Defence Department determined that the US could 
furnish sufficient small arms and ammunition for a force of this size within 
three to four months, and armoured cars and light tanks could be provided 
within to six months, all without negative effect on the minimum procurement 
requirements of the US Army. It would take about a year, however, to 
develop the capability to transport such an army. Total cost would be in the 
vicinity of $82 million, and these funds could be made available, if the 
congress could designate Austria as a recipient country under enabling 
legislation for the US Military Aid Program. Unfortunately, congress was not 
inclined to do this until the treaty was actually signed.
NSC 38/4 identified all available options. The option of accepting a treaty in 
the absence of adequate provisions for internal Austrian security was 
dismissed as unacceptable. The second involved a tactic to delay ratification 
of the treaty in order to buy more time to complete the raising of a security 
force. This, too, was dismissed as undesirable. The United States ‘...should 
not be placed in the position of delaying ratification’.92 A third tactic would 
have the Western Powers creating an Austrian army or expanding the
91 NSC 38/4, paragraph. 4-a, p. 5.
92 NSC 38/4, paragraph 5-a-(2), pp. 8-9.
existing gendarmerie without Soviet approval. The Western Powers were 
already training and equipping one regiment of gendarmerie in the Western 
zones and had begun covert military planning for more with the cooperation 
of the Austrian Government. It was thought that the gendarmerie program 
could produce an army of approximately 28,000 men. If the Soviets 
disapproved, it would have to be done covertly. This was seen an another 
‘undesirable’, but one that should be considered if the three Western Allies 
decided to proceed with the Austrian Army without Soviet approval.
The fourth option revived an agreement the three Western Powers had made 
on 15 September 1949, to raise the question of an Austrian Army with 
Moscow at the moment an Austrian treaty was signed, so that recruitment 
and training could begin immediately.
The final option, to seek a revision of the treaty, was also dismissed:
From the military point of view, the phasing-out of the occupation 
forces in consonance with the ability of the Austrian army to assume 
the responsibility of internal security would further the desired 
objective, if other means are not successful. It would be necessary, 
however, to secure Four Power agreement to increase the 90-day 
period (Article 33) to 180 days. From the political viewpoint, such a 
proposal would not be desirable, as it would open the door for the 
Soviets to request reconsideration of any other agreed article, such 
as the article relating to Austria’s frontiers. A proposal to increase the 
90-day period might also result in a Soviet demand for modification of 
the existing agreement on the schedule for the relinquishment to 
Austria of German assets now held by the Soviet authorities (Article 
35).93
93 NSC 38/4, paragraph 5-b, p. 11
In signing NSC 38/4, the President ordered that the United States should 
insure, by all appropriate measures prior to the withdrawal of the occupation 
forces, that the Austrian armed forces were adequate to maintain internal 
security. An army of 28,000 troops would be required to maintain order 
during the period immediately following the departure of occupation troops, 
and this force would have to be expanded to the full 53,000 allowed by the 
treaty within two years, maximum. The most desirable course of action would 
be for the Three Powers to seek Soviet approval to build the allowed Austrian 
Army as soon as the treaty was signed. If the Soviets did not agree to extend 
the ninety-day limit so as to allow the force to be completed, then the Three 
Powers should begin immediately to build the army in the Western zones 
without Soviet approval, and to seek agreement from France and Britain to 
begin this action at least three months before ratification of the treaty.
In any case, it was decided that the US should continue efforts to obtain 
agreement by Britain and France to assume their share of the mutual respon­
sibility for the internal security of Austria. The West should continue to 
impress upon the Austrian Government the necessity for complete 
cooperation in the creation of the Austrian army. America should earmark 
equipment for Austria under the Military Assistance Program with a 
sufficiently high priority to insure the availability of essential equipment by the 
time a treaty comes into force. Also, equipment programmed for Austria 
should be shipped to Austria and/or Germany for storage under U. S. 
control94
94 NSC 38/4, paragraph 11, p. 13.
Bischof suggests that it was the strikes of September/October 1950 that 
‘finally’ led the Western Powers and the Austrian Government to join together 
and build an Austrian security force.95 In fact, an agreement had been 
reached between Britain and the United States well before the autumn 
disturbances, requiring the US to equip an Austrian army and for Britain to 
equip an Austrian airforce.96
On 23 December 1949, Keyes wrote to his British counterpart, documenting 
a recent personal discussion during which the two agreed to review the 
whole subject of security forces for Austria.97 He suggested that the two 
agree on as many points of a detailed plan as possible, and then to forward 
the disagreed points to their respective governments for negotiation. Keyes 
stressed US desire to leave Austria capable of maintaining internal security 
and protecting against a communist coup d’etat.
Prior to the withdrawal of the occupation forces, we must insure that 
adequate progress has been made toward the creation of an 
Austrian army in being which, together with police and gendarmerie, 
is capable of maintaining internal security and preserving boundaries 
from marauding bands or satellite action groups capable of causing a 
coup d’etat.98
95 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955; The Leverage of the Weak p. 120.
96 Foreign Office London, 'Austrian Army,' 9 February 1950, FO 371/84927, C 1133/37/3G,
97 Keyes Top Secret Memorandum to Major General T. J. W. Winterton, 23 December 1949, 
C304, FO 371/84927, PRO.
98 Ibid, paragraph 3-d , p. 1.
To this paragraph, the British High Commissioner replied: ‘I agree’.99
Winterton agreed with Keyes’ statement of objectives, using only slightly 
different wording -  ‘to put down any trouble fomented in frontier districts by 
‘satellite’ countries’ -  but with the same intent. He opined that the Russians 
were not interested in the internal security of Austria and would oppose all 
efforts to raise an Austrian army. He reminded Keyes that it would be illegal 
for Britain and the United States to begin arming and organizing an army until 
the State Treaty was ratified. The West was prohibited from forming the army 
before the Treaty was signed, and it would not be possible to raise sufficient 
army units during the ninety-day period between conclusion of the Treaty and 
withdrawal of occupation forces.
Consequently, we must look to some agency other than the army to 
provide most of the internal security forces needed by the time we 
withdraw, since it is essential for us to proceed by legal means. ...It 
may be possible under these conditions to raise and train certain 
units, probably infantry units, which will be available for internal 
security purposes by the time the Occupation Forces withdraw or 
very soon afterwards.100
Winterton thought it would probably be necessary to raise the desired 
security forces before the Treaty was signed as gendarmerie. The current 
strength of Austria’s gendarmerie was 10,500 and Winterton envisioned the 
necessity to recruit an additional 10,000 men. He recognised that the 
doubling of Austria’s gendarmerie would require more money, but pointed out
99 Winterton to Keyes, 11 January 1950, C304, FO 371/84927, p. 2, PRO.
100 Winterton to Keyes, p. 1.
that a supplementary budget to accommodate this increase in gendarmerie 
strength would not be an Austrian Constitutional Law and, therefore, there 
was nothing the Russians could do to prevent its passage, even though they 
could obstruct implementation in the Soviet Zone.
One Colonel P. D. Miller of the Headquarters, Allied Commission for Austria, 
British Troops Austria, sent copies of this exchange to London, where it was 
received by A. G. Gilchrest in the German Political Department of the Foreign 
Office. On the cover sheet attached at the Foreign Office, one D. M. Kitching 
added a hand-written minute ‘General Winterton is the more practical’.101
This exchange on the Austrian army progressed to the point where talks 
were scheduled to be held in Washington. Each party was to draw up specific 
plans for, respectively, an army and air force. In the process, a table of 
organisation and equipment (TO&E) had been formulated for a military force 
of 27,855 strong.102
By the end of January 1950, the British High Command had completed a 
detailed TO&E for an Austrian Air Force, including plans to train the core 
element of the new air force in the United Kingdom -  providing that ‘the 
formation of the Austrian Air Force will in no way be a cost to the Royal Air
101 Cover sheet to the Keyes -  Winterton exchange of December 1949 -  January 1950, 
C304, FO 371/84927, PRO.
102 Miller to Foreign Office, 7 February 1950, C1173, FO 371/84927, PRO.
Force’.103 The aim of the plan was to form a small air force capable of 
supporting the country’s internal security forces. The Plan envisaged the 
creation of three fighter squadrons, an Air Force headquarters element, a 
training and organisation program, as well as plans for maintenance and 
signals units. The new Austrian air force would be equipped with fifteen 
Tiger Moths, twenty eight Harvards, eight Oxfords, sixteen Spitfire MK-14s, 
and thirty-two Spitfire MK-16s. In terms of manpower, the Royal Air Force 
plan envisaged an Austrian force of one hundred and seventy six officers, 
1,801 other ranks and thirty seven civilians. With the exception of nine 
already-qualified Austrian pilots, the RAF planned to train Austrian personnel 
with no previous flying experience. The cost was estimated at £26,342 to 
cover all of the training planned in the United Kingdom, and £1,750,000 for 
the aircraft and equipment. The plan provided for this organisation to be in 
place, having achieved combat - effectiveness eighteen months from the 
point of execution of the plan -  ‘D plus 18’.
Anglo-American discussions to finalise these plans were intentionally 
scheduled for a period of time during which the Russians were refusing to 
discuss the Austrian State Treaty. The cover sheet on a 9 February 1950 
Foreign Office Minute from Sir Ivo Mallet, Britain’s Deputy Foreign Minister 
for Austria, to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of the 
German Section, forwards ‘...reasons why these suggested talks should 
take place while the Russians are still opposed to the Treaty’.104
103 Air Ministry Memorandum from Group Captain R. B. Wardman to I. F. Porter of the 
Foreign Office, 31 January 1950, C833, FO 371/84927, PRO.
104 Mallett to Kirkpatrick, 'Austrian Army,' 9 February 1950.
Mallet suggested two reasons why Britain should try to postpone talks on an 
Austrian army. First, he saw little reason to prepare plans to rearm Austria 
when he thought these plans could not be implemented until a treaty was 
signed. Aside from the common sense conclusion that prior planning for 
major events is usually of benefit, Mallet’s assumption was simply wrong. 
The West could have begun organising and arming Austrian military and 
paramilitary units in their occupation zones at any time -  providing the British 
and American governments were prepared to do so and to cope with the 
inevitable Soviet protest. The Soviets had made it clear by this time that they 
were not prepared even to discuss an Austrian treaty, and the Western 
Powers had, themselves, concluded that progress on an Austrian treaty was 
an unrealistic expectation. The Soviets were complaining periodically about 
allegations that the Western Powers were building an Austrian army anyway, 
even as they called up their own paramilitary units in the Russian Zone, with 
little if any sensitivity to the way the Western Powers or the Austrian 
Government would react.
Mallet was also afraid, with justification as it turned out, that any talks held 
between Britain and the United States on the subject of an Austrian army 
would leak to the Soviets and harden the Kremlin’s stand against a State 
Treaty. Correspondence between London, Washington and Vienna on the 
issue carried the warning ‘this telegram is of particular secrecy and should be
retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on’.105 One Foreign 
Office Telegram to Washington warned ‘I am particularly anxious that at the 
present time there should be no leakage regarding these discussions. Please 
endeavour to ensure that secrecy is maintained, and express to your 
colleagues my hope that they to will take precautions to this end’.106 
Telegram 720 was classified SECRET and transmitted via ‘OTP,’ which 
means one-time pad, a common and unbreakable code system in which the 
sender and receiver personally encipher and decipher the message using 
code pages that are employed only once and then destroyed.
Of course, large bureaucracies have ways of neutralising the effects of even 
the most rigorous security precautions, and this Foreign Office telegram is a 
classic example of what can happen to secret material. Sender and receiver 
toiled, probably for hours, to cipher and decipher the message, yet copies of 
it were sent to British embassies in Paris and Vienna, and the distribution 
listed by the drafter provided for copies to be sent to the German Political 
Department, Northern Department and Western Departments. Technically, 
this means that most if not every official assigned to those large government 
departments could gain access to the ultra-secret, priority transmission once 
it was decoded. The wider the distribution, the less secure the information.
Mallet’s fears of a leak were well founded for other reasons, given what was 
later revealed about the depth of Soviet intelligence penetration of the British
105 As an example, see Foreign Office Telegram 1026, 4 March 1950, C1129/37/3, FO 
371/84927, PRO.
106 Foreign Office Telegram 720, 3 February 1950, FO 371/84927.
Foreign Office at home and abroad. The successes of Blake, Cairncross, 
Philby, Burgess and Maclean are legendary in the history of Cold War 
espionage, and much has been written outlining the extraordinary access 
these agents had to classified information during their service on behalf of 
Soviet Intelligence. The historiography of Soviet espionage against the 
United Kingdom includes books authored by Soviet intelligence officers who 
handled the so-called ‘Cambridge Five’ or the ‘Crown Jewels’. Any rational 
assessment of Soviet access to Western secrets during the period of the 
Austrian occupation must conclude that little if any important correspondence 
exchanged between the United States and Britain on sensitive matters 
remained hidden from Soviet eyes.107 Richard Aldrich’s excellent book, The 
Hidden Hand,108 and KGB: The Inside Story, 109 by Christopher Andrew and 
Oleg Gordievsky, are two examples of books that describe how serious were 
the security breaches in the Foreign Office and its key embassies abroad 
during precisely the period of time the Foreign Office was demanding the 
tightest possible security surrounding all exchanges regarding the rearming 
of Austria.110
107 Whether Stalin and his successors believed and acted on information flowing from British 
sources remains a matter of speculation. It is common knowledge that Kremlin leaders 
tended to ignore information that did not coincide with their own thinking, and also that Soviet 
intelligence headquarters did not always forward information that they felt would not please 
the current Kremlin leadership.
108 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence 
(London: John Murray, 2001).
109 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB : the Inside Story of its Foreign 
Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev ([London]: Sceptre, 1991, 1991).
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A u s t r ia  - A  G a r r is o n  St a t e ?
Mallet’s 9 February Minute highlights a difference of opinion between Britain 
and the US on the matter of re-arming Austria, even though Britain had 
already agreed formally to participate in the exercise. The document is also 
revealing because of what it does not contain. Reference has already been 
made to suggestions in the historiography that US High Commissioner Keyes 
used his position in Austria to launch a political power play to assume military 
control over American policy and turn Austria into a garrison state (see 
Introduction to this chapter).
British representatives in Austria and in the Foreign Office would certainly 
have become alarmed by any such extraordinary departure from normal 
diplomacy - especially given the many, daily interactions between British and 
American officials in Austria, London and Washington. Mallet makes no 
mention of any British concern that the American military were attempting to 
‘militarise’ US policy towards Austria or to turn the country into an American 
‘garrison state’. In fact, there is no mention of any such British concern in any 
of the diplomatic or military correspondence studied in the Public Record 
Office or the US National Archives for the purposes of this thesis. It is unlikely 
that Mallet could have discussed British and American views on the re­
arming of Austria in this type of document without at least referring to an 
American attempt to turn Austria into a NATO garrison state, had there been 
any such move in this direction. The British were never hesitant to tackle 
Americans when they thought Washington’s policies were straying off-track. 
They certainly did so during the Korean War when London was worried that
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General Douglas MacArthur’s aggressive recommendations might start a war 
with China and that President Truman was considering the use of nuclear 
weapons. It is inconceivable that the British would have stood idly by and 
watched American military officers seize control of US policy in Austria 
without creating a furore.
The myth that Keyes, sought to control American foreign policy seems to 
have originated with Austria’s Gunter Bischof.111 US Army Lt. Col. James 
Carafano attempts to justify the allegation, and stretches more than a little to 
do so. His dissertation and subsequent book are, in part, based on the 
premise that the American military establishment in Austria succeeded in 
turning Austria into a garrison state as part of NATO’s defence.112 According 
to this theory, the Austrian people were denied their independence for an 
inordinate period of years because of US military scheming. Washington was 
as responsible as Moscow for prolonging the occupation.
Neither Bischof nor Carafano explain how it was possible for a military High 
Commissioner to ‘militarise’ a military occupation. Neither explains why 
Keyes did not expand American military forces in Austria beyond the skeleton 
crew present throughout the occupation, if he wanted to turn the country into 
a NATO garrison state and if the military’s views prevailed in US overall 
policy formulation. To sell the idea that American military officers overturned
111 Gunter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage of the Weak 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), pp, 111-129, 'Militarization of Austria’.
112 James Jay Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold W ar: the Struggle for Occupied Austria 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). See also the advanced publicity for 
this book in Eurospan Politics, Autumn-Winter 2002, The Eurospan Group, London 2002, p. 
24.
civilian control of foreign policy and were responsible for perpetuating an 
unnecessary occupation in Austria, proponents of this school must -  and do 
-  deflect attention from the fact that a deadly war was in progress, albeit a 
Cold War, and therefore much of the intent behind all Western policies was to 
strengthen national security and contain the war. The sale of this concept 
becomes even less persuasive when one recalls that the President who 
supposedly allowed the military to dominate foreign policy was the same 
President who, only a short while later, summarily fired one of America’s 
most famous military officers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, for 
disagreeing in public with policies set by America’s civilian leadership.
The conclusion that Keyes militarised American policy in Austria is simply 
wrong. The mistake arises from an inability to distinguish between strategy 
and policy, and a more specific inability -  or unwillingness -  to differentiate 
between policy recommendations and policy decisions. The conclusion also 
reflects poor understanding of how American foreign policy was formulated, 
as well as insensitivity to the furious internecine battles that were taking place 
in Washington at the time. Here, Bischof and Carafano share Ernest Bevin’s 
penchant for misreading the American political system. But even Bevin never 
expressed concern that the American brass hats were taking control of 
policy.
Bischof and Carafano may be unaware of, or perhaps misled by a more local 
tussle that was taking place right in Vienna between Keyes and his Political 
Advisor, Jack Erhard, who represented the State Department. Here, there
was definitely a contest between military and civilian views, but it did not 
dominate American policy and it landed both Keyes and Erhard in trouble. 
The friction did not arise from any attempt to impose military control over 
policy. It had solely to do with a sharp difference of opinion regarding a fourth 
Austrian political party - a development already discussed in this chapter. 
Keyes opposed this addition to the Austrian political arena because he knew 
that the new party was Conservative and therefore would play to the Soviet’s 
campaign to prove the Western Allies were soft on neo-Nazism. Erhard, 
backed by the State Department, argued that Austria should be allowed to 
pursue her own democratic destiny, even if this angered the Kremlin. Ekern 
explained the dispute this way:
The inter-agency dispute escalated, but the British were wise and 
experienced enough to keep hands off. Eventually, it resulted in the 
removal of General Keyes - and of Minister Erhard. And (it) led to the 
transfer of occupation responsibilities to the Department of State. To . 
maintain an appearance of Western unity, the British and French 
were persuaded to also appoint civilian High Commissioners. The 
change was affected in the fall of 1950, but the Soviets did not follow 
suit for another three years. After all, their reasons for continuing the 
occupation were military, so they could hardly ‘normalise’ their 
presence.113
The militarisation issue is pertinent to the evaluation of British Austria policy 
because it demonstrates how easily one might be confused - as was Bevin - 
by the way American policy was formulated, especially in the wake of the 
1947 National Security Act. Inherent in the ‘militarisation’ allegation is the 
suggestion that civilian political leadership in the White House and both 
Houses of Congress (Republicans and Democrats) stood aside and let this 
happen at a time when the political atmosphere in the capitol was electric
113 Halvor O. Ekern, in a personal letter to author, 6 March 2002, p. 3, original in author’s 
personal files.
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and most intelligent people with future ambitions had their political antennae 
tuned to maximum sensitivity and were ducking for cover. Also, the argument 
accepts that the newly formed US National Security Council -  the operative 
word being Council - transformed itself into an advocate organisation and 
elevated the military establishment over the Department of State, allowing 
the Pentagon call the shots in American foreign policy.
Carafano alleges that (US) National security became both a mantra and 
obsession for successive post-war administrations. In the process of defining 
potential post-war dangers, the United States military, in effect, helped 
create, shape, and change the threat. Carafano is also disturbed that, in the 
policy vacuum of the early Cold War years, US strategy in Austria appeared 
to emerge from below, instead of emanating from above.114 But he also 
reveals that Keyes’ economic and political recommendations were not 
influential in Washington. He admits that Keyes failed to persuade the 
Pentagon to exaggerate the importance of Austria in America’s overall 
foreign affairs priorities.115
A less diplomatic reader might be inclined to ask: and this surprises you? 
Few others would be shocked to see a responsible government emphasise 
national security issues at a time when national security was under threat. 
Britain’s representatives in Austria certainly were not. Nor would most
114 Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold W ar: the Struggle for Occupied Austria : US Military 
Operations in Occupied Austria, 1945-1955’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Georgetown 
University School of the Arts and Sciences, 2000), p. 312.
115 Ibid., p. 531.
citizens of a democratic political system be surprised to see the strategy- 
formulation process flow upwards, as opposed to less democratic systems in 
which strategy and policy is dictated from above. If the complaint is that 
Austria presented little or no threat to US or British national security, this is 
correct, if somewhat short sighted. Armed Soviet troops were standing face 
to face with armed Western troops on Austrian soil and the slightest spark 
could have ignited a major confrontation of international dimensions. 
American foreign affairs expert, NSC member and former American delegate 
to the Allied Council in Vienna, William L. Stearman, calls the militarisation 
theory ‘clear balderdash’.116
At the Washington end, there is also little evidence that political and strategic 
reporting by military intelligence units carried much weight in high-level policy 
chambers. Cambridge’s Christopher Andrew has contributed usefully to the 
understanding of how President Truman handled the nation’s intelligence 
organisations and capabilities, and makes clear that Truman had little regard 
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff input into high level intelligence reporting and 
analyses. Truman had limited confidence in the judgement of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman, General Omar N. Bradley, struck him as 
rather weak and indecisive’.117 This was hardly an endorsement of the view 
that the military dominated policy under Truman.
116 See personal communication from Stearman to author, 28 January 2000, available in 
author’s personal files. See also : Warren Williams, The Road to the Austrian State Treaty,’ 
in Journal of Cold War Studies, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, vol. 2, 
no. 2, Spring 2000, p. 106.
117 Christopher Andrew, M., For the President's Eyes O nly: Secret Intelligence and the 
American (New York: Harper Collins, 1995) pp. 148-198.
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When challenged on his interpretation of the degree of influence America’s 
military exerted on policy, Carafano retreats to the speculation that, while the 
military may not have dictated policy, its intelligence reporting contributed to 
the making of policy in ‘fundamental and important ways’.118 Of course it did. 
Military Intelligence was one of many contributors to the large body of 
information available to decision makers in Washington and London. Military 
reporting consisted primarily of Soviet order of battle and military movements. 
Did attempts at sophisticated political and economic analyses by US and UK 
military commanders carry more or even as much weight in policy-making 
circles than those of experienced and trusted diplomats? Given American 
policy making process and the modus operandi of the National Security 
Council, probably not. Given the course of the furious debate during the late 
1940s on how the national budget should be divided up between the various 
military services, probably not. Given the eventual decisions on Austria policy 
made by America’s top leadership, certainly not. Carafano seems to 
recognise this in a less prominent paragraph in his dissertation:
By 1946, (military) intelligence support focused primarily on helping 
process individuals through the denazification program by conducting 
background checks and interrogations. Then, in February 1946, the 
Allies agreed to turn over control of the program to the Austrian 
government. A year later Army intelligence concluded that its 
participation in the process of denazification was all but complete. 
After this point its role was mostly passive, monitoring programs, 
preparing special reports, and compiling statistical analyses.119
118 Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War : the Struggle for Occupied Austria , p. 546.
119 Ibid., pp. 895-896.
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Senior intelligence officers dispute the allegation that reporting by military 
intelligence organisations in Austria shaped American policy. William Hood, 
for example, was Chief of Operations in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
Vienna Station from 1951 until the treaty was signed.120 He dismisses the 
Bischof and Carafano allegations as ‘preposterous:’
I was considerably surprised to learn ... that some ‘historians’ have 
asserted that intelligence from the military wielded a dominant 
influence on US policy on the occupation of Austria. It has been 
some fifty years now, but surely not long enough for anyone to come 
up quite so far off base. During the occupation - that is after the 
smoke had cleared - Austria was the beneficiary of two outstanding 
High Commissioners -  each, of course, with ambassadorial rank. In 
1950 ... Donnelly had the job. He was experienced, very aggressive 
and bright. He had various senior posts after leaving Austria. ... 
Donnelley’s successor was Llewellyn Thompson ....
The notion that either of these ambassadors -  not to mention the 
State Department and White House -  being dominated by any 
influence from the military in Austria is simple preposterous....
I am not sure how much if any political reporting the military did on 
Austria before 1951, but it is impossible to believe that it was 
substantial or well received. I do not recall the CIA office ever having 
seen any of it -  and I would have done had there been any. It is also 
difficult to imagine that the military had any substantial reporting brief 
on Austrian political developments by the time the possibility of a 
State Treaty became likely. I do know that the CIA office had none at 
all.
The only time when the military might conceivably have had any 
impact on US policy in Austria would have been during the first years 
of the occupation .. 1945-1948. But this would not likely have had 
anything to do with the eventual State Treaty.121
120 Letter from William J. Hood to author, 28 April 2003, original in author’s personal files.
121 Ibid.
A u s t r ia  a s  a  C e n tr e  o f  C o v e r t  In t e l l ig e n c e  A c t iv it ie s
Of course Order of Battle and other reporting against military requirements 
from within the country were of great interest. But London and Washington 
wanted to know not only where the Soviets were, in what numbers, in what 
configurations and with what kind of weapons and equipment. They wanted 
to know Soviet intentions. David Stafford writes that Churchill continually 
demanded reliable data on the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc. He wanted not 
only strength data, but also reports on military production, the Soviet budget, 
consumption of finished steel and so forth.122
Most required information was obtainable through overt sources, but British 
and American covert intelligence activities in Vienna contributed to the 
available body of information. The product from these operations was usually 
shared and received serious, if sometimes sceptical, treatment in the halls of 
Whitehall and Foggy Bottom. According to recently declassified documents 
from America’s National Security Agency, the US and Britain developed the 
capability to decipher no less than six Soviet military codes, and were able to 
read virtually all traffic in those ciphers, as well as a variety of other Russian 
diplomatic, naval and police codes that the West’s communications experts 
had broken. Unfortunately, on 29 October 1948, the Soviets changed virtually 
all of their cryptographic procedures and adopted the onetime pad, which 
was unbreakable.123
122 David Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin (London: John Murray (Publishers) Ltd., 2002), p.
59.
123 Ibid., p. 46, citing comments made by CIA historian, Dr Donald Steury during the 1998 
Conference in Berlin on the subject of: ‘On the Front Lines of the Cold War’, to which this 
author was also an invited participant.
Vienna, along with Berlin, functioned throughout the Cold War as a major 
centre of international espionage and a favourite meeting ground for 
intelligence operatives of various nationalities. ‘If there was a serious 
competitor to Berlin in the post-war spy stakes, it was Vienna.’124 One senior 
intelligence officer commented that literally as well as figuratively, Vienna and 
Berlin were British and American listening posts to track the Soviet Central 
Group of Forces (CGF) in Austria (and) Hungary, and Group Soviet Forces 
Germany (GSFG)’. 125
The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, described Vienna at the 
time as a place where ‘... the KGB is looking right down our throats...and 
they’re playing for keeps -  you can bet your hat and breakfast that they will 
double or kidnap any agent they spot’.126 Another CIA officer was cautioned 
during his final briefings before taking up a senior post in Vienna, ‘remember, 
the station is vulnerable -  the KGB has penetrated the Austrian police and 
they’ve got informers three-deep around the embassy and every other 
American office’.127
124 Ibid., p. 17.
125 Joseph C. Evans, E-Mail communication to author, 27 August 2002, p. 1, hard copy 
available in author’s personal files.
126 William Hood, Mole:the True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by 
the CIA (Toronto: George J. McLeod Limited, 1982), p. 31.
127 Ibid., p. 31, quoting Richard Helms’ advice before Hood departed for Vienna.
Vienna was a gloomy and sinister place in those days. It struck an English 
woman assigned to the British occupation authorities that ... a ‘feeling of 
menace hung over the city...stalking the streets and pervading the air so that 
you didn’t feel secure in your own home. At any time during the day or night a 
great battering on the door could bring doom and disaster’. A vast network of 
Western intelligence organizations was on the ground in Austria and some of 
them even produced helpful information, especially on Soviet order of battle 
and Soviet behaviour in general. It was one of the few places on earth where 
Westerners could observe their Soviet counterparts directly -  and, of course, 
visa versa. Vienna served as a window to the Soviet Union and some 
clandestine operations produced valuable reporting on Soviet Bloc political 
and strategic issues.
When the Soviet Army held exclusive control of the city after it fell, the 
Russians exploited the opportunity to plant agents in the Austrian police, 
political parties, the postal and telegraphic offices, and other important 
elements of the country’s infrastructure. By the time the Western Allies were 
permitted to enter Vienna, the Russians had the place locked up. All of the 
impressive variety of British and American intelligence services encountered 
formidable difficulties in penetrating the Soviet presence. One CIA officer 
commented, ‘at the time, firsthand information on the USSR was so hard to 
come by that the lowest dog-faced private deserting from the Red Army was 
considered a valuable source and immediately flown out of Austria to a 
defector center in Germany’.128 Soviet intelligence had a much easier job.
128 Hood, Mole: the True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA 
pp. 30-31.
Every member of the Austrian Communist Party was, in one way or another, 
an agent of the Soviet Union, and all of them were available to Soviet 
intelligence, on call. The top party leadership had spent the war in Russia 
being trained and prepared for reinsertion into the country as soon as the 
shooting stopped. Once back in Austria, they stood ready to obey Moscow’s 
orders.129
In Austria, the priority British and American target was Soviet, and to a lesser 
extent the neighbouring Communist governments of Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Western intelligence monitored the Austrian 
Communist Party and its relations with Soviet elements, but the Austrian 
Government was never a priority target. Examination of requirements 
assigned to British intelligence in Austria reveals that no political issues were 
given ‘Priority 1’ status. Some political issues were included in Priority 2 and 
3 lists, but none of these had direct bearing on foreign policy matters.130
Because of rapidly escalating hostilities and the perceived threat of imminent 
Soviet attack, the most urgent intelligence requirements had to do with early 
warning. Both British and American resources were concentrated on 
networks through which they could receive reliable and timely indications of
129 See E-Mail communication to author from former Soviet intelligence officer Boris 
Volodarsky, 21 July 2003: ‘all activities were preliminary planned by the CP leaders and AS 
A MATTER OF THEIR OBLIGATION coordinated with the Sovinformburo, which replaced 
the Comintern. Many individual KPOe members (most vivid and known example was Ruth 
von Mayenburg, a wife of Ernst Fischer and a high-ranking GRU officer) were GRU/NKVD 
agents recruited in 1924/1934/1938-1945/ and returned to Austria after the WWII together 
with their leaders who lived in Moscow at the hotel Lux.’
130 For example, see Annex A to Joint Intelligence Committee ‘Requirements in Austria, 
1950-1954’. DEFE 21/33, PRO.
an impending Soviet attack. Because none of the Western military forces 
were present in sufficient number to defend their European presence, and 
because the much larger Soviet Army was configured for offensive 
operations, the West looked to their intelligence capabilities to provide 
sufficient warning of an attack to allow the evacuation of dependents and 
activation of in-place delaying action plans, while a firm line of defence was 
consolidated in Italy.
An important element of early warning intelligence programs was the conduct 
of counter-intelligence operations designed in part to protect against Soviet 
penetration, but also to recruit and keep in-place Soviet civilian (KGB) and 
military (GRU) intelligence officers who were in positions to report on Soviet 
intentions. From time to time, the West benefited from Soviet and East Bloc 
officials who escaped from the Communist world and walked in to trade 
inside information for asylum in Britain or the USA.
Both the CIA and SIS stations in Vienna remained proactive against Soviet 
targets of opportunity, as well as against the neighbouring Communists 
states of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.131 Of high value were the 
global technical intelligence efforts conducted by both Britain and the United 
States. These were among the most sensitive activities in the entire history of 
either government’s information gathering efforts, and they produced vast
131 While CIA and SIS were developing their initial operations in Vienna, the two Allies were 
running a successful technical operation from Trieste against the Yugoslav target. The 
product of this operation was of particular value to Britain’s understanding of Yugoslav policy 
and plans. See Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: a history of the Intelligence Corps (London, 
New York: Brassey's, 1993).
amounts of valuable intelligence -  so voluminous, in fact, that developing 
ways of using the product on a timely basis proved to be an impossible 
challenge. Vienna was the scene for one of the first significant contributions 
to this intriguing effort.
David Stafford, ‘a deservedly well-known expert on intelligence’, is Project 
Director for the Centre for Second World War Studies at the University of 
Edinburgh.132 He is the author of a number of authoritative books on secret 
intelligence operations and on the interaction between Western intelligence 
agencies during the Cold War. His book, Spies Beneath Berlin, published in 
2002, is an authoritative description of the joint Anglo-American clandestine 
intelligence operation, with the British Secret Intelligence Service codename 
STOPWATCH and the CIA codename GOLD. This extraordinary operation 
involved the digging of a one-half mile secret tunnel underneath the border 
dividing Berlin’s Soviet and American sectors, through which the two Western 
services tapped into the landlines of Headquarters, Group Soviet Forces 
Germany. According to former KGB Colonel Oleg Gordievsky, this massive 
audio operation was functional during a critical period of the Cold War, 1953- 
1956, and it uncovered some of the Soviet Union’s ‘most closely guarded 
secrets’. 133 The tunnel ‘became one of the catalysts in the process that 
eventually resulted in Western victory in the Cold War’.
132 Oleg Gordievsky, 'It Was a Success: Spies Beneath Berlin', Literary Review, (2002), 23- 
25 p. 23.
133 Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin (London: John Murray Publishers LTD, 2002).
The Berlin Tunnel is well known to even the most casual student of Cold War 
espionage. What is less well known, as Stafford’s book reveals, is that the 
idea for the Berlin tunnel was developed during similar tunnelling operations 
started by British intelligence in Vienna during the late 1940s, conceived of 
and managed by one of the West’s most competent intelligence operations 
officers, Peter Lunn.134
By the time Lunn arrived in Vienna in 1948, the West’s security situation had 
not improved. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia had ‘sent a chill 
through Austria,’ and was soon followed by the Berlin Blockade. Lunn found 
the overall atmosphere in Vienna to be tense and the people bracing 
themselves for a Communist coup.135
The Berlin Blockade escalated the Western Allies’ need for more and more 
reliable early warning information. Because of its geographic location and 
almost ideal circumstances for the conduct of espionage, Vienna was seen 
by London and Washington as a valuable front line listening post.
Lunn learned from an employee of the Austrian telecommunications system 
that cables linking Soviet headquarters to military units spread throughout 
eastern Austria ran through parts of the British and French sectors. If these 
cables could be tapped, SIS would be in a much stronger position to keep 
London informed on Soviet military strengths, movements and intentions.
134 Peter Lunn was also Captain of the British ski team at the 1936 Olympic Games.
135 Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin p. 19.
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Lunn collected blueprints of Vienna’s telephone nets and devised a plan to 
dig underground tunnels to the main Soviet communications cables. He was 
able to win the approval of his superior in London, Andrew King. Both were 
smart enough to know, however, that such a daring and risky venture would 
require approval from a skittish Foreign Office that was not known within SIS 
circles for its supportiveness or sense of adventure. Fortunately, a former 
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee had just arrived in Vienna to 
take up post as the new British High Commissioner. This was the robust and 
forthright Harold Caccia. Caccia’s experience told him that the Foreign Office 
would veto such a daring operation in Vienna. So he decided not to tell them. 
Instead, Caccia gave Lunn the go-ahead on his own initiative. ‘I couldn’t look 
at myself if there’d been an invasion and I denied the chance of getting the 
information, he confessed later.’136
Sir Harold Caccia, ‘a keen shot and good sportsman’, was assigned as 
British Minister in Vienna in December 1949.137 In August of 1950, he 
became High Commissioner. Caccia was Britain’s first post-war Ambassador 
to Austria, and served from 1951-1954. He ended his career as Ambassador 
to Washington. Sir Harold Anthony Caccia was one of Britain’s most 
experienced diplomats, and enjoyed the confidence of Britain’s political 
leadership. In his memoirs, Eden said of Caccia, ‘Sir Harold was persistent in
136 Ibid., p. 24.
137 Ibid., p. 24.
negotiation, cool in hours of crisis. I knew him well, for he had been my 
Private Secretary when I resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1938’.138
The operation was on, and SIS code-named it CLASSIFICATION. It began 
officially in the autumn of 1948, and involved at least three tunnels. In 
describing how SIS constructed and managed the CLASSIFICATION 
operation in Vienna, Stafford provides details on the organisation’s ‘Section 
Y’, with headquarters at 2 Carlton Gardens in London, which housed the 
army of:
...transcribers and translators who sweated day and night to keep 
pace with the tapes from Vienna being flown in three times a week 
on a special RAF flight. After the transcribers did their job, the results 
passed on to a second team of a dozen or so army and air force 
officers with a good knowledge of Russian. They studied the 
transcribed conversations, extracted intelligence they thought 
important and compiled a regular intelligence bulletin on the state of 
the Soviet forces in Austria ... The customers (the War Office and the 
Foreign Office) got very excited....139
Even though the Soviet spy, George Blake, was part of the British 
CLASSIFICATION team from the beginning and had told his Soviet KGB 
handlers about it, the KGB, reportedly, chose not to inform either the Soviet 
military or the Soviet military intelligence service (GRU) about it. So, the vast 
wealth of information and insight gathered during the course of the tunnel 
operations in Vienna remained valid, reliable and of value to both the British
138 Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden; The Full Circle (London: Cassell & 
Company Limited, 1960), p. 118.
139 Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin p. 64.
and American intelligence services, which reported the product from 
CLASSIFICATION to their respective governments.
This operation was almost the cause of an embarrassing flap between the 
British and American intelligence services. Lunn had elected not to tell his 
American counterpart about the tunnelling. Yet, the product from the 
operation was being passed to the Americans at a high level, through 
London.140 One senior American officer opined:
The Vienna tunnel turned out to be a much more valuable asset than 
MI6 calculated when it launched the operation on its own. ...With the 
Vienna tunnel...MI6 staked out a strong claim to join CIA later in the 
Berlin Tunnel operation. Without MI6, CIA might not have been able 
to capitalize as fully on the intercepts, to say nothing about tapping 
the Berlin landlines.141
In 1951, it occurred to the CIA station in Vienna to undertake the same type 
of audio operation against Soviet communications. When SIS discovered the 
CIA’s explorations, they correctly assumed that CLASSIFICATION was about 
to be blown, entirely by accident. CLASSIFICATION became a joint SIS/CIA 
operation, but not before some heavy sweating in the local SIS offices.
Under Lunn, the local CIA station in Vienna had been kept strictly out of the 
picture. Lunn’s successor, Andrew King, was left to tell the Americans, and
140 When contacted at his retirement home in Surrey, Peter Lunn politely declined to discuss 
any aspect of his government employment. See Lunn’s personal letter to author, 21 
September 2002, in author’s personal files.
141 See E-Mail communication from Joseph C. Evans to author, 27 August 2002, p. 1, hard 
copy in author’s personal files..
he visited the Vienna CIA station headquarters to let them into the secret. By 
coincidence, the American he had come to brief, Bronson Tweedy, turned out 
to have attended the same British preparatory school. Stafford says this 
schoolboy friendship eased what might otherwise have been a frosty 
reception.142 Tweedy, on the other hand, recalls that SIS informed CIA of the 
Vienna tunnels on a much earlier date. He flatly denies that his professional 
decisions would have been swayed by the fact that he and King had attended 
the same school ‘as children’.143 In any case, nobody knew at the time that 
SIS’s revelations to CIA in Vienna were to lead to a much larger and an even 
more valuable venture in Berlin.
During its lifetime, the joint operation in Vienna kept a steady supply of first­
hand information flowing to top decision-makers in London and Washington. 
The CIA recruited the first of a series of Soviet intelligence officers at the turn 
of the year 1952/1953. This invaluable source, posted right in the Soviet 
rezidentura in Vienna, combined with the CLASSIFICATION information, 
contributed greatly to the West’s requirements for reliable early warning of a 
Soviet offensive. When the Berlin Tunnel came on-line in early 1955, even 
though Blake had also blown this operation to his Soviet handlers, the West 
was well positioned to assess the probability of Soviet attack on Western 
Europe. This capability also provided one of the very few windows into the 
Soviet Union’s closed society in Moscow, which was particularly important in 
the wake of Stalin’s death in 1953 when the West had virtually no insight into
142 Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin p. 38.
143 Personal letter from Bronson Tweedy to author, 30 August 2002, original letter available 
in author’s personal files.
how the leadership struggle was unfolding inside of the Kremlin. Indiscreet 
conversations over the wires in Vienna and Berlin, as well as the ciphered 
telegraph traffic (which the West could decipher), helped educate Western 
decision makers on important political developments in the USSR.
A final note on intelligence operations is necessary. Because of a natural and 
deeply ingrained sense of scepticism on the part of counterintelligence 
officers, the value of the Vienna (and Berlin tunnels) has often been called 
into question and even dismissed by some during the Cold War as obvious 
Soviet deception operations. Critics accused the Western services of a 
blunder -  an embarrassing demonstration of naivete and incompetence. Why 
would the Soviets allow their military and even the GRU to use 
communications facilities the KGB knew were being tapped unless the 
Russians were using those same communications for disinformation 
purposes in order to deceive and mislead the West? According to Stafford 
and to another authoritative author, we now have a reliable answer, directly 
from the horse’s mouth, so to speak.
The critics had been entirely wrong about the KGB’s response to 
Blake’s treachery. Far from using the Berlin and Vienna tunnels for 
misinformation and deception, the KGB’s First Chief Directorate had 
taken a deliberate decision to conceal its existence from the Red 
Army and the GRU, the main users of the cables being tapped.144
144 Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin , p. 180. See also David Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, 
George Bailey, Battleground Berlin (New Haven, Conn.: R R Donnelly & Sons, 1997), pp. 
233-237, for first-hand observations by KGB and CIA officers who were directly involved with 
the tunnel, obviously on opposite sides.
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In April 1993, during a visit in Moscow to confer on a joint book project, CIA’s 
David Murphy was told by retired KGB Lieutenant General Sergei A. 
Kondrashev, George Blake’s case officer over the years and eventual head 
of KGB operations in Germany and Austria, that the KGB did not use the 
tapped land lines to disseminate disinformation. ‘Kondrashev stated 
unequivocally that they were not used for disinformation. To do so, he said, 
would have involved too many people and would have risked Blake’s 
security’.145 According to Kondrashev, the KGB had allowed the West to 
listen in on Soviet military and GRU conversations and to read ciphered 
telegraph traffic. The KGB was prepared to ‘sacrifice GRU and Soviet Army 
secrets to preserve its own mole’.146 Kondrashev, at least, wants the West to 
conclude that the take from CLASSIFIED was legitimate, and information 
acquired from this extraordinary operation was valid. To those with a 
sceptical mind, who is to know for sure?
C o n c l u s io n s
Lord Strang was correct in identifying this period of time as a turning point in 
the Cold War. It was certainly an important period for the Austrians who, 
once again, presented themselves as a special post-war case. The Soviet 
Occupation Zone was the only territory in Europe to receive Marshall Plan 
aid. Britain also benefited from this massive program, which helped relieve 
London of at least some of the financial strain resulting from the occupation, 
and which allowed the Western Allies to help the Austrian Government bring 
the country’s finances under reasonable control, despite repeated
145 Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, ‘Battleground Berlin...,’ p. 218.
146 Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin, p. 181.
Communist efforts to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the 
coalition government.
It was during the period covered by this chapter that the British Government 
decided to end the occupation of Austria, even if this meant paying Moscow a 
hefty bribe. Foreign Secretary Bevin launched an intensive lobbying 
campaign designed to persuade his American counterpart of the wisdom of 
this course of action. That this lobbying effort was ill-timed and almost 
certainly ill-conceived is now fairly clear. Bevin was wrong in his assessment 
that Moscow was ready to sign an Austrian treaty, as was proven 
conclusively when the Soviets refused to discuss a treaty even after the West 
conceded virtually everything the Soviets were demanding. Stalin’s attention 
had turned toward the Far East and, not long afterward, the Cold War turned 
hot in Korea. Was Bevin naive in believing Moscow was ready to end the 
occupation? He had been specifically told so by senior Russian diplomats 
who may, themselves, have believed Stalin ready to negotiate a treaty at the 
time they spoke with Bevin and other senior British diplomats. Bevin was 
perhaps not as naive as he was, quite simply, wrong.
At least some of Bevin’s confusion is understandable and can be attributed to 
the different ways the United States and Britain used to manage foreign 
affairs. The political arena in Washington at the time was both complex and 
dynamic, with a variety of interested parties jockeying for positions of political 
power and larger chunks of a national defence budget, all in the wake of one 
of the largest and most important pieces of legislation passed in US history -
the 1947 National Security Act. Whether it was the case that Bevin was ill- 
served by his experienced diplomatic team in Washington or whether he was 
in possession of sound advice and exercised flawed judgement, the result 
was the same.
The atmosphere surrounding interaction in the Allied Commission was, 
during this period, frigid, and not helped by the relentless Soviet campaign to 
strip Austria of its industrial and natural resources, while abducting people it 
did not like from public streets, even in Western sectors of the capital. East- 
West relations were also not improved when the United States and Britain 
agreed on a plan to create an armed security force so that the Austrian 
Government would be left with the capability to provide for the country’s 
internal security when the occupation ended and foreign troops pulled out. 
Britain agreed to build and train an Austrian airforce.
The Jerram report on significant events of 1948 received detailed attention in 
this chapter because it provides a useful overview of the political and 
economic developments which were seen as most important by the British 
diplomatic establishment. Jerram’s analysis of political developments leading 
up to the national elections of 1949, and the appearance of entirely new 
political parties is helpful to the understanding of how the young Second 
Republic was growing up. Jerram also called attention to the importance of 
the Austrian Government’s approach to wage and price control, and he 
correctly focused attention on issues that were to cause horrendous 
problems in 1950 and lead to the worst labour unrest in the country’s history.
Jerram also raised, for the first time in official British reporting, the 
observation that many Austrians recognised that an early end to the 
occupation might not necessarily equate with freedom and independence for 
the country. The public statements by Austria’s political leadership calling for 
occupation troops to withdraw were frequently accompanied by more private 
assurances by these same officials that they were more than happy for 
Western forces to remain in place until the Russians finally left.
This chapter will hopefully put to rest the artificially concocted tale that 
America’s military, under the noses US Congress and the other occupying 
powers, seized control of US foreign policy, turned Austria into a garrison 
state and integrated the country into the Western defence network in Europe. 
It is time that this absurdity was relegated to the obscurity it deserves. A 
study of British policy is constructive in this respect. Any suggestion that 
American military officers dominated American foreign policy in Austria is 
absent from British records. Austrians did lean toward the West, and the 
Western Allies were certainly interested in ensuring that the country did not 
fall into the Communist Bloc, but this policy objective was in no way dictated 
by the military in either London or Washington.
Finally, the chapter provides a brief review of the scope and importance of 
British and American clandestine intelligence operations in Austria - a 
necessary part of any narrative on Austria of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
The narrative now moves along to the year when British soldiers were once
again committed to battle and when Stalin’s death set the stage for resolution 
of the post-war Austria problem.
C hapter  Fo u r : D ram atic  Events
This chapter summarises Britain’s strategic position in Europe at the 
beginning of the 1950s, and examines significant developments relating to 
Austria up to the death of Stalin in March 1953, which marked a major turning 
point in East-West relations. The focus is on British policy deliberations, 
objectives and strategies. By this point in post-war history, however, Britain 
was securely positioned as the junior member in the Anglo-American 
relationship, and British policy analyses or proposals regarding Austria were 
almost always in reaction to American initiatives. One glaring exception was 
Britain’s unilateral decision to remove British occupation forces from Austria 
without advising the United States in advance. Britain was concerned about 
the consequences of American actions in Korea, but these fears had nothing 
to do with Austria, other than that Britain participated in contingency planning 
together with the other Western Powers. Nor did British-American differences 
regarding the diplomatic recognition of Communist China have relevance to 
Austria. In fact, it is an extraordinary fact of history that, even during the 
fiercest fighting in Korea, Americans and British officials sat at the same 
negotiating table with their Russian counterparts, and the affairs of the Allied 
Council in Austria proceeded more or less as usual, which does not mean on 
an amiable basis.
The chapter recovers the historical narrative, with temporary halts along the 
way to consider significant issues in greater depth, including the violent 
strikes in September and October 1950, which confronted Britain with an 
important policy decision, and which triggered a strong protest by London to
Moscow. The chapter includes recognition of the significance of Stalin’s 
death in March 1953, and it concludes with the withdrawal of British 
occupation forces and an updated assessment of the Soviet threat.
S u m m a r y  o f  t h e  S itu a tio n  a t  th e  T urn  o f  t h e  D ec a d e
On New Year’s Eve, 1949/1950, on route home from what he regarded as a 
successful Commonwealth meeting in Colombo with stops in Cairo, Rome 
and Paris, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin looked forward to the forthcoming 
general election in the United Kingdom. The Labour Government was to 
retain power, albeit with a reduced majority, and Bevin was to remain in 
charge of the nation’s foreign affairs. During the ensuing thirteen months, 
however, ill health required him to undergo two operations and to be absent 
from the Foreign Office most of the time. Between 1 March and 31 July 1950, 
Bevin was absent for eighty five out of 113 days. Between November 1949 
and November 1950, he spoke only twice in the House of Commons, and he 
gave only two speeches outside of Parliament: one at the United Nations in 
September 1950 and one at the Labour Party Conference in October. He 
retired in March of 1951 and died five months later.1
As he celebrated New Year’s Eve 1949/50, Ernest Bevin did not know that, 
within six months, British soldiers would once again be engaged in battle. He 
did not know that, for the past nine months, during precisely the period of 
time when Bevin thought the Soviets were most prepared to be reasonable 
with the West on an Austrian State Treaty, Josef Stalin and North Korea’s
1 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: William Heinemann Ltd.
1983), p.757.
Kim II Sung had been engaged in intensive deliberations on the relationship 
between the new Democratic Republic of Korea and Moscow, and on Soviet 
military support for North Korea’s forthcoming invasion of the South.2 Bevin 
did not know that, on the preceding day and half a world away, Soviet 
Ambassador T. F. Shtykov had delivered a personal telegram from Josef 
Stalin to Kim II Sung, in which Stalin assured Kim of Kremlin assistance in 
the unification of Korea ‘by military means’.3
By the end of 1949, the focus of Soviet foreign policy had shifted from 
Europe to the Far East. Europe, particularly Germany, remained important, 
but Stalin was concentrating on consolidation rather than change. With the 
exception of Austria, the lines of East-West demarcation in Europe had 
become clear. Events in Asia held forth new opportunities and even dangers 
for the USSR. Chinese Communists under Mao Zedung had taken power 
without Soviet help. Moscow had, in fact, maintained diplomatic relations with 
the Kuomintang during most of China’s civil war. Stalin was faced with the 
possibility of another rift in the Communist world, one that offered even more 
potential problems than did the split with Yugoslavia. Cronin observes:
The People’s Republic of China was founded on 1 October 1949. By
December, Mao had come to Moscow for a visit that lasted two
months. Stalin’s attention was clearly diverted from Austria. Sino -
2 Official Minutes of the meeting between Stalin and Kim II Sung, Moscow, 5 March, 1949, AVPRF, 
Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 10-20, as translated and published in CWIHP Bulletin 
Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 4-6.
3 Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, 
Papka 11, list 92, published in CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, p. 36.
Soviet consultations were a portent of events in the Far East that 
would soon monopolise Western attention as well-4
1949 had been an eventful year. It had seen the first nuclear weapons test by 
the USSR, founding of the Communist Bloc’s Council for Mutual Economic 
Cooperation (COMECON), the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
merger of Western occupation zones in Germany and approval by the Allied 
Control Council of a German federal constitution. Konrad Adenauer had 
become Chancellor in the new Federal Republic of Germany. East Germany 
became the German Democratic Republic during the same month that the 
Soviet Union renounced its 1945 treaty with Tito’s Yugoslavia. 1949 had 
started with Beijing falling to the Chinese Communists and declaration of the 
new People’s Republic of China -  a dramatic event that captured serious 
attention in both East and West. In Europe, sessions 111-163 of the Deputy 
Foreign Ministers for Austria had taken place, with thirty-five articles in the 
draft Austrian treaty agreed and eighteen still undecided. The United States, 
France and Britain had begun to train and equip an Austrian gendarmerie in 
their respective zones of occupation, the first real step toward the 
development of a military force capable of providing for the nation’s internal 
security. While not surprising to the Soviets, this provided Moscow with grist 
for the Kremlin’s propaganda mill.5 The Council of Foreign Ministers had met 
unproductively in Paris. The Deputies met again for the 164th-212th sessions
4 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria (Ithica, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 94.
5 Ibid., p. 183, citing: Pravda , ‘Military Construction in Austria’, 24 March 1949, p. 3. ‘Military 
Construction in the American Occupation Zone of Austria’, 14 May 1949, p. 4; ‘Formation of Secret 
Military Committee in Austria’, 29 June 1949, p. 4; ‘American Authorities Train Cadres for Future 
Austrian Army’, 25 July 1945, p. 4.
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in London and for the 213th-246th sessions in New York. Austria’s second 
coalition government was established, under Chancellor Leopold Figl.
Bevin looked back on four years of exasperating negotiations on the Austrian 
State Treaty. His efforts had come to naught, despite the breeze of optimism 
that had drifted fleetingly past only a few months before. Bevin had toiled 
long and hard to persuade Washington of the benefits of an Austrian treaty, 
and he could take some comfort in the knowledge that he had succeeded in 
selling his views to at least his American counterpart, Dean Acheson, if not to 
the entire U. S. national security establishment or the congress. But the 
Anglo-American dispute over the Austrian State Treaty was resolved when 
Truman, observing his ‘the buck stops here’ leadership style, decided to sign 
the treaty and use the West’s remaining time in Austria to expedite the 
development of an Austrian security force.6
Alas, what should have been a major achievement turned out to be only a 
false hope. Foreign Office opinion that the Kremlin was prepared and 
possibly even eager to end the occupation of Austria was based on wishful 
thinking. Britain’s Foreign Secretary entered the 1950s with the impression 
that Austrian independence appeared not only ‘elusive, but futile’.7 It was not 
a happy New Year's Eve for Mr Bevin. He could probably sense that 1950 
was to bring even more distress, but it is doubtful that he foresaw just how
6 NSC 38/4, ‘Future Courses of US Action With Respect to Austria’, 17 November 1949, p. 1. See 
also ‘Action Memorandum of Conversation during the meeting of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson and President Truman,’ on the subject of the Austrian Treaty, 
available in the Papers of Dean Acheson, Truman Library.
7 Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria p. 95
bad things were to become. On 25 June 1950, one month after the London 
Conferences took place and with Stalin’s guarantee of support, North Korea 
invaded the South and the Cold War turned hot.
Britain committed itself to a participation in United Nations forces in Korea, 
thus creating a situation in which she found her representatives sitting across 
the negotiating table in Austria from Soviets, while British military forces were 
engaged in hot combat against a Soviet client state in Asia. The fear of war 
once again gripped Europe and hung menacingly over the diplomatic 
process. In addition to the Korean War, a number of other developments 
brought about changes in the atmosphere within which remaining World War 
Two European issues had to be resolved, including Austria’s long term fate. 
President Truman’s instruction to proceed with the development of the 
hydrogen bomb, combined with a new sense of firmness in Washington’s 
dealings with the Russians, contributed to the concern of Europeans who 
were already uncomfortable with their dependence on the United States at 
the expense of a more unified Europe. The ‘soft on Communism’ accusations 
levelled by Members of Congress at Acheson and his State Department, 
especially after his and the Democratic Party’s spirited defence of convicted 
Soviet spy Alger Hiss, served as a catalyst for anti-American sentiment on 
the Continent, where the prospects of a People’s Paradise still found a soft 
spot in many a heart.
While the Soviet Communist party and its satellite partners joined together in 
a new, so-called peace offensive, concern over the rearmament of Germany
began to be expressed in the halls of European governments. There was 
mounting pressure to create a third force as a buffer between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. France was in the forefront of an argument that 
held that it would be impossible for Europe to develop a viable military 
defence against Soviet attack until an American force had time to arrive. The 
answer, it was suggested by some, was European political neutrality. Bevin’s 
Atlantic reliance was under threat at exactly the time he was least capable of 
defending it. Indeed, even in the United Kingdom there was a view that the 
Labour Government’s policies were an expression of ‘petulant isolationism’ 
and that the entire Western Alliance suffered from a lack of the kind of 
inspirational leadership Bevin had previously been able to give it.8
While battle raged in Korea, the Western Allies made several attempts during 
1950 to engage Moscow in rational discussion on Austria. A number of 
initiatives were taken, one of the most important being the replacement of 
military High Commissioners with civilian diplomats and reduction in the size 
of occupation costs. The intent behind these Western initiatives was perhaps 
best described in a 24 August 1950 statement by Truman, announcing the 
appointment of Walter J. Donnelly as both American Ambassador and US 
High Commissioner to Austria. The appointment, said Truman, followed an 
18 May 1950 decision by the three Western Powers to appoint civilian High 
Commissioners in Austria, consistent with Article 9 of the Control Agreement 
of 28 June 1946. Britain and France announced the appointments of Sir 
Harold Caccia and M. Jean Payard, respectively. Truman said:
8 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: William Heinemann Ltd,
1983), p. 761, citing The Economist, 25 March 1951.
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The three Western Powers have taken this step because in the 
absence of an Austrian treaty -  blocked by the Soviet Union -  they 
are determined to carry out such measures as may properly be taken 
to strengthen within the framework of existing quadripartite 
agreement the authority of the Austrian Government and to lighten 
the burden of occupation on Austria to the greatest possible extent.9
In April 1950, Sir Y Kirkpatrick wrote to Winterton:
The Secretary of State has now considered the matter fully and 
decided that the British Element of the Control Commission be 
integrated with the Legation and that His Majesty’s Minister will 
become High Commissioner. The purpose is to move toward a more 
normal relationship with Austria.10
In May of 1950, Bevin told the Cabinet:
Action by the Soviet Deputy, and the attitude of the Soviet 
government which it represents, makes it difficult for me any longer 
to nourish the hope that agreement on the Austrian Treaty can now 
be won by further concessions by the Western Powers. We must, I 
fear, conclude that the Soviet government have no intention of 
completing the Austrian Treaty until wider political developments 
make it in their interest to do so. This means that, whatever 
concessions we now make, there is not merely no guarantee but little 
likelihood that we shall get a Treaty.11
9 Statement by the President Upon Nominating Walter J. Donnelly as Minister and US High 
Commissioner for Austria, Truman Library, Public papers of the Presidents, available in digital format 
at: <http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/trumanpapers/pppus/1950/218.htm>, [3 June 2003].
10 Kirkpatrick to Winterton, 12 April 1950, Papers of Sir John Winterton: Papers Relating to Austria, 
1943, 1946, March-June 1950, Department of Documents 02/53/2, Imperial War Museum, Lambeth 
Road, London.
11 Secret Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Austrian Treaty’, 4 May 1950, 
C.P.(50) 93 [CAB 129/39], p. 1, PRO. See same document in DBPO, Series II, Volume II 1950, p. 
218.
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T he  D a n g e r  o f  P a r tit io n
Along with the disappointing acknowledgement that an Austrian treaty was 
beyond reach, came a renewed fear that the country might be partitioned, 
with the three Western zones merging in alliance with the West and the 
Atlantic Treaty, and the Soviet Zone incorporated into the Communist Bloc. 
Foreign Minister Gruber had raised this possibility with the British High 
Commissioner on several occasions, suggesting that, if there was to be no 
treaty, the Western Powers should consider taking unilateral action and 
simply withdraw their occupation forces, even if Soviets stayed. Gruber’s idea 
was that the Western Powers could bring into force those articles in the draft 
treaty to which the Soviets had already agreed, and arrange for some form of 
partitioning of the country.12
Western concern over partitioning was expressed in a paper prepared by the 
British Element to the Allied Commission in co-operation with the Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Economic Planning in 1947. When, in 1950, the real 
potential for partition again appeared imminent, Western authorities made the 
strategic assumption that an Eastern Austria cut off from the rest of the 
country would be quickly absorbed into the Communist Bloc and would not 
be able to survive economically. One Western representative observed: 
‘Such an act of dissection is economically undesirable, but it would be a 
historical disaster’.13 According to Cronin:
12 Caccia to Mallet, 28 February 1951, discussing a paper prepared by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, 
CA1071/19G, FO 371/93603, PRO.
13 ‘Austria and the Marshall Plan,’ a paper preared by the British Element to the Allied Council, 
October 1947, C14986, FO 371/64144, PRO.
Western Austria would probably dissolve under the strains of 
provincialism, with the central provinces drawn toward Germany, 
Vorarlberg toward Switzerland, and Carinthia toward Yugoslavia. The 
result would be dangerous instability on the continent and a possible 
rebirth of the kinds of tensions that had already helped bring about 
two major wars.14
P e r c e p t io n  o f  t h e  S t r a t e g ic  T h r ea t
By the end of the 1940s, according to a secret Foreign Office Minute, the 
Soviet Union was maintaining 565,000 troops in fifty five divisions outside her 
own borders.15 27,500 of these were in Austria, organised into three 
divisions. 320,000 were stationed in Germany, 85,000 in Poland, 30,000 in 
Rumania, 14,000 in Hungary, 10,000 were in Finland, 2,000 in Bulgaria, 
1,000 in Czechoslovakia, and the rest were in the Far East. Britain’s internal 
debates on major defence alliances were more or less settled. Britain was 
obligated for fifty years to provide reciprocal military and other assistance to 
Western European countries in the event of attack, under the terms of the 
Brussels Treaty signed on 17 March 1948. The Chiefs of Staff still relied on 
Field Marshall Montgomery’s assessment that none of the other Western 
European nations would fight if attacked by the Soviet Union, regardless of 
reciprocal treaty obligations. In Montgomery’s opinion, it would take years 
before the war-weary European states were mentally capable of even 
mounting effective defensive operations. While he knew the West would have 
to stop the Soviets as far to the east in Europe as possible if war broke out,
14 Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria p. 105.
15 Foreign Office Minute, 31 January 1949, Estimated Strength o f  Red Army Outside Soviet Union, FO 
371/77650, N  1242/1201/38G, PRO. Handwritten comments on the official cover sheet to this Minute 
indicate that not all Foreign Office officials were happy with the accuracy of this estimate.
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Montgomery also knew that the Western Powers were not capable of 
blocking a concerted Soviet offensive.16 At the beginning of 1950, Britain had 
the 2nd Infantry Division, the 7th Armoured Division and the Berlin Brigade in 
Germany. In Austria, the British had only three battalions. At the same time, 
the United States had only the 1st Infantry Division and assorted 
administrative troops in all of Europe.17 These Western forces were looking 
at some forty Soviet divisions, supported by over 4,000 tactical aircraft, 
capable of initiating offensive operations against the West.18 The Western 
Powers presented no credible, conventional deterrent to a Soviet attack and, 
perhaps worse, it was generally believed in Britain’s leadership circles that 
the Soviets knew it.
We now know that the Soviets did, in fact, know of their overwhelming 
superiority vis-a-vis NATO forces in Europe. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc, Western military analysts acquired a collection of Russian and 
Warsaw Pact military plans. Moscow’s archives may have remained closed, 
but those in the Satellite states opened their doors to the international 
community, and a volume of classified files have since been translated and
16 Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs o f Field-Marshal: Montgomery o f  Alamein (London: Collins, 
1958), p. 498 ff.
17 T.F. Mills, Land Forces o f  Britain, the Commonwealth and Empire, http://www.regiments.orq. 
[11 November 2003].
18 British units in Austria have already been identified. In 1948, the US had one infantry division in 
Europe, consisting of three infantry regiments, five constabulary regiments and six artillery battalions. 
Total personnel strength in Austria was 9,466. By 1950, the US maintained one infantry division in 
Europe, the 1st Infantry Division, consisting of three infantry regiments, three cavalry regiments, eight 
artillery battalions including two anti-aircraft units. Total US strength in Europe was 85,000 of which 
about 3,000 were in Austria. See E-Mail message to author from William Webb, Historian, US Army 
Center for Military History, Fort Leslie McNair, Washington DC. See also Robert S. Rush, Cold War 
Organizational Database NP.2003 and Cold War Manpower Database NP.2003, Drawn from US 
Army Station List 1945-1970 and US Army Personnel Strength Reports 1945-1970, copies in author’s 
personal file. See also E-Mail messages from Rush to Author, 29 October 2003.
made available to scholars through a variety of sources.19 Among other 
things, these plans show that Western estimates of the late 1940s and early 
1950s were accurate. The Soviets banked heavily on mechanized infantry 
and tank superiority on the ground in Europe, backed-up by tactical nuclear 
weaponry, with plans to stream through the Fulda Gap and accomplish initial, 
intermediary objectives before NATO could begin to react. The Soviets never 
expected the West to initiate hostilities in Europe. To the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact, ‘NATO’s defensive preparations were a sham’.20 With the 
exception of a few field exercises in the late 1980s, the Group Soviet Forces 
Germany (GSFG) did not even rehearse plans to defend against NATO 
attack because they had concluded that a NATO attack was implausible. A 
1965 Warsaw Pact exercise conducted in Hungary featured, bluntly, plans to 
'completely destroy’ Munich, Vienna, Verona and several other Western 
European cities with Soviet nuclear missiles. Vojtech Mastny reports that the 
authors of this exercise were ambiguous as to whether Budapest and other 
East European cities were expected to be destroyed by Western attacks, or 
whether plans to obliterate Western cities were to precede or follow NATO- 
initiated activities. But there is no doubt that the Soviets had plans to launch 
offensive operations in which nuclear missiles would be employed against 
major Western European population centres.21
19 Among the most productive and reliable sources are: CWIHP, The Harvard Center for Cold War 
Studies, The Parallel History Project and the Yale Avalon Project.
20 Plan of Actions of the Czechoslovak People's Army for War Period’, 11 October 1964, Warsaw 
Pact High Command, Parallel History Project, translated by Dr, Svetlana Savranskaya, Research 
Fellow, National Security Archives, and Anna Locher, Research Assistant, Center for Security Studies 
and Conflict Research, Zurich, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/l/warplan l-engl.htm>, [20 
June 2001.]
21 See Parallel History Project document collection on the 1965 Warsaw Pact exercise in Hungary, 
entitled ‘European Cities Targeted for Nuclear Destruction: Hungarian Documents on the Soviet Bloc
Now-available Soviet and Warsaw Pact plans demonstrate how dominant the 
offensive was in strategic doctrine. Despite dramatic changes in the Russian 
domestic arena, and indeed in overt Soviet foreign policy during the period 
covered by this chapter, the military focus on offensive operations dominated 
plans. Soviet planners knew that neither the United States nor Great Britain 
had deployed forces anywhere near adequate to defend against a Warsaw 
Pact offensive, and also that both would have to fight any war in Europe with 
troops and equipment brought in from over the seas. The Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact forces (USSR, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania) had the advantage of already being 
on the ground in Europe, because Moscow’s treaties of bilateral friendship 
and mutual assistance provided for the stationing of Soviet Army units in the 
territories of signatory nations. Hence, Russian planning relied heavily on the 
Soviet Army’s initial capability to disrupt relocating Western troops who would 
be highly vulnerable to both Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and 
submarine weaponry, as they embarked and attempted to cross the water.22
War Plans, 1956-71’, translated documents available online at: 
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_4.htm>. [24 July 2003.]
22 See Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy (Santa Monica CA: The Rand 
Corporation544, 1963), chapter 6.
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The B r it is h  P re s e n c e  in A u s tr ia 23
As of February 1948, the Commander, British Troops Austria (BTA), 
subordinate to the War Office, was situated in Klagenfurt in the Province of 
Carinthia. Reporting directly to BTA Headquarters were the 138th Infantry 
Brigade, Vienna Area Command and Styria Sub-Area Command in Graz. 
Also directly subordinate to BTA Headquarters were a variety of supply, 
engineer and other logistics units, the Permanent President of Courts Martial 
(Austria), physical training and ski school Instructors’ pools, a chaplains’ pool, 
signals units, veterinary services, fire advisors, financial advisors, catering 
advisors, and the 31st British General Hospital (with 600 beds).
The 138th Infantry Brigade was a Second Line Territorial Army infantry 
brigade. It had entered Austria on 19 April 1945 as part of the 46th Infantry 
Division. The Brigade had fought in France, Palestine, Egypt, Italy, and 
Greece and of course in Austria. Among the more notable battles the Brigade 
had participated in were St. Omer-LaBassee (May 1940), Tunis (May 1943), 
Salerno (September 1943), the capture of Naples (September-October 
1943), the Volturno Crossing (October 1943), Monte Camino (November- 
December 1943), the Gothic Line (August-September 1944), Rimini Line 
(September 1944) and the Lamone Crossing (December 1944).24
23 Order of Battle and locations in the following paragraphs are based on two sources. First, a 9 
February 1948 letter from Headquarters, British Troops Austria, entitled, ‘BTA Order of Battle &  
Location Statement’. This letter superseded BTA Hqs. Letter number 230 G of 25 November 1947. 
Original copy of this letter is to be found in ‘British Troops in Austria, Orders of Battle and Location 
Statement -  January 1948,’ Printed Books Department Accession Number X K  93/1816, Imperial War 
Museum, Lambeth Road, London. The second source is Land Forces o f  Britain, the Empire and 
Commonwealth, <www.regiments. or g>, created by T. F. Mills. 1 March 2001,updated 29 April 2003, 
[30 April 2003.]
24 H F Joslen, Orders o f  Battle, Second World War, 1939-1945, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1960), p. 324,
All British infantry units in Austria reported to the 138th Infantry Brigade for 
training purposes. Otherwise, the 138th consisted of five battalion-sized 
infantry units: 1st Battalion, the West Yorkshire Regiment (amalgamated in 
November with the 2nd battalion without change of name); 2nd Battalion, the 
Dorsetshire Regiment; and 2nd Battalion, the North Hampshire Regiment 
(amalgamated in August with the 1st Battalion without name change). The 
1st Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment (The Duke of York’s Own -  
amalgamated in September with the 2nd Battalion without change of name) 
reported directly to the Styria Sub-Area Command in Graz.
Vienna hosted the Vienna Area Command (Army Component), a Royal 
Engineering unit, transport and movement control organisations, service 
corps, ordnance, postal units and relatively large military police, intelligence 
and other security organisations. Interestingly, the Headquarters Civil Affairs 
Component, situated in Vienna, reported directly to the British Element, Allied 
Commission Austria. The 70th General Hospital was also located in Vienna, 
with 150 beds.
The Styria Sub-Area Command in Graz was assigned operational control 
over A and B Companies, 1st East Yorkshire Regiment, and hosted a 
surprisingly large intelligence component, consisting of 263d, 301st, 313d, 
409th and 418th Field Security Sections. Although posted in Graz, the
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Censorship Group reported directly to British Element, Allied Commission 
Austria.
C o n t in g e n c y  P l a n n in g
Austria does not play a major role in any of the Warsaw Pact plans studied 
for the purposes of this thesis.25 The three Western Powers, on the other 
hand, anticipated a Soviet offensive and planned for it. These plans are now 
declassified and available at Britain’s Public Record Office (PRO)26
Allied plans called for a coordinated withdrawal from Austria to Italy, and 
were code named PILGRIM ABLE, PILGRIM BAKER and PILGRIM 
CHARLIE. There was a fourth plan, PILGRIM DOG, which provided for a 
holding action in the Tyrol. This was heavily supported by the French but 
opposed by General Galloway who forbad any of his subordinates from even 
discussing it with the other Allies. Galloway wrote that he was warned by the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff not to have anything to do with this plan.27 
Later, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected PILGRIM DOG, while at the 
same time rejecting all other USFA recommendations for fighting forward in 
Austria.28
25 See for example: Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Militarische Planungen des Warschauer 
Paktes in Zentraleuropa: Eine Studie, Bonn, February 1992, trans. and annot. by Mark Kramer in 
Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations from the East German Archives, 
CWIHP Bulletin No. 2 (Fall 1992).
26 ‘Plans for Austria and Trieste, 1947-1950’, DEFE 11/23, PRO.
27 Top Secret Letter from Galloway, Commander-in-Chief British Forces Austria, to the Secretary, 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, 12 May 1949, DEFE 11/23, PRO.
28 Joint Strategic Plans Committee Report, 27 June 1952, JCS Geographic Files 1951-1953, RG 218, 
p. 12, NARA II.
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PILGRIM was based on three general assumptions. First, it was assumed 
that the Soviet Union, reinforced by troops from Satellite nations, would cross 
the borders of the Western occupation zones in Germany and Austria. 
Second, the Western forces in Germany would implement their own 
contingency plans and withdraw immediately west of the Rhine. The third 
planning assumption - indeed a fact - was that Italy already declared her 
intention of joining the Allies at the beginning of such a war.
PILGRIM took into considerations a Western appreciation of possible enemy 
courses of action, and concluded that enemy decisions would be heavily 
influenced by the state of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
at the beginning of the campaign.29 If the Soviet Forces in Austria and 
Hungary attacked in conjunction with the Yugoslavs, the most likely course of 
action would be to combine this offensive with Soviet forces in Germany to 
destroy US Forces in Austria and continue the offensive in the general 
direction of Graz-Klagenfurt-Po Valley and into the Italian peninsula with the 
objective of securing Italy and thereby control of the central Mediterranean 
region. If the Yugoslavs did not join in, the Soviets would attack together with 
Soviet troops in Germany in the direction of Salzburg-lnnsbruck-Graz- 
Klagenfurt with the objective of destroying all US forces in Austria. In 
response, Western forces would respond according to one of three 
contingency plans:
29 ‘Plan PILGRIM -  Evacuation of Allied Forces From Austria’, DEFE 11/23, J.P. (48) 134 (Final), 
PRO.
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PILGRIM ABLE
Western forces in Austria would stage a coordinated withdrawal to the 
Rhine and follow orders from the Allied Commander-in-Chief Western 
Europe. Under this plan, British forces would withdraw southward 
immediately, through Italy to France. American forces would withdraw 
through the French Zone to the Brenner Pass. And then follow British 
forces through Italy to France. French forces in the Vorarlberg would 
withdraw immediately to Mulhouse, and the remainder of French 
forces in Austria would protect the US withdrawal and then withdraw 
through Italy to France.
PILGRIM BAKER
This alternative plan was designed to effect an Allied withdrawal from 
Austria and Trieste, and to evacuate them from Italian ports. Each 
Allied contingent would pull back to Leghorn. British forces in Austria 
and Western forces in Trieste would withdraw directly across Northern 
Italy, with American troops moving through the French Zone to the 
Brenner Pass.
PILGRIM CHARLIE
In CHARLIE, Western forces in Austria and Trieste would execute a 
coordinated withdrawal to Northern Italy where they would join with 
Italian forces to take such action as they could. This alternative
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assumed that Italy would in fact resist enemy forces crossing her 
borders. The plan provided for the withdrawing forces to concentrate 
in the area of Vicenza and be redeployed with the Italians to the area 
of Brenta-Piave. The priorities and withdrawal systems would be the 
same as in PILGRIM ABLE and BAKER.
In a War Office note critiquing PILGRIM, British planners observed that there 
seemed to be no reason for the circuitous route established in PILGRIM 
ABLE (through Italy and France to the Rhine) other than a concern by Allied 
commanders in Austria over a possible attack from the east, if they withdrew 
northward directly to the Rhine. Also, PILGRIM BAKER did not take into 
consideration that the withdrawal line directly across Northern Italy would 
expose Western forces to the large Communist element present there. In a 
war against Russia, Western forces in Northern Italy would have to expect 
sabotage and Communist partisan resistance. Britain’s General Sir 
Alexander Galloway, Commander in Chief British Troops Austria from 
October 1947 until 1 January 1950, was opposed to PILGRIM CHARLIE 
because British, French and American troops involved in Northern Italy would 
have no air, armoured or artillery support: ‘Under the conditions of modern 
war, I do not think this is on’.30 Galloway was over-ridden by the Chiefs of 
Staff: ‘the approach to the problem is however in accordance with the
30 Top Secret letter from Galloway to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 12 May 1949; Annex I to Chiefs of 
Staff Committee Report, 3 July 1950, entitled ‘Disclosure of Information to the Italians About Co­
ordinated War Plans for the Allied Occupation Forces in Austria and Trieste’, DEFE 11/23, COS (50) 
228, PRO.
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directive issued by the Chief of Staff and appears to be the best that can be 
done under circumstances which are bound to involve considerable risks’.31
In a 31 March 1950 report on PILGRIM, as it affected British forces in Trieste, 
the Joint Planning Staff noted that Italian-Yugoslav relations were somewhat 
improved, and that Trieste was no longer being used to support Allied forces 
in Austria.32 The Staff also noted a concern expressed by combined 
Anglo/US/French planners in Austria that Western forces could not hope to 
withdraw westward toward the Rhine before the Soviets could cut their lines 
of retreat. Therefore, withdrawal from Austria could only be executed through 
Italy. The Commanding General US Forces Austria was charged with the 
responsibility of coordinating plans for withdrawal of all Allied forces from 
Austria in the event of a Soviet attack. The Joint Staff report summarised 
three approaches being taken in this planning process. The first had Italy 
declaring war on the side of the Allies and fighting when attacked. In this 
case, all Western forces in Austria would withdraw directly into Italy and fight 
alongside Italian forces for ‘as long as practicable’. If, on the other hand, Italy 
did not become an active ally but did not oppose Western forces movements 
into Italy, Western forces in Austria would withdraw to Western Italian or 
Southern French ports from which they would be evacuated. If nobody knew 
how the Italians would react to war, occupation troops in Austria would 
withdraw to Trieste and be evacuated by sea.
31 ANNEX II, ‘Plan PILGRIM -  Evacuation of Allied Forces From Austria’, DEFE 11/23. J.P. (48) 
134 (Final), p. 6.
32 Top Secret Joint Planning Staff Report, 31 March 1950, p. 2, J.P.(50)26 (Final), C.O.S.(50)91,
DEFE 11/23, PRO,
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Galloway was not the only British senior military officer who was 
uncomfortable with these plans, which, by the way, had never been cleared 
with the Italian Government. Upon learning this, Major General H. Redman of 
the War Office was inspired to observe that the Italian troops’ morale would 
perhaps be boosted by the sight of British troops on their soil, but he 
wondered how it would go down with these same Italian troops if they were 
ordered northward to face an attacking Soviet Army while dodging British and 
American troops streaming southward through their ranks in rapid retreat.33
On 2 September 1950, Redman, confirming that even the War Office was 
having problems with security, sent a Top Secret letter to A.G. Gilchrest of 
the Foreign Office German Department, regarding PLAN PILGRIM, after Italy 
had joined the Atlantic Pact. Here, the War Office admits that a highly 
classified communication had somehow gone ‘out of channel’ and landed on 
Gilchrest’s desk. Gilchrest’s response obviously caused a stir, because 
Redman was swift to explain:
I am afraid that you have been caused unnecessary trouble by being 
shown a telegram sent on a personal basis, and giving guidance to 
our Army Chiefs of Staff in Austria and Trieste in relation to a 
particular aspect of military planning. ... The small unbalanced forces 
which we have agreed to contribute to the defence of Northern Italy 
are not, from the military point of view, a sound proposition but have 
been committed for psychological and political rather than military 
reasons. The occupation forces are not organised as field forces and 
they lack the supporting arms and administrative backing necessary 
to make them efficient even in a defensive role ... it will be essential 
for our forces to set an example to the Italians and for us to 
demonstrate that we mean what we say. This will not be achieved if
33 Ibid.
our forces are seen to be retreating as rapidly as possible through 
the Italian frontier defences and make no attempt to cover the Italians 
whilst they are mobilising.34
The European mutual defence agreement might have added to Britain’s 
defence capability, at least in appearance, but it also obligated the British 
government to share secret information with its treaty partners, including the 
French who were widely disliked and mistrusted, especially in British military 
circles.35 Throughout its post-war diplomacy, the British government was 
terrified that the Soviet Union would find out how weak the country actually 
was, in both military and economic terms. Attlee did what he thought he 
could to protect the country’s secrets. He excluded Communists from 
sensitive positions in which they might have access to classified information, 
for example, and both he and Bevin warned the French about the dangers of 
Communist penetration.36 They understood that the more sensitive 
information London passed to its European treaty partners, the more likely it 
was that this information would reach Soviet ears. What they did not know 
was the extent to which the Soviet intelligence services had already, 
beginning in the 1930s, penetrated British government circles at practically all 
levels, the ‘Cambridge Five’ being but a few examples of secret agents who 
insured that Moscow received copies of sensitive British diplomatic traffic, 
policy papers, and first-hand reports of Anglo-American deliberations on 
strategic matters.
34 Top Secret letter from Redman to Gilchrest (Foreign Office), 1 September 1950, M03/SE/51, FO 
371/84923, pp. 1-2, PRO,
35 Elizabeth Barker, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (London - Basingstoke: The 
Macmillan Press Limited, 1983), p. 116, citing DEFE 4/14 COS(48)36th Mtg., 23.6.48.
36 CAB 128/12 CM(48)25, 25.3.48.
A n o t h e r  T r y
While contingency planning was underway, there were renewed efforts to 
breathe life back into treaty negotiations. Following the unsuccessful 
Deputies meeting on 9 January 1950, the British, French and American 
ambassadors in Moscow requested appointments with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Vyshinsky to submit protest notes over the lack of progress toward 
solution of the Austria issue, but all three were deflected to the Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko. This fifty minute-long meeting of the three 
Western ambassadors together with Gromyko produced one memorable 
quote from the Cold War’s Austrian ‘battlefield.’ Tired of receiving what he 
regarded as evasive replies from Gromyko to fairly specific questions, 
American Ambassador Alan Kirk asked Gromyko how much longer it would 
be before the Western Allies could expect a resolution to the Austrian 
problem: ‘it’s been going on for some time.’ 37 Gromyko replied: That 
depends on the value you place on time’.38
Subsequent meetings in 1950 of the four Deputies for Austria produced no 
movement at all, with the Soviet representative refusing to discuss any 
outstanding articles in the draft treaty until all matters pertaining to Austrian 
post-war debts to the Soviet Union were settled (e.g. the dried peas). The 
Soviets also refused to comment on the negotiations or even to speculate on
37 Telegram from Sir D. Kelly (Moscow) to the Foreign Office, 19 January 1950, C445, FO 
371/84896, PRO.
38 Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria p. 101, citing Lydia Kirk, Postmarked 
Moscow (London:Duckworth, 1953), p. 121.
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when these might end.39 In April 1950, the Soviets added a new obstacle in 
the discussions, alleging an alarming growth of neo-Nazi sentiment in Austria 
and demanding that a new article be added to the treaty draft requiring 
Austria to take action against all organisations of a ‘Fascist type’.40 There 
was no definition of what the Soviets meant by the term ‘fascist’.
The real intent of this improvisation became clear only eight days later, when 
the Soviets demanded that progress on the Austrian Treaty would depend on 
settlement of Soviet objections to Allied policies regarding Trieste. One can 
only assume that the Soviet assessment of the issues attached to Trieste 
was the same as those presented in London and Washington, where it had 
already been concluded that an impasse had been reached. During the rest 
of 1950, the Soviets clung to the demand that Trieste be resolved before they 
were prepared to discuss Austria, rejecting Western claims that the two 
issues had nothing to do with each other. In a 23 May 1950 Minute for the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mallet reported that: The Soviet Union 
had now made it abundantly clear that they had no intention of concluding 
the treaty’.41
39 Ibid., p. 101.
40 Ibid., p. 102.
41 Foreign Office minute by Mallet to Bevin, 23 May 1950, C3578, FO 371/84904, PRO.
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C a c c ia ’s  F e b r u a r y  1950  S u r v iv a b il it y  M e m o r a n d u m
On 28 February 1950, Sir Harold Caccia sent a telegram to Bevin, entitled 
‘Survival of Austria as an Independent State’.42 The date is important 
because of the impending conference of Western foreign ministers, 
scheduled to be held in London beginning on 11 May. The document was 
considered to be of sufficient importance to be included in the 1950 
Confidential Print file distributed by the Foreign Office to a select audience -  
an archival collection that was declassified only in the year 2001. Here, 
Caccia sought to assess the political and economic dangers which might 
threaten the survival of Austria ‘if a treaty on the present terms were after all 
ratified and implemented in conditions as they are today’.43 He based this 
assessment on certain assumptions:
For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that on the ninetieth day 
after ratification all occupying forces will have been withdrawn, that 
the full sovereignty of Austria will have been re-established and that 
Soviet-owned enterprises in Austria (oil administration and Danube 
Shipping Company) will then become subject to Austrian jurisdiction 
as prescribed in the treaty. It is also assumed that there will be no 
direct military action by the Soviet. On these assumptions, the 
immediate short-term danger is that of a Communist coup d’etat, and 
the longer-term dangers are of Austria succumbing to political or 
economic weaknesses or a combination of both 44
The threat of a Communist coup was, according to Caccia, not great. 
Conceivably, well-armed Communist organizations such as the Werkschutz 
could seize machinery of government and broadcasting facilities and hold out
42 British High Commission Vienna, 'Survival of Austria as An Independent State,' 28 February 1950, 
FO 465/4, Document No. 3, Telegram No. 36, C 1678/1/3, .
43 Ibid., p. 1.
44 Ibid.
long enough for neighbouring countries to dispatch Communist 
reinforcements. But Caccia also opined, as it turned out prophetically, that 
the Austrian police and gendarmerie were probably able to handle any such 
eventuality. Even if the Soviets were to strengthen the Werkschutz and raise 
a strong militia, the Communists would still require help from forces 
smuggled into the country at the time of the coup. But ‘the Austrian 
Government are already quite clear that it would be one of the primary tasks 
of the Austrian State forces to forestall any Communist coup’. Even if a 
Communist putsch succeeded in Vienna and Eastern Austria, it would in all 
probability not extend to the Western part of the country, and a partitioned 
state would result.45
Caccia then addressed the ramifications of political and economic weakness 
after occupation troops withdrew. In doing so, he offered an interesting, 
personal observation about the Austrian people.
There is unfortunately an inherent lack of confidence and will that 
Austria could and should survive as a separate political entity. The 
fanatic passion for national survival, which is characteristic of the 
Greeks, does not exist in Austria. On the other hand, it is easy to 
underestimate the capacity of the Austrian people for resistance by 
more devious means and to exaggerate the extent to which a 
mentality of fatalism saps their purpose 46
Hence, the ‘prophets of woe’ were likely to be more vocal than others. Caccia 
pointed out that there were three possibilities, should Austria not be able to 
stand on her own feet. First, it could be absorbed into some system of
45 Ibid., paragraph 2, p. 2.
46 Ibid., paragraph 4, p. 2.
Danubian Soviet satellites. Second, Austria could be absorbed into a 
Western European Federation. Third, Austria could once again enjoy a 
‘fusion’ with Germany. On the basis of past elections, Caccia reported, some 
ninety percent of the Austrian people would be opposed to becoming part of 
the Soviet empire, and this percentage would not change unless the Western 
Powers somehow demonstrated that they had neither the will nor ability to 
continue to support a free-standing, independent Austria. ‘Social Democracy 
has some solid foundation here, and the prospect of Austrian Socialists, on 
becoming embroiled with the Right, throwing themselves into the arms of 
Soviet Communism is remote’.47
Of the two remaining alternative fates, incorporation into some form of 
Western European Federation would probably be most attractive to 
Austrians, provided that there was a Western European Federation to join. If 
the Western Powers wanted it, there ‘would always be widespread support in 
Austria for adherence to a Western Federation. ... Indeed, the Austrians 
would feel that they had a right to belong for historic and cultural reasons as 
well, as because this would afford them some added physical protection from 
the Soviet Empire’.48
Most interesting of Caccia’s observations is the one addressing his third 
alternative, that of Austria’s becoming part of some ‘fusion’ with West 
Germany. Article 4 of the draft treaty, one of the articles already agreed by all
47 Ibid, paragraph 5, pp. 2-3.
48 Ibid., paragraph 7, p. 3.
Four Powers, prohibited any type of political or economic union with 
Germany. But, as Caccia pointed out, so did the Treaty of St. Germaine and 
the Anschlufi still took place. It is interesting that it occurred to Caccia to see 
this as a possible future course for Austria. He said himself that it was difficult 
to estimate just how attracted the Austrian people would be to the prospect of 
another Anschluft with Germany. In any case, he was confident that Britain 
would possess some form of veto in any western union and, in the absence 
of positive action by the Western Powers to bring about another Anschlufi, it 
would almost certainly not come about. Economic developments, on the 
other hand, could lead Austria back into despair and cause her to reach out 
for more extreme solutions.
After listing the benefits and burdens Austria would probably derive from a 
treaty, Caccia concluded that the economic consequences of the treaty, in its 
then-current draft form, were not ‘calculated to facilitate the Soviet in 
subverting the Austrian State’. The economic benefits of a treaty would far 
outweigh the burdens, provided that Western economic assistance would 
continue after the cessation of Marshall aid.49 Again we see the British 
depending a great deal on the American taxpayer’s willingness to continue 
economic support for Austria beyond the termination of major international 
aid programs.
Caccia concluded his assessment of political and economic risks by 
suggesting that, even with continuing Western aid, Austria’s future would
49 Ibid., paragraph. 12, p. 4.
depend largely on her own efforts. A huge national drive would be required, 
and the execution of a treaty would, in his opinion, create sufficient incentive 
for the Austrian people to ‘put their backs into it’.
All that is safe to assert here is that as things are today and on the 
basis of such assumptions as it is reasonable to make now, it is clear 
that Austria has a fair prospect of survival if two conditions are 
fulfilled. They are that the balance of power and influence in Europe 
does not turn significantly against the West, and that Austria receives 
an adequate degree of financial and economic support from the West 
after the end of Marshall Aid in order to prevent a sharp and enduring 
deterioration in the condition of living and employment.50
T he  V io l e n t  D e m o n s t r a t io n s  o f  S e p t e m b e r  a n d  O c t o b e r  1950
Communist gains in Korea during the initial phases of the war caused serious 
concern in Austria, where most people felt their future depended on the 
West’s ability to protect them. But Western military forces were not doing 
very well against North Korean Communists, and the rapid US withdrawal in 
Korea sent Austrian self-confidence plummeting. Hugo Portisch recalled:
Der Koreakrieg hat eine ganze Reihe von Konsequenzen fur 
Osterreich. Unmittelbare und langerfristige. Zu den langerfristigen 
gehort sicherlich der vollige Stillstand in den 
Staatsvertragsverhandlungen. Langerfristig wirkt auch die 
Uberzeugung der Amerikaner -  wie auch vieler Osterreicher Politiker 
- Korea bestatigt die Annahme, daft, wo der Westen ein Land raumt, 
die Kommunisten eindringen. Denn dies sei die Ausgangslage in 
Korea gewesen: Im Norden standen die Sowjets als
Besatzungstruppen, im Suden die Amerikaner, beide zogen ab. Im 
Norden hinterlieften die Sowjets ein kommunistisches Regime, im 
Suden die Amerikaner ein prowestliches. Des militarischen Schutzes 
beraubt, wurde das prowestliche Sudkorea e1n Opfer des 
kommunistischen Regimes im Norden. Einem solchen Schicksal 
konne man in gleicher Lage offenbar entgehen, wenn man unter dem
50 Ibid., paragraph. 17, p. 5.
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militarischen Schutz der USA bliebe Oder selbst stark genug ware, 
einen Angriff abzuwehren.51
Hopes of a tranquil future were not helped a few months later, when 
Communists in Austria launched what one British historian described as the 
greatest and ‘most potentially dangerous wave of labour protests in Austria’s 
post-war history’.52 Audrey Cronin interpreted the strikes as the second major 
Soviet-inspired putsch -  a Communist attempt to overthrow the Austrian 
Government.53 Cronin’s version of this incident is supported by other 
scholars who have studied the 1950 demonstrations in depth.54 One of the 
more persuasive opinions in support of the putsch theory is that of Boris 
Volodarsky, former Soviet military intelligence officer and author of a 
forthcoming book on the history of Soviet intelligence operations in Austria. 
Volodarsky writes:
One should realise, that since its formation in 1918, KPO never 
existed as a separate body, it had always been only an arm of the 
Comintern, and after 1943 the Covinformburo (sic) and its 
successors. Koplenig, Fiala, Honner, Ernst Fischer & Co. were 
trained to fulfil orders, and do precisely what Moscow told them to do. 
There is no doubt that the Soviet intelligence played a leading role in 
the September-October 1950 strikes. There is plenty of open 
information that the target of the strikes was the existing coalition
51 Hugo Portisch, Der Lange Wegzur Freiheit (Vienna: Verlag Kreymayr &  Scheriau, 1986), p. 410.
52 J. Lewis, 'Austria 1950: Strikes, 'Putsch' and Their Political Context', European History Quarterly, 
30 (2000), 533-552 (2000), p. 533.
53 Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria Cronin, p. 111. Cronin identifies the 
1947 food riots as the first attempted Soviet-backed putsch.
54 See, as examples: Ulricke Wetz, Geschichte der Wiener Polizei-Direktion vom Jahre 1945 bis zur 
1955: mit Berueksichtigung der Zeit vor 1945, (PhD, University of Vienna, 1970b). See also Klenner, 
Fritz, ,Putschversuch oder nicht: Tatsachenbericht iiber das 4. Preis-und Lohnsabkommen und die 
beiden Gescheiterten Kommunistischen Generalstreikversuche im September und Oktober 1950,’ 
Pressereferat des Osterreicher Gewerkschaftsbund, Wien 1958.
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government, and the aim yet a new coalition government headed by 
the Communists, i.e. we can clearly speak of the putsch. ... ALL 
Austrian Communists, members of the government, were Soviet 
agents, the exact type of their relation to the Soviet ‘organy’ did not 
really matter. They all had pseudonyms and were getting instructions 
from Moscow.55
In other words, whether or not the incident represented a pre-planned coup d’ 
etat, Volodarsky maintains that Soviet intelligence would have been heavily 
involved, and he describes the demonstrations as a clear attempt by the 
Communists to assume control of the coalition government.
American historian, William Bader, who wrote one of the better books about 
the occupation of Austria, suggests that Austrian accounts of the 1950 
demonstrations, while reflecting an understandable pride in the role played 
by the country’s workers and security forces in suppressing the violence, 
ignore the fact that the Soviet attitude toward the strikes was ‘probably the 
most crucial factor of the entire affair’.56 What the Communists needed, 
according to Bader, was an incident that would have thrown the Austrian 
people into a mood of intense dissatisfaction with the coalition government. 
Such an incident would have to be so dramatic as to create a broad base of 
social discontent, one that would transcend political party lines. The summer 
of 1950 provided that opportunity because: ‘only with the support of large 
numbers of dissatisfied Socialist workers could the Communists hope to
55 E-Mail message from Volodarsky to author, 2 July 2003, paragraphs 2 and 5. Hard copy in author’s 
personal files.
56 William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1966), p. 158.
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succeed in an attempt to shake or unseat the coalition government’. 57 
According to Bader:
The Austrian Socialists have long contended that the objective of the 
Communist Party in the fall of 1950 was the overthrow of the coalition 
government and the establishment of a ‘people’s democracy’ in 
Austria. This is certainly true to the extent that such a takeover was 
the ultimate objective of the Communist Party.58
Bader maintains that, while the Communists may have wanted to exploit the 
situation they did not have the capability to do so. As an indication of how 
shallow support for the KPO had become, sixty nine of the eighty six factories 
voting to strike in Lower Austria were Soviet-run USIA plants. Only seventeen 
were not. No putsch occurred because Austrian workers did not want it.
What cost the Communists any chance of success in the October 
strike was the response of the workers to this (Government) appeal. 
The personal courage shown by many Austrian workers during these 
two critical days drew all too little comment in the Western press.59
In her 1970 PhD thesis on the history of Vienna’s Police, Ulrike Wetz 
reported: ‘Der Plan der Komunisten war, die Kontrolle uber die 
Gewerkschaften und uber diese Regierungsgewalt zu erlangen’.60 Others 
disagree and conclude that the September and October 1950 violent 
demonstrations were simply Communist-inspired expressions of outrage 
stirred by rumours of a new government wage and price plan that
57 Ibid., p. 158.
58 Ibid., p. 166.
59 Ibid., p. 179.
60 Ulricke Wetz, Geschichte der Wiener Polizei-Direktion vom Jahre 1945 bis zur 1955: mit 
Berueksichtigung der Zeit vor 1945, (PhD, University of Vienna, 1970a), p. 394.
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disadvantaged the working class. A reliable explanation of the motives 
behind the strikes will not be available until KPO files and Soviet archives are 
entirely open to the public. Attempted coup or not, these demonstrations 
inflamed the Austrian public and frightened the government to the point 
where Chancellor Leopold Figl asked, as we shall see, at least three times 
for Western military troops to augment Austrian police, who they thought 
were being overwhelmed by superior numbers of demonstrators. It was this 
request that forced Britain into a policy decision of some consequence.
The strikes of 1950 did two things for British Austria policy. First, they alerted 
everybody to the disaster that might have happened, given the Government’s 
lack of preparation, inadequate intelligence capabilities and the questionable 
capability of Austrian law enforcement authorities to contain the mobs. 
Everybody learned new lessons from this serious incident, which forced 
British officials into at least one major decision on the ground in Austria - not 
to dispatch armed soldiers to support the police. Second, unashamed and 
illegal Soviet support for the demonstrators reinforced Britain’s views about 
Soviet behaviour in Austria and of what might be expected from the Russian 
counterparts in the future.
In addition to daily situation reports to the Foreign Office from the Vienna 
Embassy, British High Commissioner, Sir Harold Caccia, wrote three 
substantive reports on the demonstrations. On 3 October and again on 8 
October 1950, he sent comprehensive, analytical reports to Prime Minister
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Attlee.61 On 27 October 1950, he sent Ernest Bevin the agreed text of 
Britain’s formal Note protesting Soviet behaviour during the 
demonstrations.62 These documents are worthy of special note because they 
reflect how Britain’s foreign policy team in Vienna interpreted the 
demonstrations and the underlying causes. The reports also highlighted the 
strikes’ significance to British policy in Austria. All three documents were 
selected for inclusion in the Foreign Office’s Confidential Print collection for 
the year 1950, for dissemination at the highest levels of the British 
Government.
According to Caccia’s first report, the agitation that accompanied the Fourth 
Wage & Price Agreement dated back to the 1949 Agreement, which was 
broadly denounced by the Communists, who ‘have taken every opportunity 
since to try and convince the workers that their real wages have been 
steadily declining’.63 When it became known that another such agreement 
was under consideration, the KPO intensified propaganda efforts and 
accused the Socialists and trade union leaders of selling the workers out by 
engaging in a secret conspiracy with their ‘reactionary’ coalition partners. ‘It 
was clear that the Communists were determined to challenge the 
Government and the trade union leadership on the streets whatever form the
61 Caccia to Attlee, ‘Communist Demonstrations Against the Wage-Price Agreement in Austria: 
Evidence of Soviet Intervention’, Vienna despatch no. 141, 3 October 1950, (C 6401/12/3), FO 465/4. 
Caccia to Attlee, ‘Communist Disturbances in Austria,’ Vienna despatch No. 143, 8 October 1950, C 
6559/12/3, FO 465/4, Document 14, PRO.
62 Caccia to Bevin, ‘Disturbances in Austria: Note of Protest to the Soviet Government’, Vienna 
Telegram No. 1202), 27 October 1950, C 7229/12/3, FO 465/4, PRO.
63 Caccia to Attlee, British High Commission Vienna, 'Communist Demonstrations Against the 
Wage-Price Agreement in Austria: Evidence of Soviet Intervention,' 3 October 1950, FO 465/4, 
Document 13, C 6401/12/3,, p. 27.
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agreement took’.64 Caccia opined that the Wage & Price Agreement was ‘the 
occasion and not the whole explanation’ of this challenge to the Austrian 
coalition Government. Nonetheless, he saw the strikes as a clear challenge 
to existing authority.
On 3 October, Caccia reported that the first signs of real trouble began in 
July and August 1950 when farmers intensified efforts to obtain price 
increases for grain and other agricultural products. Austria’s internal price of 
grain was about one-third the world price, and farmers in Austria had little 
incentive to sell through conventional channels. At the same time, a decision 
was made to withdraw government subsidies from a number of imported 
commodities, including coal and fertilizers. The worldwide price increases 
resulting from the Korean War were beginning to catch up with Austria, 
where there was also a proposal for a unitary exchange rate, a move 
encouraged by the International Monetary Fund and the Economic 
Cooperation Administration -  always a lightening rod for Communist 
attacks.65 Instead of conducting all of these deliberations in the open, the 
Government chose to do so in secret, denying to the public that any 
negotiations on a new Wage & Price Agreement were taking place at all.
News of the September demonstrations reached Austrian Government hands 
on the afternoon of 25 September. The Federal Chancellery was to be the 
target of Communist demonstrators entering Vienna from the city’s outskirts.
64 Ibid.
65 See Section on The Marshall Plan in Austria, Chapter 3.
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The first hard news about the terms of the Fourth Wage & Price Agreement 
was published by the President of the Trade Union Federation in the Arbeiter 
Zeitung just before a scheduled 26 September Cabinet meeting. Communist 
demonstrators were already assembling, even before the terms of the 
Agreement were known.66
At about nine o’clock a.m., 26 September 1950, between 6,000 and 7,000 
demonstrators began gathering in the Ballhausplatz, where they were 
addressed by Communist spokesmen. Austrian police were unable to 
disperse the mob. Chancellor Figl and some staff were besieged in the 
Chancellery until after 2 o’clock in the afternoon. At the same time, strikes 
were organised by Communists in Lower and Upper Austria and also in 
Styria, the most serious incident being the blocking of railway lines in the 
Soviet Occupation Zone south and west of Vienna. In the British Occupation 
Zone, police were unable to contain demonstrators who threatened the seat 
of government in Graz. Caccia reported that police were also unable to 
control crowds in Wiener Neustadt, Linz and St. Polten. Then, Communist 
organisers ordered their people to withdraw, return to work on 27 September, 
and await the outcome of a so-called congress of shop-stewards scheduled 
for 30 September in Vienna.67 Stearman reports that the program ‘Russian 
Hour’ on the Soviet military radio station, RAVAG, actually broadcast
66 Caccia to Attlee, 3 October 1950, 'Communist Demonstrations Against the Wage-Price Agreement 
in Austria: Evidence of Soviet Intervention'.
67 Ibid., p. 29.
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instructions to the demonstrators to go home and await the ‘All-Austrian Shop 
Steward’s Conference’.68
Franz Muhri was the KPO District Secretary for Modling at the time. In 2002, 
he wrote a piece on the strikes, in which he admitted that the KPO made a 
serious mistake when they halted the strikes just when they were picking up 
steam: ‘Der Aufruf zur Unterbrechung des Streikes hatte sich im weiteren als 
schwerer Fehler erwiesen was auch die KPO Fuhrung spater selbstkritisch 
feststelit’.69 This, he suggested, gave the government time to launch a 
massive anti-Communist press campaign and also to prepare law 
enforcement authorities for the next wave of strikes.
Socialist shop stewards did meet as scheduled and they passed a resolution 
endorsing the Fourth Wage & Price Agreement.70 By the time the second 
round of violent demonstrations started, the government, the police and 
socialist trade union leaders were prepared. Wetz reported:
Auf der am 3.10.1950 nachmittags abgehaltenen Konferenz der 
sozialistischen Betriebsobmanner Wiens, in der das Lohn-und 
Preisabkommen gebilligt und die Streikparole zuruckgewiesen 
wurde, gab der Obmann der Gewerkschaftssektion der 
Sicherheitswache, Schindler, unter dem sturmischen Beifall der 
Konferenzteilnehmer die Erklarung ab, daft die Wiener
68 William L Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria (Bonn, Vienna, Zurich: 
Siegler & Co, 1962), p. 121.
69 Franz Muhri, ;Am Beginn des Kalten Krieges: Der Oktoberstreik 1950 -  Personliche Bemerkungen 
zur Putsch-Metapher’, Kalter Krieg: Beitrage zur Ost-West-Konfrontation 1945-1990,’ eds. Schopfer, 
Gerald and Kamer, Stefan, Leykam, (Buchverlagsgesellschaft: Graz, 2002), p. 195.
70 Caccia to Bevin, Telegram No. 143, 8 October 1950, C 6559/12/3, FO 465/4, PRO, p. 31.
70 Caccia to Bevin, 8 October 1950, p. 1.
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Sicherheitswache sich strikte an die Anordnungen des 
Polizeiprasidenten halten werde.71
During the period 28 September -  4 October, furious exchanges took place 
in the Austrian press, and these served to inflame an already incendiary 
environment in which the government described the Communist-inspired 
strikes as a deliberate attempt to take over the government by force and 
install a Communist regime. Given what had already happened in 
neighbouring Hungary and Czechoslovakia, these accusations carried a 
plausible ring.
On 30 September, some 2,417 representatives of works committees and 
other spokesmen from every province met in Vienna’s Floridsdorf locomotive 
factory. After a three-hour debate, the participants agreed on an ultimatum to 
the government:
Zuruckziehung der Preiserhohungen oder Verdopplung der im 
Abkommen vorgesehenen Erhohung der Lohne, Gehalter, 
Pensionen, Renten, Kinderzulagen, bei voller Steuerfreiheit fur die 
gesamten Erhohungen.
Keine weiteren Preiserhohungen, gesetzlicher Preisstopp.
Keine weitere Schillingabwertung ... falls die Regierung nicht bis 
spatestens Dienstag auf unsere Forderungen positiv antwortet und 
eine solche positive Antwort durch die Exekutive der osterreichischen 
Betriebsratekonferenz uber die Rundfunksender nicht mitgeteilt wird - 
ohne weitere Aufforderung am Mittwoch der Streik in ganz Osterreich 
zu beginnen.72
71 Wetz, Wetz Dissertation, p. 397.
72 Franz Muhri, 'Am Beginn des Kalten Krieges: Der Oktoberstreik 1950 - Personliche Bemerkungen 
zur "Putsch-Metapher', in Kalter Krieg: Beitrage zur Ost-West-Konfrontation 1945-1990, Schoepfer 
and Kamer, (Graz: Leykam Buchverlagsgesellschaft m.b.H., 2002), p. 196.
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When the 3 October deadline passed without government acceptance of 
shop stewards’ demands, violent demonstrations broke out, with 
demonstrators forcefully taking over a post office in the Soviet Zone near 
Vienna. Using augmenting forces from the capital, Austrian police re-took the 
post office but were ordered away by Soviet military authorities. The smell of 
a concerted coup was definitely in the air, especially after Soviet authorities 
intervened on behalf of rioters by providing military vehicles for 
transportation, and by preventing Austrian police stationed in the Soviet Zone 
from responding to orders from higher headquarters to rush to Vienna and 
reinforce the police presence in the centre of town.
By noon on 5 October, enthusiasm for continuing violent demonstrations had 
waned, the non-communist press was reporting the strikes as failures, and 
Austrian police had succeeded in decompressing the most serious trouble 
spots. Socialist labour union leaders played a major role in obstructing 
Communist attempts to add fuel to the fire and one in particular, Franz Olah, 
Chairman of the Gewerkschaft der Bau- und Holzarbeiter (1949-1957), 
emerged from the incident as a national hero. As head of the construction 
workers’ union, he organised his members into small bands, about the same 
size as the roving Communist demonstrators who were building road blocks 
and otherwise disrupting transportation facilities. These ‘Olah Bataillone’, 
armed with clubs, engaged the Communists in hand-to-hand fighting in ‘hard 
fought battles all over the city’.73
73 Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955 , p. 179.
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On Thursday, 5 October 1950, the Presidium of the all-Austria works 
committees met again in the Floridsdorf locomotive factory. Following 
another lengthy debate, there was unanimous opinion that the government 
had acted against the interests of Austrian workers by pursuing the Fourth 
Wage & Price Agreement, that the Austrian Trade Union Federation had 
done the same, that the workers’ voice had been heard but ignored, and that 
the workers had been subdued by the unreasonable application of force.
Dadurch ist es im gegebenen Augenblick nicht moglich, eine 
einheitliche Bewegung in ganz Osterreich zu entfalten. Aus diesen 
Grunden empfiehlt die Exekutive der osterreichischen 
Betriebsratekonferenz der Arbeiterschaft, den Streik abzubrechen 
und Freitag in Betriebsversammlungen die Aufnahme der Arbeit zu 
beschliefien. ...der Streik ist zu Ende, der Kampf geht weiter. ... so 
endet der grofie Streik mit einer Niederlage der KPO.74
Caccia’s 8 October telegram to Bevin reported that ‘the Communists’ second 
challenge to the Government and to the trade union leadership on 4th 
October proved a fiasco’.75 In Caccia’s opinion, the Austrian Government had 
‘learned their lesson’ during the September demonstrations and were fully 
prepared for the second round in October. The Government were, this time, 
‘on their toes and the population firmly in opposition to the Communist strike 
promoters’.76 The whole affair was, according to Caccia’s report, ‘clearly 
identified as a Communist attempt to injure the country and not as a popular
74 Ibid., p. 197.
75 British High Commission Vienna, 'Communist Disturbances in Austria: Preparedness of the 
Government ot Meet the Challenge,' 8 October 1950, FO 465/4, Document 14, C 6559/12/3, p. 31, 
PRO.
76 Ibid., p. 31.
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outcry against the Wage Price Agreement’.77 Caccia reported that the strikes 
assumed a ‘gratuitous and spiteful character’ on 5 October 1950, when they 
became largely confined to the Soviet occupation Zone and the Soviet Sector 
of Vienna, ‘where the strikers and demonstrators enjoyed Russian protection 
from police interference’.78
He concluded that:
The scale of the disturbances ... did not exceed that of past 
occasions and no grave incidents took place. So far so good. What 
created anxiety was the realisation of what might have happened: for 
two things had been shown up. The inadequacy of the police and 
Russian support. ...Here I would point principally to the fact that the 
police failed to stop the demonstrators from reaching a dangerous 
objective, the Chancellery, and that a disaster did not occur mainly 
because the leaders of the demonstration had not willed it.79
Caccia proceeded to report that the Chancellor had not been adequately 
advised throughout the crisis by the Minister of Interior. According to Caccia, 
Figl made no less that four (sic) appeals to the US High Commissioner, who 
was in the Allied Council Chair in September, for intervention of Allied 
troops.80 ‘Why? Put simply, the answer is absence of early information and 
the failure to take energetic action soon enough’.81
77 Ibid., p. 31.
78 Ibid., p. 32.
79 Caccia to Attlee, Telegram 141, 3 October 1950, ‘Communist Demonstrations Against the Wage -  
Price Agreement in Austria’, FO 465/4, Document 13, p. 27.
80 There were only three requests.
81 Ibid. p. 29.
There was also an information gap between the Austrian Government and 
the Western Allies, who received no information at all from the Government 
in advance of the September demonstrations. During the events of 26 and 27 
September, Figl appealed to American Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes 
for intervention of Allied troops. General Keyes was chairing the Allied 
Council during September of that year, his last month in office. There is, in 
fact, some confusion here in the historiography. Historians reporting on the 
violent strikes of September and October 1950 usually refer to the direct role 
played during the strikes by General Keyes, most often identified as US High 
Commissioner. Military records, however, show that Keyes relinquished his 
position as High Commissioner to civilian Walter J. Donnelly, effective 20 
September 1950 -  six days before the strikes started. President Truman did 
not sign Executive Order 10171, Transferring Occupation Functions in 
Austria to the Department of State’, until 12 October 1950.82 Perhaps 
expediency caused Donnelly to ask Keyes to handle the crisis, even though 
he had been effectively relieved of his High Commissioner duties. This, in 
any case, is a problem to be solved by students of the American participation 
in the occupation of Austria.
Caccia reported that, when Keyes queried the Ministry of Interior for detailed 
information on the situation, he was told that things were not, in fact, out of 
hand and that there was no need for Western troops.83 Keyes knew that the
82 Footnote to Document 274, Public Papers o f  the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1950, Harry S. 
Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
83 'Communist Demonstrations Against the Wage-Price Agreement in Austria: Evidence of Soviet 
Intervention'.
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Western military in Austria was far outgunned by the Soviets. He also knew 
that Allied troops could be effective in quelling the demonstrations only if they 
were prepared to fire their weapons, and neither Keyes nor the other 
Western High Commissioners were thrilled by the prospect of a fire fight on 
the streets of Vienna at the same time Communist and Western forces were 
shooting at each other in Asia.
The Western High Commissioners met on 29 September to discuss the 
demonstrations. They were joined by the Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor and 
the Minister of Interior.
We pointed out the vital need for the Austrian Government to ensure 
that the police and gendarmerie took energetic action at an early 
stage to prevent the necessity of more drastic steps later. In doing 
so, General Keyes, as chairman, made it quite plain what would be 
the consequence of the intervention of Allied troops. They could only 
be used as troops and not as a few extra policemen in a different 
uniform. This meant, in plain language, that the Austrian Government 
should calculate in their own minds that such an intervention would 
mean shooting. This must have a profound effect inside and outside 
Austria.
Austrian ministers accepted this. Indeed, the Minister of Interior said 
that such intervention of Allied troops would be ‘end of the Austrian 
Government’.84
Caccia conferred with his own Commander-in-Chief, General Thomas J. W. 
Winterton, who agreed with Keyes’ response to Austrian requests for the 
commitment of Western troops. Following this conferral, Caccia met with the 
Minister of Interior, who pointed out to him that the Austrian police were still 
inadequately equipped and armed. For example, during the strikes, the police
84 Ibid.
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did not have shock-resistant helmets, and they were armed only with wooden 
truncheons. Caccia brought this point up with the other Western High 
Commissioners, and all agreed that they should do as much as possible to 
prepare the police better to deal with violent demonstrations on the street, 
without violating the Control Agreement. Caccia told Attlee:
So far as policy is concerned, it was made clear that in our future 
discussions and plans we shall proceed on the basis that the police 
and gendarmerie be provided with such equipment as the Austrians 
wish to secure without violation of quadripartite agreements.85
Caccia told Attlee that poor equipment was not the only explanation for weak 
performance by Austrian police and gendarmerie. There was, he reported, a 
very real need for moral support, because ‘the fear of reprisal is real. ... it 
goes down to the individual policeman, who realises that the Communists 
may take down his number during a melee, and that this may ultimately 
mean the kidnapping of himself and his family and deportation to Russia’.86
In the formal British Protest Note, Caccia flatly accused the Soviet 
Occupation authorities of infringing the Control Agreement both ‘by omission 
and commission’. The charges were discussed at an Allied Council meeting 
on 13 October 1950, and were detailed in the Protest Note handed to the 
Soviets, as described in Caccia’s 9 November 1950 telegram to Bevin. He 
reported that, when the American Commander of the International District 
attempted to confer immediately with his colleagues about the possible
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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involvement of occupation forces, as he was obligated to do by quadripartite 
agreement, the Soviet Commander refused to attend the meeting or even to 
send a representative. When, on 26 September, the Police President of 
Vienna appealed for reinforcements from the Soviet Sector of town, the 
Russian City Kommandatura refused to allow the police to move. It was on 
the basis of these two actions -  although there were other instances of 
Soviet obstructionism vis-a-vis the police and support for demonstrators -  
that Caccia brought charges against the Soviet Element at a 29 September 
Allied Council meeting.
At this meeting, the British and French representatives demanded that the 
Soviet Representative respond to Western charges that he obstructed the 
police. The Soviet High Commissioner rejected these demands and said ‘the 
indignation of the Austrian toiling population is connected with the 
deterioration of living conditions raised by the imposition of the Marshall Plan 
on the population’. He did not refer to or attempt to explain the evidence at 
hand that his troops had obstructed Austrian police in the performance of 
their duty. The French High Commissioner observed that it was curious that 
ninety nine percent of the ‘indignant’ Austrian demonstrators were employees 
of Soviet-owned factories located in the Russian Zone.87
87 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria , pp. 121-122, citing Allied Council 
Meeting Minutes, 29 September 1950.
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The official Protest Note handed to the Soviets by Britain referred specifically 
to these Allied Council discussions.88 In this Note, the British Government 
accused the USSR of violating Article 3(d) of the Control Agreement, which 
required the Allied Council to ‘assist the Austrian Government in assuming 
full control of affairs in Austria’.89 The Foreign Office, at first, objected to this 
accusation and suggested it be left out of the Note. They wanted to avoid a 
legal argument with the Soviets over interpretation of the Control Agreement. 
Caccia responded to this objection with a strongly worded telegram 
requesting that this particular part of the Note be left in: ‘the purpose of our 
denunciations in the Allied Council has been to prove specifically that it is a 
flagrant violation of the particular standards by which (sic) under the Control 
Agreement they have undertaken to abide in Austria’.90 He went on to argue 
that the Soviets had been at pains to lead the discussion away from a review 
of their obligations under the Control Agreement, and it was exactly Caccia’s 
desire to pin the Soviet Representative down on the precise definition of 
power provided for under the terms of the Control Agreement: ‘the more 
precise the charges are framed, the more difficult is their rebuttal’. The 
Foreign Office cover sheet to this incoming telegram from Vienna contains no 
handwritten comments, other than a note to the effect that it pertains to past 
Foreign Office correspondence on the same subject. The reference to the 
Control Agreement stayed in:
88 Caccia to Kelly (Foreign Office), ‘Disturbances in Austria: Note of Protest to the Soviet 
Government’, 9 November 1950, Telegram no. 1202, (C7229/12/3), FO 465/4, PRO.
89 Ibid., p. 39.
90 Caccia to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 375, 16 November 1950, C7408, FO 371/84925, PRO.
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During these (13 October) discussions the Soviet Representative 
argued that mob violence in the Soviet Zone of Austria was not 
properly the concern of the Allied Council and those actions taken by 
the local Soviet Commander could not be discussed by the Council. 
This view cannot be accepted by His Majesty’s Government in the 
United Kingdom. The Control Agreement for Austria of 28th June, 
1946, states clearly that the Allied Council may and should concern 
itself with any matter relating to the maintenance of law and order, 
and requires that it should support the authority of the Austrian 
Government guaranteed by that agreement.
Although the Soviet Government must be aware of the 
circumstances which gave rise to the statement of their 
representative on the Allied Council, especially since he himself at no 
time denied that they had occurred.91
The Note details how Soviet actions were in breach of the Control 
Agreement. First, the Soviet Commander in Wiener Neustadt obstructed the 
efforts of the Austrian police to restore order, and he instructed the police to 
return a Federal post office to a lawless mob which had seized the building 
illegally and had then been ejected from it by the police. The same Soviet 
Commander ordered the withdrawal of police sent to Wiener Neustadt by 
recognised Austrian authorities with the object of maintaining order and 
protecting life and property from the rioters. In taking these measures, the 
Soviet Commander actually threatened that Soviet armed forces would act 
against Austrian police if they failed to withdraw.
Further, the Note specifies, the Soviet Town Commandant ordered the 
President of the Vienna Police to recall to the Soviet sector all police forces 
employed outside that sector. He also refused to allow the execution of 
orders of dismissal and transfer of Austrian police officials without the 
consent of the Soviet Element of the Inter-Allied Command. Furthermore, the
91 Caccia to Kelly, 9 November 1950, p. 39.
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same Soviet Town Commandant forbad any deployment of police forces 
located in the Soviet sector to any other sector of the City.
These actions by Soviet officials are clearly contrary to the Control 
Agreement, under Article 3(d) of which the Allied Council is required 
to assist the Austrian Government in assuming full control of affairs in 
Austria. Obstruction of the work of the police is patently inconsistent 
with this objective. In particular, the action of the Soviet Commander 
in ordering the surrender of a Government building to a rioting mob is 
contrary to this principle and calls for action by the Allied Council, 
since it involved support of elements of the population who were 
acting against the authority of the Austrian Government and police. 
...Any move to immobilise the police or to create artificial 
geographical boundaries to their authority is in conflict with the duties 
of the signatories as laid down in the agreement. ...In the recent 
events in Vienna the Allied Council had issued no directives and no 
situation existed in which Article 5 could be deemed to apply. In 
these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government can only regard the 
views expressed by the Soviet Commander in Austria at the meeting 
of the Allied Council on 13 October as unjustified and inadmissible.92
The Note objects to certain actions taken by Soviets since the 13 October 
meeting, which ‘derogate further from the authority guaranteed to the 
Austrian Government under the Control Agreement of 1946’. Specifically, 
when the President of the Vienna Police felt compelled to suspend the chiefs 
of the Police Department Commissariats for the 2nd, 4th, 20th, 21st and 25th 
Vienna districts, these officers consulted with the Soviet Commander and 
then refused to obey the President’s orders. This situation persisted, 
according to the Note, and local Soviet authorities ‘have not only prevented 
exercise by the Austrian Government of their clearly established right to carry 
out disciplinary action in respect to their own police but have even gone so 
far as to order the Vienna Police President to withdraw his orders of
92 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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suspension’.93 His Majesty’s Government then invited the Soviets to issue 
appropriate instructions to their subordinates to stop interfering with the 
Austrian police.
There are still today two interpretations of the 1950 strikes. Some describe 
them as an attempt by communists to overthrow the Austrian Government, 
and this indeed was the interpretation the Austrian Government gave at the 
time.94 Here, there are two schools of thought. The first is that Communists 
planned and executed a concerted effort to overthrow the government. The 
second is that the Communists did not pre-plan anything, but attempted to 
exploit the street violence and social chaos to either replace the government 
or at least to increase Communist participation in the coalition government. 
Others describe the incident as a series of communist-inspired strikes, and 
discount the suggestion that there was ever a concerted effort to overthrow 
the government. Labour leader Franz Olah was interviewed on this 
controversy by Austrian television (ORF) in 1986. Did the KPO attempt a 
putsch?
Ich mochte nicht sagen, sie wollten die Volksdemokratie 
durchsetzen. Dali sie die Volksdemokratie nicht einfuhren konnten, 
das war ziemlich klar, wie wollten sie das in einem Land, das vierfach 
besetzt war! Aber was sie bezweckten war, durch den Druck aus der 
sowjetischen Besatzungszone, wo ja der entscheidene Teil der 
Bevolkerung lebte und auch ein entscheidener Teil der Industrie, der 
Wirtschaft und der Verwaltung war, wieder Einflufi zu bekommen, 
auch auf die Bundesregierung, auf diesem Weg die Ruckkehr in die
93 Ibid., p. 40.
94 According to British historian Jill Lewis, in a nine-hour debate in the Austrian Parliament, on 12 
October 1950, ‘government politicians repeated the putsch allegations time and again’. Lewis, 'Austria 
1950: Strikes, 'Putsch' and Their Political Context', p. 543.
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Positionen zu erzwingen, die sie durch Wahlen verloren hatten. Auch 
in den Gewerkschaften wieder mehr Einflud zu bekommen durch 
diesen sogennanten Streik und die Betriebsetzung. Das was ihr 
Ziel.95
There is also disagreement on the role the Soviet occupation forces played. 
Those who may be inclined to minimise the importance of direct Soviet 
support for the rioters, and who discount reporting by British and American 
officials from Vienna confirming this support, might benefit from reading the 
reporting from Austrian police precincts during the two periods of violent 
strikes. The Austrian national archives [Osterreichische Staatsarchiv, Archiv 
der Republik (AdR)], have voluminous files containing copies of reports from 
police field stations throughout Austria, confirming official Soviet intervention. 
These were not politically motivated reports, but rather minute-by-minute, eye 
witness, factual reporting by trained observers, based on what individual 
policemen were actually seeing in various parts of the country. One such 
report - labelled ‘dringende Lagemeldung’ (urgent situation report) - informed 
headquarters that:
Der Russische stadtkommandant von st. valentin hat dem 
gendarmerieposten st. valentin soeben folgenden ... auftrag erteilt: 
der posten hat sorge zu tragen, das die besatzungsmacht nicht 
beschimpft wird, eventuelle demonstrationen geben die 
besatzungsmacht verhindern.
Die gendarmerie darf am 4.10.1950 gegen die demonstranten nicht 
einschreiten.
die bundesstrasse ist frei zu halten, eine patouille ist dahin abgehend 
zu machen.-
samtliche gendarmeriebeamten haben in ihrem postenrayone zu 
verbleiben, zuteilungen von anderen posten (zur sicherungdes
95 Portisch, Der Lange Weg zur Freiheit p. 436.
umspannwerkes ersthofen und das kraftwerkes muhlrading) sind 
sofort aufzuheben.-
alle vorkommnisse sind am 4.10.1950 der kommandantur zu 
melden.96
Another report described the use of Soviet trucks to transport demonstrators 
to Vienna: 'Nebenbei wurden auch noch mit zahlreichen Kraftfahrzeugen, 
von denen viele aus USIA-Betrieben stammten und sowjetrussische 
Kennzeichen trugen, demonstrierende Arbeiter in die Innere Stadt 
befordert’,97 Other reports in the same files actually described the license 
plate numbers of trucks with Soviet markings used to transport 
demonstrators to Vienna’s 1st District.
Perhaps the most bizarre interpretation of the events of September/October 
1950 is that by Austrian historian Bischof, who suggests that the strikes 
‘came to the rescue of the stalled American plans for the rearmament of 
Western Austria’.98 Bischof speculates, in his 1999 abbreviated history of the 
occupation period, that the Western powers would have been willing to 
provide direct military support for the Austrian police during these violent 
demonstrations of September/October 1950. He implies that the West was 
prepared to commit military forces to suppress the strike. US High 
Commissioner Keyes had refused the Austrian Government’s request for 
Western military assistance no less than three times, for reasons which have
96 Telex from Amstetten police to police Generaldirektion, Vienna, number 1786, 3 October 1950, 
Bmfl, Z134939-2/50, AdR.
97 Excerpt from a Vienna Police Headquarters report entitled, ‘Vorfalle anlasslich des 4. Lohn-Preis 
Abkommens’, 26 September 1950, Bmfl, Z-132012-2/50, p .l., AdR.
98 Gunter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage o f  the Weak (New York:
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), p. 120.
already been described. By this time, there was enough hard evidence of 
direct Soviet involvement in the demonstrations to cause serious concern in 
the Western camp. It was reasonable to assume that Soviet troops would not 
hesitate to confront Western forces the moment these were committed on the 
streets.
There is little reason to believe that British and American military forces 
would ever have been committed on an adventure that would have been, by 
any interpretation, a suicide mission. Besides, the prospect of Anglo- 
American troops exchanging fire with vastly superior Soviet military forces on 
the streets of Vienna could not have been a pleasant one for either side. It is 
more reasonable to conclude that Western military forces would not have 
been dispatched to shore up Austrian police under any circumstances, even 
if Keyes and his British counterpart predicted a Communist take-over. More 
likely, the West would have avoided direct intervention and then attempted to 
deal with a new Austrian Government to the extent this was possible. It is not 
speculation but rather fact that the West did not command a military 
capability adequate to dictate the outcome of the situation in September and 
October 1950 on Vienna’s streets. It is also a fact that, whereas they 
probably found the prospect unpleasant, the Western Powers knew they 
could not defend Vienna or even their own occupation zones in the face of a 
resolved Soviet military offensive. Western contingency planning called for 
the rapid abandonment of Austria and strategic withdrawal to Italy.
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In the mid-1980s, an Austrian Television (ORF) crew, completing what turned 
out to be an authoritative history of the occupation period, produced some 
very interesting and provocative information. Headed by a respected 
journalist, Hugo Portisch, the team claimed to have interviewed a number of 
individuals who actually participated in planning and other deliberations at the 
highest levels of the KPO, and also in discussions between the KPO and the 
Soviet High Command, during the period of the strikes. None of those 
interviewed agreed to be identified or to have their comments recorded, and 
so the only lasting record of these reports is to be found in reporting on the 
tapes of the resulting documentary, ‘Osterreich II,’ and in volume II of the 
book that was published, based on the television documentary. Nonetheless, 
the Portisch reports are worthy of mention.
According to the Portisch interviews, the Communist Party leadership was, 
itself, surprised by the strength of the street demonstrations and the speed 
with which they escalated." Lengthy deliberations were held on how the 
Party might exploit the violence to its advantage. There was an opinion that 
the Party should take advantage of the leverage the demonstrations had 
created to demand the admission of one or more ministers into the Cabinet, 
and also more Communists in the leadership ranks of the Trade Union 
Federation (OGB). Before these initiatives could be taken, however, the First 
Secretary of the KPO, Friedl Furnberg, emerged from meetings with the 
Soviet High Command to report that the Soviets were upset over the 
disruptions being caused by the strikes. According to Furnberg, the Soviet
99 Hugo Portisch, Die Wiedergeburt Unseres Staates (Vienna: Verlag Kremayr &  Scheriau, 1985)., p. 
420.
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USIA network of production facilities was being adversely affected to the 
extent that production targets to which management was committed would 
not be met, and this could get a lot of people into trouble.100 Members of the 
Central Committee (most prominently Ernst Fischer and Franz Honner) 
argued that, whereas it was usually politic for the Austrian Communists to 
bow to the desires of their Soviet comrades, this strike presented a unique 
situation in which just the opposite should happen. Soviet interests should 
give way, so that the KPO could exploit the situation. Honner and Fischer 
saw this as a real, rather than concocted workers’ movement, and there were 
huge opportunities for the KPO, as well as for Communism in general. 
Furnberg brought all such argument to an abrupt stop, however, by repeating 
the Soviet position that they had their hands full with Korea and could not 
take the risk of generating a major confrontation with the West in Austria -  at 
least for the time being: ‘Moskau hat mit Korea schon genug Sorgen’.101 The 
KPO would have to tremble and obey. Party Chairman Koplenig argued that 
the only way for the KPO to proceed was to broaden support for the strikes -  
seek coalition partners so that the KPO was not seen as the sole instigator. 
This is, then, what led to the end of the first wave of strikes and to the Shop 
Stewards meeting of 3 October.
The Portisch presentation includes information from one source who reported 
that there were strong differences among the Soviet occupation leadership, 
as well, with some ideologs urging swift action to exploit the present
100 Ibid., p. 421.
101 Ibid.
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instability, and some realists who were not prepared to provoke the West too 
far. There were also those who were concerned about Moscow’s reaction to 
local under-achievement in the USIA production facilities.102
Sturmthal, in his 1982 contribution to Austria Solution, agrees that ‘the vast 
majority of observers at the time were convinced that this (a Communist 
coup) was the ultimate aim of the CP (Communist Party), or at least this was 
what they asserted’.103 He cautions that it would be difficult to believe that 
intelligent KPO leaders would have really thought that a party with around 
five percent support among the Austrian population could have formed a 
viable government. The most the Communists could have hoped for was a 
strong Soviet intervention, but here he concludes that: ‘what seems clear is 
the contempt in which the Austrian Party was held by its Soviet protectors’.104 
Caccia’s view was that the strikes were not the result of a pre-planned 
putsch: ‘insofar as the Communists have plans for overthrowing the Austrian 
Government by a putsch, they do not seem at any stage to have committed 
themselves, either between 26th and 28th September or between 4th and 5th 
October, to an all-out effort’.105 American reporting from Vienna to the State 
Department at the time also concluded that the KPO had not attempted a 
putsch:
102 Ibid., p. 422.
103 Adolf Sturmthal, 'The Strikes of 1950,' in: Bauer, Austria Solution (Charlottesville: The University 
Press of Virginia, 1982), p. 73.
104 Ibid., p. 74.
105 Caccia to Bevin, Telegram 154, 27 October 1950, C 6869/12/3, FO 465/4, Document 15, p. 34, 
PRO.
As to Communist action, it should be emphasized that they could not 
have achieved measure of success attained without Soviet 
assistance. Nature of action, however, lends weight to recent 
Intelligence report that Central Committee of Party had decided 
concentrate on economic issues, where government is, of course, 
most vulnerable. ... [I]t does not appear this Communist strategy, 
even if confirmed, would pose threat beyond capabilities of Trade 
Unionists to control, unless Soviets have in effect taken over 
management of program themselves and are to continue overt 
instigation and support so apparent in past week.106
Portisch provides verbal testimony that Moscow intervened directly to defuse 
the Austrian strikes. Moscow wanted no new crises in Central Europe. There 
was to be no confrontation with the West. There was to be no hostile action 
taken against the Austrian Government. Instead, Portisch alleges, the 
Kremlin ordered Soviet High Command in Austria to restore calm and 
security to the overall situation. Local Russian authorities were also to do 
what was possible to ensure the local Communists did not lose face as a 
result of the strikes, and shift concentration back to the productivity of USIA 
factories.
There is no way under existing circumstances to confirm or deny Portisch’s 
reports. But, if accurate, they would explain why Western observers saw the 
Soviets vacillate between support of the demonstrators on one hand, and 
surprising caution on the other. Whether or not the industrial disruptions of 
September and October 1950 represented a planned coup etat, as Figl and 
his Cabinet said they did, it is fairly certain that the KPO could have 
overthrown the government, had the Soviets acted more aggressively. The 
answer as to why they didn’t must await access to protected information in
106 Dowling to Secretary of State, Vienna Embassy telegram No 583, 1 October 1950 , RG 59 (1950- 
1954), 863.062/10-150, p. 2, NARAII.
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Moscow. More broadly, one hopes that information currently in closed Soviet 
archives will help to explain why, on several other occasions, Moscow did not 
employ their military superiority on the ground in Austria to further the 
Communist cause.
Muhri’s opinion on the motivation behind the strikes should probably be taken 
seriously: W ar der Oktoberstreik ein “kommunistischer Putschversuch“ mit 
dem weiteren Ziel einer Machtergreifung und Errichtung einer 
Volksdemokratie? Ich meine, nach sorgfaltiger Abwagung aller Fur und 
Wider, nein’. '07
Whatever the motives behind the incident, it occurred at a very dangerous 
stage in the Cold War. It pitted Austrian police against violent demonstrators, 
and the incident almost triggered an armed confrontation between Soviet and 
Western military personnel. The incidents also created, in the opinion of 
Britain’s Foreign Office, a direct threat to Austria’s future as a democratic 
society, as was pointed out by Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison who, 
while visiting Vienna on 23 May 1951, observed that if the Austrian 
Government and people, especially the trade unions, had not manfully 
resisted the Communist general strike attempt, they might have lost their 
liberties within a few weeks.108
107 Muhri, Am Beginn des Kalten Krieges', p. 198.
108 New York Times, 23 May 1951.
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T r a n s it io n
On 4 January 1952, Sir Harold Caccia dispatched his annual report on 
political developments in Austria for the year 1951 to Anthony Eden.109 
Caccia reported that 1951 was a relatively quiet year, certainly in comparison 
with 1950. Austria had survived yet another year of occupation, ‘physically 
and on the whole morally, in tact’ (sic).110 Unfortunately, Austria’s 
independence was no closer. Indeed, 1951 saw less progress in the 
direction of a treaty than past years. Relations between the Four Powers had 
become, if anything, more tense, and the meetings between the Foreign 
Ministers’ Deputies in Paris (March -  June 1951) served only to ‘emphasise 
Austria’s role as a pawn in the Soviet Union’s European strategy, with little 
hope of its problems being settled’.111 There were no important changes in 
Austria’s relationships with the rest of the world except perhaps for gradual 
progress in her relations with Yugoslavia.
The global ideological contest affected Austria in some new ways. Vienna 
had been designated as the headquarters site for the World Federation of 
Trade Unions and a number of other Communist activities, including a 
meeting of the World Peace Council. At the time of Caccia’s report, rumour 
had it that the Cominform was to be added to the number of ‘unwelcome 
guests’ in Austria under Soviet protection. Caccia observed that it had
109 Caccia to Eden, British Embassy Vienna, 'Austria: Annual Review for 1951,' 4 January 1952, FO
371/98038(CA1011/1), Note that the Foreign Office cover sheet attached to this document, carried 
the handwritten note that it was to be included in the 1952 CONFIDENTIAL PRINT collection. (FO 
465/6).
1,0 Ibid., p. 1.
111 Ibid.
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become obvious that Vienna was growing in stature as one of the more 
attractive ‘neutral forums from which to preach Communist internationalism’. 
The inability of coalition partners to agree on a successor to Dr Renner, who 
had died at the end of 1950, forced a national election, the result of which 
was a Socialist victory and a black eye for the OVP. The British Embassy’s 
analysis of this election showed that Austria had returned to its pre-war 
voting patterns, with an extreme Right Wing poll of about fifteen percent, an 
increase of four percent since 1949, gained at the expense of the OVP. 
Communist support in the second, or run-off election guaranteed the victory 
of Socialist Dr Theodore Korner to succeed Renner. According to Caccia, the 
threat to the OVP Right had been strengthened by the defection of one 
reformist group which sought to create a stronger Right Wing to the party in 
collaboration with the Union of Independents (VdU). Revealing both his sharp 
wit and disdain for the country’s political elite, Caccia observed:
These ominous lessons were not lost on the rank and file of the 
People’s Party, whose first inclination was to look for scapegoats. 
They were found in their own leaders, in particular the Chancellor, 
who was also party chairman. Acrimonious debates ended in an 
interim adjustment which solved nothing.112
Julius Raab was made acting Chairman of the party, replacing Felix Hurdes, 
the former Minister of Education. Raab, who was to lead Austria into 
independence in May of 1955, set about instilling a new sense of party 
discipline. The separation of administrative from political responsibility within 
the OVP did, however, cause difficulties within the coalition government.
112 Ibid.
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Socialists complained that decisions and promises made by former OVP 
ministers were no longer valid and were vulnerable to change. The election 
drubbing did nothing to enhance the OVP’s standing in the public arena, 
where there had been rumours for at least six months predicting the downfall 
of some OVP leaders. To make matters worse, the party’s rank and file, 
particularly the provincial leaders, chose that particular time to press for 
tougher positions by their leaders in government. The political ‘malaise’ was, 
in Caccia’s view, aggravated by ‘continuous economic difficulties and the 
cramps of old age from which the coalition of Austrian political parties, now 
entering its seventh year, is inevitably beginning to suffer’.113 Still, there were 
no signs that Austria’s coalition government was about to collapse, even if 
that coalition had become noticeably less efficient, and Caccia predicted that 
there would probably be no drastic changes of government personalities 
during the immediate future.
During the second half of the year 1951, the West’s steady progress in 
strengthening Austria’s security forces became an increasingly attractive 
target of Soviet and other Communist propaganda. The local security scene 
was, however, relatively calm, with no major strikes or demonstrations. 
Soviet kidnappings, ‘of course’, continued to occur throughout the year, and 
the ever-present threat of Soviet reprisals against Austrians who offended 
them continued to hang over government officials at all levels, such realities 
being ‘inseparable from Soviet occupation’.114 Still, the Soviet occupation
1,3 Ibid.
114 Ibid., p. 2.
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establishment did not make any overt attempt to destroy the authority of the 
Austrian Government, and, other than the occasional kidnapping, Caccia 
knew of no particularly notable effort to intimidate Austrian residents in the 
Russian Zone.
The new Soviet ‘peace’ campaign became more intense. A favourite target 
was the Western program designed to strengthen Austria’s internal security 
through a gradual build-up of police and gendarmerie. Allegations against 
the Western Powers in the Allied Council and in the Communist press about 
alleged remilitarisation of the Western zones of occupation were ‘ initiated on 
a big scale in September (1951) and rose in crescendo until the beginning of 
November’, when the World Peace Council was presented with a major 
paper on the subject by the ‘local partisans of peace’. The rearmament 
issues were debated during heated sessions of the Allied Council, but the 
Russians steadfastly failed to follow through with their demands for a Four 
Power investigation into the allegedly illegal rearmament activities by the 
West. Caccia offers no explanation of this Soviet behaviour, but concludes 
this part of his report by saying the Russians seemed to be diminishing the 
intensity of their interest in this particular campaign. Perhaps they had, by 
this time, come to the realisation that the rearmament was in progress and 
they could do little to stop it. For whatever reason, the Soviets seemed to 
have shifted into a lower gear. Nonetheless, Soviet occupation authorities 
continued to inspire alarm and despondence, with the obvious objective of 
frightening Austrians away from their apparent Western allegiance.115
115 Ibid., p. 2.
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Caccia introduced an issue that was to become increasingly pertinent, right 
up to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May of 1955: ‘what “unity” is 
to Germany “full sovereignty and independence” is to Austria. The price 
being asked for both is “neutrality”’. The Communists in Austria had held 
their Party Congress in 1951 concurrently with a meeting of the World Peace 
Council, and they passed a resolution that an Austrian government of any 
complexion would be acceptable to the KPO only if it remained ‘neutral1.
Caccia reminded Eden that this neutrality theme, while featuring prominently 
in 1951 and 1952 Communist propaganda, was not new. For years, the 
Communists and crypto-Communists had been harping on the necessity for 
any independent Austrian Government to be neutral: ‘but it does look like as 
if it is henceforth to occupy a more central position in Communist propaganda 
and to be tied more explicitly to the question of the treaty’.116 It was Caccia’s 
view that the broad concept of neutrality appealed to the average Austrian, 
but this did not mean the average Austrian was inclined to ‘fall for it any more 
than for other Communist blandishments’. By this, he presumably meant the 
Soviets would not succeed in luring the Austrian public toward Communism, 
simply by holding out the prospect of a treaty in return for a pledge of 
neutrality. Caccia continued: ‘Communism has accomplished very little, as a 
political party virtually nothing’.117
116 Ibid., p. 3.
1,7 Ib id , p. 3.
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According to Caccia, the Western Powers were able to do very little during 
1951 to respond to Austrian exasperation with the continuing occupation. No 
progress was made toward a treaty, and the increase in the cost of living 
resulting from the Fourth Wage & Price Agreement had caused them to 
request increased funds to cover the costs of occupation. Indeed, occupation 
costs had become quite an issue, being a material symbol of foreign 
domination. Caccia predicted that demands would increase for a halt to 
occupation costs, as indeed they eventually did. For that matter, all parties 
were getting sick of the occupation and of the total stalemate in the many 
efforts to bring it to an end. Even the Russians were tiring of the occupation 
and showing signs of frustration over the obvious fact that no strategy had 
succeeded in breaking through the logjam. Apparently, the Soviet Political 
Representative had said as much to Caccia before he left for Moscow. The 
main problem was, Caccia reported, the same ground had been raked over 
so often and by so many of the same people, and nobody had been able to 
find any way to generate progress.
Without prejudicing the interests of one side or the other ... there is 
practically nothing left to be done except recriminate or to air views 
for propaganda purposes. ... Thus week after week during the year 
under review the position of virtual deadlock was examined and re­
examined to preserve the illusion that Vienna is the only city in the 
world where Allied administration still works.118
The substantive part of Caccia’s 1951 report concluded with a summary of 
economic affairs in Austria, and here Caccia once again revealed what 
seemed to be a typical British disdain for the country’s leaders and their
118 Ib id , p. 3.
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ability to conduct the affairs of state. This represents a consistent line in 
British reporting on Austria since at least the end of WW I. British officials in 
the foreign policy chain of command frequently found it difficult to formulate 
reports without calling attention to what they regarded as some of the more 
unfortunate traits inherent in the Austrian character. Austria was the only 
OEEC member state that did not have to spend anything on defence or 
rearmament. Yet in 1951, Austria suffered the worst record of any OEEC 
member state on inflation. A surplus of money, rising wages and prices, 
rumours of devaluation and a deteriorating balance of payments had been 
‘symptoms of an Austrian economy which had been present since the end of 
1950’. Until they finally took steps to increase the bank rate and restrict 
credit, the Government dithered with ‘half-hearted expedients which have left 
the main problem more or less untouched’.119
The failings to which the Managing Board of E.P.U. drew attention in 
its report of 8th November are not new. Dual exchange rates, foreign 
exchange retention quotas, inefficient (and often politically tainted) 
control of imports and exports, inflated Government expenditure, too 
loose domestic credit, lack of internal competitive stimulus: all these 
things that reflect the failure of the Government to substitute for the 
tangle of expedients, left behind by successive crises, a real policy 
designed as a cure for the disease rather than as a palliative for the 
symptoms, are familiar problems with which the E.C.A. administration 
have wrestled for years. The shock caused by their reinstatement in 
the O.E.E.C. report is in itself sufficient proof of the past lack of 
realism shown by the Austrian Government.120
Caccia admitted that the Government’s excuses for its failures in 
management were not all frivolous. The desire to pre-empt Communist
119 ibid..
120 ibid..
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propaganda blasts and the weaknesses inherent in any coalition government 
added considerably to Austrian difficulties, ‘but whatever reasons may be 
adduced for the Government’s lack of courage, its effects have now become 
too obvious to be ignored’.121 Caccia pointed out that both Britain and the 
United States had pressed Austria’s ‘special case’ as far as possible in the 
world, but if her viability as an independent state remained a goal at some 
point in the future, then there was no reason why inflation should be allowed 
to go forward unchecked, or that progress toward self-sufficiency should not 
proceed faster. Both coalition partners paid lip service to the need for bold 
action, but each seemed to be waiting for the other to take it. Socialists 
seemed to be waiting for the People’s Party to reconcile conflicting interests 
of farmers, businessmen and the country as a whole, as a preliminary to any 
discussion of future policy or of ways to promote a healthier degree of 
competitive efficiency.
Caccia concluded his report by comparing the state of affairs in Austria with 
that in other countries, and opined that the Government should have been 
‘relatively uninhibited in doing its duty’. The need for a viable, long term 
economic policy was more than evident, and formulating this should have 
been the goal for both members of the coalition, as the fate of Austria 
depended in large measure on their zeal and courage in finding that policy.
121 Ibid., p. 4.
T he E ff e c t  o f  t h e  Fa il u r e  t o  C o n c l u d e  a  T r e a ty
On 24 May 1951, the Foreign Office’s Research Department distributed a 
report describing Foreign Office views on how the failure to conclude a treaty 
was affecting Austria.
This was really the first comprehensive stock-taking of treaty issues since 
June 1950, when the West capitulated to virtually all Soviet economic 
demands. Acting on Bevin’s convictions that such generosity would result in 
Soviet agreement on a treaty, the three Western Deputies granted to the 
Soviets sixty percent of oil extraction and prospecting areas in Austria, oil 
refineries with a total annual production capability of 420,000 tons, all of the 
assets of the Danube Shipping Company (including those located in 
Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria), and a lump sum payment of $150 million, 
payable over a period of six years in lieu of other so-called German assets 
held by the Russians in Eastern Austria. Moscow withdrew its support for 
Yugoslav territorial demands in British-occupied Carinthia and Styria. At that 
point in time, agreement had been reached on all but four articles in the draft 
treaty.122
To the Foreign Office, none of these four articles was especially important. 
Agreement on all of them should not have been difficult, given good will on 
both sides. Beginning in late 1949, however, signs of such good will were few 
and far between, and ‘it became increasingly clear that the Soviet
122 These were: Article 16, pertaining to displaced persons and refugees; Article 27, pertaining to the 
prevention of German rearmament; Article 42(9), regarding compensation to Russia for certain 
properties; and Article 48, which had to do with the servicing of certain pre-AnschluR loans.
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Government was not interested in concluding an Austrian treaty in isolation 
from other international questions at issue between itself and the Western 
Powers’.123 An end to the occupation of Austria, the Foreign Office 
recognised, would not only mean the departure of Soviet troops from Austria, 
itself, but also, in conformity with the Balkan peace treaties, from Hungary 
and Rumania, where Russian forces were allowed to remain for the 
expressed purpose of maintaining supply and communications routes to 
Soviet occupation forces in Austria.
Accordingly, one pretext after another was used by Soviet delegates to delay 
the conclusion of the treaty. First the need for bilateral negotiations with the 
Austrians over Article 48(b) was adduced as a reason for postponing the 
settlement of the other outstanding articles. Later it was claimed that the 
Austrian Government had failed to comply with the Allied Council’s decisions 
on denazification and demilitarisation, thus making necessary an amendment 
to Article 9, which had already been agreed. And, since May 1950, Moscow 
made a point of obstructing any further discussion of the Austrian Treaty by 
demanding prior settlement of Trieste, which, Moscow alleged, had been 
turned into an Anglo-American military base in violation of the clauses of the 
Italian Peace Treaty.124
123 Research Department, Foreign Office London, 'The Effect on Austria of the Failure to Conclude a 
Treaty,' 24 May 1951, FO 371/93603, CA 107, PRO, p. 1.
124 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
The study concluded that no Austrian Treaty would emerge unless it fitted 
into some broader international agreement between the West and East. 
What, then, were the consequences of this stalemate for Austria?
First of all, the continuing uncertainty about the country’s future had, the 
study suggested, kept Austria’s political life in a state of suspended 
animation. Despite a number of Western initiatives -  appointing civilian high 
commissioners, combining the post with that of Minister, reducing on the 
ground staffs, releasing requisitioned property, and so forth -  Four Power 
occupation of Austria would continue ‘for as long as the Russians are 
determined to remain in Austria’.
Among the negative effects of the ongoing occupation on Austria, was the 
continuing blow to the prestige of government and parliament of having the 
sovereign power rest in foreign hands, requiring every law and piece of 
government legislation to be submitted to the Allied Council for approval. Mail 
censorship was continuing, newspapers could be suspended, no new 
political parties could be formed without Allied Council approval, radio 
stations had to carry propaganda messages, and the lack of quadripartite 
consent meant that the police could not be appropriately equipped to manage 
strikes and other forms of potentially dangerous street violence. In general, 
the very existence of the occupation carried with it a suppressive 
atmosphere.
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A new level of absurdity had recently been achieved when a request from the 
Director General of the Austrian Post and Telegraph Administration for 
permission to operate a remote-controlled ship model exhibit at the Vienna 
Spring Fair was solemnly considered first by a Quadripartite Signals 
Committee, then by the Executive Committee, and the fair was already over 
while the committees were trying to overcome Soviet objection.125
In this paper, one senses the frustrations of not only those British diplomats 
in the field, and not even just those in policy positions in the Foreign Office, 
but also among the research staff that was responsible for completing what 
were essentially academic exercises, removed from any chain of command 
or negotiating process. While the Western Allies acted on the principle that 
they should interfere with the Austrians only when absolutely necessary, as 
infrequently as possible, and would gladly do away with censorship and other 
restrictions, ‘unfortunately, the Soviet attitude is exactly the opposite. ... The 
Soviet element misses no opportunity of attempting to control, and if possible 
discredit, the actions of the Austrian Government’. The Soviets were inclined 
to use every small legal foothold as justification for such interference, 
harkening back to ‘long-outmoded’ decisions taken in the Allied Council 
during the first months of the occupation.
Significantly, for the first time in Austria’s history, a general, national election 
had to be held to choose the new Federal President because the fear of 
Soviet disapproval was so intimidating that Parliament declined pass a
125 Ibid., p.2
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constitutional law allowing the election to be held in the two Houses of 
Parliament. Here, the Research Department paper reminded the reader that, 
as a result of the Second Control Agreement, Allied Council approval was 
required before any law could be passed altering the constitution. Ordinary 
laws took effect after thirty one days unless the Allied Council vetoed them. 
The practical result of this ruling for some time past has been that the three 
Western elements never join the Soviet element in vetoing an ordinary law, 
while the Soviet element never joins the others in approving a constitutional 
law’.126
The Research Department study reported that, aside from the annoying 
administrative requirements, the total cost of the occupation of Austria was 
high. For the years 1949, 1950 and 1951, occupation costs accounted for 
7.27 percent, 4.67 percent and 4.45 percent of the total Austrian budget, 
respectively. While the US element had, for some years, waived its right to 
occupation costs, the Soviet element ‘took more than its allotted share by the 
simple device of demanding services and requisitioning property without 
issuing receipts which may be set against its occupation cost account’. The 
paper concluded that the most onerous and ‘dangerous’ effect of the 
extended occupation was the extent to which Soviet authorities were able to 
‘undermine the economic life of the country and the control of the 
government over its own administrative and executive forces’. In support of 
this statement, the paper mentioned past Research Department reports on 
the disruptive effects on Austria’s economy of the way the Soviets were
126 Ibid..
administering the oil and shipping industries in Eastern Austria on an extra­
territorial basis. The products from these concerns were being withheld from 
the Austrian economy, and Russian managers ignored customs duties and 
taxes. This Soviet behaviour also created an opportunity for a serious leak of 
strategic materials through the Iron Curtain, and, conversely, created fertile 
ground for a thriving black market. It was easy to smuggle consumer goods 
into Austria from Eastern Europe, like cigarettes and clothing, which were 
then sold at cut-rate prices by Soviet-run establishments. The losses to both 
individual traders and Austrian national revenue were considerable. Soviet 
industrial concerns, the USIA network of companies, were also convenient 
bases for Communist anti-government activities. Whereas not all USIA 
employees were Communists, the USIA organisations did attract a higher 
percentage of Communists. Therefore, when the KPO wanted to organise 
one or another form of societal disruption, the USIA facilities were convenient 
starting points. The report referred to the number of USIA personnel and 
trucks used to ferry demonstrators from the Soviet Zone to Vienna during the 
September and October violent strikes of the previous year.
On this same topic, the Research Department observed that, when the 
Communists tried to ‘plunge the country into serious industrial unrest’, Soviet 
attitudes toward the Austrian police were demonstrated most clearly. During 
the first months of the occupation, when the Soviets were in sole control of 
Vienna and the police force was totally disrupted, large numbers of 
Communists were salted throughout police ranks, and in fact the Minister of 
Interior was, himself, a Communist. Despite Government efforts in the
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meanwhile to cleanse the police of Communists, this had proven very difficult 
in the Russian Zone where the Soviets called the shots on everything. All 
‘attempts to build up an adequate and efficient police force met with most 
determined resistance in the quadripartite committees’. So, when the 
Government called on the police to manage the 1950 demonstrations, some 
simply failed to perform their duty, while others were deliberately obstructed 
by Soviet authorities:
The public malaise and nervousness engendered by such Soviet 
interference with the executive, intervention in the courts, abduction 
of administrative officials, etc. is one of the worst by-products of the 
occupation. The Austrians feel that, left to themselves, they can deal 
with their own Communists, who never manage to gain more than 5 
percent of the votes in general elections. It is the protection afforded 
by their Soviet masters which complicates matters.127
The Research Department concluded the 14 May study with the observation 
that the continuing occupation had two advantages for the UK. First, it 
allowed the Western Allies to ‘hold the ring against Soviet pressure to which 
Austria’s geographical position would undoubtedly expose her’. Second, the 
presence in Austria of a common enemy was forcing the Socialists and 
People’s Party to get along with each other and work together.
The long experience of coalition government is to a great extent 
eradicating the violent and irreconcilable extremes of political thought 
which made any real democracy in Austria impossible between the 
wars. And if the Austrian parliament chafes at the leading strings 
which the occupation imposes it presents now a considerably more 
dignified appearance than in the riotous days of the late twenties and 
thirties, when insults and inkpots were hurled across the chamber 
with equal abandon.128
127 Ibid., p.3.
128 Ibid., p. 4.
1952 -  N e w  In it ia t iv e s  a n d  T he  A b b r e v ia te d  T r e a ty
1952 marked yet another year during which no progress was achieved on an 
Austrian State Treaty. Gunter Bischof reports that, by this time, Britain was 
the only occupying Power that sincerely wanted an Austrian treaty, but he is 
wrong. Fortunately, he does himself a favour by not attempting to justify this 
observation.129 It would have been more accurate had he said that Britain 
couldn’t afford to remain in Austria and was prepared pay the Soviet Union 
whatever they asked, just to get out. The United States certainly wanted a 
treaty, but not at any cost. Washington was, from the beginning of the 
occupation, dedicated to seeing a fully sovereign and independent Austrian 
state. Had any doubts existed about this objective, these would have been 
wiped away in 1949 when the President of the United States signed the 
policy paper ordering that an Austrian State Treaty be signed as soon as 
possible. Still, Bischofs is an interesting suggestion, given that it was the 
United States and the Austrian Government who were the only parties to 
introduce new initiatives in attempts to break the treaty negotiations logjam. 
The United States introduced the idea of a shortened, or abbreviated, treaty, 
and, after informing the Western Allies of their intentions, the Austrian 
Government approached the United Nations in a unilateral plea for help.
Sir Harold Caccia’s report to Anthony Eden on political events, together with 
other Foreign Office documents included in the 1952 Confidential Print
129 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War , p. 124. ‘Ever since 1948, the British had been the only 
power interested in concluding an Austrian treaty.’
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collection, provides valuable guidelines on what Britain’s policy makers 
considered to be the most important issues of 1952.130 This collection of 
twenty three archival documents was declassified only in January 2003, and 
was therefore particularly helpful to research leading to this thesis.131
The year began with the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Washington where he 
held discussions with a variety of senior American officials. In February, the 
three Western Foreign Ministers met in Lisbon and agreed to forward a 
proposal for an abbreviated treaty to Moscow. The termination of activities by 
the International Refugee Organisation left some 357,000 displaced persons 
in Austria, creating a humanitarian crisis, which had to be dealt with by the 
occupying forces. Mr Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations 
visited Austria in July, thereby contributing to the international prestige of the 
Austrian Government, which nonetheless failed to reach agreement on the 
annual budget, in October, and the Coalition Government was forced to 
resign. The British High Commissioner gave advice to Austria’s Foreign 
Minister during these confusing days, and this discourse is reported by 
Caccia to the Foreign Office. The holding of the Austrian Catholic Congress 
created cause for another report to London from the British High 
Commissioner, as did the matter of occupation costs and the formation of a 
new political party with Nazi and German nationalist overtones. But by far the 
most important issues surrounded the abbreviated treaty initiative and 
Austria’s appeal to the United Nations.
130 British Embassy Vienna, 'Review of Political Events in Austria for the Year 1952,' 1 January
1953, FO 371/10378, Telegram 1, CA 1011/1/53,
131 FO 465/6, PRO.
In July 1952, Caccia told Eden that: ‘as long as the Occupation lasts, Austria 
will be threatened with economic crisis and kept alive only by United States 
aid and a stolid, unexciting coalition government’.132 In the opening 
paragraphs of his despatch summarising key political developments for 1952, 
Caccia observed that Austria had lived through yet another year of 
occupation with no significant change in her circumstances. The country’s 
coalition government was showing the strains of the continuing occupation 
and lack of progress toward a treaty. With a national election scheduled for 
the next year (1953), and a growing sense of unrest and dissatisfaction 
among the Austrian people, the Austrian Government decided to appeal to 
world opinion through the United Nations, hoping that this would serve to 
increase pressure on the Soviet Union to end the occupation and grant 
Austria her freedom. This initiative was, according to Caccia, the main 
development in Austrian foreign policy during 1952. He attributed the idea to 
Foreign Minister Gruber, who thought it might be a good way to ‘earn a 
reputation for activity’. British reaction to Gruber’s U.N initiative is perhaps 
best reflected by Eden’s statement to Chancellor Leopold Figl: ‘I said I 
doubted whether anything would be achieved by this’.133 On 1 January 1953, 
Caccia assured Eden that: ‘no sane person in Austria thought that the ending
132 British Embassy Vienna, 'Political Situation in Austria: Situation and Prospects of the Independent 
"Right-wing" Parties.,' 29 July 1952, FO 465/6,
133 Foreign Office London, 'Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Austrian Chancellor', 
8 May 1952, FO 465/6, PRO, p. 16.
of the occupation had been brought any nearer by this event [referring to 
U.N. support for Austria])’.134
The final draft of an abbreviated treaty was circulated among the Western 
Allies on 11 March 1952, and sent by the British Government to the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 March 1952.135 Initially, the Foreign Office 
was not impressed by either the suggestion for an abbreviated treaty or the 
way in which the Department of State planned to introduce it to Moscow. In a 
telegram from Washington, Sir Oliver Franks felt compelled to assure a 
sceptical Foreign Office that the American side, in planning for the short 
treaty exercise, was sure that the proposal was a ‘practical one designed to 
obtain a treaty on the best possible terms’.136 But the British in Washington 
were still dubious, and felt that the Americans had not yet made a convincing 
case for believing that the proposal would induce the Russians to modify their 
stance. The British Embassy felt there should be a longer build-up to the 
introduction of a short treaty. There is a handwritten comment on the Foreign 
Office cover sheet to this telegram, cautioning: ‘Sir Harold Caccia should 
perhaps be warned that we have not yet decided our attitude to the 
abbreviated treaty and do not wish to be committed in any way to accepting it 
at this stage’.137 By March 1952, however, the only serious disagreement on 
the short treaty had to do with the British opinion that both it and the long
134 'Review of Political Events in Austria for the Year 1952', p. 1.
135 Foreign Office London, 'Draft ABBREVIATED TREATY on Austria', 11 March 1952, FO 465/6, 
p. 27, PRO.
136 British Embassy Washington, 'State Department's Attitude Toward Austrian Treaty,' 4 October 
1951, FO 371/93606(CA1071/92), PRO .
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drafts should be left on the negotiating table, giving the Soviets a choice. The 
Americans felt that the long draft should be withdrawn, leaving only the 
abbreviated draft on the negotiating table.138
The abbreviated treaty consisted of only eight articles, following a preamble 
that acknowledged the fact of the Anschlufi, summarised the Moscow 
Declaration and stressed the desire of the occupying Powers to conclude 
negotiations on Austria in a way that would grant Austria her full 
independence and at the same time foster friendly relations. Article 1 stated: 
The Allied and associated Powers recognise that Austria is re-established as 
a sovereign, independent and democratic State’.139 Article 2 provided that the 
Four Powers would recognise Austria’s independence and, significantly, 
‘declare that political or economic union (Anschluft) with Germany is 
prohibited’.140 Article 3 established that Austria’s borders should be the same 
as they were on 1 January 1938. Article 4 provided that the Control 
Agreement of 28 June 1946 would terminate at the moment the treaty came 
into force, that Four Power control of their respective districts in Vienna would 
also terminate on the same date, and that Four Power control of their 
respective occupation zones would terminate when all occupation forces had 
withdrawn from those zones and, in any case, within ninety days from the 
coming into force of the treaty. Within those ninety days, the occupying 
Powers would return all unspent currency the Austrian Government had
138 Foreign Office London, 'Conversations Between the Secretary of State and Mr. Acheson,' 16 
January 1952, FO 465/6, PRO, p. 5.
139 Foreign Office TelegramNo. 621, 4 September 1952, 'Draft ABBREVIATED TREATY on 
Austria,' FO 465/6 (CA 1071/168), p. 11.
140 Ibid.
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made available to support the occupation, and return all requisitioned 
property still in Allied possession. The language in Article 5 is interesting, 
because it does not address directly the different ways the Four Powers 
handled Austria’s status during the war. It provided that no reparations would 
be exacted from Austria ‘arising out of the existence of a state of war in 
Europe after 1 September 1939’.
Article 6 sought to resolve the so-called German assets issues with the 
simple statement: ‘Each of the Allied and Associated Powers shall within the 
ninety days period specified in Article 4 relinquish to Austria all property -  
real and personal of whatever description -  held or claimed by them as 
German assets or as war booty in Austria’.141 Article 7 dealt with accession 
issues, providing that any member of the United Nations at war with 
Germany, which held the status of a United Nation on 8 May 1945, and was 
not a signatory to the proposed abbreviated Treaty, could accede to the 
Treaty and thereby become an Associated Power for the purposes of the 
Treaty. The final Article, Article 8, addressed the ratification process and 
confirmed the authenticity of the English, Russian and French texts. It 
stipulated that the Treaty would come into force immediately upon deposit of 
ratification documents by all Four Powers. This Article also stipulated that all 
articles of ratification would be deposited with the Government of the USSR 
as quickly as possible.
141 Ibid., p. 12.
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After the abbreviated treaty was handed formally to Moscow, Gruber did not 
wait for the rejection, but proceeded with his U.N. initiative. By mid-August, 
he had secured Brazilian sponsorship for Austria’s appeal to the General 
Assembly. There was virtually no enthusiasm among the Western Powers for 
this particular gambit, but Gruber persisted and, on 20 December 1952, the 
U.N. General Assembly adopted a Brazilian motion, by a vote of 48-0, calling 
for an early conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.142 Eden’s and Caccia’s 
predictions were correct.
The Soviets rejected the abbreviated treaty proposal on 20 August.143 By this 
time, Moscow had launched a massive propaganda campaign harping on the 
alleged remilitarisation of Austria by the Western Powers, and Austrian 
‘connivance in United States plans to split Austria in readiness for a world 
war’. This campaign subsided somewhat in mid-year when the Kremlin 
seemed to be distracted by other matters, but it resumed with full force 
toward the end of the summer, with the addition of allegations of unspecified 
‘undemocratic activities’ by the Austrian Government. Throughout the year, 
various Austrian ministers spoke out to refute Soviet charges, which some 
were brave enough to call slanders. In April and again October, Parliament 
was called upon to endorse Government policies ‘in two impressive debates 
against the occupation, particularly insofar as the Soviets were concerned’.144
142 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria, p. 144.
143 'Review of Political Events in Austria for the Year 1952,' p. 2.
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The Western Powers did not withdraw the abbreviated treaty until the fall of 
1953, the year which, in Stourzh’s words, saw ‘years of political winter turn 
into a thaw’.145 The abbreviated treaty would, had Moscow accepted it, have 
resolved the few outstanding difficulties and would have set Austria free -  as 
Anthony Eden’s response to the Soviet rejection makes clear. Moscow’s 
attitude had not changed; the Soviets were simply not interested in progress 
toward an Austrian treaty. In its official note, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, deflecting from the core issue at hand, referred to alleged Western 
misconduct in and about Trieste and to Austria’s alleged failure to observe 
international agreements. The note stated that the abbreviated Treaty was 
not in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. It pointed to several 
provisions in the original, long draft, which were not included in the 
abbreviated draft, and dismissed the document as not acceptable. Moscow 
asked if the British Government was prepared to withdraw the abbreviated 
Treaty. The note ended with a gratuitous and unexplained crack: ‘the 
Government of Austria refuses to recognise the State treaty with Austria.’146 
Moscow demanded the withdrawal of the abbreviated treaty as a 
precondition to any further negotiations on ending the occupation.
In the 1998 update of his Herculean, 831-page treatise on the Austrian State 
Treaty, Gerald Stourzh reported that, on 5 September 1952, the Western 
Allies responded that they were prepared to incorporate four more articles
145 Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit; Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat und das Ende der Ost-West 
Besetzung Oesterreichs 1945-1955 (Vienna - Cologne - Graz: Boehlau Verlag, 1998b) p. 220.
146 Soviet Note of 14 August 1952, Official Translation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, No. 
39/2E, forwarded from the British Embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office, Gascoigne to Eden,
No. 152, 15 August 1952, CA 1071/171, FO 465/6, pp. 27-29, PRO.
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from the long draft into the abbreviated treaty, in order to accommodate 
Soviet concerns that these issues had been omitted from the short draft. He 
wrote that the West invited Moscow to a meeting of the Deputies in London 
on 29 September. The Soviets did not, as Bischof reported, ignore the 
abbreviated treaty.147 On 24 September, Moscow did respond by introducing 
a new demand. They would be prepared to participate in another Four Power 
conference on Austria if the issues of remilitarisation and denazification 
would be ‘reviewed’.148
Bischof is critical of the Western Powers, especially the United States, for 
turning to the abbreviated treaty tactic. He describes it as solely and 
exclusively an American propaganda stunt, and he speculates that, ‘they 
(American officials) were all perfectly aware of the fact (sic) that the Soviets 
would never accept such a drastically shortened treaty draft’.149 It is a good 
bet that not all American diplomats and national security officials were so 
cynical. In any case, no American official could have known that Soviet 
rejection was a ‘fact’ until that rejection had taken place. Bischof adds: ‘State 
Department officials conceded that the advantage of an abbreviated draft 
was ‘purely propaganda’. Perhaps some did, but this is not the language of 
NSC 38/6, which established official US policy, of which the abbreviated 
treaty was a major pillar. NSC 38/6 was classified Top Secret, and it was not 
meant for public consumption. Had propaganda been the sole objective of
147 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War , p. 126.
148 Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat und das Ende der Ost-West 
Besetzung Osterreichs 1945-1955 (Vienna - Cologne - Graz: Bohlau Verlag, 1998a), p. 187.
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the abbreviated treaty, this internal document, carrying the highest 
classification, would have revealed as much. Instead, the policy document 
clearly states that it was American policy to see a free, independent and fully 
sovereign Austria as soon as possible.
Bischof is a prolific writer and an important contributor to Austria’s post-war 
historiography, but he tends to shoot from the hip while ignoring, or perhaps 
failing to understand, the international environment in which events 
transpired. One has the impression that he is oblivious to, or disinterested in, 
political forces that were in play during a given time frame. His sweeping 
conclusions expose what can only be, at best, a passing familiarity with geo­
strategic, policy and military affairs. The British, Bischof writes (without a 
citation), concluded that only the ‘notoriously woolly’ State Department 
officials dealing with Austria could have ‘cooked up such a treaty draft which 
would be ‘anathema’ to the Soviets’.150 If Bischof is so interested in facts, 
then perhaps he should accept the fact that the State Department was only 
one of several federal agencies and departments that participated in 
deliberations on US policy toward Austria and that signed off on the National 
Security Council’s policy recommendations to the President. Bischof refers in 
his book to NSC 38/5, but the ‘fact’ is that it was NSC 38/6, of 5 May 1950, 
signed by the President on the same date, declassified only in 1999, which
150 Ibid.
established US policy toward Austria until it was superseded by NSC 164/1 
on 14 October 1953.151
At their 56th meeting, the US National Security Council and the Secretary of 
the Treasury considered the Executive Secretary’s draft report on NSC 38/5, 
as well as the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The State Department 
version of one key paragraph was adopted, instead of the JCS version, and 
NSC 38/6 was forwarded on 5 May 1950 to the President for adoption.152 
After reiterating that it remained the US policy objective to re-establish 
Austria’s sovereignty and independence, and concluding that recent Soviet 
actions were designed to delay finalisation of the Austrian State treaty, the 
document outlined the policy decisions the President should take vis-a-vis 
Austria. The recommendations included a proposal that the United States 
should ‘continue to participate in the Treaty negotiations and make every 
effort to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion’.153 It was also recommended 
that conversations with Britain and France begin at an early date to decide on 
future courses of action regarding Austria, including ‘the preparation of a draft 
Four- Power Declaration re-establishing Austrian independence which could 
be proposed if agreement cannot be reached in the present Treaty 
negotiations’.154 Discussions between the three Western Powers did begin
151 For confirmation that President Truman signed NSC 38/6 on 5 May 1950, see E-Mail message to 
author from T. Branigar of the United States National Archives, dated 13 June 2003, hard copy in 
author’s personal files.
152 See NSC 38/6, 5 May 1950, Future Courses o f  US Action With Respect to Austria, Box 47, Austria 
(3), 5/5/50. Eisenhower Library, 200 Southeast Fourth Street, Abileen, Kansas 67410.
153 NSC 38/6, paragraph 15, p. 9.
154 NSC 38/6, paragraph 20(2), p. 10.
shortly thereafter The actions outlined in NSC 38/6 reflected official US 
policy toward Austria until 13 October of 1953, when NSC 38/6 was 
superseded by NSC 164/1.155
NSC 38/6 provisions for such a Declaration led eventually to, and contained 
language that was quite similar in the abbreviated treaty that was approved 
by Britain and France. There is nothing in this language that even hints that 
the proposal was for propaganda purposes. Quite obviously, the propaganda 
ramifications of all major policy initiatives during the Cold War must have 
been taken into consideration, but scoring propaganda points was, in all 
probability, not the primary objective of the abbreviated treaty initiative.
The Confidential Print collection of Foreign Office documents, declassified in 
January 2003, contains a copy of Eden’s instructions to his ambassador in 
Moscow, dated 4 September 1952. Here we see how the British really 
responded to both the abbreviated treaty and to the Soviet rejection of it.
The Soviet Government’s recent reply suggests the withdrawal of the 
proposal made on 13 March. This suggestion is based on four 
objections, namely, that it fails to provide for free elections as 
specified in article 8 of the long draft of the State Treaty, that it fails to 
guarantee human rights and basic freedoms as specified in article 7 
of the long draft, that it fails to eliminate Nazism as specified in article 
9 of the long draft, and that it fails to provide for Austrian Armed 
Forces.
155 I am grateful to Bonita M. Molanax, Mandatory Review Staff, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, for 
responding effectively to my request that twelve pages of NSC 164/1 be declassified. Under 
provisions of Executive Order 12958, the Eisenhower Library did declassify these pages, and on 13 
March 2002 Ms. Molanax sent copies to me free of charge. See letter from Molinax to Williams. 13 
March 2002, original available in author’s personal files.
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With reference to the first three of these points, it is the view of Her 
Majesty’s Government that none of these provisions specified in the 
note of the Soviet Government are required in a simple instrument 
designed to terminate the prolonged occupation and to re-establish 
the independence of Austria. These points are all covered in the 
Austrian constitution or in Austrian legislation now in force.156
Eden’s language here is too important to paraphrase:
None the less, appreciating the careful consideration given by the 
USSR during these past five months to the proposal of 13th March, 
and anxious, as they have been since the Moscow Declaration of 
1943, to restore to Austria full independence, Her Majesty’s 
Government therefore proposes that there be added to their proposal 
of 13th March articles 7, 8 and 9 of the long draft as previously 
agreed by the four Powers.157
Eden further instructed his ambassador that, with reference to the Soviet 
objection that the abbreviated treaty did not include a provision specifically 
allowing Austria to have her own armed forces, the right to maintain armed 
forces belongs inherently to a free and independent nation. Therefore, such a 
right should not have to be specifically granted to a nation which had never 
been identified as an enemy. Indeed, the Soviet response on this point would 
seem to indicate a desire to impose limitations on Austria’s right to maintain 
armed forces for the purposes of national defence. Again, however, given 
Britain’s strong desire to end the occupation, Eden told Gascoigne to offer to 
include Article 17 from the long draft, if this would mollify the Soviets. With 
these concessions, Eden wrote, it should be obvious that the British 
Government was prepared to accept all Soviet suggestions on the only points 
of Soviet objections to the draft abbreviated treaty. The way was therefore
156 Eden to Gancoigne, London, 'Draft Abbreviated Treaty on Austria,' 4 September 1952, FO 465/6
(CA 1071/168),
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clear for conclusion of the Austrian problem. Britain stood ready to attend a 
meeting of the Deputies with the objective of ‘initialling the proposal of 13th 
March amended as above in accordance with the suggestions outlined in the 
Soviet Government’s note'. The Kremlin’s outlook on the path toward 
Austrian freedom was, apparently, not quite so clear.
Gerald Stourzh dismisses the abbreviated treaty as an American ploy, 
concocted as a public relations exercise designed to place the blame 
squarely on Moscow's shoulders for the prolonged and unsuccessful 
negotiations on Austria’s independence. Stourzh reports that neither the 
British nor French were enthusiastic about this new initiative. France was 
especially critical, labelling the abbreviated treaty as the ‘Japanese Treaty’, 
presumably referring to the 8 September 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan, 
which was signed in San Francisco without Soviet participation. According to 
Stourzh, the French were concerned about the possibility that the West 
would somehow insult Moscow and bring about a partitioning of Austria. They 
believed the Soviets would never accept something that was being shoved 
down their throats by the Western Powers, especially if that something 
involved the revoking of concessions that had been given to them in 1949.158
Stearman, on the other hand, points out that, by 1952, the Western Powers 
regarded the original State Treaty draft as ‘outdated in many respects’.159 
Every one of the agreed articles had been drafted during the period 1947-
158 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit; Staatsvertrag, Neutralitaet und das Ende der Ost- West 
Besetzung Oesterreichs 1945-1955 pp. 184-188.
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1949. Between then and 1952, Austria’s rejection of Communism and 
commitment to a democratic form of government rendered some of the more 
‘tutelary and punitive clauses in this draft redundant, if not offensive’. Of the 
eight articles, only one was new. Article 6, as described above, relinquished 
to Austria all German assets and war booty. Stearman suggests there is 
evidence that this new Western approach to the German assets issue ‘took 
into account the heavy compensation the Soviet Union had already received 
through seven years’ exploitation of Eastern Austria’.160
If academics like Stourzh and Bischof are going to continue to dismiss the 
abbreviated treaty as just another American propaganda stunt and nothing 
more, then they are going to have to explain the language in now- 
declassified US policy documents such as NSC 38/6. Here, the abbreviated 
treaty is described as a serious attempt to introduce an alternative way of 
solving the Austria problem, given that all past strategies had failed and the 
Kremlin was refusing to even discuss the long treaty. If they are going to 
pursue their allegations that the abbreviated treaty was ‘cooked up’ by 
‘notoriously woolly State Department experts on Austria’, then they are going 
to have to explain why the full National Security Council approved the 
abbreviated treaty tactic and recommended it to the White House.161 They 
will then have to explain why the President of the United States accepted this 
recommendation and signed NSC 38/6, thereby confirming that it was official
160 Ibid.
161 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War , p. 123.
United States policy to introduce an abbreviated treaty and press the Soviets 
to agree on it. Thus far, they have not done so.
Da s  T a u w e t t e r ?
According to Stourzh, 1953 brought the Tauwetter, but in hindsight, there 
was little sign of any thaw.162 The year did see major changes in the 
leadership of those nations most involved in Austria’s future. Dwight David 
Eisenhower took office as the thirty-fourth President of the United States. He 
appointed John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. February’s national 
elections in Austria resulted in seventy four seats for the OVP, seventy three 
for the SPO, fourteen for VdU and four for the Communists.163 The Figl 
Government stepped down on 25 February and the new government, 
featuring Julius Raab as Chancellor, took its place on 2 April. The leadership 
team of Raab, Figl and newcomer Bruno Kreisky were to remain at the 
country’s helm until the Austrian State Treaty was signed in May 1955. He 
certainly did not know it at the time, but Julius Raab was to become the very 
first ‘real capitalist’ with whom Nikita Khrushchev was to negotiate directly.164
In February 1953, the Special Deputies held their 259-260th sessions in 
London (6 and 9 February 1953), again without any signs of progress. The 
Soviet representative flatly refused to enter into negotiations until the West 
withdrew the abbreviated treaty. The Western Powers were reluctant to do
162 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatsvertrag, Neutralitat und das Ende der Ost-West 
Besetzung Osterreichs 1945-1955 , Chapter IV , beginning p. 173.
163 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit; Staatsvertrag, Neutralitaet und das Ende der Ost-West 
Besetzung Oesterreichs 1945-1955, Zeittafel, p. 786.
164 William Taubman, Khrushchev : the Man and his Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 349.
this as a precondition to further negotiations. In the meantime fate had 
ushered in another important change in national leadership.
On 4 March 1953, the US National Security Council met for its 135th session 
to discuss what little was known in Washington about rumours of Josef 
Stalin’s ‘illness’. In the midst of this discussion, a message arrived from the 
State Department, informing the meeting that the Soviet Embassy had called 
a press conference for later that same day. This news inspired a former 
American Ambassador to Moscow and then-current Under Secretary of State 
to exclaim: ‘Stalin is dead as hell’.165 He was almost right.
During the night of 1-2 March 1953, after dining late into the evening with 
Lavrentiy Beria, Nikolay Bulganin, Georgiy Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev, 
Josef Stalin suffered a debilitating stroke.166 According to Russian military 
historian Dmitriy Volkogonov, Stalin had retired to his room where he 
completed reading at least two top-secret files. One informed him that the 
USSR’s gold reserves had risen to 2,049 tons, which must have pleased him. 
The second file would have been less soothing. It advised Stalin that, 
‘despite imaginative efforts’, the Kremlin’s attempt to assassinate 
Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito had failed.167
165 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 
March 4th, 1953’, Document 550, FRUS (1952-1954), Vol. V III, p. 1091, Eisenhower Library, 
Whitman File.
166 Peter S. Deriabin and Joseph C. Evans present a persuasive summary of the theory that Stalin was 
murdered: See Peter S with Evans Deriabin, Joseph C, Inside Stalin's Kremlin; an eyewitness account 
o f brutality, duplicity, and intrigue (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's Inc., 1998).
167The document contained the Russian word skovyrnut, which means literally ‘rub out.’ Dmitrii A. 
Volkogonov (1928-1995) was a prominent Russian military historian. For many years, he headed the 
Institute of Military History of the Soviet Army and, from 1991 until his death, chaired a special
Four days later, on 5 March 1953, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union convened an emergency plenary session to 
consider ‘the unbroken, correct leadership of the country, which in turn 
requires complete leadership unity and the impermissibility of any kind of 
division or panic’.168 It was acknowledged that Stalin’s ‘serious illness’ would 
probably mean that he would not be available for leadership duties for some 
time to come. Stalin died at 9:50 p.m., that same night.
There followed a period of so-called collective leadership, during which all 
deliberations and decisions became indelibly linked with the individual 
political fortunes of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev. With the 
benefit of hindsight, and even the small volume of Soviet archival material 
that has become.available in the meanwhile, it is possible to imagine how 
terribly ferocious was the Kremlin power struggle in the wake of Stalin’s 
death.169 This was a contest catalysed by a series of astonishing events 
around the world that eventually forced all of the competing Soviet leaders to
parliamentary commission overseeing the management of Soviet archives. In the Presidential Archive 
of the Russian Federation in Moscow, Volkogonov discovered and published a document outlining a 
series of options to assassinate Tito, with the help of one Iosif Romual’dovich, a Soviet agent who had 
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168 March 1953 CPSU Plenum documents stored in TsKhSD, f.2, op.l, dd.23-26 translated by CWIHP 
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accept the need for a new set of priorities in the management of the socialist 
camp and in their dealings with the West.
Stalin’s successors had inherited a nightmare.
The international situation had become so tense that another turn of 
the screw might have led to disaster. There was a war going on in 
Korea and another in Indochina; the two superpowers were facing 
each other with daggers drawn; the arms race was steadily gaining 
momentum; the German problem hung like a dark cloud over 
Europe; there was no settlement of the Austrian problem in sight. ... 
The inevitability of a major new war was still part of the Communist 
doctrine and this, if taken at face value, would have made any 
attempts to prevent a new conflict meaningless.170
In the midst of this cabal, Nikita Khrushchev emerged with power. It was 
under Khrushchev’s leadership that the Soviet Union reversed its long­
standing position and agreed to the Austrian State Treaty. But that was not to 
come for another two years. On 25 May 1953, the Soviet Ambassador in 
London, Jakob Malik, refused to participate in a scheduled meeting of the 
Special Deputies for the Austrian State Treaty, stating that his country 
planned to pursue the Austria question through normal diplomatic channels 
from then on. Malik had thus put an end to the diplomatic vehicle of the 
Special Deputies. On 12 June, the three Western Powers asked the Soviet 
Government to present a treaty which it would find acceptable. On 30 July 
1953, Moscow again demanded withdrawal of the abbreviated treaty as a 
precondition to further negotiations, and in August the Soviets delivered
170 Oleg Troyanovsky, in a paper entitled Nikita Khrushchev and the Making o f  Soviet Foreign 
Policy, presented to a December 1994 conference at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. 
The paper will appear as part of a volume entitled Nikita Khrushchev: Fresh Perspectives on the Last 
Communist, edited by William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev and Abbott Gleason. I  am indebted to 
Sergei Khrushchev and Abbott Gleason for providing me with a draft copy of this paper.
another note linking the Austrian treaty with a final settlement on Germany.171 
On 17 August, the Western Powers agreed to withdraw the abbreviated draft 
if the Soviets would not introduce further, extraneous issues to the 
negotiations. Moscow refused to accept this condition.
K ey  P e r s o n a l it ie s
Every year, the British diplomatic installation in Vienna prepared a 
communication entitled ‘Leading Personalities in Austria’. In 1952, this 
document was compiled by the deputy chief of mission, Minister G.P. 
Labouchere, CMG.172 These reports are significant for several reasons. First, 
they showed clearly who in Austria the British diplomatic team regarded 
worthy of mention. Second, they reflected what the British team thought of 
these people. Under Sir Harold Caccia’s rule, it was not uncommon to detect 
an element of humour and sometimes even sarcasm in these biographical 
sketches.
Raab
Julius Raab was, of course, among the 105 leading personalities who 
qualified for mention in Labouchere’s 1952 report. Raab was at the time an 
OVP member of the National Assembly. He was acting national Chairman of 
the party, and President of the Federal Chamber of Commerce. Raab was 
born in 1893. He became a construction engineer. In 1938, he had been
171 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f Austria p. 144(n), citing Tass reports of 30 
July 1953 and 4 August 1953.
172 British Embassy Vienna, Telegram No. 139 (CA 1012/6), 'Biographical Notes:Leading 
Personalities in Austria,1 10 July 1952, FO 465/6, PRO. Labouchere to Eden, No. 139, 10 July 1952. 
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Minister for Commerce. Raab had been a member of the Heimwehr, but left 
to form his own party, the Christliche Landbund, which later merged with the 
Christian Socialists. When all political activities were suspended in 1938, and 
after the Nazis confiscated his family’s business, Raab went to work for a 
Viennese construction company. He is reported to have been ‘active in 
resistance’, but Labouchere does not expand on this brief sentence. Raab 
became Minister for Public Works and reconstruction in the first post-war 
Austrian Government, under Karl Renner. Leopold Figl wanted to bring Raab 
into his Cabinet, but the Russians vetoed the move, ostensibly because of 
Raab’s activities in the Heimwehr. Labouchere includes an explanatory 
comment here, to the effect that most people, even Socialist friends, thought 
that Raab joined the Heimwehr with the intent of luring away the more liberal 
wing. The British in Vienna saw Raab as a ‘tough and humorous Right­
winger and firm believer in free enterprise’. He was regarded as the strong 
man of the People’s Party and ‘the power behind Ing. Figl’s throne’.173 
Following the 1953 elections, Raab apparently felt that his time had come, 
and he emerged from behind the throne to unseat Figl and assume the reins 
of government himself.
Figl
Figl also received prominent mention in Labouchere’s 1952 report. He was at 
the time Federal Chancellor. Figl was born in 1902 ‘of peasant stock’. He 
graduated as an agricultural engineer. He had been active for a long time in 
the Peasants’ Association of the Christian Socialist Party, and he became
173 Ibid., p. 57.
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this party’s secretary in 1935. Figl was appointed to organise the abortive 
plebiscite in 1938, and was immediately arrested by the Nazis when they 
marched into Vienna. He spent some five and one-half years in various 
German concentration camps, including Dachau and Mauthausen. In 1945, 
he was appointed in the Renner Government as Provincial Governor of 
Lower Austria and Minister without portfolio, a post from which he eventually 
resigned. He was also made chairman of the National Organisation of the 
Peoples’ Party. He became Federal Chancellor as a result of the 1949 
elections. In 1951, he was replaced by Julius Raab as chairman of the OVP, 
but Figl remained as Chancellor. In 1952, Figl paid official visits to London, 
Paris and Washington.
Small and physically unimpressive, he nonetheless appears none the 
worse for his long periods of internment, and has shown evidence of 
considerable strength of character in his dealings both with Austrian 
officials and with the Allies. Has strengthened both his personal 
position and his relations with the Socialist members of his 
Government. Is active, honest and a good administrator. Fond of 
sport. Speaks no foreign languages.174
Kreiskv
Interestingly enough, Bruno Kreisky did not qualify for the British Embassy’s 
list of leading personalities in Austria, at least not in 1952. But he was to 
become one of Austria’s best known political figures, including Federal 
Chancellor. Raab as Chancellor, Figl as Foreign Minister and Kreisky as 
Minister of State, were to shepherd Austria through some treacherous 
diplomatic times and lead her to full sovereignty and independence in May of 
1955.
174 Ibid., p. 47, PRO.
In his Internet Dossier on Bruno Kreisky in the Wiener Zeitung ‘WZonline,’ 
Von Rainer Mayerhofer observed: ‘Seine Welt war grower als sein Land’.175 
Thirteen of his twenty six years as a member of the Austrian Government 
were spent as Federal Chancellor. Kreisky was born on 22 January 1911 to a 
Viennese Jewish family. He was to become a lawyer and one of Austria’s all- 
time great Socialist leaders. He was, from the time of his youth, a real 
revolutionary. In 1926, he became active in the Socialist Workers’ Youth 
movement. In 1930, he became chairman of the Lower Austria Workers’ 
Youth organisation for Purkersdorf, Klosterneuburg and Tulin. He was 
arrested for revolutionary political activities the first time in 1933. In 1934, he 
joined Franz Olah to inspire Socialist Party’s opposition to Dollfufi’ 
declaration of martial law, and in February of that year, he was co-founder of 
the illegal Revolutionary Socialist Youth (Revolutionare Sozialistische 
Jugend). In January 1935, he was arrested, tried and sentenced to one year 
in prison. Kreisky was to recall in his memoirs that he was probably the first 
Federal Chancellor to have sat in prison, having been convicted of high 
treason. He was finally able to conclude his academic studies in 1938, taking 
his very last examination on 14 March, the day the Nazis were celebrating 
their march into Vienna. One day later, he once again found himself a guest 
of the police, this time in Schutzhaft, or protective custody. At the end of the 
year, he was able to make his way to Sweden, where he lived in exile until 
his return to Austria in 1946. He was almost immediately dispatched back to 
Stockholm as the official Austrian Representative, and he stayed there until
175 Rainer Meyerhofer, WZonline, http://www.wienerzeitung.at/linkmap/personen/kreiskv.htm. [20 
June 2003].
1949. In 1951, he was appointed as a senior official in Renner’s Cabinet 
staff, and in 1953, Kreisky became Secretary of State in the foreign ministry. 
It was in this capacity that he accompanied Raab and Figl on the successful 
path to the country’s freedom and independence.
There were two other newcomers to the international diplomatic arena who 
had profound influence on the eventual resolution of post war Austrian 
issues.
Eisenhower
Dwight David Eisenhower was born in Texas in 1990, and he grew up in 
Abilene, Kansas. He was the third of seven sons. He excelled at sports in 
secondary school and he received an appointment to the United States 
Military Academy at West point. During his military career, he excelled in 
various staff positions, serving under some of America’s most famous 
general grade officers, Pershing, MacArthur and Krueger among them. He 
was selected as Supreme Allied Commander for the invasion of France and 
the eventual defeat of Germany. Following the Second World War, he 
became President of Columbia University before returning to uniform and 
commanding the new NATO forces in Europe. He was persuaded to run for 
the presidency in 1952 and he did so with success, winning a sweeping 
election victory. Eisenhower became the thirty-fourth President of the United 
States, succeeding Harry S. Truman.
Dulles
It is probably a little known fact that the gravestone in Arlington Cemetery 
marking John Foster Dulles’ final resting place bears this identification: ‘John 
Foster Dulles, Major, United States Army’. He was born in 1888 and fought in 
World War One. According to his obituary in the New York Times:
Mr Dulles was a man of complex character, full of paradoxes. A 
shrewd and successful corporation lawyer, he was also a moralist 
and political philosopher. He could marshal his ideas swiftly, fluently 
and extemporaneously; he coined many phrase, but he was not 
noted as an originator of new ideas. He was gregarious, but he 
worked alone, to the despair of his State department staff. Gracious 
in private, he was often awkward in public. Yet he held news 
conferences more regularly than any other member of President 
Eisenhower’s Cabinet
For over six years, Dulles dominated US foreign policy, and presented a 
formidable adversary to his Soviet counterparts. His New York Times 
obituary called particular attention to three of Dulles’ personality traits. First, 
he was, reportedly, by far the strongest personality in the Cabinet.177 He 
played a leading role in Washington and often in the councils of Europe. 
Second, ‘whatever his qualities as a policy maker, he had few peers as an 
advocate. No one could equal him as a persuader in the White House 
councils.’ His interaction with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was 
frequently testy, but ‘he inevitably had his way’. Third, he had exceptional 
vitality. As Secretary of State, he flew a total of 479,286 miles outside of the 
United States. He was TIME magazine’s Man of the Year in 1954. During 
that particular year, he committed himself to an exhausting campaign ‘pour la
176 John Foster Dulles Obituary, The New York Times, 25 May 1959.
177 In his memoirs, Bruno Kreisky describes Dulles as ‘ ...der ohne Zweifel, der starkste Mann des 
westlichen Lagers...’ See Bruno Kreisky, Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen aus Fuenf Jahrzehnten 
(Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1986), p. 462.
paix’, and succeeded in winning over the support in Cold War strategies of 
even the French. A French diplomat told a TIME magazine reporter:
You know the other day a pamphlet came across my desk. Written in 
French, it was titled ‘Pour La Paix’. My first reaction was that it was 
just another Communist propaganda tract. But it wasn’t. It was John 
Foster Dulles’ recent speech in Chicago. For years now -  in Europe 
at least -  the Communists have made ‘peace’ their private property. 
Even though people knew what the Communists meant, the idea in 
their hands helped them and hurt us. It looks now as if your Mr Dulles 
is going to take peace away from the Communists and restore it to its 
real meaning.178
Molotov
And of course Molotov remained very much on the scene. Viacheslav 
Mikhailovich Molotov’s true family name was Skrjabin. His chosen 
pseudonym, Molotov, translates as ‘hammer’. He joined the Bolshevik wing 
of Tsarist Russia’s Social Democratic Party when he was sixteen years old. 
At the age of twelve, he helped to found Pravda. He was exiled to Siberia in 
1915, but soon escaped and returned to Bolshevik activities. During Russia’s 
civil war, he performed a variety of duties for Bolshevik causes, and in 1921 
was elected Secretary of the Central Committee and a candidate for the 
party’s most senior body, the Politburo. Molotov was Lenin’s chief of staff and 
he later became Stalin’s deputy secretary when the former was elevated to 
the General Secretary of the Central Committee. Molotov became a full 
member of the Politburo in 1926. He participated in the collectivisation of 
Russia’s agriculture and was active in Stalin’s purges of political adversaries. 
In addition to holding several important political party positions, he actually 
became head of government for a brief period, before being appointed
178 Obituary, The New York Times, 25 May, 1959.
Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1939. He remained in this position until 
1949 when he was caught up in one of Stalin’s reshuffles and sidelined until 
being brought back into favour and once again assigned responsibility for the 
Soviet Union’s foreign affairs. Molotov participated in the Tehran Conference 
(1943), Yalta (1945) and Potsdam (1945). He was by far the USSR’s most 
experienced diplomat.
Following Stalin’s death, it seems that Molotov was driving Soviet Austria 
policy almost on his own, in the midst of a complex leadership struggle in the 
Kremlin. When Stalin was alive, Molotov took a back seat and basically did 
what Stalin told him to do. Until March 1953 it was Stalin alone who had the 
last word on foreign policy decisions. He controlled policy with an iron fist, 
and he exercised this control with the same degree of intimidation and 
brutality that characterised his command of the country’s domestic scene. 
Troyanovsky explained:
Exchanges of view did not take place ... his entourage preferred to 
keep their opinions to themselves when they differed from those of 
their boss, or khozain, as he used to be called.179
One exception, apparently, was Austria, where, at least according to 
Khrushchev, Stalin allowed Molotov considerable freedom. We now have 
evidence that Molotov drove the Kremlin’s Austria policy, and that he 
remained the single, most significant obstacle to Austrian independence 
throughout the period 1945-1955. It was his commitment and his personal 
influence on Austria policy that delayed conclusion of the Austrian State
179 Troyanovsky, Nikita Khrushchev and the Making o f  Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 280
Treaty for so long. Khrushchev said that it was against Molotov’s strong 
objections and only as a result of Khrushchev’s intervention that the State 
Treaty was signed in May 1955, following ten years of cantankerous 
obstructionism.180 Oleg Troyanovsky explained Khrushchev’s position in the 
Kremlin as follows:
Nikita Khrushchev was the driving force behind the effort to move the 
world away from the edge of the abyss, where it stood at the 
beginning of 1953. In this he had the active support of Anastas 
Mikoyan and up to 1957 of Nikolai Bulganin, whereas his main 
antagonist was Viacheslav Molotov, particularly on such issues as 
the Austrian State Treaty and reconciliation with Yugoslavia.181
Reports vary regarding the degree of autonomy Molotov enjoyed in the 
formulation of USSR foreign policy. It appears, however, that he was the only 
official in the Kremlin who, together with Stalin, exercised control over both 
policy formulation and implementation. Molotov had ready access to Stalin, 
and seemed to enjoy Stalin’s confidence. He was intelligent enough not to 
acquire sufficient influence and support to attract the kind of attention Stalin 
gave to those of his subordinates whom he thought to be too powerful. He 
shared Stalin’s mania for highly centralised diplomacy', his fear being that 
otherwise Soviet stratagems and tricks would leak to the enemy’.182
Molotov did not delegate authority, except when it was absolutely necessary 
to do so. He used his ambassadors more often as messengers than as
180 Concluding words by Nikita Khrushchev to the Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth 
Session, 12 July 1955, as translated by CWIHP, < http://www.cwihp.si.edu,>, [15 August 2003].
181 Troyanovsky, Nikita Khrushchev and the Making o f  Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 280.
182 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to 
Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), p .87.
advisors. Like Stalin, he kept his cards very close to his chest, while 
manipulating a widespread network of informants so that he could remain 
well informed on what others were thinking and doing. The very fact that he 
survived for as long as he did confirms his extraordinary abilities to negotiate 
the intricate internal political web of the Kremlin, while manipulating with 
equal success his counterparts in the West. Molotov was to explain later: ‘I 
think it was not easy to fool us. ...Everything was in Stalin’s fist, in my fist -  
we could not act otherwise in that period’.183
Molotov was convinced that, without a strong Soviet Union and its Red Army, 
there was no hope for the worldwide revolution. While he was a realist, 
Molotov still viewed developments in the international arena from a Marxist 
perspective:
His understanding of international relations gravitated to the Marxist- 
Leninist ‘theory of imperialism’ with its conviction that under the 
capitalist order selfishness, expansion and war were the key to 
relations among states, and that class struggle was the driving force 
of human history. He liked to instruct young diplomats: ‘you always 
have to keep Lenin in the back of your mind, particularly when you 
are dealing with foreign policy’.184
There is no indication that Molotov ever believed that tensions with the West 
could have been prevented after the war. He was convinced that Western 
leaders were behaving during the Cold War in the only manner they could -
183 Ibid.
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as enemies of Communism.185 He never relented, even after Khrushchev 
was successful in ousting him from the Politburo. He also never abandoned 
his conviction that Khrushchev was a right wing deviationist’.186
R e d u c t io n  o f  B r it is h  Fo r c e s  A u s tr ia
In August 1953, a Top Secret, UK EYES ONLY, War Office Note recorded 
the British Government’s decision to reduce its garrison in Austria from the 
then-existing three battalions (down two from 1948), with supporting 
elements, to one battalion with reduced support.187 It was noted that British 
troops were stationed in Austria in order to allow Britain to carry out her 
obligations under the Control Agreement and also to support British policy 
objectives. Paragraph 2 of this Note states that the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe had already been informed of Britain’s plans to remove 
the British garrison from Austria altogether ‘if and when the political situation 
permits’. It is important to note the wording here. This alleged report to the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, European Theatre (SACEUR), only 
said that Britain might pull their troops from Austria if political circumstances 
permitted. It did not say that a decision had already been made to withdraw 
the troops, as, apparently was the case. This is important because, despite 
later disclaimer memoranda from the War Office, NATO Command was 
surprised when Britain actually withdrew the two battalions. In spite of plans
185 Ibid. ‘Cold War’ was a term Molotov never liked, as indicated by a quote from Felix Chuev in 
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to make sure the move did not come as a surprise, it did, and the War Office 
was among the first to scurry into a protective mode. A minor and totally 
unnecessary Anglo-American spat ensued.
Here, an explanation of Allied military structure might be helpful to the 
understanding of why Britain and the United States ran into this 
misunderstanding.
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949. In mid-December
1950, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states asked 
the United States to designate an officer to function as Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR). It would be this officer’s assignment to set 
up an integrated Allied command for the defence of NATO in Europe. 
President Truman nominated General Dwight David Eisenhower, who 
became the very first Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe. On 2 April
1951, General Eisenhower established the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE), based in Rocquencourt, France. The first SHAPE 
organisation consisted of 183 officers from nine of the twelve NATO allies. 
Portugal and Luxembourg sent staff officers to SHAPE later. Iceland, a 
NATO member state, had no armed forces. In 1952, Greece and Turkey 
joined NATO, as did Germany in 1955, bringing total NATO membership in 
the mid-1950s up to twelve. Eisenhower immediately set out to form a 
cohesive defence grouping, in which the loyalties of each representative 
were to NATO, rather than to his respective home country. He told his staff:
Here we know ourselves as a single entity in carrying out the 
objectives of NATO and in building up a strong defence for the 
purpose of preserving the peace. Actually, for the purpose of this 
operation, we shall set aside our individual nationalities. 8
On the matter of British troops reduction in Austria, both Sir Harold ‘Caccia 
and Lt. Gen. Winterton had agreed that one battalion would be adequate to 
allow Britain to meet obligations under the Control Agreement, and that 
Austrian gendarmerie were capable of dealing with any attempt by local 
Communists to seize power, provided such an effort was not supported by 
the Soviet Army.189 It was also Caccia and Winterton’s opinion that such a 
reduction in the British garrison would not ‘seriously undermine Austrian 
public morale or diminish the will of the Austrian Government to stand up to 
the Russians’.190
In a discussion with Austrian Chancellor Figl on 24 September 1952, Foreign 
Secretary Eden had admitted that Britain was carrying too heavy a burden in 
her defence budget, what with eleven divisions overseas apart from the air. 
and naval commitments. The occupation of Austria was costing Britain £21/a 
million and Trieste was costing some £2 million. The burden of British troops
188 Information on SACEUR, SHAPE and NATO is available from the NATO Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe Home Page, <http://www.nato.int/shape/>. [3 July 2003].
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officers and 753 men, although most British military units were under strength. Nonetheless, these 
numbers are probably reliable when estimating total British strength in Austria during the occupation. 
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personal files.
190 W ar Office Note, 24 August 1953, W O  32/21399, paragraph 3, p. 2. PRO.
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in both locations was obviously weighing heavily.191 On 30 July 1953, the 
Russians said they would stop collecting reimbursement for occupation costs 
from Austria, and both Britain and France felt obligated to do the same. 
Britain renounced occupation costs on 19 August 1953, thereby increasing 
the financial burdens created by a continuing occupation.192
The Soviets had also, in July 1953, handed back to Austria the Ybbs- 
Persenberg vehicle manufacturing facilities, which had been confiscated as a 
German asset, and in August they had terminated postal censorship in the 
Soviet Zone. The Soviets also agreed with the Western Allies to end control 
of electronic and postal communications in the entire country. Hopes that 
these gestures signalled stronger willingness to end the occupation faded 
when there were no new Soviet initiatives by August. Also, Moscow did not 
respond favourably to the Austrian Government’s discreet, bilateral 
communication in June 1953, undertaking to adopt a policy of neutrality in 
return for conclusion of the treaty.
There were other internal British arguments favouring the withdrawal of 
troops from Austria, or at least supporting a substantial reduction of that 
military commitment. First, the Austrian Government had, for domestic 
political reasons, passed a resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of 
all occupation troops. The West could not withdraw unless the Soviets did, 
but some in the Foreign Office felt that some gesture acknowledging the
191 Record of a Meeting Between the Secretary of State and the Austrian Federal Chancellor in Vienna 
on 24th September 1952, 24 September 1952, CA 1051/27, FO 465/6, pp. 30-31, PRO.
192 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit..., p. 787.
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Austrian Chancellor’s resolution should be made. Besides, the Chiefs of Staff 
concluded that the British presence in Austria in 1953 was larger than 
necessary for occupation duties and much too small to be considered an 
effective fighting force. It was ‘imperative to cut down overseas commitments 
anyway’ and the troops in Austria could be withdrawn easily.193
There were arguments against Britain taking the unilateral action to pull out 
her troops. First, all NATO plans for the defence of Southern Austria would 
have to be revised. The British contribution to NATO, in the event of war, 
would be reduced by two battalions, and this would have a negative effect on 
NATO’s overall military capability. Such a British action might be seen as an 
excuse for smaller NATO members to reduce their contribution to the NATO 
force, and in any case ‘the proposal is likely to be badly received in the 
United States’.194
Under the existing 1953 plan, based on the full British Troops Austria (BTA) 
garrison of three battalions plus supporting elements, British troops were to 
cover the evacuation of families from Austria and then withdraw to a Brigade 
position in Villach. This position was to be held for as long as possible to 
facilitate Italian mobilisation and movement to hold the Tarvisio Pass. At that 
point, according to the plans, BTA forces were to withdraw through the 
Italians to a concentration area at Tolmezzo. US and French troops were to 
fight a delaying action along the axis line Linz -  Salzburg -  Innsbruck, and
193 War Office Note, 24 August 1953, paragraph 4, WO 32/21399, p. 2., PRO.
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eventually withdraw to the Italian border. American, French and Italian forces 
were to hold the Austro-ltalian frontier, with the French holding the Resia 
Pass and Americans the Brenner Pass. British and American forces in 
Trieste were to cover evacuation of dependents and then withdraw to an area 
south of Udine.195
Obviously, these plans had to be revised when the British presence in Austria 
was cut by two-thirds. At about the same time, France announced her 
intentions to withdraw troops from the area, and both Britain and the United 
States were pulling out of Trieste. War planning was put on hold all around, 
while NATO adjusted to the new situation.
Britain was also withdrawing three battalions from Trieste, but had informed 
SACEUR that these units would remain committed to SACEUR. Still, the War 
Office recognised that, unless additional forces were made available to 
SACEUR, or Italian mobilisation plans were expedited considerably, NATO 
would have insufficient strength to defend the Italian border. At the eastern 
end, the Yugoslav left flank could be exposed.
One possibility to compensate for the British and French troops reductions 
was to call more heavily upon Austrian auxiliaries. The War Office warned 
that any discussion with the Americans about using Austrians should be 
verbal, so long as it concentrated on the use of Austrians before conclusion
195 War Office Note, 2 December 1953, Part II: ‘Operational Implications of the Reduction of the 
British Garrison in Austria and the Withdrawal of the British Garrison from Trieste’, M 01/P(53)l 12, 
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of an Austrian treaty, but any such discourse should definitely not be 
recorded in writing.196 The War Office saw Austrian auxiliaries as falling into 
four categories.197
The category ‘Specialist Personnel’ applied to drivers, interpreters and other 
Austrians currently working for the occupation authorities. The services of 
these people could be called upon in time of war. ‘Ordinary Gendarmerie’ 
encompassed the gendarmerie, who was policing Austria’s rural areas. There 
were approximately 2,000 such people in the British Zone and, while they 
were not trained soldiers and they were not destined to become a military 
force in time of war, real emergency situations could necessitate the 
enlistment of the gendarmerie. The category of ‘Special Gendarmerie’ 
applied to six battalions; essentially paramilitary forces the three Western 
Powers had agreed to form. In December 1953, only two such battalions 
existed in the British Zone. The US was suggesting that Britain create a third 
to compensate in part for the withdrawing two British battalions.
There was a fourth category of Austrian auxiliaries identified by the War 
Department: the so-called Additional Austrian Auxiliaries. Britain, France and 
the United States had drawn up lists of Austrians in their respective zones, 
who had previous military training and experience. In late 1953, these lists 
totalled some 100,000 men, including those who were or who were destined
196 Ibid., paragraphs 8-9, p. 4.
197 Ibid., Appendix, ‘Note on Austrian Auxiliaries’.
to serve with the Special Gendarmerie. The idea was to call upon at least 
some of these people to supplement Western ranks, should a war break out. 
Completing the assessment of this new situation, the War Office observed:
It will be seen from the above that there are strong NATO military 
objections to the proposed course of action. On the other hand, it 
must be admitted that our present garrison in AUSTRIA, being 
without artillery and badly balanced in its composition, would have 
the greatest difficulty in carrying out the tasks assigned to it and 
could not be expected to make more than a small initial contribution 
to the fighting. The lost fighting power occasioned by the reduction to 
one battalion is not, therefore, likely to be of any considerable 
influence on the course of the fighting. In these circumstances, the 
advantages enumerated above would appear to out-weigh the 
disadvantages, and it is urged that the proposal for a reduction 
should be adopted.198
In addressing the way Britain might best go about implementing the decision 
to reduce troop strength in Austria, the War Office recommended that 
Eisenhower be notified directly by The Standing Committee, which would 
explain that the action reflected Britain’s desire to see the conclusion of an 
Austrian treaty. Also, Britain’s National Military Representative (NMR) at 
SHAPE would personally tell Eisenhower of the British plans. The Foreign 
Office would notify the US, France, Italy and Yugoslavia formally and only 
then would anything be said to the Austrian Government. The War Office felt 
the withdrawal should take place as quickly as possible, and because the 
relocating battalions would need three months notice, a hard and fast 
decision would have to be made before the end of August.
198 War Office Note, 24 August 1953, paragraph 6, W O  32/21399, p .3, PRO.
Another War Office Note, dated 2 December 1953, summarised the way 
British plans for the troops reduction went askew, and also sought to explain 
why this was not the War Office’s fault.199
The British were aware, as late as June 1953, that NATO Command fully 
expected the British garrisons in Austria and Trieste to remain available to 
Commander in Chief South (CINCSOUTH) even if those troops were 
relocated for political reasons. On 19 June, the Chiefs of Staff instructed the 
UK NMR to tell SHAPE that Britain ‘intended to withdraw British forces from 
Southern EUROPE when political considerations permitted’.200 In a huge 
logical leap, from reporting what the Military Representative had been 
instructed to do to the assumption that SHAPE understood Britain actually 
intended to withdraw troops from Austria, the Note records: This information 
produced no reaction from SACEUR.’ Worded in the way the War Office says 
it was, the report probably did not even catch SACEUR attention.
On 27 July 1953 the Foreign Office informed the War Office that it was 
politically possible to reduce the British garrison in Austria. On 27 August, the 
Chiefs of Staff approved the reduction from three to one battalion. They also 
ordered that the following procedure would be followed to inform NATO. First, 
the Chiefs of Staff would inform the Standing Group who would, in turn, 
inform SACEUR. At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff would ‘give SACEUR 
private information of our intention through the UK NMR at SHAPE’. These
199 War Office Note, ‘Record of Events Leading Up To the Reduction of the British Garrison in 
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instructions were sent to Washington and the British NMR at SHAPE on 2 
September 1953. The Foreign Office notified appropriate foreign 
governments.201
The 2 December Note then observes: ‘the Standing Group did not in fact 
inform SACEUR as they had been asked, and did not inform us (the War 
Office) that they had not done so until 8 September’. In the meantime, on 6 
September and without warning the Chiefs of Staff or the War Office, the 
Foreign Office issued a public announcement of the decision to reduce 
British Troops in Austria. The BBC reported the announcement in its news 
bulletins. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe was less than 
thrilled to hear about this significant news on the radio.
On 7 September, SACEUR informed the British Chiefs of Staff of a concern 
that the forces already available for Southern Austria were inadequate, and 
asked that the withdrawal of British troops be postponed.202 On 9 September, 
the Chiefs of Staff apologised to SACEUR for the manner in which the news 
of the troop withdrawal from Austria had reached him, but also confirmed the 
decision to implement troop reduction. Shortly thereafter, the American State 
Department asked the Foreign Office about the decision, and the Chiefs of 
Staff once again confirmed that the troop reduction would proceed as 
ordered. On 28 October, American Secretary of State Dulles dispatched a 
communication to the Foreign Office, in which he suggested that the
201 Ibid., paragraph 4, p. 1.
202 Ibid., paragraph 6, p. .2.
‘implications of the withdrawals would still warrant military discussions prior to 
implementation of the decision’. Once again, the Chiefs of Staff confirmed the 
troop withdrawal, but agreed to enter into discussions with the US, providing 
the US ‘defined the problem they wished to raise.’ A meeting was scheduled 
in Paris.
The 2 December Note acknowledges that it was ‘unfortunate’ that news of 
the troop reduction in Austria only reached NATO Headquarters through the 
NMR and not the Standing Committee -  which had obviously failed in their 
duties. It was also unfortunate that the Foreign Office chose to issue a public 
announcement ‘before the ground had been properly prepared’. It was the 
War Office’s view, however, that neither the Standing Group nor SHAPE 
could complain that they had not been warned about the action.203
The Foreign Secretary was later to inform the Cabinet that: The United 
States Government had expressed surprise that we had not consulted them 
before deciding in 1953 to reduce the strength of the British forces in Austria 
to one battalion’. After discussing this matter and the American suggestion 
that Britain send an additional battalion to Austria, the Cabinet concluded that 
the Foreign Office should reject this suggestion.204 The Cabinet also advised 
that the reply to the United States Government should point out that Britain 
had only recently accepted the obligation of stationing four divisions on the
203 Ibid., paragraphs 10-11, p. 2.
204 Cabinet Minute, C.C.(54) 73d Conclusions, Minute 2, 5.11.54, PREM 11/818, PRO.
European Continent. If NATO wanted a larger force in Austria, NATO should 
transfer some units from Germany.
U p d a te d  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  S o v ie t  T h r e a t
One can place this lengthy and at times cranky dialogue over two battalions 
of British ground forces into perspective by glancing briefly at US and British 
intelligence estimates of Soviet strength. The Top Secret US National 
Intelligence Estimate, NIE-87, published by the Central Intelligence Agency 
on 28 May 1953 and declassified on 14 March 1995, Appendix A, reveals 
that, as of April 1953, Soviet forces stationed on the ground in the European 
Soviet Satellite states were estimated to number 538,000 men organised into 
no fewer than twenty eight divisions.205 In addition to Soviet forces, Satellite 
ground forces were estimated to number 1,317,000 men organised into 
seventy four divisions.206
This estimate was updated in August 1954, at which time the CIA observed 
that ‘the emergence of a new leadership in Moscow has not weakened Soviet 
control over the Satellites. ... Soviet control of the Satellites has in effect 
moved the Soviet frontier into Central Europe.’207 Total Soviet strength in 
Europe was revised to 531,000 Soviet troops and 24,000 security troops,
205 Central Intelligence Agency NIE-87, ‘Probable Developments Within the European Satellites, 
Through Mid-1955’, 28 May 1953, Appendix A, NARA II. Note: for the purposes of NIE-87, the term 
‘European Satellite’ describes East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria 
and Albania. A full index of National Intelligence Estimates can be found on the Home page of the 
Center for the Study of Intelligence, <http://www.odci.gov/csi/index.html>, [4 May 2001].
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207 Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Estimate, 12-54, 24 August 1954, ‘Probable 
Developments in the European Satellites through mid-1956’, pp. 1 - 12, NARA II.
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with approximately 415,000 (twenty two line divisions) posted in East 
Germany. The remaining 140,000 (eight line divisions) were located in 
Austria, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. Soviet air units based in the 
Satellites and the Soviet occupation Zone of Austria consisted of some 2,200 
aircraft and 1,800 men. NIE 12-54 continues to report:
The Satellite ground forces have become a substantial element in the 
balance of military power in Europe. Their present strength is 
estimated at 1,115,000 men organised in 82 line divisions of which 6 
are armoured and 13 mechanized. The Satellite ground forces, with 
the exception of the East German, have probably reached nearly the 
desired peacetime strength level.208
British Intelligence was still relying on a fundamental assessment of the 
Soviet threat completed by the Joint Intelligence Committee and Chiefs of 
Staff in April 1952. While British and American intelligence agencies 
exchanged information and analyses rather liberally, their conclusions 
sometimes differed. How significant this was remains debatable. There was 
no all-out war and therefore no real test as to whose information was more 
precise. Operationally and strategically, the United States was calling the 
shots. The British military retained freedom to act as they and their civilian 
superiors saw fit, but their overall capabilities were such that Britain 
depended on American military might and on US leadership in NATO. All of 
this makes the unilateral British decision to downgrade military presence in 
Austria without consulting the US even stranger. One wonders what the 
Chiefs of Staff hoped to gain by simply pulling two battalions out of Austria
208 Ibid., p. 13.
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without allowing the US and NATO some time to factor this troop reduction 
into their overall planning.
Soviet Army strength as of 1 December 1951 was estimated at 2.8 million 
men (excluding security troops) organised into 178 line divisions, plus thirty 
seven artillery and anti-aircraft divisions. Twenty two divisions were posted in 
East Germany and 8 throughout the rest of occupied Europe. Eighty five 
divisions were in the Western part of the USSR, excluding the Urals; 
eighteen divisions were in the Caucasus; thirteen in East Siberia, Southern 
Urals and Turkestan; thirty two divisions were in Transbaikal, the Far West, 
Western Siberia, maritime areas and Manchuria. It was estimated that the 
European Satellite countries had seventy one line divisions, but that the 
majority of these could not immediately be deployed to the front lines.209 This 
report estimated that some 11,500,000 reservists with military experience 
would be available to the Soviet army on the day mobilisation for war was 
ordered. Another 15,000,000 men would be available from industry and 
agriculture. Thus, the total available manpower, including those already 
serving, was estimated to be 19,000,000 men.210 The Soviet Tactical Air 
Force consisted of fifteen Tactical Air Armies.211 The Fighter Defence Force 
would consist entirely of jet aircraft by 1955, and the Long-Range Air Force 
consisted of three Air Armies, one in the Far East and two in the W est212 In
209 Chiefs of Staff Committee and Joint Intelligence Committee Top Secret Report, ‘Soviet and 
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Austria, the Soviet Army maintained some 26,500 men in two line divisions, 
along with 1,500 security troops.213
Prior to the British withdrawal, the West had, in total, some 15,000 troops in 
Austria.214 Given this NATO-Warsaw Pact match up, an Anglo-American 
spat over two infantry battalions hardly seems worth the effort.
C o n c l u s io n s
During the period covered by this chapter, no progress was made in 
negotiations toward an Austrian State Treaty or toward an end of the 
occupation, despite new initiatives introduced by the United States and 
backed by Britain and France. A unanimous resolution by the United Nations 
General Assembly calling for an end to the occupation also did not result in 
any significant change in Austria’s status. The Soviet Union continued to 
block progress in Four Power negotiations, even though the West agreed to 
meet all of the Kremlin’s economic demands in return for a signature on a 
treaty. It seems that Stalin’s attention beginning in 1949 turned from Europe 
to the Far East where Chinese Communists had won a civil war and 
introduced the world to the People’s Republic of China, and where Korea’s 
Communist leader sought and received Moscow’s support for an invasion of 
the South.
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The outbreak of war in the Pacific served to heighten tensions between East 
and West in Europe; however, Vienna remained one of the few places in the 
world where British and American representatives continued meeting with 
their Soviet counterparts, even while soldiers from the respective countries 
confronted each other on the battlefield in Korea. Initial Communist gains in 
that war worried Austrians who, by this time, assumed their continued 
wellbeing depended to a large extent on Britain and America’s ability to 
protect them. British diplomatic and military reporting from Austria included, 
for the first time, acknowledgement that many Austrians did not, in fact, wish 
to see an early end of the occupation, despite what political leaders were
saying for public consumption. There was an honest fear of the
consequences, should Soviet forces remain on the ground after the West had 
left the country. The continuing rape of Austria’s industrial and natural 
resources by Soviet occupation forces, along with the kidnapping campaign 
described in earlier chapters, did nothing to ease these fears.
Communist inspired violent strikes in 1950 also did not help to relieve 
Austrian concerns about the future, especially given the fate of Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, Austria’s neighbours. There is still a controversy over the 
nature of these strikes, with some arguing they represented a concerted, 
planned attempt by Communists to overthrow the coalition Government. It 
would be irresponsible to discount the overwhelming evidence of active 
Soviet support for the Austrian Communist Party during these violent
demonstrations, as this chapter has demonstrated. Soviet trucks carried
demonstrators from the Soviet occupation Zone to Vienna -  police officers
recorded license numbers as evidence -  and Soviet field commanders 
refused to allow Austrian police to respond to the orders of their commanding 
officers to move swiftly to Vienna in support of their colleagues confronting 
violent demonstrators on the streets. In other incidents, Soviet officers 
interfered with police attempting to expel Communist demonstrators from 
public buildings they had occupied. Then again, one must note the comments 
of a prominent KPO leader who claimed Moscow had specifically told him 
that the Soviet Union did not want undue trouble in Austria at that time -  the 
Kremlin had enough to do in Korea. Franz Olah, the Socialist labour leader 
who is credited with doing much to neutralise the violent Communist gangs, 
expressed the opinion that there was no planned putsch, but rather an 
attempt by the Communists to increase their influence in the unions and over 
the coalition government, something they had been unable to do through 
democratic elections. Probably the most persuasive evidence against the 
putsch theory is the fact there was no successful putsch. Why would a 
Communist coup not succeed with the whole Soviet occupation army behind 
it and Western forces badly outnumbered, unwilling to intervene? One 
reasonable explanation is that there was no plan, but the KPO saw an 
unexpected opportunity to increase its position and influence, but did not act 
with sufficient resolve and commitment to succeed in doing so. There is also 
some reason to conclude that the Soviet military was not sure what it should 
do. Certainly, there was direct intervention by Soviet military personnel, but it 
seemed to be sporadic and without an overall plan of action. The controversy 
will not be resolved beyond doubt until more KPO files are available to the 
public and, most importantly, Russian archives are opened to the
international community. In the meantime, the important point is that the KPO 
did not enjoy expanded influence as a result of these strikes, nor did they 
ever succeed in winning more than about five percent support from the 
Austrian people.
The March 1952 attempt by the Western Allies to break through the 
negotiations logjam with an abbreviated treaty was, whatever else it may 
have been, a sign of desperation. Everybody was sick and tired of the 
occupation, with absolutely no indication of any kind that a treaty would be 
forthcoming at any point in the future. The idea was to abandon the longer 
draft that was holding up progress, and concentrate on a shorter document 
consisting of only eight articles, one of which sought to resolve the sticky 
German assets issue with a straightforward statement. If this could be 
signed, everybody could go home. Again, the Soviets baulked. Some 
Austrian academics continue to dismiss this initiative with the cynical 
allegation that it was nothing more than an American propaganda stunt. 
Hopefully, this chapter has posed certain questions for these people, and it 
will be interesting to see if there is an honest attempt to reconcile the 
propaganda allegation with the language actually in the policy document 
signed by the President of the United States, which stated specifically what 
the intent behind the short treaty was. The comments by Anthony Eden in 
support of the abbreviated treaty should also be noted seriously. Stearman 
has reminded us that, when the abbreviated treaty was submitted, all of the 
agreed draft articles were long out of date. A lot had happened between 1949 
and 1952, and it made sense to update the whole treaty exercise. Whatever
the intent behind it, the strategy failed and the Soviets continued refusing to 
even discuss an Austrian State Treaty.
Stalin’s death during this period marked a major turning point in East-West 
relations, but it took almost two years before the ensuing situation resulted in 
a direct effect on Austria, as the next and final chapter will tell. In the 
meantime, Britain made the unilateral decision to reduce her occupation 
force by two-thirds, without giving advanced notice to the other Western 
Allies. This did not really make a great difference, because only two 
battalions were involved and the West never had planned to hold Austria in 
the event of war, anyway. Some signs of progress began to appear when the 
Western Allies appointed civilian High Commissioners, reduced occupation 
costs and some control measures, such as censorship and travel restrictions, 
began to be relaxed. And the Austrian Government was, at the end of this 
period, in the hands of Chancellor Julius Raab, who was to guide his country 
through the surprising, final days of foreign occupation. But nobody could 
sense that this was in the cards in March 1953.
C ha pter  F iv e : End G ame
The post-Stalin era brought significant change in the way Soviet occupation 
authorities managed Austrian affairs. In 1953, a civilian Soviet High 
Commissioner was appointed. The three Western Powers had made this 
change in 1950. Censorship stopped and zone controls were relaxed. If the 
Soviets still held any hopes of a strengthening Communist movement in 
Austria, these must have been shattered by the 1953 elections, in which the 
KPO won just above five percent of the votes which, as Bader points out, 
was also what they were able to achieve in Lower Austria and Burgenland, 
both in the Soviet Occupation Zone. Not one Communist delegate from 
Burgenland was elected to parliament.1 Still, the Soviets gave no sign of any 
willingness to end the occupation. As became obvious at the Berlin 
conference of foreign ministers, the Kremlin - or at least Molotov - was no 
longer attempting to conceal his objective to link settlement of the Austria 
problem with Germany.
This final chapter recovers the historical narrative from the point where the 
British Foreign Office was preparing for a Four Power meeting, possibly to be 
held in Switzerland. This conference never took place, but the preparations 
were not in vain because the Soviet Union agreed to a conference of foreign 
ministers in Berlin somewhat later. In the meantime, two policy speeches, 
delivered by President Dwight Eisenhower and his secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, respectively, attracted serious attention in the Kremlin and put 
the Soviets somewhat off-balance. The narrative moves swiftly on to the end
1 William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1966) p. 199.
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of 1953 and the Tripartite talks on Germany and Austria in Paris (21 October 
- 2 November 1953), and further to the Berlin Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, the first meeting of the Four Power foreign ministers since June 
1949. It was in Berlin that the issue of Austria’s eventual neutrality became 
more serious in considerations connected with an end to the occupation.
A main focus of the chapter is on early 1955 when the Austrian Chancellor 
was invited to Moscow for bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union, and 
when Moscow finally agreed to sign the Austrian State Treaty. Here, 
reference is made to certain disagreements in the historiography over how 
the Western Powers reacted to Moscow’s invitation to Raab, and also the 
explanation as to why Moscow abruptly terminated opposition to the Austrian 
State Treaty. Some historians have sought to establish that Britain and the 
United States went to great lengths to prevent Raab from visiting Moscow. 
These accounts are erroneous, as is demonstrated in the following 
paragraphs.
Most of the discussion at this juncture is on strategy rather than policy. 
Events moved swiftly and a series of important strategic decisions had to be 
made quickly when the Kremlin suddenly shifted tactics and showed signs 
that they wanted to end the occupation of Austria. British policy remained 
essentially the same, although Anthony Eden had withdrawn somewhat from 
Bevin’s headlong rush to end the occupation at any cost. As he showed in 
Berlin, Eden was prepared to continue voluntary concessions to Moscow, but 
with a touch more balance than his predecessors had been able to muster.
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Britain’s refined Austria policy was spelled out in very useful fashion in a 
secret report prepared in the Office of the Prime Minister toward the end of 
1953, following Tripartite talks in Paris. Interest had grown in the possibility 
of Austrian neutrality, and so the Foreign Office had to look anew at the 
various options the prospect of a neutral Austria created, but there was 
minimal difficulty and virtually no controversy surrounding these 
deliberations. Nor did the final position on neutrality differ from analyses that 
had been more or less accepted all along.
Some of this chapter is based on US archival material. Readers should 
accept that Britain and the United States remained in very close liaison, 
despite the occasional spat, and most if not all communications from the 
West to Moscow were agreed in advance by the three Western Powers. But 
at this point in time, it was the United States and the Soviet Union who were 
calling the shots, and any presentation narrowly focused on British policy, to 
the exclusion of this reality, would be very brief indeed. Important events 
occurred during this period, and it is necessary to refer to them in the interest 
of perspective and continuity.
T he  W in d s  o f  C h a n g e
Audrey Cronin referred to the period 1953-1954 as bringing ‘Signs of 
Change’.2 There certainly were major changes in the world at large, as 
dramatic Cold War events continued to unfold, with the advent of 
thermonuclear weapons and introduction of the strategic concepts of Massive 
Retaliation and Mutual Assured Destruction. But progress toward an Austrian
2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria, (Ithica, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 120.
State treaty did not feature among the gifts the period 1953-1954 brought to 
the world. Neither did British policy regarding Austria change all that much. 
Britain continued to press for an Austrian State Treaty - a matter of 
increasing importance at the time, in part because the cessation of Marshall 
Aid in 1952 placed greater economic burdens on Great Britain. She also 
maintained her long-standing willingness to pay whatever bribes Moscow 
demanded in return for a Russian signature on that treaty, although Eden 
was less intrigued by this prospect than was Bevin.
Both Britain and the United States were less worried about Austria’s 
capability to protect her internal security than they were during the late 
1940s, given progress that had been achieved in training and equipping the 
gendarmerie, and few in the West really envisioned tiny Austria as an 
important participant in NATO. Austria’s geographic location was, however, 
of interest and the West did not want to see her absorbed into the Soviet 
Bloc. As it turned out, these concerns were legitimate, and Austria’s eventual 
policy of perpetual neutrality did, in fact, become a matter of some 
inconvenience to NATO. Senior American diplomat Wolfgang J. Lehman 
observes:
From the strategic and military standpoint a neutralized Austria next 
to a neutralized Switzerland across the Alps was more advantageous 
to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact than an occupied Austria 
whose western zones were for all practical purposes a part of NATO 
as long as the country was occupied...From the perspective of one of 
my later assignments as Political Advisor (to) the US European 
Command from 1970 to early 1973, I can tell you that Austrian 
neutrality under the State treaty did cause serious problems for 
NATO defense planning. Not only that, but it complicated our ability 
to deal with other contingencies not directly related to the NATO -
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Warsaw pact confrontation, such as military overflights from 
Germany to the Middle East.3
By the end of 1954, the issue of Austria’s neutrality had been conceded in 
both London and Washington. From Vienna, the Austrian Chancellor had 
written to the Soviets promising that Austria would never align itself with any 
military block. In Berlin, Foreign Minister Figl repeated this pledge. The 
British had given their blessings to Austrian neutrality and the American 
Secretary of State had formally acknowledged that, in the eyes of the USA, 
neutrality was an honourable status for a nation - providing that it was not 
imposed by others. In Moscow, Chancellor Raab once again confirmed that 
Austria would not join any military alliances or allow foreign bases on 
Austrian soil. The fact that the Western Powers recognised the potential 
problems a neutral Austria could pose did not prevent the neutrality argument 
from holding the day. America’s military leaders in Washington objected to 
neutrality for understandable strategic reasons, but they did not dominate 
foreign policy and their views on this issue were not accepted. Austria was 
going to be neutral. Only the Soviets - and specifically Molotov - appeared 
hard to convince.
The Soviets did not want to see Austria become a Western military base, nor 
did they want Austria to affiliate with a Western European security alliance. 
These concerns were evident in all Kremlin negotiations on Austrian issues. 
However, it seems that Molotov’s main objective was to use Austria and the 
West’s desire for her independence as bargaining leverage in the overall 
effort to prevent Germany from re-arming and, later, from acceding to NATO.
3 Wolfgang J. Lehman personal letter to author, 12 April 1999, p. 1, original in author’s personal files.
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Perhaps he thought that, by demonstrating Soviet willingness to grant 
independence to Austria in return for a guarantee of neutrality and a promise 
that Austria would not join any European military alliance, the West would 
see that the USSR was prepared to resolve the more important German 
issue in the same way. This was the American Government’s assessment of 
Molotov’s hard stance on the Austrian treaty. On 30 October 1953, the 
Secretary of Defence wrote to the Secretary of State: There is the further 
important consideration of the effect of an Austrian treaty on the final 
settlement of the German problem’.4 Also, US National Intelligence Estimate 
No. 95, approved on 22 September 1953, stated:
It is also unlikely that the Kremlin will consent to an Austrian treaty 
so long as the German question remains unresolved. The Kremlin 
might become willing to accept an Austrian treaty which it believed 
would serve as a precedent for a German settlement advantageous 
to the USSR.5
Stalin must have approved Molotov’s negotiating positions on these issues. 
But Khrushchev did not seem to be so interested in connecting the two 
issues, at least according to what he says he told Molotov: ‘the Austrians and 
Germans are nations [natsii] close to one another. ...Why should we stick our 
noses into that matter?’6 Whether or not Khrushchev was inclined to separate 
the Austrian and German questions, thereby departing from Stalin’s strategy, 
it remained fairly clear from Soviet behaviour that the Kremlin wanted to 
prevent the rearmament of Germany and Germany’s accession to NATO. It
4 Enclosure, letter from Secretary of Defence to Secretary of State, 30 October 1953, ‘US Position 
With respect to Austria’, p. 2, RG 59, file 663.001/10-3053, NARA.
5 US National Intelligence Estimate No. 95, ‘Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through M id-1955’, 
approved 22 September 1953, RG 263, NARA.
6 Concluding Words by N.S. Khrushchev to the CC CCSU, CWIHP Bulletin No. 10, p. 43.
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was also clear in the post-Stalinist era that Molotov thought he could use 
Austria as leverage in pursuing these objectives.
B r it is h  P o l ic y  T o w a r d  A u s tr ia  in t h e  Po s t -S t a lin  E r a
The frenetic pace with which Ernest Bevin had pursued an end to the 
occupation, at almost any cost, had been reduced to a spry quick-step by the 
end of 1953. No longer was Britain pressing the United States to pay the 
Russians whatever they asked in return for a Kremlin signature on an 
Austrian treaty. British policy had been reduced to a simple and 
straightforward objective: ‘to conclude an Austrian Treaty which will ensure 
the political and economic independence of Austria,’ and ‘In the event of 
Soviet obstruction, make it clear that the latter alone is responsible for failure 
to agree on a treaty’.7
A comprehensive policy paper prepared in the Office of the Prime Minister in 
the wake of a Tripartite meeting in Paris, 21 October - 2 November 1953, 
and designed to prepare the British team for a possible ministerial meeting 
(in Lugano) with the Soviets, set forth these policy objectives and, at the 
same time, described what the British Government saw as probable Soviet 
objectives regarding Austria: To obstruct the conclusion of any Austrian 
Treaty until the German problem has been settled in a manner satisfactory to 
the Soviet Union.’8 This paper is useful because it gives a detailed summary 
of British policy toward Austria.
7 Office of the Prime Minister Report, ‘Tripartite Official Talks on Germany and Austria, Paris
October 21 - November 2, 1953’, 2 November 1953, PREM 11/419 (Records of the Prime Minister’s 
Office, Office Papers, Correspondence and Papers 1951-1964, Foreign Policy), p. 4, PRO.
Ibid.
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The British Government was hardly optimistic about the outcome of another 
meeting with the Soviets, either about Austria or the larger problem, 
Germany:
Before the usual wrangle on the agenda, the Conference should 
begin with a general discussion, in which Ministers could present a 
broad outline of their views on Germany and Austria and on the 
problem of security, and could set out the principle objections to the 
proposals advanced by the Soviet Union during the past few years. 
... If we are to achieve our basic objectives, we must avoid a 
breakdown of the Conference on the establishment of an agenda, 
particularly on the problem of the order in which the various points 
should be discussed (i.e. whether free elections or a peace treaty 
should come first, or whether the Austria problem should be dealt 
with before the German problem).9
If the Soviets tried to relegate Austria issues to routine diplomatic channels, 
rather than the special machinery set up to deal exclusively with Austria, 
Britain’s representatives planned to object and argue strongly that, while 
diplomatic channels should always be kept open, the Austrian Treaty issues 
must be discussed at the Conference, and discussed while the ministers 
were still assembled. However, if the Soviets wanted to refer Austria back to 
the Deputies, Britain should agree, but insist that the Deputies be instructed 
specifically to solve the problem before the Conference ended. Discussions 
on Austria should follow, not precede Germany in the discussion. The 
Soviets should be told in no uncertain terms that Britain did not ‘link the 
Austrian Treaty in any way with a German settlement’, and that Britain 
wanted a prompt conclusion of the Austrian Treaty. Should the Soviets refuse 
to discuss Austria because of the Abbreviated Treaty, they should be told
9 Ibid.
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that the West had already withdrawn the Short Treaty and was prepared to 
continue discussions on the long draft.
It was essential that the Lugano discussions not permit the Soviets to evade 
their responsibility for the non-conclusion of a treaty. The three Western 
Ministers were to indicate at the outset that they were ready to negotiate on 
the basis of the long treaty. To go beyond this draft on any point was to be 
out of the question and incompatible with the Commitment of the Four 
Powers to re-establish the independence and sovereignty of Austria.10
According to the briefing paper, Article 35 of the draft treaty, providing for 
final disposition of the German asset issues, still remained the most 
controversial and difficult treaty issue. It was Britain’s policy objective to ease 
the burden this article imposed on Austria and to restrict the extra-territorial 
position which the Soviets had claimed to date and might continue to claim in 
post-treaty Austria unless the wording of Article 35 was amended.
British representatives were instructed to refuse to discuss Trieste, should 
the topic arise, because it had nothing to do with the Austrian State Treaty. 
Also, any attempt by the Soviets to discuss denazification in Austria should 
be avoided on the grounds that the issues had already been resolved. If the 
Soviets attempted to attack the West because of support for the Austrian 
gendarmerie, they should be reminded that there were no legal bars 
preventing Austria from taking steps to protect its own internal security. The 
West should press for a general exchange of views by Ministers, in which
10 Ibid., p. 10.
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they would examine the question of participation by the Austrian Government 
and, if possible, would agree on an Austrian Treaty. ‘We could, however ... 
recommend that the question be referred to the Deputies. We should 
naturally refuse to establish any link between the Austrian question and the 
German question.’11
T he  B er lin  C o n f e r e n c e
On 26 November 1953, Leopold Figl replaced Karl Gruber as Austria’s 
Foreign Minister. On the same date, the Soviet Government called for a 
meeting of the Four Power foreign ministers in Berlin, and Figl had an 
immediate opportunity to brush up his diplomatic skills. Austria was invited to 
meet with the four foreign ministers for the very first time under these formal 
circumstances, and an official Austrian delegation went to Berlin. The 
delegation consisted of: Foreign Minister Leopold Figl; State Secretary Bruno 
Kreisky; Dr Gordian Freiherr von Gudenus, who went on to complete a 
distinguished career in Austria’s diplomatic service; Figl’s loyal and trusted 
Secretary, Lukas Beroldingen; and the delegation’s interpreter, Anton 
Bundschuh.12 From the Austrian and Western perspectives, it was hoped that 
this Soviet initiative signalled a change in attitude toward Austria, and that the 
conference would lead to conclusion of the state treaty. Alas, these hopes 
were once again to be dashed by a surprisingly obstinate Moscow.
11 Ibid., p. 5.
12 Bruno Kreisky, Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen aus Ftinf Jahrzehnten, (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 
1986), p. 459. Biographical information on Beroldingen from Landtag vom Niederdsterreich, Tagung 
2002/03. der XVPeriode, Festsitzung vom 1 Oktober 2002, p. 13, „Sitzungsbericht: Festaktes 
Landtages Niederdsterreich,aus Anlafi , 100 Geburtstag von Leopold Figl, ’ Dienstag den 1. Oktober 
2002. Listed information on Gudenus from The Complete Peerage: A Genealogical Survey o f the 
Peerage o f  Britain as Well as the Royal Families o f Europe, Name Index 60, 
<http://www.hostultra.eom/~thepeerage/i60.htm#7704>. [18 July 2003].
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The Four Power Ministers met from 25 January to 18 February 1954, but the 
discussion on Austria was placed last on the agenda, beginning only on 12 
February, so the Austrian delegation was left to cool its heels in Berlin for 
more than two weeks. For the very first time, the Soviet delegation revealed 
that Kremlin policy toward Germany might have changed. This was to be 
confirmed over the next year. Soviet German policy was now based on an 
acceptance that there would be two independent German states (the so- 
called Two States Theory).13 When the topic of Austria did come up, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov began the discussion by suggesting an Austrian 
treaty in which the Allied Commission would be dissolved but occupation 
troops would remain in Austria (not Vienna) until the German peace treaty 
was concluded. Also, Austria would have to undertake not to enter into any 
military alliance or permit foreign military bases on Austrian territory.14 
Finally, Molotov said the treaty would have to provide for the redemption of 
German assets in goods, not currency. He demanded a revival of the 
discussion on Trieste.15
13 Gerhard Wettig, 'Die Beginnende Umorientierung der Sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik im Friijahr 
und Sommer 1953', Deutschland Archiv, 28 (1995), [495-507,] pp. 495-507.
14 In his memoirs, Kreisky describes a luncheon conversation he and Figl had with Molotov at the 
Soviet Embassy (sic) in East Berlin on 16 February 1954. He says Molotov specifically told them that 
the Soviet Union would agree to a treaty in return for agreement to keep 5,000 Soviet troops in 
Austria after the treaty was signed and until the German treaty was signed. Kreisky writes that he and 
Figl were very clear that Austria could never accept such an arrangement, but he does not report what 
the Austrians actually said to Molotov on that luncheon occasion. Kreisky says, correctly, that 
Molotov then raised this prospect in the actual meetings, but he does not pursue this development in 
the memoirs. He must have had his dates mixed up. See Kreisky, Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen 
aus Fiinf Jahrzehnten, pp. 460-462.
15 Department of State Publication Number 5399, ‘Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, 
January 25 - February 18, 1954,’ Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1954, pp. 
233-234.
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British delegates had prepared well for this occasion, as the 2 November 
1953 policy paper confirms. Her representatives, backed by the other two 
Western foreign ministers, stuck to their guns and summarily rejected 
Molotov’s idea of having occupation troops remain in the country after an 
Austrian treaty was signed. The West also took a formal position on the issue 
of Austria’s neutrality - a subject that had grown in importance since the last 
foreign ministers’ meeting. It was all right with London for Austria to adopt a 
foreign policy of neutrality, but this should not be imposed from outside. 
Rather, it should be left to the first free and sovereign Austrian Government 
to declare the country’s neutrality after the treaty was signed and ratified, if 
this is what they wanted to do. The United States agreed and, on 16 
February 1953, Secretary Dulles made the following statement:
A neutral status is an honourable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a 
nation. Under the Austrian State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria 
would be free to choose for herself to be a neutral nation. Certainly, 
the United States would fully respect Austria’s choice in this 
respect.16
Two days into the discussion of Austria, the United States attempted to press 
the Soviet Union toward decisive action. Dulles volunteered that Washington 
was prepared to accept Moscow’s draft on the five articles of the Austrian 
treaty still under contention, if the treaty would be signed within four days. 
Molotov rejected this offer and introduced, yet again, the absurd issue of 
dried peas and the post-treaty status of Trieste - neither of which had 
anything to do with the Austrian State Treaty. Molotov also introduced new 
Soviet language preventing another AnschlufS, even though this departed
16 Ibid., pp. 188-208. See also William L Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f Austria, 
(Bonn, Vienna, Zurich: Siegler &  Co, 1962) p. 145.
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-from draft Article 4, which had already been agreed by the Four Powers. It 
was obvious to Western representatives that the Soviet Union was not going 
to agree to an Austrian treaty.17
The first to respond to Molotov’s presentation in Berlin was Figl, who said 
Austria would accept any condition in the present draft treaty, but could not, 
under any circumstances, accept the prospect of a continuing occupation by 
foreign troops. Secretary Dulles responded to Molotov strongly, dismissing 
the possibility of a discussion on Trieste, and calling for a discussion on the 
five draft treaty articles still not agreed. He said that acceptance of Molotov’s 
new proposals would require a total re-write of the draft treaty, to eliminate all 
references to independence and removal of occupation troops. The treaty, 
Dulles said, would thus become not a treaty for liberation of Austria, but a 
treaty for the subjugation of Austria. Molotov stuck with his initial demands 
and blamed lack of progress in treaty negotiations on the alleged failure by 
the Western Powers to meet commitments on Trieste and the Italian peace 
treaty. He said the Soviet Union considered inclusion of specific wording 
forbidding a second Anschlufl necessary because of the ongoing efforts by 
the West to construct a European defence community. For all practical 
purposes, he ignored French and British offers to accept a new article on the 
Anschlufi question, once again demonstrating that his primary objective at 
the conference was to obstruct progress.
The United States Information Agency reported from Berlin:
17 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
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The real issues in the Austrian question were brought out strongly 
today in the best parliamentary drama of the conference.... Only new 
point we have from today’s session is that Molotov is hard pressed to 
keep from admitting to the world that he is unwilling to accept a draft 
treaty that he proposed in 1949. This crystal clear evidence that the 
Soviet came here unwilling to do anything to improve the condition of 
the German or Austrian people, to relieve them of any burden of 
Soviet occupation and exploitation, and unwilling to do anything to 
give security to Western Europe and relax tensions. The Soviet 
Union is panicky with fear of how it can continue to hold onto ill- 
gotten and ill-digested spoils of war and postwar confusion.18
On the last day of the Berlin Conference, Foreign Minister Figl told Molotov 
that Austria would agree to allow occupation troops to remain in Austria for 
longer than the (already agreed) ninety days after a treaty was signed, if this 
concession would allow for conclusion of the treaty there and then, in Berlin. 
Molotov brushed this gesture aside, and the Conference ended in yet another 
failure.
A fte r m a th  o f  t h e  B e r lin  C o n f e r e n c e
Stearman describes how, in the wake of the Berlin Conference, the Soviet 
‘new course’ in Austria began to adopt a much harsher tone. The increase in 
Soviet occupation abuses was met with more frequent appeals by the 
Austrian Government to ease the burdens of the occupation. On 22 July 
1954, the Austrians proposed a meeting between the four Allied 
ambassadors and the Austrian Government to discuss the occupation. 
Moscow responded by suggesting that such a meeting be for the purposes of 
discussing the Austrian State Treaty. Two months later, on 12 October, the 
Western Powers responded positively to this Soviet note, but pointed out that 
this kind of meeting would have to be convened by the Allied Council, and
18 United States Information Agency Priority telegram TOUSIA 191, 13 February 1953, p. 1, RG 59, 
DF 1950-1954, 663.001/2-1354, NARA II.
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that the West would not be prepared to accept a treaty unless it called for the 
withdrawal of all occupation troops. In between these two notes, the Trieste 
situation was resolved, permitting the evacuation of Western troops from that 
territory. It is reasonable to assume that the Western Powers waited until 
Trieste was resolved before replying to the Soviet note, thereby depriving 
Molotov of one of his favourite obstacles in Austrian treaty negotiations.
We now know that the Kremlin had been surprised by a speech delivered by 
American President Eisenhower in which he specifically identified the 
Austrian State Treaty as an issue of major importance to the United States. 
According to Oleg Troyanovsky, a distinguished diplomat and senior foreign 
policy advisor to Khrushchev, the latter was impressed by this speech, given 
before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 16 April 1953. 
Eisenhower called upon the Soviet leadership to ‘seize the opportunity for 
peace’ by departing from its war of words and taking four concrete actions.19 
He set forth four conditions which the Soviet Union should fulfil as proof of 
her good intentions: truce in Korea, the Austrian State treaty, return of 
German and Japanese prisoners of war, and positive steps toward 
disarmament. Troyanovsky confirms that ‘these points remained firmly 
imprinted in Nikita Khrushchev’s memory. In the ensuing years, I heard him 
refer several times to Eisenhower’s April 16 speech.’20
19 Eisenhower speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 16 April 1953, full text in 
US State Department Bulletin 17, [27 April 1953,] Vol. X X V II, No. 722, 27 April 1953, as published 
in Dwight D Eisenhower: Public Messages, Bulletins and Speeches, Vol 1.
20 Oleg Troyanovsky, Nikita Khrushchev: Fresh Perspectives on the Last Communist, Presentation by 
Troyanovsky - (trans.) David Gehrenbeck, Eileen Kane and Alla Bashenko, (Providence: 1998), 43 ,
p. 282.
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The fact that the Kremlin was thrown off-balance by a more hostile speech 
given just days later by US Secretary of State, Allen Dulles, is not so 
important. It was Eisenhower’s speech that Khrushchev remembered, that 
made such an impression, and that remained influential to Khrushchev’s 
thinking regarding the Kremlin’s interaction with the United States on 
Austria21
As interested as he may have been in the American President’s remarks on 
Austria, it took Khrushchev some time to react. After the Berlin Conference, 
Soviet behaviour in Austria became even more obstreperous. In March 1954, 
the Soviets arrested several Austrian policemen and gendarmerie when they 
refused to remove posters protesting the Soviet obstructionism in Berlin.22 In 
April, the Soviet Information Service announced that the ‘634’ Austrian 
prisoners still in the USSR would be regarded .as war criminals and that they 
would have to serve their full sentences. The Austrian Government protested 
vociferously, stating that Austria had evidence there were some 1,500 
Austrian prisoners in the Soviet Union, of whom 900 were civilians arrested 
since the end of the war.23 In May, the Soviet High Commissioner summoned 
Chancellor Raab and Vice Chancellor Scharf and accused the Austrian 
Government of conducting hostile and subversive activities against the Soviet 
Union. May and June saw increased Soviet attacks on the Austrian press, 
the re-instatement of Soviet spot checks on traffic crossing the Soviet Zone
21 Dulles speech entitled ‘The First 90 Days’ delivered to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
18 April 1953, as published in US State Department Bulletin, Vol. X X V II, No. 722, 27 April 1953.
22 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria, p. 146, citing United Press, Vienna, 25 
March 1954.
23 Ibid., p. 146n.
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borders, and reintroduction of film controls.24 The post-Stalin Russian peace 
offensive seemed to be having little effect on Austria.
In December 1954, the Soviets launched a vicious, multi-faceted propaganda 
campaign against the West in Austria. The general thrust of this assault was 
that ratification of the October Paris Agreement would spell lasting trouble for 
the Austrian State Treaty. This was seen as the Kremlin’s last desperate 
attempt to head off Germany’s accession to NATO. Late in the afternoon of 
20 December, Soviet High Commissioner llyishev, who was at the time 
Chairman of the Allied Council, convened the first special meeting that body 
had ever held in its nine-year history. He did not announce the reason for this 
unprecedented action and so, not surprisingly, rumours began flowing in 
Western circles, with some preaching optimism and .predicting a major 
change in Soviet attitude. After all, there had to be some important reason 
llyishev broke precedent in the way he did. Once again the Kremlin 
disappointed, llyishev introduced a series of entirely new demands, including 
the withdrawal from the French occupation Zone of some 300 American 
troops who were there to man supply depots linking Italian ports with US 
Forces Austria. These troops had been in the same location for more than 
eight years without Soviet complaint, and it was more than obvious that the 
Soviets were once again scraping the barrel for any pretext, however 
implausible, to cause difficulty, llyishev told the Allied Council that further 
negotiations on Austrian independence would be ‘hopeless and useless,’ 
especially if the Paris Agreements integrating West Germany into the
24 Ibid., p. 146n, citing Wiener Zeitung, 18 M ay 1954.
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Western European security alliance were ratified. This became a prime 
sound bite in the Kremlin’s worldwide propaganda machine.25
None of the Kremlin’s previous antics astonished the West more than the feat 
of diplomatic prestidigitation performed by Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov in 
February 1955. After delivering an 8 February speech before the Supreme 
Soviet warning that ratification of the Paris Agreements would sound the 
death knell of Austrian independence and after orchestrating a vicious anti- 
West propaganda campaign that ran from the time the Paris Agreements 
were signed in October of 1954. Molotov then proceeded to announce that 
ratification of the Paris Agreements would necessitate early agreement on an 
Austrian State Treaty! In other words, suddenly it was Molotov who was 
chasing the Austrian State Treaty. There were more ominous warnings in this 
speech about the potential dangers of ratification of the Paris Agreements 
providing for Germany’s accession to NATO, but Molotov’s U-turn on the 
Austrian treaty was clear and unmistakable.
The West had no way of knowing at the time that Khrushchev had instructed 
Molotov to settle the Austrian issue and conclude a treaty, and so a sense of 
bewilderment accompanied an otherwise delighted reaction by the Foreign 
Office and in Washington. In the same speech, Molotov announced that 
foreign troops could be withdrawn from Austria before a German peace treaty 
was signed, providing there was some guarantee that there would be no 
second Anschlutl. He summoned Austrian Ambassador Norbert Bischoff for
25 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f Austria, pp. 146-147.
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discussions on 25 February and 2 March 1955, and actually asked for 
Austria’s reaction to the statements he had been making before the Supreme 
Soviet.26 On 14 March 1955, the Austrian Government submitted a formal 
Note responding to Molotov’s request, saying basically that Austria welcomed 
any and all guarantees against another Anschlufl, and that Austria committed 
itself not to join any military alliance. On 24 March, bypassing the Four Power 
arrangement for negotiating the Austrian treaty, Molotov invited the Austrian 
Chancellor to visit Moscow for bilateral discussions. Events moved rapidly 
and, within two months, the Austrian State Treaty was being celebrated in 
Vienna. But it is necessary to pause here briefly.
B r it is h  R e a c tio n  t o  t h e  R a a b  M o s c o w  D e le g a tio n
On 25 March 1955, the British High Commissioner in Vienna, Sir G. 
Wallinger, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office discussing Molotov’s 
invitation to Raab to visit Moscow and enter into bilateral discussions on the 
Austrian treaty. He had conferred with his French and American 
counterparts, and the three reached agreement on how the Western Allies 
should respond to this surprising development. First, it was agreed that Raab 
could not refuse this invitation and therefore the Western representatives 
should not attempt to dissuade him from going to Moscow.27 At the same 
time, the dangers of sending the inexperienced Raab into a one-on-one 
confrontation with Molotov were recognised, and it was agreed to move 
Moscow’s desire for pointed discussions on an Austrian treaty onto a Four 
Power stage as soon as possible: ‘The Austrians are already slipping, and
26 Ibid., p. 148.
27 British Embassy Vienna, Telegram No. 56, 25 March 1955, FO 371/117787, R 1071/61, PRO.
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should no longer be left exposed alone to Soviet pressures and 
enticements’.28 Wallinger suggested that a ‘tripartite public declaration’ be 
communicated to the Soviet and Austrian governments as quickly as possible 
in order to ‘give Raab some protection against Soviet pressure for 
concessions which we may be unwilling to endorse’. A Foreign Office cover 
sheet attached to this incoming telegram confirms that it was read by and 
discussed with Eden and that the Foreign Office agreed the negotiations 
would have to be brought back into proper channels as soon as possible. At 
no time did the Foreign Office undertake efforts to block Chancellor Raab 
from going to Moscow.
On 26 March, Eden sent an ‘Immediate’ telegram to Vienna, Paris and 
Moscow, conveying his concern over this development: ‘Herr Raab will 
clearly find himself under intense pressure to agree to concessions and we 
may find ourselves faced with bi-lateral commitments ... which would place 
on us the onus for delaying the treaty and evacuation of troops.’29 Eden said 
he would much prefer for Raab not to go to Moscow ‘just now’, but he must 
reluctantly accept that the Chancellor would have to accept Molotov’s 
invitation or suffer severe consequences at home for having refused it. He 
instructed his ambassadors in Washington, Paris and Vienna to confirm that 
their host governments agree that no attempt should be made to stop the 
Raab delegation from proceeding to Russia. He also reported that he, Eden, 
was considering ways the Western Powers might strengthen Raab’s hand
28 Ibid., p. 1
29 Foreign Office London, Telegram No. 412, 26 March 1955, FO 371/117787, PRO.
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during the forthcoming discussions with the Russians.30 Eden had studied 
the correspondence exchanged between Austrian Ambassador Bischoff and 
Molotov in Moscow, and he concluded, correctly as it turned out, that the 
Russians ‘may now have certain clarifications to offer regarding their policy 
towards Austria’. If so, he favoured convening an early meeting of the Four 
Power ambassadors in Vienna, with Austrian presence, to discuss what 
appeared to be new opportunities for an Austrian State treaty.
Meanwhile I think it is urgent that we should inform Herr Raab of our 
attitude. I suggest that the three Western Ambassadors in Vienna 
should speak to him on Monday on the following lines. We have been 
considering the situation created by Mr Molotov’s invitation to Herr 
Raab to visit Moscow. As Herr Raab knows, we welcome any action 
designed to lend to the conclusion of a Treaty which would ensure 
Austrian freedom and independence. We can understand that 
internal pressure in Austria may make it impossible for him to refuse 
Mr Molotov’s invitation. At the same time we are sure that he is as 
conscious as anyone of the dangers of a tete-a-tete with Mr Molotov 
at which he would be under powerful pressure to make concessions. 
With ratification of the Paris Agreements in the final phase, we are 
turning our attention to ways and means of re-engaging in talks with 
the Russians and in such talks Austria is likely to figure at the head of 
the programme. We would urge Herr Raab, if he goes to Moscow, to 
avoid entering into any bi-lateral commitments which the Western 
Powers might find it impossible to endorse. Meanwhile we are 
considering whether there is any action we can usefully take to 
strengthen his hand in Moscow.31
It is interesting that none of the substantive diplomatic reporting about Raab’s 
forthcoming trip to Moscow devoted much space to Molotov’s public 
reference to the necessity of Austria’s adopting a policy of neutrality. In fact, 
this neutrality issue was presented with what appeared to be equal
30 Ibid., p. 1.
31 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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importance with all other issues mentioned by Molotov as he announced 
Moscow’s invitation to Raab. On 25 March 1955, The Times reported:
The Soviet statement said Russia, in accordance with the wishes of 
the Austrian Government, was prepared to discuss the form of a 
statement in which Austria could give guarantees that she would 
refrain from participating in military alliances and from permitting the 
establishment of military bases on her territory. The Soviet 
Government considered it necessary that the Governments of the 
United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union should take 
corresponding obligations on themselves.32
On 26 April 1955, the same month in which he was appointed Foreign 
Secretary, Harold Macmillan delivered a lengthy presentation to the Cabinet 
on the subject of Austria. After reviewing recent events associated with the 
treaty negotiations, including the recent Soviet initiative of starting talks with 
the Austrian ambassador in Moscow, the Secretary said he agreed with the 
Austrian Government’s assessment that Moscow seemed, at last, ready to 
sign a treaty:
Soviet motives are no doubt mixed. They may have been 
embarrassed by the bad international posture in which they found 
themselves on the Austrian question; they may wish to demonstrate 
their willingness to settle this outstanding question as a preliminary to 
wider Great Power negotiations; they may feel that, by the further 
condition regarding neutrality which they have imposed on the 
Austrian Ministers, they will have been successful in preventing the 
absorption of Austria into the Western defence system. But I have 
little doubt that their main purpose is to unsettle opinion in Western 
Germany by holding out the prospect of the re-unification of Germany 
on conditions of neutralisation.33
32 Reuters , ‘Soviet Move on Austria’, The Times, 25 March, 1955, Issue 53199, p. 5, col. G. See 
University of Wales Swansea, Library and Information Services, The Times Digital Archives 1785- 
1985.
33 Cabinet Office London, 26 April 1955, PREM 11/818, C.P.(55) 12, PRO.
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After briefing the cabinet on how the Foreign Office assessed Austrian and 
Soviet positions on the matter of neutrality, and revealing that Britain had 
agreed to a meeting of ambassadors in Vienna as a possible prelude to a 
Conference of Foreign Ministers with the objective of actually signing a 
treaty, the Secretary asked the Cabinet for two decisions. On the first 
question - should Britain recognise an Austrian declaration of neutrality of the 
type practised by Switzerland - the Cabinet accepted Macmillan’s 
recommendation that Britain should. It also approved his recommendation 
that Britain agree to participate in a Four Power guarantee of Austria’s 
declaration of neutrality, but he continued to feel strongly that the Foreign 
office should insist on seeing the language of the declaration before 
extending any such guarantee of it.34 This was, indeed, the position that 
Macmillan took at the Vienna meeting of Foreign Ministers (2-13 May 1955).
Moscow M em orandum
The Austrian delegation arrived in Moscow on 12 April 1955 and within three 
days, 15 April, had signed the so-called Moscow Agreement, a four-page 
document confirming bilateral agreement on all outstanding issues 
obstructing the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. Gerald Stourzh 
published the entire document in his epic history of the Austrian treaty, and 
he has also published the stenographic transcription of the meetings that 
took place between the Raab delegation and the Molotov team.35
34 Ibid., p. 3.
35 Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit undFreiheit; Staatsvertrag, Neutralitaet und das Ende der Ost-West 
Besetzung Osterreichs 1945-1955, (Vienna - Cologne - Graz: Boehlau Verlag, 1998), pp. 667-670 for 
the Moscow Agreement. See pp. 614-666 for the meeting minutes.
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Essentially, Austria agreed not to enter any military alliances or permit foreign 
bases on Austrian soil. She also agreed to pursue a policy of ‘independence’ 
vis-a-vis other nations. Both sides agreed that occupation troops should be 
withdrawn by 31 December 1955. Austria agreed to pay the Soviet Union 
US$150 million for the German assets confiscated by the Soviets during the 
occupation, with certain specific exceptions. Austria would pay some $2 
million for Danube Shipping Company assets, and one million tons of crude 
oil per year for each of ten years in return for oil properties and rights held by 
the USSR. Trade relations would be normalised and all Austrian citizens still 
held in the Soviet Union would be returned before occupation forces left 
Austrian soil.
On 14 April 1955, Raab transmitted a telegram from Moscow to Vienna 
reporting: ‘Osterreich wird frei. Wir bekommen unseren Heimatboden in 
seiner Ganzer zuruck. ...,36 On 15 April, the Raab delegation returned to 
Vienna and to national acclaim. Kreisky concluded his memoirs with the 
following report:
Unterschrieben haben wir am nachsten Morgen in folgender 
Reihenfolge: Raab, Scharf, Figl, Kreisky. Alles was sehr feierlich, 
trotz des vollen Tageslichts. Als die Zeremonie zu Ende war, sagte 
Molotov lachelnd: ‘Aber die Wiener haben das schon Heute in der 
Friih in den Zeitungen gelesen.’ Scharf hat gelachelt, Raab etwas 
gebrummt, und die Russen haben geschmunzelt.
Zu Mittag flogen wir nach Hause. Dort wurden wir mit ungeheurem 
Jubel empfangen. Tausende saumten die Strafien vom Flughafen 
bad Voslau nach Wien. Dieser 15. April 1955 was der grolite Tag 
meines politischen Lebens. Nie wieder, so schien es mir, wurde ich 
ahnliches erleben. Und so ist es bis Heute geblieben.37
36 Wiener Zeitung, 15 April 1955.
37 Kreisky, Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen aus Ftinf Jahrzehnten, p. 476.
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The British Embassy in Moscow followed the Austro-Soviet discussions 
during Raab’s visit carefully. There was interaction between the visiting 
Austrians and the Western ambassadors, and of course the latter made 
attempts to keep an open dialogue with Austrian Ambassador Norbert 
Bischoff. Western representatives never had a particularly favourable opinion 
of Bischoff, who was considered by most to be overly close to the Russians, 
and his performance during this critical period of time did not improve. In a 
scathing telegram to the Foreign Office, Sir William Hayter reported on a 
strange interaction with Bischoff at the Austrian Embassy.38 Reportedly, 
Bischoff had summoned the Western ambassadors to the embassy for 
discussions with Figl. Figl, however, did not turn up for the meeting and, 
according to Hayter, Bischoff ‘was in a mood unusually confused and odd, 
even for him’. Hayter did collect some substantive information during the 
chat, but concluded his report with the observation:
This interview made a frankly deplorable impression on my 
colleagues and myself, and we were far from certain that the Austrian 
Ambassador was not concealing something from us. But it may be all 
merely a reflection of his notorious idiosyncrasies.39
S o v ie t  La r g e s s e ?
The decision by the Soviet Union to agree to an Austrian treaty has attracted 
attention from politicians and scholars representing the broad spectrum of 
ideological leanings. To some, it was the first time the Soviets voluntarily 
gave up territory taken and occupied by the Red Army -  Moscow’s first step 
backwards in the Cold War. To America’s Director of Central Intelligence,
38 British Embassy Moscow, Telegram 353, 14 April 1955, PREM 11/818, PRO.
39Ibid.,
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Allen Dulles, Russian agreement to the treaty was ‘the most significant action 
since the end of World War II’.40 To his brother, the American Secretary of 
State, Moscow’s concession opened the door for other Soviet-occupied 
territories to throw off the yoke of Soviet oppression:
And furthermore this, this joy at their freedom which was so manifest 
by the Austrian people, that is going to be contagious and it’s going 
to spread surely to the neighbouring states -  Czechoslovakia -  for 
the first time there will be an open door to freedom on the part of 
Hungary. ...The Soviets are accepting those consequences. Why 
they are doing it, we’re not quite sure, except we can be quite certain 
that the policies of strength and firmness that we’re adopting in 
partnership with the other free countries of Europe are beginning to 
pay o ff41
As we have seen, some historians have strained over the years to draw 
equation between East and West, suggesting that the United States was to 
blame -  or at least equally to blame -  for an unnecessarily long occupation 
and for triggering a seemingly unending series of unnecessary and 
dangerous Cold War confrontations, frightening and inconveniencing the 
poor Austrian people. In order to further this argument, revisionists and other 
careless scholars have had to obscure the fact that ending the occupation 
would not necessarily have resulted in freedom and independence. A 
premature departure of Western military forces would almost certainly have 
left the Austrian people at the mercy of the Soviet Union. It was naive to 
suggest that ending the occupation under any circumstances would have led 
necessarily to Austrian independence. American diplomat Halvor Ekern 
observes:
40 Giinter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955; The Leverage o f  the Weak, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999) , p. 152.
41 John Foster Dulles, New York Times, 18 May 1955
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I am generally aware that politically correct historians, and the media, 
have distorted history to the benefit of Marxists. It is practically 
hopeless to engage them in discourse. It is incomprehensible to me 
that any scholar with an ounce of integrity and objectivity could read 
the minutes of the Four-Power meetings in Austria, whether it be the 
Council of Foreign Ministers or the local Allied Council, and come 
away with anything but the conclusion that the US, British and 
French sought else but the immediate restoration of Austria’s 
freedom. It is utterly plain. And furthermore, it was in our own 
interests.42
Austrians who have chosen to study this phase in their country’s history, 
perhaps understandably, have gone to similarly agonising efforts to 
perpetuate the myth that Austrians were responsible for their own 
independence because Chancellor Raab took the bit in his teeth, ignored 
British and American obstructionism, and flew to Moscow where his 
‘legendary Moscow diplomacy’ won the day.43 Such flights into fantasy are 
probably harmless and can perhaps be excused. It was certainly true that, for 
the first time in her history, post-war Austria was drifting in the direction of a 
fully sovereign democracy. In the process, her scholars and other thinkers 
apparently recognised the value of building some kind of reliable societal 
foundation for a participatory form of government. At this point in her history, 
Austria’s experience with democracy was shaky to say the least. There is no 
doubt that some Austrian historians and political scientists have tried to 
contribute to the formation of a historical foundation, seeking to strengthen - 
or, more accurately, establish democratic traditions. While the tale that 
Austria shrugged off tutelage from the Western powers and single-handedly 
won her own independence may not be accurate, the Austrians did succeed
42 Ekem letter to author, Part II, 10 March 2002, p. 2, original in author’s personal files.
43 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955; The Leverage o f the Weak, p. 153.
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in building one of Europe’s most successful democracies - but only after they 
were handed their independence by the occupying powers.
One of the more stirring renditions of the Austrian ‘legendary Moscow 
diplomacy’ theme is that of Gunter Bischof, who in a fit of national pride 
observed:
The West could no longer stop the train of bilateral Austro-Soviet 
negotiations from picking up speed. Western crisis management 
found itself relegated to the sidelines of merely observing this 
vigorous bilateral diplomacy, reduced to the unsavoury task of trying 
to strictly proscribe the Vienna Ballhausplatz’s diplomatic 
manoeuvring space.44
And in case this assertion did not adequately put the Western Powers in their 
place, Bischof proceeded to lecture his readers that Austria, ideologically, 
became a showcase for a new Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and a 
new element of flexibility in Russian diplomacy. Apparently choosing to 
ignore the American Secretary of State’s flat statement that the Austrian 
treaty signalled an optimistic future for all of Eastern Europe, Bischof spins 
the tale that the powerless Americans and their British puppets were 
sidelined by a superior thrust of legendary Austrian diplomacy combined with 
Soviet largesse: ‘the new Kremlin masters were making a major diplomatic 
concession to the West by signing the Austrian treaty.’45 For some reason, 
however, perhaps because he found difficulty making up his own mind, 
Bischof quickly flips the coin over and concludes:
44 Ibid., p. 144.
45 Ibid., p. 151.
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Unfortunately, many Austrians have forgotten that their post war 
security rested on American support and their prosperity owed much 
to the generosity of the American people. ... American economic aid 
and Austria’s participation in the Marshall Plan became crucial in 
integrating the country into Western Europe. ...Without the persistent 
support of Western diplomacy a unified Austria might not have been 
attained.’46
One can dispense quickly with the suggestion that British and American 
authorities attempted to prevent the Raab delegation from accepting 
Moscow’s invitation for bilateral talks in Moscow, as the diplomatic traffic from 
both Washington and London clearly prove. This myth was invented in 
Austria, presumably by some who wished to strengthen the image of the new 
Chancellor and his policy team by contrasting him with Western Powers who 
were the bad guys and who wanted to prevent the Austrian delegation from 
going to Moscow for discussions with the Soviets. According to Bischof, ‘the 
legendary Moscow diplomacy of the Raab delegation was not only a 
milestone in East-West diplomacy but the high point of Austrian diplomacy in 
the entire Cold War’ 47
Halvor O. Ekern was an American diplomat intimately involved in the affairs 
of the Allied Council for a period in excess of nine years. He was head of the 
US Element Political Directorate of the Allied Council for the better part of the 
period 1947 - 1950. From 1950 until 1956 when he was transferred back to 
the State Department in Washington, Ekern was also Director of the US 
Element Quadripartite Secretariat, and in this capacity he participated in 
virtually all important Allied Council activities. As an indication of his seniority,
46 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
47 Ibid., p. 153.
he was promoted in November 1955 to the rank of FSO - 3, equivalent to the 
military rank of full colonel.48 Ekern recalls:
Neither the US nor, to my knowledge, the British opposed the (Raab) 
trip -  but we were apprehensive. To send a man untutored in 
diplomacy or the guile of Molotov into the lion’s den! I believe our 
Ambassador, and maybe the British Ambassador, did make a call on 
Raab but only to reassure him that we stood by him, and to be sure 
that he understood the magnitude of the Soviet threat, and the issues 
at play. No, we did not oppose his going; in fact we saw the chance 
of a breakthrough 49
Diplomatic correspondence shows that Dulles warned the Austrians that 
Moscow was ‘a dangerous place to go alone’ - a catchy quotation popular 
with Austrian historians. It is less often reported, however, that this is only 
half of what Dulles actually said - a classic case of selective quotation. Dulles 
finished his thought in the same breath by expressing the hope that 
something constructive would result from the exercise and, in any event, it 
might be difficult for the Austrian Chancellor to decline Molotov’s invitation to 
Moscow.50 Reference has already been made to Eden’s conclusion that 
Raab had to accept Molotov’s invitation, and to Eden’s desire to do whatever 
was possible at the time to strengthen Raab’s negotiating position vis-a-vis 
Molotov.
48 25 September 2003 E-Mail message to author from William L. Stearman, quoting the official 1971 
State Department Foreign Service Biographic Register entry for Halvor O. Ekem. Hard copy in 
author’s personal files.
49 Ekem personal letter to author, Part II, 10 March 2002, p. 2, original available in author’s personal 
files.
50 US Department of State Telegram No. 2658 from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to 
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Vienna, 25 March 1955, RG 59, DF 1955-1959, 663.001/3- 
2355, NARA II. See also Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 25 March 1955, 
‘Austrian Treaty Problem,’ RG 59, DF 1955-1959, 663.001/3-2555, NARA II. See also US Vienna 
Embassy telegram No. 2122, 25 March 1955, from Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson to Secretary of 
State Dulles, RG 59, DF 1955-1959, 663.001/3-2555, NARA II: ‘We do not believe that Raab can 
refuse Soviet invitation ... we therefore believe it would be useless and unwise for us to attempt to 
prevent Raab’s acceptance.’
Behind all speculation regarding Molotov’s invitation to the Austrians and the 
Chancellor’s subsequent trip to Moscow for bilateral discussions with the 
Kremlin, hangs one irrefutable fact: no Austrian bilateral agreement with the 
Kremlin would have been valid without the Western Allies’ approval, and 
everybody involved knew it.
F in a l  D ip l o m a c y
On 19 April 1955, the Soviets proposed a meeting of foreign ministers in 
Vienna, including Austrian participation, to sign the Austrian State Treaty. 
Moscow accepted a counter-proposal that the high commissioners meet first 
to settle any remaining issues and to facilitate a problem-free foreign 
ministers conference. Under the chairmanship of American Ambassador 
Llewellyn Thompson, this meeting began on 2 May 1955, as scheduled, in 
the same room in which the Allied Council had met for all the years of the 
occupation. The ambassadors continued discussions until 13 May.
On the second day of meetings, the Soviets opposed Western proposals that 
Articles 16 and 17 be eliminated from the final treaty draft. Article 16 provided 
for voluntary repatriation of displaced persons and refugees. Article 17 limited 
the size of the Austrian army.51 The Soviets also wanted a significant change 
in the language of Article 33 providing for withdrawal of occupation forces. 
On the third day of meetings, Soviet Ambassador llyishev astounded 
everybody by agreeing, without argument, to drop both articles from the
51 The West was concerned that the Soviets would use the Displaced Persons article as an excuse to 
force refugees to return to their home countries against their will. The West also took the position that 
no free and independent country, especially a neutral one, should have external limitations placed on 
the size of their defence forces.
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treaty. Given that no Soviet ambassador would have deemed to make such 
concessions on his own, it was obvious that he was acting on overnight 
instructions from Molotov.
By 6 May, the following articles had been eliminated from the draft treaty, by 
agreement of all four ambassadors:52
Article 6: Naturalization and Residence of Germans in Austria.
Article 11: War Criminals.
Article 13: Liquidation of League of Nations.
Article 14: Bilateral Treaties.
Article 15: Restoration of Archives.
Article 16: Displaced Persons.
Article 16-bis: Transfer of persons of German Origin.
Article 17: Limitation of Austrian Armed Forces.
Article 19: Prohibition of Military Training.
Article 21: Prohibition of Special Weapons.
Article 36: Restitution by Austria.
Article 48-bis: Debts.
In addition, Article 18, dealing with service in Austrian armed forces of former 
Nazis and members of certain other organisations, was altered with 
unanimous agreement. Ilyishev objected to Article 33 calling for withdrawal of 
all occupation forces within ninety days of conclusion of the treaty, and he 
rejected a recommended compromise by the French. Both East and West
52 US State Department briefing memorandum, 11 May 1955, RG 59, DF 1955-1959, CF 446A-CF 
450, CF 449, NARA.
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were sticking to their guns on this article, which the Soviets demanded be 
considered as still under discussion.
Only two other articles remained under contest and, not surprisingly, one was 
Article 35, dealing with German assets. The other was Article 42, addressing 
the matter of the restitution of United Nations property in Austria. The British 
Government, and to an equal extent the United States, were concerned 
about the latter Article because they wanted guarantees for the restitution to 
their national oil companies of properties in Austria which they were forced to 
sell to the Nazi Government. Moscow was opposed to the inclusion of such 
guarantees, maintaining that the guarantees would contradict that part of the 
15 April bilateral agreement in which the Austrian Government agreed not to 
transfer to foreign citizens any property returned by the Soviet Union. On 10 
May, the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
United States and Austria, providing for the transfer to Austria of British and 
American assets. Britain, for example, confirmed that all married family 
quarters constructed at British expense would be handed over to Austrian 
authorities ‘in a manner advantageous to Austria’.53
The main impediment to conclusion of a treaty, however, was Western 
concern about the economic concessions Austria had made to the Soviet 
Union. Moscow had demanded, and been promised, a hefty bribe, and this 
bothered many in the West, especially those who questioned Austria’s ability 
to deliver on its economic promises, as well as those who suspected the
53 Memorandum, ‘Results of the Conversation Between the Members of the Austrian Federal 
Government and the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom and the United States of America’, 
American Embassy Vienna Air Pouch 1297, 10 May 1955, RG 59, DF 1955-1959, CF 446A-CF 450, 
CF 449, NARA II.
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Soviets might not be prepared to deliver on theirs. Stearman correctly 
reported that the ‘deadlock over Article 35 gave rise to considerable 
pessimism and a delay in signing the treaty appeared to be a real 
possibility’.54
On 10 May, US Ambassador Thompson notified the Soviets that American 
Secretary of State Dulles, who was in Paris preparing to travel to Vienna for 
the foreign Ministers meeting and signing of the Austrian State Treaty, was 
‘unwilling to come (to) Vienna until these points (were) resolved’.55 Reports 
were circulating in Vienna that British Foreign Secretary Macmillan had made 
the same decision.56 Despite the new and more amiable environment 
surrounding the treaty talks since 8 February, the sceptics on both sides still 
had reason to worry. The path to the Austrian State Treaty was not yet 
completely clear.
Halvor Ekern provides a fascinating eye witness account of these thrilling, 
final moments of the treaty negotiations:
At the final meeting of the four negotiating Ambassadors and the 
Austrian Foreign Minister, the Soviets continued to hold out for extra­
territorial rights regarding Austrian payment of reparations to the 
USSR - such rights would have meant leaving a Soviet authority 
within Austria with powers over the Austrian Government, a potential 
Fifth Column. We had assumed from earlier Soviet assurances that 
they would drop this ten year-old demand. But they didn’t. It was 
suggested by our Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson ... that the 
plenipotentiaries repair to a smaller room, with only one plus one 
(each with only one advisor).
54 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria, p. 152.
55 State Department Washington, 11 May 1955, RG 59 1955-1959, DF 446A-450, CF 449, NARA II.
56 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria, p. 152.
Thompson chose Ekem, and the reduced assembly, now numbering 
ten, faced the moment of truth. The Foreign ministers - Dulles, 
Macmillan, the Frenchman and Molotov - were scheduled to meet in 
Vienna the next morning for the formal signature of the Treaty. The 
world was holding its breath for this lovely spring day. Final positions 
were asked for: the Soviet Ambassador held fast, the French 
Ambassador passed. Leopold Figl, the Austrian Foreign Minister was 
white-faced-he knew that if he had to go out and announce that the 
Treaty talks were a failure, and the hated ten year-old Occupation 
would continue, he could probably be lynched. The British 
Ambassador sat silent. He, too, was undoubtedly weighing the 
consequences for the Macmillan Government of diplomatic failure. 
Ambassador Thompson called the Soviet bluff: he said. ‘I will advise 
my Foreign minister (sic) not to come’ (Dulles being still in Paris). 
The meeting broke up in silence. For once, we did not have the 
support of the British.
Footnote: On the way out, Thompson instructed me to go directly to 
the airport and get on the first plane to Paris--and to explain to Dulles 
what had happened, not knowing what Washington’s reaction might 
be. It so happened, as Thompson had guessed, that while the plane 
was still in the air, the Soviets folded-they withdrew their demands 
for a post-Treaty extraterritorial presence. I grabbed the Secretary of 
State’s plane the next morning, and briefed him on our way to 
Vienna.
On 12 May 1955, the Soviets removed the final obstacle to agreement on 
Article 35 by accepting resolution in the form of an annex to the Austrian 
State treaty stating that this Article was amended by the terms of the Austro- 
Soviet Agreement of 15 April. Dispute over the withdrawal date for 
occupation forces was ended by the agreement that all troops would be out 
of the country ninety days after ratification of the treaty, but no later than 31 
December. The West agreed to settle oil company claims with Austria after 
the treaty was signed. The four ambassadors had totally eliminated eleven 
articles and three annexes from the final treaty draft, and had agreed on
57 Ekem personal letter to author, 6 March 2002, Part I, p. 3, original in author’s personal files.
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significant modification of three others.58 The way was then clear to the 
Conference of Foreign ministers.
On 14 May 1955, at 5:00 p.m., Messrs. V. M. Molotov representing the 
USSR, Sir Harold Macmillan representing the United Kingdom, Anton Pinay 
representing France and John Foster Dulles representing the United States 
of America met together in Vienna. They were joined by Dr Leopold Figl and 
Dr Bruno Kreisky of the Austrian Government. Secretary Dulles opened the 
discussions by proposing that Mr Molotov preside at the meeting. Mr Molotov 
responded: ‘I accept the honor and propose that we get down to work.’59 M. 
Pinay stated that he had nothing to say. Mr Dulles proposed that the text of 
the treaty ‘prepared for us’ be accepted, and Mr Molotov responded: The 
proposal made by Mr Dulles does not contradict the one I have in mind, 
because I had the same idea in mind. Can we accept that proposal then?’ 
Messrs. Dulles and Pinay signified yes. Sir Harold Macmillan signified yes. Dr 
Figl asked for a minor amendment in the preamble to the treaty, and there 
was unanimous approval.
Molotov said he wanted to draw the Western representatives’ attention to the 
first five paragraphs of the Agreement signed in Moscow between the USSR 
and Austria pertaining to the country’s perpetual neutrality, and he proceeded 
to read those paragraphs. Mr Dulles said he understood the text and that the 
United States ‘finds no objection to Austria following the course laid down in
58 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria, , p. 153, and State Department Briefing 
Memorandum, 11 May 1955.
59 Department of State 14 May 1955, RG 59, DF 1955-1959, CF 446A-450, CF 445, NARA II.
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that memorandum’. 60 Pinay, at somewhat greater length, assured the 
participants that France accepted that, ‘if the Austrian Government wishes to 
make such a declaration in the field of national politics, it is the right enjoyed 
by any independent and sovereign government.’ Sir Harold Macmillan said:
The Government of the United Kingdom has no objection in principle 
to the Austrian Government following the course it has proposed. 
Naturally, however, if the Government of the United Kingdom is to 
consider taking some action which would appear to follow, then it 
would wish to know the terms of any declaration and it would be 
really very willing to consider with other governments the ways and 
means of taking part in any four-power guarantee.61
Molotov then read a proposed text of a Four Power statement guaranteeing 
Austria’s neutrality. Dulles suggested that any Four Power guarantee of 
Austria’s neutrality await the finalisation of the Austrian Government’s actual 
declaration of neutrality. In principle, he had no difficulty with the text just 
read out by Molotov. The French Foreign Minister then launched into a 
lengthy lecture, essentially agreeing with Dulles and saying the Austrian 
Government should issue a unilateral declaration confirming its neutrality 
after the treaty was signed and ratified. Appropriately, the minutes of this 
meeting concluded the transcript of M. Pinay’s comments with the notation: 
‘One sentence garbled’. Probably with some relief, Molotov asked him: ‘are 
you finished. ..?’ Unfortunately, M. Pinay was not, and for some reason felt 
compelled to repeat that he thought the Soviet statement on neutrality was 
‘somewhat misplaced’. Macmillan confirmed that Britain would want to see 
the actual Austrian declaration before guaranteeing it. The matter was settled 
when Figl assured the group that the Austrian Government would, on the
60 Ibid., p. 2.
61 Ibid.
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same day, provide the foreign ministers with a ‘provisional draft of the 
declaration’, which, it was agreed, would be issued formally when Austria 
was, in fact, a sovereign nation.
Following a brief discussion on what type of statements each foreign minister 
would make at the next day’s signing ceremony - Dulles suggesting 
statements not to exceed two minutes and Molotov suggesting twenty 
minutes - M. Pinay said he agreed with both Mr Dulles and Mr Molotov. Sir 
Harold Macmillan concluded the United Kingdom’s participation in this 
historic meeting of the foreign ministers with the statement: ‘I agree with 
everybody.’62
At precisely 6:15 p.m. on 14 May 1955, V. M. Molotov adjourned the 
Conference of Foreign Ministers with the statement: Then allow me to close 
the meeting.’ And so he did.
Ein T a g  W ie Kein A n d e r63
A day like none other, indeed! Hugo Portisch describes in colourful, 
appropriately emotional language, how the Viennese worked feverishly 
during the last days before the treaty signing ceremony to spruce up the city 
and make certain that all of its monuments and buildings were clean and 
gleaming:
Fieberhaft hatte man in den letzten Tagen die beiden schonsten 
Schlosser Wiens auf Hochglanz gebracht: das Schloft Schonbrunn
62 Ibid., p. 4.
60 Hugo Portisch, Der Lange Weg zur Freiheit, (Vienna: Verlag Kreymayr &  Scheriau, 1986), p. 492.
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und das Schlofi Belvedere. Im Belvedere sollte der Staatsvertrag 
unterzeichnet werden, in Schonbrunn wollte man das Ereignens am 
Abend gebuhren feiern, mit all dem Glanz, zu dem die Zweite 
Republik nun schon wiederfahig war.64
The 15 May treaty signing ceremony was orchestrated with precision and 
strict diplomatic protocol. Austria’s leaders were at the Belvedere Palace, in 
the Great Marble Hall (Groflen Marmorsaal), awaiting their foreign guests. 
The Russians arrived at eleven o’clock a.m. Seven minutes later, the British 
delegation arrived. Precisely seven minutes after that, the Americans arrived, 
and yet seven minutes later, the French limousine stopped at the Palace 
entrance. The arrivals were planned this way to allow the Austrian hosts 
enough time to greet each delegation with appropriate courtesy. Dr Figl then 
invited everybody to take their places and prepare to sign the Austrian State 
T reaty.
The 300-page treaty was bound in green Moroccan leather, and the British, 
American, French and Russian Foreign Minister each had a version 
translated into his native language. There was also a German language 
version, prepared so that future generations of Austrians would know that the 
instrument was not only a treaty about Austria, but also a treaty with 
Austria.65
Following the signing ceremony, each of the foreign ministers made a 
speech. Molotov, the first to speak, did so at some length. His remarks
64 Ibid., p. 491.
65 Salvatore J. Rizza, Austrian Stamps Homepage, ‘The Signing of the Austrian State Treaty by One 
Who Was There,’ for a description and photo of the bound Austrian State Treaty:
<http://www.kitzbuhe 1.demon.co.uk/austamps/sirO 1 />, [8 August 2003].
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reminded everybody that the Red Army had conquered Austria’s capital city, 
Vienna, after hard fighting, thereby making it possible for the victorious 
powers to implement the provisions of the Moscow Declaration. Molotov’s 
speech stressed the importance of Austrian neutrality, referring to the 
country’s obligations of neutrality no less than six times. He reminded his 
audience that, whereas the Austrian issues had been resolved by the Four 
Powers, the German problem had not. Before wishing the Austrian people 
well, Molotov referred to recent Soviet proposals for arms reduction, including 
limits for nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and stressed his country’s 
commitment to world peace and desire to resolve the German question. It 
was a speech more of propaganda and a little substance, rather than 
ceremony.66
Sir Harold Macmillan’s speech was much shorter, and designed simply to 
assure the Austrian people that they could always depend on the true 
friendship of the British people. Fortunately, it did not occur to him to remind 
the Austrians how their British friends reacted in March of 1938 when last an 
Austrian Chancellor had turned to London for help.
Secretary Dulles said Austria’s seventeen year ‘thorny path’ during which 
they lacked freedom never caused the Austrian people to lose their hope for 
a free and independent Austria. The Austrians, he said, had every reason to 
celebrate, not because of what had been given to them, but because of what 
they had achieved. M. Pinay said France had no doubts that the Austrian 
people would protect and defend their new freedom and independence,
66 American Embassy Vienna, Despatch 1515, 14 May 1955, RG 59, DF 1955-1959, CF 446A-450,
CF 445, NARA II.
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thereby providing the cue line for Austria’s Foreign Minister Leopold Figl, who 
said exactly what the assembled Austrians wanted most to hear: ‘...wir haben 
zehn Jahre auf diesen Tag gewartet.... Fleute ist derTag gekommen.’67
C l e a n in g  U p
And so the big day came and went, but British, American, French and 
Russian troops were still on Austrian soil. None of the Allied Commission 
machinery had been dismantled, and there were huge challenges facing the 
Four Powers, to say nothing of the tasks confronting the now-independent. 
Austrian Government. According to Article 20 of the Treaty, the occupation 
forces retained all rights, immunities and facilities until 25 October, the end of 
the specified ninety-day period marking the deadline for total withdrawal of 
foreign troops. From the perspective of British policy toward Austria, though, 
the game was over and only house cleaning tasks were left to be done. 
Stearman provides a useful overview of some of the more important things 
that had to be accomplished, as the occupying powers prepared to leave the 
country. 68 Mandatory identification cards, for example, were rendered 
unnecessary. The Allied newspapers stopped publishing. The Allied Council 
was reduced from thirteen directorates to five. Restrictions, for example on 
civil aviation, were lifted. The popular, American-run radio station 'Rot-Weiss- 
Rof, went off the air. Slowly, the Austrian Government began taking over the 
Soviet-owned USIA and SMV facilities - an activity that did not proceed 
without problem, as the Government looked forward to 31 August when the 
USSR would be paid the first instalment provided for by the treaty - some $2
67 Figl’s remarks are quoted in virtually every history of the Austrian State Treaty. For one source, 
see: Portisch, Der Lange Weg zur Freiheit, p. 493.
68 Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation o f  Austria, pp. 154-157.
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million for the Danube Shipping Company properties. This, observed 
Stearman, ‘(brought) home to the Austrian people in a graphic manner the 
price they had paid for freedom.69
One other sign of Austria’s freedom - and at the same time a reminder of not 
so pleasant things of the past - was the return by the Soviet Union of 
Austrians who had been arrested or otherwise abducted during the 
occupation. The celebrated cases of Police Inspector Anton Marek and Dr 
Ottillinger were resolved when both were returned to Austria, Ottillinger on a 
stretcher.70
On 27 July 1955, the last of the five governments to deposit its ratification of 
the Austrian State Treaty, France, did so with the Foreign Ministry in 
Moscow. Also on 27 July, the Allied Council met for its 249th meeting for the 
purpose of terminating the Allied Commission, following which the national 
flags of the four occupying powers were lowered in a ceremony witnessed by 
a large Austrian audience. The Four Power Control over Austria was thereby 
ended. With the departure of the last Allied soldier on 21 October 1955, an 
American in Salzburg, the occupation of Austria was over.
S o v ie t  M o t iv e s
In 1996, a close personal friend and respected former superior began 
encouraging this author to undertake PhD level research. The objective, he 
suggested, should be to provide for the first time a legitimate and reliable
69 Ibid., p. 156.
70 Ibid., citing Die Presse, 21,26  and 28 June 1955.
380
explanation as to why the Soviet Union agreed to sign the Austrian State 
Treaty after ten years of obstinate obstructionism. Perhaps with an excessive 
degree of presumptuousness, the research was begun - and swiftly 
abandoned. The failure of Russian authorities to declassify the most 
important source documents and to deny open access to Russian archives 
quickly led to the conclusion that the completion of such a project was, at that 
point in time, beyond the realms of possibility. Yet an intense personal 
interest in the occupation of Austria had been awakened, and the work was 
redirected toward British policy - also a subject nobody had researched and 
written about in depth.
While it is not possible to offer an airtight explanation of the frequently 
baffling and erratic Soviet behaviour in and about Austria, it would be 
irresponsible not to put forward at least a calculated guess as to why the 
Kremlin abruptly changed gears in February 1955, and then triggered a mad 
dash to the treaty. While the subject of this thesis is British policy, some 
evaluation of Soviet behaviour is a necessary part of the research because it 
was the Soviet Union which presented the most formidable obstacle to an 
earlier end to the occupation and an earlier conclusion of the Austrian State 
Treaty. Britain’s policy formulation, by necessity, had to accommodate Soviet 
initiatives. Source documents still locked away in Moscow’s archives may 
eventually allow scholars to reach a solid conclusion on this issue. Then 
again, such documents might not exist at all. As has already been observed 
here, the keeping of written records by contestants in the Kremlin was not 
always the safest thing to do. There are some things we do know.
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Thanks to the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the multi­
lingual scholars who have contributed to CWIHP publications, we have fairly 
persuasive evidence of Molotov’s role in Soviet management of the Austria 
problem, and of the reason why he suddenly changed his tune on the 
Austrian State Treaty in early 1955. Taken at face value, this evidence could 
be considered conclusive. Given the complex political forces at play between 
the Kremlin’s leadership contenders, however, an appropriate degree of 
scepticism should accompany any presentation of this otherwise impressive 
material.
In his concluding remarks to the Central Committee Plenum of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Ninth Session, 12 July 1955, Nikita 
Khrushchev placed the blame for Austria’s prolonged occupation squarely on 
Molotov’s shoulders. After drawing laughter from the hall with an anecdote on 
Yugoslavia and Tito, Khrushchev said: ‘Now on Austria. This is a very 
important issue.’ He went on to say:71
I remember how Stalin, about a year before his death, said several 
times:
- Why don’t we conclude a treaty with Austria?
But this matter kept being postponed: it was said we would resolve it 
after Trieste. When the Trieste matter got cleared up, comrade Stalin 
again asked:
- Why aren’t we concluding a treaty with Austria?
After Stalin’s death, somehow com. Malenkov and I began talking 
with com. Molotov about Austria. He told us that the Austrian issue 
was a very complex one which we needed very much [i.e. to keep on
71 The entirety of Khrushchev’s 12 July 1955 remarks to the Central Committee Plenum, Ninth 
Session, in Moscow is taken from the official minutes of these meetings, TsKHSD fond 2, delo 176,
11. 282-95, (trans.) Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 10, March 1998, ‘Leadership 
Transition in a Fractured Bloc’, pp. 42-43.
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the agenda without resolving it], [and] that its resolution had to be 
delayed.
Here at the plenum, I will frankly say that I believed Molotov’s word 
on everything, [and] like many of us, thought that he was a great and 
experienced diplomat.
Sometimes you’d look and then reason and think:
- Damn it [chert voz’ mi], maybe I am missing something! After all, 
that is what it means to be a diplomat - he sees and I don’t see 
anything (laughter in the hall). I’m telling you all this in sincerity.
Some time passed, and I still wanted to find out what Molotov saw in 
the Austrian issue and [why] he was fighting to drag out its resolution, 
but I can’t see [it].
Khrushchev continued:
I came to the conclusion that there was no reason for us to drag out 
this matter, since time was beginning to work against us. In Austria 
we are losing our good position by dragging out a resolution to the 
issue of a peace treaty with the country. I then say to com. Bulganin:
- You know what I think, Comrad Nikolai Aleksandrovich? The 
Austrian issue as Molotov understands it is reminiscent of an egg 
which has gone bad. Soon you will have to throw it in the garbage 
because everything will change and there will be no value in 
resolving it positively. And that is really so.
But if we had gone halfway [vyshli navstrechu] with a resolution of 
the Austria issue when the events connected with the conclusion of 
the Paris agreement had just ripened, after all, then the issue of 
these agreements could have arisen in a different way.
At this point, two voices drifted from the audience in the gigantic hall, one 
simply shouting ‘correct,’ and the other suggesting that ‘the Paris 
Agreements would not have come about’. Khrushchev continued by reporting 
that the Austrian issues were then discussed in a meeting of the Central 
Committee Presidium:
I said to com. Molotov: Listen Viacheslav Mikhailovich, you 
understand this issue. But some comrades and I do not understand 
why we should delay the conclusion of a treaty with Austria. Explain
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to us how you understand it. Perhaps I will begin to understand it 
differently; after al, we aren’t fools. And when I understand it, I will 
support you; after all, right now I don’t see anything complicated in it. 
I see only stupidity on our side, which consists of the fact that we are 
dragging out the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria for no 
apparent reason.
We discussed the issue and came to the conclusion that we should 
conclude a peace treaty with Austria, [and] make sure that Austria 
became a neutral state. When we came to such a decision, Molotov 
said: - it is good that it was decided this way. After all, I did not object 
to such a decision.
At this point, Khrushchev became extremely critical of Molotov, pointing out 
that a number of the Presidium Members had talked with him often about the 
Austria question, asking Molotov why it was necessary for the Soviet Union 
to remain in Austria when it was obvious the tide of international opinion was 
turning against them. When Molotov tried to defend himself by saying he 
agreed that an Austrian treaty should be concluded, Khrushchev laughed at 
him, and pointed out that it was only Molotov who had been rigidly holding 
out and obstructing resolution of the Austria question. Khrushchev went on to 
tell the assembled members:
During the discussion I ask[ed] com. Molotov:
- Tell me, please, are you for or against war?
- no, he says, I am against war.
Then what are you achieving by having our troops sit in Vienna? If 
you stand for war, then it would be correct to stay in Austria. It is a 
beach-head [platsdarm] and only a fool would give up such a beach­
head if he planned to make war now. If [you are] not for war, then we 
have to leave. In our country, communists do not understand you; 
the Austrian communists do not understand, and Austrian workers 
begin to see our troops as occupiers. Communists abroad also do 
not understand us. Why are we sitting in Austria? What are we 
waiting for there?
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Khrushchev then said Molotov had been sent away to prepare a draft treaty, 
which is a bit strange, since a draft treaty had been in existence since the 
early days after WW II, and all but five of its articles had been agreed by 
1949. But, Molotov returned with a draft that contained, among the rest of the 
treaty provisions, a stipulation that the USSR reserved the right to ‘lead our 
troops into Austria’, should there be another AnschluQ> with Germany. This, 
according to Khrushchev, had angered him:
There was a lot of nonsense in the draft.... I said to com. Molotov:
Listen, we have to look at things realistically and concretely. Let’s 
assume that we conclude a treaty in which this is said. Imagine that 
they prepare an anschluss. After that, after we find out about it, 
everything will be ready for an anschluss - artillery will be deployed 
where they should be, and troops will be assembled. After all, they 
are not fools, and know that if there is an anschluss, we can oppose 
the anschluss and, probably, repulse it. So, in such a situation, would 
you start a war?
You have t keep in mind that the Austrians and Germans are nations 
[natsii] close to one another. If someone set us such conditions: to 
separate the Russians from the Ukrainians or Belorussians, what 
would we say? We would say, without pausing for thought:
You take your proposals to God’s mother[k’ bozh’ei materi].
Why should we stick our noses into that matter?
Khrushchev’s explanation as to why Molotov took his abrupt U-turn on the 
Austrian treaty seems clear - perhaps even beyond question: ‘And so when 
we all bore down on him, [navalilis na nego], he couldn’t do anything other 
than to say, I agree, we have to submit whatever draft you propose.’
And so they did.
C o n c l u s io n s
During the post-Stalin period, when the leadership of the Soviet Union was 
undergoing dramatic turmoil, it became clear that the Kremlin was linking 
resolution of the Austria problem to resolution of the German problem, and 
also that, at least in Molotov’s mind, there was a chance that the people of 
West Germany could be persuaded that their freedom and independence 
was quite possible, if they were prepared to adopt a policy of neutrality, along 
the lines of the Swiss model. Hence, one saw Molotov focus on the issue of 
neutrality for Austria during the 1954 Berlin Conference and during 
Chancellor Raab’s visit in Moscow in early 1955. In his thinking, a posture of 
neutrality would not only pre-empt Austria’s joining a Western defence 
alliance or allowing foreign military bases on Austrian soil, it would also set 
an example for Germany.
British policy regarding Austria during the post-Stalin period remained 
essentially the same, although the Foreign Office backed away somewhat 
from Bevin’s headlong dash to get a treaty signed regardless of the size and 
nature of the bribe the West would have to pay Moscow in return for a 
signature. Britain had to fight for an end to the occupation, if for no other 
reason than that they couldn’t afford to keep British troops in Austria
The Office of the Prime Minister Report of November 1953 provides useful 
insight into Foreign Office thinking at the time regarding Austria. Among other 
things, this report demonstrates that British policy toward Austria had 
remained fairly consistent, and the foreign policy makers were by that point
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more concerned with diplomatic strategy. It was recognised that the Soviets 
had linked Austria with the Germany problem, and it was equally obvious that 
London had decided to fight hard to interrupt this link in interactions with 
Moscow.
By far the most dramatic development during this period of time, at least 
regarding the occupation of Austria, was the sudden and unexpected 
invitation to Chancellor Raab to visit Moscow for bilateral discussions on the 
Austrian State Treaty. Some Austrian historians, supported by a few others, 
for example the American, Carafano, have reported correctly that Britain and 
the United States were concerned about the obvious dangers of sending the 
relatively inexperienced Julius Raab into face-to-face negotiations with the 
wily Molotov in the latter’s back yard. They were not correct, however, in 
perpetuating the suggestion that this concern led the Western Powers to 
attempt to prevent Herr Raab from accepting the Kremlin invitation. It is clear 
from the diplomatic correspondence and other archival material now 
available that they did not. In any event, students of the Four Power 
occupation of Austria should know that any agreement on the conclusion of 
the Austrian State Treaty would have had to enjoy the support of all four 
occupying Powers, and hence any bilateral agreement struck by Raab in 
Moscow would have been invalid in the absence of this unanimous approval.
The 1954 Berlin Conference marked the first time Austria’s leaders were 
invited to sit with the Four Powers in such an esteemed forum, but it didn’t do 
them much good. Molotov’s abuse of the Austrian leaders and his summary 
dismissal of Chancellor Raab’s repeated assurances that Austria would
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adopt a policy of neutrality in the Cold War left everybody with the clear 
impression that Moscow had no intention of ending Austria’s occupation and 
agreeing to an Austrian State Treaty, under any circumstances. Molotov’s 
revival of the irrelevant Trieste and dried peas issues sent a clear signal to 
this effect.
Macmillan’s briefing to the Cabinet in April 1955 provides enlightening insight 
into the thinking of this new Foreign Secretary, and it confirms for the first 
time that London was prepared to accept a neutral Austria. The briefing 
papers also demonstrate that Macmillan believed that Molotov was motivated 
to press the neutrality issue forcefully in order to unsettle the West Germans 
and plant the suggestion that they, too, could have their freedom in return for 
a pledge of military neutrality.
It is debatable whether or not one can accept Khrushchev’s public 
condemnation of Molotov as the sole caretaker of the Kremlin’s Austria 
policy. It would not be the only instance where senior Kremlin leaders looked 
for scapegoats and sought to place blame on others’ shoulders. The concept 
that V. M. Molotov could have kept the Soviet Army on the ground in Austria 
all by himself is a bit of a stretch. And of course Stalin is no longer around to 
confirm or deny Khrushchev’s account of their conversations on Molotov and 
on Austria. Thanks to William Taubman and his important new book on 
Khrushchev, we are advised that Molotov later objected strenuously to being 
identified as an opponent to the Austrian State Treaty.72 So, what we have 
are first-hand statements by the principals, offering their reports and
72 William Taubman, Khrushchev : the Man and his Era, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 368.
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describing their opinions. We still lack all but a few archival copies of in- 
house Kremlin memoranda and diplomatic correspondence that had to be 
exchanged between Moscow and various embassies abroad, as the Austrian 
State Treaty developments unfolded.
What Khrushchev told the Presidium members makes sense, however, in 
that it would offer a rational explanation for the Kremlin’s abrupt policy shift in 
March 1955. This shift and indeed Khrushchev’s apparent decision to 
uncouple the Austria and Germany issues could have resulted from his 
recognition that Germany was going to rearm and there was nothing the 
Soviet Union could do about it. Austria was probably marginal in Soviet 
military thinking, and by agreeing to a deal, Khrushchev may have believed 
he could extract a heavy bribe and gain credit on the international stage. He 
may also have thought that settlement of the Austria problem would 
contribute to his new vision of international diplomacy and alert the capitalist 
world that Moscow was sincerely interested in improving relations and 
reducing tensions. After all, what he did was precisely one of the actions 
President Eisenhower said the USSR had to take in order to prove its good 
intentions. Taubman tells us:
The centrepiece of Khrushchev’s new diplomacy was a campaign for 
what a later era labelled detente. As he saw it, reducing tensions 
could undermine Western resistance to Communist gains, tempt 
capitalists to increase East-West trade, and project a more friendly 
image in the Third World.73
These are issues that will, no doubt, be debated long into the future and until 
Russia’s leaders decide to open their most preciously guarded archives - if
73 Ibid., p. 348.
they ever do -  and if those archives actually contain hard documents that will 
resolve the many debates on what motivated Soviet behaviour in the 
international arena after comrade Stalin departed the scene.
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C o n c l u s io n s
This thesis has described British interests and policies regarding Austria 
during the ten years following World War Two. Its narrative has paused from 
time to time to analyse particularly important events and issues, such as the 
Moscow Declaration, the European Advisory Commission, Yugoslav mischief 
at the end of the War and key meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It 
has described other milestones in the Austrian State Treaty negotiations, the 
Marshall Plan as it affected Austria, the violent strikes of 1950, the Soviet 
kidnapping campaign and the Raab delegation to Moscow in 1955. And it has 
examined selected reports from British representatives in Austria that 
influenced the formulation of British policy.
The thesis has addressed Britain’s policy formulation process and the 
specific policies, strategies and concerns that emerged from them. Based on 
a close examination of secondary sources and original material, some of 
which has not been adequately exploited to date, and some of which has 
only recently been released, this thesis took into serious consideration, and 
tried to differentiate between, policy recommendations, policy decisions and 
strategies designed to implement those decisions. It did so with the 
recognition of how difficult it sometimes is to evaluate old documents and 
arrive at an intelligent assessment of their actual impact on policy decisions. 
In the historiography of post-war Austria, one occasionally sees signs that 
researchers may not have understood that recommendations do not always 
translate into official policy. There are also indications throughout the 
historiography that researchers have concocted theories about military and
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other security issues in the absence of understanding or recognition that 
these issues existed during a time of war, albeit a ‘Cold’ War. Issues affecting 
a nation’s security are always given quite different attention in times of war, 
both by those who submit recommendations for policy and strategy and 
those who make decisions. Other contributors to historiography have 
suggested that an unfounded perception of Soviet threat existed, and that 
this misperception led to unwise policy. Carafano, for example, predicted that 
‘post-revisionist’ historians would be ‘upset’ with his conclusion that the 
American military ‘militarised’ American foreign policy, implying that the 
military establishment dreamed up the presence of a non-existent threat to 
Western security and sold this story to the country’s allies and policy 
makers.1 He was right in one regard. Objective historians should be upset by 
such nonsense. To those of us who fought in the front lines of the Cold War, 
it was very much a war and the Soviet threat was very real.
Not surprisingly, this narrative has also brought to the surface certain 
questions, the answers to which are important to an understanding of 
Britain’s behaviour vis-a-vis Austria during this turbulent decade.
B r itish  p o l ic y  t o  A u s t r ia
The first major question has, of course, to do with whether Britain 
accomplished her main policy objectives in Austria during the period 1945- 
1955. British policy on Austria gelled in December 1943 with the Moscow 
Declaration. Britain honoured her agreement to treat Austria as a victim of
1 James Jay Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War: the Struggle for Occupied Austria (College Station: 
Texas A & M  University Press, 2002), p. 37.
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Nazi Germany and a country to be liberated rather than conquered, despite a 
host of initial problems that arose when administration of the occupation had 
to be handled by front line combat troops at a time when the Yugoslavs, 
French and Russians were being difficult. Britain’s main policy objective 
toward Austria remained essentially the same between 1945 and May 1955; 
namely, to maintain order and help Austria recover to the point where she 
was capable of governing herself. This objective was shared by the United 
States and France, and was very much in the best interests of the Western 
Powers as they confronted the Communist Bloc in Europe during what 
became the Cold War.
Although British resolve in pursuing this objective began to weaken toward 
the end of 1947, Britain’s behaviour overall during these ten years was 
honourable and worthy of commendation. Despite severe economic 
constraints at home -  a situation that certainly added to the already heavy 
burdens of an exhausted military force responsible for rehabilitating another 
war-torn nation -  Britain fulfilled her responsibilities as an occupying Power. 
She administered the British Occupation Zone with competence and 
sensitivity. Britain also fulfilled her responsibilities in the Allied Commission, 
where she stood shoulder-to-shoulder with her stronger ally, the United 
States, through many difficult years and in the face of more than one 
dangerous challenge. Britain was an important member of the Western 
Alliance.
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The conclusion, therefore, is that Britain did indeed accomplish her main 
policy objectives in Austria. Armed confrontation with the Communists was 
avoided. Austria was not incorporated into the Communist Bloc. The 
occupation ended peacefully, and foreign troops withdrew voluntarily. Austria 
recovered her sovereignty and went on to become one of Europe’s success 
stories.
How much of this success can be attributed to British initiatives and to the 
effectiveness with which Britain’s statesmen implemented the nation’s foreign 
policy? Britain’s participation as an influential member of the Anglo-American 
alliance remained a positive factor throughout the occupation. It was 
Churchill who persuaded Franklin Roosevelt to accept an occupation zone in 
Austria. It was Churchill who began the process of convincing influential 
people in Washington that the Soviet Union represented a threat and not a 
reliable post-war ally. It was Britain that brought centuries of experience in 
diplomacy to the alliance and thereby strengthened the effectiveness of some 
American initiatives that were launched with good will but not always 
accompanied by the sophistication and worldliness essential to success. 
Britain was very much the junior partner in the Anglo-American relationship, 
but her representatives fought well above their weight, and the net impact 
Britain had on the outcome of most controversial Austrian issues was 
extraordinary, especially given the limited resources Britain had available to 
support her policy positions.
B r ita in  a n d  t h e  S t a t e  T r e a ty
Although co-operation between the British and Americans in Austria was 
generally good, there were also underlying differences of approach that 
sometimes led to tensions. It is clear that both Britain and the United States 
wanted an end to the occupation. However, whereas both were committed to 
a free, independent and fully sovereign Austria, Britain placed less value on 
Austria’s future status than did Washington. The two differed in their 
respective assessments of the relationship between an end of the occupation 
and real independence for Austria. To the British, especially Ernest Bevin, an 
end to the occupation meant freedom for Austria -  and, not incidentally, 
tremendous financial relief for the British Treasury. To the US, a premature 
end to the occupation meant abandoning Austria to the Communist Bloc or, 
at the very least, leaving a militarily weak Austria to the mercies of a 
Communist coup.
This Anglo-American disagreement reached a peak in 1948, at the same 
time that the polarisation of power between Moscow and the West became 
acute. By the end of 1947, negotiations with the Soviets had reached 
stalemate, after eighty-five sessions of the Austria Treaty Commission, when 
Soviet economic goals and the disposition of German assets in Austria 
remained the most contentious issues between East and West. The gloomy 
outlook for a treaty, combined with Britain’s domestic financial pressures, 
contributed to Ernest Bevin’s eventual conclusion that the West would benefit 
by caving in to the excessive demands made by Moscow in return for a
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Russian signature on an Austrian treaty. The US thought Bevin was wrong 
and disagreed that capitulation to Moscow’s demands represented a reliable 
way to ensure Austria’s independence after Western troops withdrew from 
the country. To Americans, the actual results of any agreement were more 
important than words on a piece of paper -  no matter how well intended 
those words might be.
Ernest Bevin was surely wrong in his assessment that an end to the 
occupation equated with freedom for Austria. To assume differently would be 
to remain oblivious to the way the Soviets conducted themselves since 
entering Vienna in 1945. The USSR began her occupation by appointing a 
provisional government, unilaterally and without consulting the Western 
Allies. Soviet troops engaged in atrocious behaviour, looting and raping to 
such an extent that the Russians lost the loyalties of all but a small group of 
Communist fanatics. Partially as a result of this Soviet barbarism, Austrian 
Communists were never able to achieve a position of influence in the 
subsequent Austrian governments. The Soviets proceeded to seize all 
natural and industrial resources which were of interest to them, even some in 
the British Zone, and they engaged in a massive program of transferrals, 
ripping out machinery and other equipment for shipment back to the Soviet 
Union. They set up a Soviet administration to manage confiscated assets and 
refused to pay Austrian taxes or to observe other Austrian laws which in any 
way inconvenienced them -  including the constitutional law that should have 
had the effect of stripping Moscow of her veto power in the Allied Council. 
The Soviet economic rape of the country became one of the most
contentious and unpleasant issues causing trouble in the Allied Commission 
and obstructing an earlier end to the occupation. This, combined with the 
massive Soviet campaign of kidnappings and other acts of lawless 
intimidation, did nothing to improve the atmosphere surrounding Allied 
Commission deliberations or to reassure the Austrian people of a safe or 
even acceptable future. Early in the discussions on an Austrian treaty, 
Moscow let it be known that her preference was for Western forces to 
withdraw from Austria, leaving Soviets in continuing control of the country’s 
resources and still with a military presence on the ground. Even here, these 
‘concessions’ would not be delivered unless the West paid Moscow a huge 
bribe in the form of an impressive amount of US dollars. Given this 
background of Soviet duplicity, brutality and economic exploitation, it is hard 
to believe that the Western Powers would have done Austria a favour by 
pulling out before the Soviets were prepared to do the same and before 
Austria possessed sufficient military and police strength to protect her own 
internal security.
Bevin also demonstrated a surprising lack of diplomatic adroitness in 1948 by 
launching a passionate campaign to persuade his American counterpart to 
accept all of Moscow’s demands and pay Moscow whatever she was asking 
in return for a Russian signature on the Austrian State Treaty. Here, Bevin’s 
behaviour is baffling. He was a seasoned negotiator. There was no stronger 
advocate of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe. He understood and accepted the 
vital importance to Britain of this Alliance and of the necessity to strengthen it 
wherever possible. Yet his initiatives vis-a-vis his American counterpart
regarding the Austrian treaty were ill-timed. Given the anti-Communist 
atmosphere in the United States, and given the pressures being brought to 
bear on Acheson and indeed on the whole Truman administration for being 
soft on Communism, Bevin should have recognised that there was no way 
Acheson and his State Department could have argued for such a large 
concession to the Russians in the public forum. He also appeared not to 
recognise the furious battles underway in Washington in the wake of the 
1947 National Security Act. While these had mostly to do with how a new US 
federal budget was to be carved up and how American armed forces were to 
be organised, they contributed significantly to a highly charged atmosphere 
which was hardly receptive to suggestions that the American taxpayer pay 
Moscow one hundred and fifty million dollars just to sign a piece of paper 
regarding a country which was, at best, of secondary or tertiary importance in 
the Cold War confrontation between East and West. Ironically, Acheson 
needed little lobbying. Basically, he agreed with Bevin. But he also realised 
that conditions in Washington were, to say the least, not conducive to the 
kind of capitulation Bevin was suggesting at the time he was suggesting it.
The final question raised by the British approach to the State Treaty is 
perhaps the most interesting one. Obstreperous, irritable negotiations on the 
Austrian State Treaty went on for more than eight years. Why, then, did the 
Western Allies subject themselves to this painful process? After it became 
more than obvious that the Soviet Union was not going to sign an Austrian 
State Treaty -  that Moscow was going to use treaty negotiations as a 
channel for causing trouble and delaying an end to the occupation -  why did
Britain insist that one treaty was essential to the resolution of all Austrian 
issues?
Neither Britain nor the United States had declared war on Austria. The 
Moscow Declaration had, for all practical purposes, rendered the AnschluR 
null and void. Instead of regarding each issue as an article in one overall 
agreement, why didn’t they simply agree on and dispatch each issue 
individually, thereby neutralising the ability of Moscow to keep dragging up 
articles that had already been agreed? In one of his very first public 
comments on the Austria issues, Harold Macmillan asked essentially this 
same question.
One can only speculate on the explanations for this behaviour. Perhaps the 
answer lies in the obsession of the British Foreign Office with the traditional 
ways of diplomacy -  with the traditional process for resolving international 
issues. Without much thought, the Austrian State treaty process was initially 
modelled on the peace treaties with Germany’s other allies, even though a 
peace treaty with Austria was not necessary. Once having embarked on this 
particular process, it seems the British Foreign Office and its overseas 
representatives simply assumed that this process, once put into motion, 
would have to be completed. Americans displayed more flexibility and 
imagination. They suggested, for example, that the Four Powers withdraw 
their military forces from Austria and the Austrian Government deal with the 
Soviets. But the Allies rejected this proposal, even after the Austrian 
Government itself had made the same suggestion.
For some reason, there was a predisposition that a treaty had to be 
concluded. The much-maligned Abbreviated Treaty would have reduced 
outstanding issues to a total of six and accepted agreement on all others in 
the longer draft. Whether or not some historians still elect to describe this 
initiative as a propaganda stunt, the text of the National Security Council in its 
recommendation to the President makes it clear that policy makers in 
Washington thought it was a serious venture, and it was a new and fairly 
imaginative attempt to break through the treaty logjam.
There is reason to believe that Bevin’s (and the Foreign Office’s) faith that 
one treaty could resolve all outstanding quadripartite issues was misplaced. It 
is difficult to imagine how the Western Powers could have avoided 
confrontation with the Soviet Union in Austria, but one can still see how at 
least some of the problems plaguing quadripartite interaction could have 
been pre-empted or possibly even resolved without such singular focus on 
the potential value of one hugely complex document. Here, one must also 
ask whether Ernest Bevin’s obsession with one treaty served to prolong the 
occupation and cause unnecessary difficulties between the victorious 
powers, and also whether the importance Britain attached to the successful 
conclusion of a treaty did not create some powerful negotiating leverage for 
the Soviets. It probably did. And one fact remained clear to all -  the 
occupation was not going to end until Moscow was ready to end it.
H is t o r io g r a p h ic a l  r a m if ic a t io n s
Hopefully, this thesis has contributed constructively to -  and perhaps even 
expanded -  the historiography of Cold War Austria, while describing issues 
and events from the perspective of British policy. This historiography, 
especially on British policy during this period, is fairly thin. For example, a 20 
December 2003 search of the British Library catalogue using the key words 
‘Britain’ and ‘Austria’ produced 477 hits. Judging from the titles and from 
personal knowledge of the historiography, only three of these references 
were on policy issues during the occupation and only one on British policy -  
excepting the official documents such as copies of treaties and agreements, 
some commentaries on trade and cultural exchanges and a few on Jewish 
concerns.
Most Austrian and foreign historians of the Cold War have, as described in 
the Introduction and listed in the bibliography of this thesis, chosen to 
concentrate on larger issues in more important places, with Austria playing 
only a supporting role. Austria was a Cold War battlefield but certainly not the 
most important, and there is sound reason to believe that, in attempting to 
manage issues in and about Austria, the competing world Powers always 
had Germany and the rest of Europe in mind. Also, Britain was not the 
dominant power in Europe’s post-war decade. Arguably, it was US and 
Soviet policies that drove events. Still, Britain’s influence on Western policies 
was not inconsequential.
C u r r e n t  H is t o r io g r a p h y  o n  B r it ish  P o lic y
This is an appropriate section in which to revisit the existing English language 
literature on British policy during the Austrian occupation to see how it fares 
in light of these conclusions and observations. Alice Hills’ book, written in 
2000, is precisely on British occupation planning and policy. This is a useful, 
straightforward account of how that planning process was formed and 
managed, as well as the identification of the various people and 
organisations involved. As a reference book for authors needing specifics on 
the pre-armistice planning process, it is valuable. Hills based this book on the 
doctoral thesis she wrote under a different name in 1975 and, unfortunately, 
chose not to consider any new material that had become available in the 
meantime. Still, the Hills book has not been invalidated by the research 
conducted for this thesis and remains an important part of the historiography 
of British policy regarding Austria.
Robert Knight has probably written more about Austria and British interests 
there than any other non-Austrian historian, and his 1986 doctoral thesis was 
on British policy from the end of World War Two through the deceptively 
encouraging moments of 1949, up to 1950, with a few concluding 
observations of the period from 1950-1955 when the treaty was signed. 
Knight chose to concentrate on what happened in Austria with only an 
occasional foray into the field of explanation -  why these things happened. 
Knight’s reporting on the failure of the occupying powers to conclude a treaty 
were fairly sound, however, and especially interesting if one considers that
the author had little if any practical experience other than as a young man in 
an academic environment when he wrote his thesis. Knight was correct in 
describing the ebbs and flows of treaty negotiations up through 1949 when 
British representatives were deceived into thinking Moscow was ready to end 
the occupation and when Washington had become so suspicious of Soviet 
motives that few actually thought the Soviets were capable of negotiating in 
good faith. His credibility drifts, however, when he attempts to describe US 
initiatives and motives, and certainly goes astray with his allegation that 
America’s commitment to Austria declined after 1949, at the same time that 
Austrians’ fear of the Soviet Union and of the Communist threat subsided. 
One must wonder if he would not want, now seventeen years later, to re­
evaluate his conclusion that American policy toward Austria was 
‘misconceived’. Austrians’ fear of the Soviet Union and doubts about their 
future skyrocketed with the advent of the Korean War and the ensuing 
escalation of friction between East and West. Western policy toward Austria 
was, after all, successful and both Britain and the United States achieved 
policy objectives. Knight’s thesis remains one of the most important elements 
of the historiography of post-war Austria and should be involved, still today, in 
debates on the occupation era. His subsequent works include helpful 
summaries of how others have contributed, but despite occasional 
references to British policy he does not address the question directly.
C o n c o c t io n s
The contribution of Austrian historians to the historiography of the Cold War 
has been both positive and mischievous. This historiography is cluttered with
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a number of contributions that were obviously written by academics who, in 
an effort to make names for themselves, stretched the facts more than a little 
in order to present some different and ‘original’ slant. This tendency in 
academia is probably not unique, given the requirement to contribute 
knowledge in order to qualify for advanced degrees and given that element of 
human behaviour that permits different people to examine the same body of 
evidence and come away with different conclusions. The concocted theory of 
militarisation is a good example of this type of creative writing. Another is the 
allegation that Britain and the United States were frightened by Molotov's 
invitation to Chancellor Raab and did their best to stop Raab from making the 
trip to Moscow. Some have also dreamed up a vision that Austrian leaders 
ignored the Western Powers and negotiated their own independence.
The first of these allegations is simply not credible. Had, as Bischof, 
Carafano and even Stourzh suggested, one American general-grade officer 
seized control of and began dictating American foreign policy, it is safe to say 
he would not have lasted long in his position. Two strong, competent 
successive American ambassadors and one very tough American President 
would hardly have stood by and watched a three-star general in the field call 
policy shots. The British would have been among the first to object, just as 
they did when a number of American initiatives -  and even rumours -  
reached Foreign Office ears during the Korean War -  when, by the way, the 
same American President fired a five-star general for challenging civilian 
control over America’s foreign policy. There is not one indication in British 
diplomatic or military correspondence during the period of the occupation that
conveys a British concern over attempts to ‘militarise’ the military occupation 
of Austria. Nobody should be surprised or alarmed, however, to find 
evidence that a competent military commander behaved like a military 
commander and forwarded recommendations to his higher headquarters that 
he felt, if accepted, would strengthen his ability to accomplish those missions 
assigned to his command. This does not mean his recommendations were 
approved, and there is a big difference between recommendations and 
policy. Even Carafano acknowledges that American Lieutenant General 
Keyes’ policy recommendations were not always approved in Washington. 
And someone much closer to events, Halvor Ekern, remembers that Keyes’ 
had such a spat with his State Department advisor, Erhardt, that the General 
retired and Erhardt was transferred out of Vienna. Despite frequent 
disagreements and very different inclinations, career military officers and 
diplomats of the same country are expected to know how to get along with 
each other. In Austria, this was not a major problem. The military occupation 
of Austria was never ‘militarised’. On policy matters, both the diplomatic and 
military establishments expressed views which were taken into consideration 
in Washington. The US National Security Council made recommendations to 
the President of the United States, who decided policy. Information collected 
by both military and civilian intelligence organisations contributed to the body 
of data studies in this process. US military Intelligence did not, as Carafano 
suggested, dominate American foreign policy considerations.
Britain and the United States were caught off guard when Molotov invited 
Austrian Chancellor Raab to Moscow for bilateral discussions on the Austrian
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treaty. It is understandable why the West might have been concerned over 
the prospect of sending the inexperienced Raab into what they regarded as 
enemy territory without close support from the other occupying powers. Both 
British and American diplomatic correspondence reflects these concerns, and 
there was a debate between professionals as to how the West might best 
manage this new development. The correspondence cited in this thesis 
shows clearly that, while they were not particularly happy about the prospect, 
decision makers in both London and Washington recognised that it would be 
improper and unwise to attempt to interfere with the Raab delegation. 
Perhaps the most enlightening commentary on this pending visit came from 
Anthony Eden, as he is quoted here in chapter five, and from the American 
Secretary of State who said that he hoped something good would come of 
the trip.
It has been in the interests of historians who for whatever reasons do not 
wish the United States well and who perhaps lament the outcome of the Cold 
War to establish that the West did not want the occupation to end and, with 
this in mind, did their best to prevent Raab from striking a deal with Moscow. 
Half truths and partial quotations have been used to support this contention. 
Hopefully, this revisionist viewpoint has been sufficiently discredited, and 
hopefully this thesis has contributed to that end. There is one underlying and 
incontestable fact that will serve to demolish any lingering suspicions in the 
revisionist school on the matter of Raab’s trip to Moscow in March 1955. Any 
agreement on the eventual fate of Austria and the Austrian people would 
have required agreement by all of the Four Powers. No bilateral accord
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between Austria and any one of the occupying powers would have been valid 
in the absence of this unanimous agreement, and everybody involved knew 
it.
P l u c k y  L ittle  A u s t r ia
One can perhaps understand why Austrian historians sometimes extend their 
imagination in an effort to establish that Austria’s political leaders tired of the 
Four Power wrangling took the bit in their teeth and then flew off to Moscow 
and negotiated their own freedom. Austria owes her political leaders much 
and, as has already been observed here, their capability to keep a difficult 
coalition government together and functioning throughout a turbulent decade 
has to be commended. This highly creative, exciting vision has inspired 
some of Austria’s most vocal spokesmen toward colourful accounts of the 
dumb-founded Western Allies standing helplessly on the sideline, their crisis 
management in tatters, while witnessing what Bischof termed Raab’s 
‘legendary Moscow diplomacy’. Essentially, there is nothing nefarious about 
these accounts and it is good that the Austrians have found something to feel 
proud of. Every successful society needs favourable images of itself and the 
impression of a plucky little Austria outwitting the Four Powers and winning 
its own freedom is certainly a healthy one. It is also almost certainly incorrect. 
Hopefully, one contribution this thesis has made to the historiography of 
occupied Austria is to place these claims in perspective. There is no slight 
intended here. Austrians will look far and wide for a man who carries more 
affection for them as a successful democracy and as a lovable people than 
this author.
T r a d it io n a l is t s  a n d  R e v is io n is ts
It is not the intent of this thesis to engage in the wider debate on the 
underlying causes of the Cold War. This ongoing dispute must be 
acknowledged, however, because what happened in Austria was dictated or 
at least highly influenced by the events of the broader Cold War. Austria was 
in many respects both an important battlefield and a pawn in that war. The 
traditionalists accept the clear understanding that the Soviet Union was to 
blame for most if not all of the confrontational issues that made up the Cold 
War. In the 1970s, so-called revisionists came along with suggestions that 
the West was equally to blame, and these spokesmen have had ample time 
and space to present their case. They have also seen their Soviet champions 
crumble and disappear.
This author makes no secret of his view that the Soviet Union and her client 
states were responsible for triggering the post-war confrontation and for 
perpetuating a Cold War the West did not want. As far as Austria’s role in 
that war is concerned, the facts speak for themselves. It is extremely difficult 
to imagine that any researcher claiming any degree of objectivity could study 
the interaction between East and West in any international forum of the time 
and come away with any conclusion other than that Britain, France and the 
United States worked diligently for a free and independent Austria, while the 
Soviet Union acted consistently to obstruct progress toward that objective.
It is interesting that the analysis of William L. Stearman (1962), William Bader 
(1966) and Audrey Cronin (1986) have held up so well over the years -  
despite, one should add, Bischofs condescending criticism of American 
historians because of their alleged lack of linguistic ability and cultural 
sensitivity. While none of these authors concentrated solely on the British 
role in Austria’s occupation years, all of them described that role as 
constructive and essential to the Western coalition that, in the end, won the 
day. The Austrian people should be most grateful that Britain and the United 
States chose to protect them to the extent they did from Soviet domination. 
Both British and Austrians should be glad that the Marshall Plan responded 
to both their economic and strategic needs and, at the same time, to US 
national security interests. Austrians also have every right to take pride in 
their national leaders who at times demonstrated remarkable foresight and 
courage to opt for the Western way of life, sometimes in the face of 
dangerous Soviet intimidation.
At the same time, the British people have every right to be proud of their 
political leaders and policy makers during this phase of the Cold War. The 
Anglo-American coalition was instrumental in creating a situation in which it 
was possible for Austria to regain her sovereignty and to build sufficient 
strength to protect against real and potential threats to that sovereignty. But, 
while a number of Cold War issues are yet to be resolved, an argument can 
be made that the Austrian State Treaty was signed in May 1955 not as a 
result of a plucky little Austria which dispatched her courageous leaders to 
Moscow to win freedom, not directly because of the effectiveness of Anglo-
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American diplomacy during the decade of the occupation, but because of 
decisions made in the Kremlin. Why did Khrushchev show such disdain for 
the Stalin-Molotov posture vis-a-vis Austria and issue a direct order to 
Molotov to sign the Austrian treaty and pull the Soviet Army out of Austria? 
We have had a quick look at how Khrushchev answered this question, but 
the full explanation is yet to be found. What we do know with reasonable 
reliability is that Molotov was ordered to end the occupation of Austria. And 
so he did.
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